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THE POLITICS OF MEMORIALIZATION:
CREATING A HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM IN NEW YORK CITY
by
Rochelle G. Saidel
Sponsor: Professor Asher Arian
Reader: Professor Marshall Berman
This study of how government intervention affects the 
implementation of a project of an interest group analyzes the 
political processes of the 45 year impasse in completing a 
major Holocaust memorial in New York City. Using as a case 
study the 1981-1991 effort to create such a project, the 
study develops a new concept for analyzing long-term public- 
private projects. This study develops and uses a so-called 
Mutagon to analyze the complicated and changing political 
coalition that has endeavored for ten years to create a 
Holocaust museum.
The Mutagon concept augments existing interest group 
theories, (e.g., iron triangle and issue network theory) 
which do not adequately account for: changes in political 
coalitions during long-term projects,' the possibility of an 
interest group having to deal with both a governor and a 
mayor; the conflicts of interest when elected officials are 
part of the interest group.
The Mutagon concept is summarized as follows: 
Government policy for a long-term city-state public-private
project emerges from a changing polygon consisting of the 
interest group, mayor, governor, and other officials. 
Although the Mutagon is working for closure, it may instead 
create an impasse because of: 1. changes within this polygon
that occur over time (e.g., when a player enters or exits); 
2. the top-heavy structure of a political alliance that 
sometimes has two heads; and 3. the complex relationship 
among the players.
Using the Mutagon, the study also builds on existing 
literature on citizen participation, agenda setting, and 
political symbolism, by demonstrating how changes over time 
in a political alliance must be taken into account. The 
study traces the history and pre-history of the New York City 
project, including failed attempts since 1946 to create a 
major Holocaust memorial, and the emergence of the Holocaust 
as a "hot" agenda item for President Jimmy Carter and then 
for Mayor Edward I. Koch. The study also analyzes the 
changing stages in the Mutagon coalition, including the 
sharing of power between Koch and Governor Mario Cuomo, and 
how these changes have affected the prospects for 
implementation and the projected museum's image and way of 
remembering.
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PREFACE
When I chose as the subject of this dissertation the 
case study of the effort to create a major Holocaust memorial 
museum in New York City, I did so with deep personal interest 
in the subject and with the expectation of analyzing a 
successful project. I chose the topic because I have had a 
lifelong commitment to Judaism, and specifically, since 1977, 
to studying and writing about the aftermath of the Holocaust.
My interest in the Holocaust solidified in 1977, when I 
attended one of the first Nazi war criminal hearings in the 
United States and spoke with survivors who were witnesses. 
This led to my writing many articles and a book on this 
specific aspect of the Holocaust.. As part of my 
responsibility on the staff of Senator Manfred Ohrenstein 
from 1981 until 1989, I organized a permanent exhibit in the 
New York State Museum in Albany which detailed the odyssey of 
Holocaust refugees who were interned in Oswego, New York, and 
kept him abreast of the progress on the New York City 
Holocaust museum project.
I thus began following the project closely almost from 
its initiation by Mayor Koch in 1981. At that early date, 
and even in 1988-1989 when I chose the project as a case 
study for my dissertation, it seemed destined for ultimate 
success. However, the intricacies of the political coalition 
behind the museum, the changes in this coalition over time,
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and other circumstances have created problems that as yet 
have prevented the museum from becoming a reality. In an 
effort to understand why this project has been so 
problematic, I developed and coined the concept of the 
Mutagon.
Studying and writing about the Holocaust and its 
memorialization can be depressing because of the subject 
matter. A study of the successful creation of a Holocaust 
museum, with its evocation of the history being recreated, 
would be heartbreaking enough. Because I cannot write about 
a successful conclusion and because the path to the creation 
of this museum has been so torturous, it has been even more 
difficult to deal with.
There have been efforts to create a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York City since 1946, and all of them have 
failed. It is ironic that this city with its huge Jewish 
population, which was the first Jewish community to attempt 
to create a major memorial in the United States, still does 
not have one. It is my personal hope that this project will 
succeed, and that in the not too distant future the victims 
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CHAPTER 1: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW
"There's no monument in New York....
In the dark silent night 
They throng without lament,
Wreathe New York's expanse 
Of steel and concrete;
Carry water, sand, cement 
To build a monument 
For themselves--
The s i x  m i l l i o n . . . "  Wolf Pasmanik1
This study of how government intervention affects the 
implementation of a project of an ethnic interest group in 
the United States will analyze the political processes of the 
45 year impasse in completing a major Holocaust memorial in 
New York City. Using as a case study the 1981-1991 effort to 
create such a project, the study will develop a new concept 
for analyzing long-term public-private projects. (During 
these ten years, the New York City project was first the 
Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force— 1981-1982, then the 
New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission— 1982 through 
1985, then the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission— from 
early 1986 on. Earlier attempts to create a major Holocaust 
memorial began in 1946.) The new concept takes into
account: 1) . the shifts in political alliances that occur
over time; and 2) . the top-heavy structure of a public-
1 "There Is No Monument in New York", translated from the 
Yiddish by Samuel Kreiter, World Union Press, mimeographed 
release, New York, 1964? (undated), used with permission of 
WUP editor David Horowitz.
private project that involves both city and state 
governments.
The ways in which the New York City and State 
governments intervened— from the genesis of the idea for the 
latest memorial museum project in 1981 and throughout the 
implementation stage— are extremely complex, with an 
intricate interplay of various organs of City and State 
government. The question of whether the Commission is 
private, State- and City-connected, or both, is also complex. 
This study will examine how government intervention has 
changed over ten years, and how these changes have affected 
the structure of the combined interest group and government 
influences that are creating the project.
IRON TRIANGLE AND ISSUE NETWORK THEORIES
The literature on the structure of interest group- 
government alliances is limited, and dominated by iron 
triangle and issue network theories. Iron triangle theory is 
usually applied to interest groups operating vis-a-vis the 
Federal government. This analysis of three-way interaction 
involving members of Congress, agency heads, and special 
interest lobbies was often employed in the 1960s and 197 0s 
and continues to be utilized in the 1990s.2 According to 
this theory, there is a solid trilateral bond formed by the
2 For a recent example, see Graham K.Wilson, Interest 
Groups. Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1990, p. 60 and passim.
interest group, its advocates in Congress, and in the 
executive branch agency. Government policies emerge from 
this closed triangle of interests, with congressmen passing 
favorable legislation, agency bureaucrats implementing these 
mandates, and special interest groups supporting the helpful 
elected officials (e.g. with votes and campaign 
contributions).
According to Harold Seidman's iron triangle analysis3, 
there was no significant weakening of the triangular 
alliances that unite interest groups with their agents in 
Congress and in the executive branch's bureaucracy. He said 
that "[congressional] staff develop alliances with the 
executive branch bureaucracy and the bureaucracies 
representing interest groups."4 With regard to Richard 
Nixon's presidency, Seidman said Nixon was initially naive 
and that "discovery of the triangular alliance among 
departments, congressional committees, and clientele groups, 
known to any reasonably sophisticated observer of the 
Washington scene, came as a rude and nasty shock."5
In analyzing President Ronald Reagan's relationship with 
Congress, David Everson wrote about "Reagan versus The 'Iron 
Triangles'" He said: "The specific issues involved in the




Reagan program would be fought out in Congress in decisions 
involving organized interest groups, government bureaus, and 
congressional committees and subcommittees.11 According to 
Everson, Reagan's plans to cut the budget and deregulate had 
to pass through the iron triangles of interlocking government 
and private interests that protect their favorite programs.6
Writing about the viewpoint of an official in a Federal 
executive agency, rather than a President, Graham K. Wilson 
said:
"Thus, the agency leader is often obliged to engage in 
a complex balancing of the wishes of the White House, 
Congress and interest groups linked to legislators on 
the relevant committees. Occasionally, particularly in 
agencies which rarely attract controversy, an 'iron 
triangle' emerges in which the agency acts to please its 
attendant interest groups so as to please the relevant 
congressional committees, whose members in turn are 
eager to please the interest groups representing their 
constituents."7
Hugh Heclo and Anthony King critiqued iron triangle 
theory, and instead developed an issue network theory. 
Writing in 1978, Heclo said that "the iron triangle concept
6David Everson, Public Opinion and Interest Groups in 
American Politics. Franklin Watts, New York, 1982, pp. 200- 
201 .
7Wilson, p.60.
is not so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete."8 
He defined an issue network as "a shared-knowledge group 
having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, 
some problem) of public policy." According to Heclo, 
participants in issue networks are shifting, fluid and 
anonymous, unlike the iron triangle concept of a defined 
small circle which forms to promote specific narrow issues. 
He believes issue networks are less interested in material 
gain than iron triangles and often are more interested in 
intellectual or emotional commitment. According to his 
definition of issue networks, they consist of "political 
technocrats" who become zealots for narrow interests and 
prefer open arguments to closure.
King said of issue networks: "The traditional interest
groups have not disappeared; instead they have been joined by 
all manner of committees, organizations, and alliances owing 
their raison d'etre not to considerations of self-interest, 
even corporate self-interest, but to a disinterested concern 
with the common weal."9 (As examples he listed Green Peace, 
Friends of the Earth, Nader's Raiders, and Common Cause.) 
King said that in the 1960s and 1970s there was "increasing
8Hugh Heclo in The New American Political System edited 
by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 87-124.
9Anthony King in The New American Political System 
edited by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, (pp. 371-
395), p. 377.
professionalization of both governmental and interest-group 
politics, and the development of issue networks so porous in 
their structure that it is sometimes hard to know where 
government ends and nongovernment begins, who is the person 
being lobbied, who the lobbyist."10 Regarding coalition 
building, he said this language no longer described American 
politics and that the primary message of his book was that 
"fewer and fewer cohesive blocs are to be found in the 
American polity."11
THE MUTAGON: BEYOND IRON TRIANGLES AND ISSUE NETWORKS
As this dissertation will demonstrate, these iron 
triangle and issue network theories are not adequate for 
analyzing the structure of the political forces behind the 
New York Holocaust memorial museum or any long-term public- 
private project involving both city and state governments. 
First, these two theories concern themselves with interest 
coalitions on a Federal level, not a state or city-state 
level. Although they might be adjusted to analyze political 
alliances on a state or city-state level, they are generally 
used for the relationship between the President (and 
executive agencies), the Congress, and interests. Even if 
the theories were adjusted for state and city-state politics, 
however, the New York City Holocaust memorial museum is not
10Ibid. , p. 387.
11Ibid. , p. 390.
being created by a political alliance that can be analyzed as 
an iron triangle or an issue network. This alliance must be 
analyzed as a far more complex and changing polygon. This 
polygon consists or consisted of the former and present 
mayor, the governor, past and present Battery Park City 
Authority (BPCA) officials, interest groups (including the 
officially appointed New York City and then the New York 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, and a myriad of survivor 
organizations, heads of major and minor Jewish organizations, 
developers, administrative staff of the Holocaust Commission 
and museum, architects and exhibit designers, consultants, 
and Community Board One— each with its own factions, agendas
and issue networks) ; and, to a lesser degree, the City
Council, the Board of Estimate, the State Legislature, and 
the City Planning Commission.
At different times, the influence of each of the
components of the polygon has increased or diminished. In 
addition to the varying influence of each of the concerned 
parties over time, some new alliance partners were added 
along the way and others faded away. No one was ever
officially removed from office or membership in the New York 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, as there is no provision for 
such removal. A distinguishing characteristic of the polygon 
is that beginning in 1986 it has had two heads with power of 
appointment to the Commission— the mayor and the governor. 
(After Mayor Edward I. Koch, the founder, left office at the
end of 1989, there were no further appointments by either the 
new mayor or the governor.) Thus its structure will be 
analyzed not as an iron triangle or an issue network, but as 
a changing and for much of the time a two-headed geometric 
polygon that will be called a "Mutagon”. (In Latin mutare 
means to change; the syllable ”-gon", from the Greek, means 
having angles or sides.)
In addition to not accounting for changes in a long-term 
project, iron triangle and issue network theory are not 
applicable to this case because the interrelationships 
between the components of this alliance are more complex. 
There are: two executive branches (the mayor and the
governor); Battery Park City Authority (which is more 
autonomous than most agencies of the executive); two 
legislative branches (the New York State Legislature, and the 
New York City Council), which have a much less significant 
role than the executive branches. The major interest group 
involved, the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, was 
officially appointed by the mayor and then the governor 
(unlike the interest groups in iron triangle and issue 
network theory).
The three sub-heads, or co-chairmen, of the Mutagon also 
have conflicts that make the polygon complex: Then Mayor
Koch appointed two of the co-chairmen, powerful Republican 
real estate developer George Klein and Manhattan District 
Attorney Robert Morgenthau. When Governor Mario Cuomo became
a Founding Co-chairman in 1986, he appointed the third co- 
chairman, New York State Senate Minority Leader Manfred 
Ohrenstein. Besides being a leader of the State Democratic 
Party and creating an anti-development image among his 
constituents (potentials for conflicts with Klein), 
Ohrenstein was indicted in 1987 by none other than co- 
chairman Morgenthau. (All charges were finally dropped in 
September 1991.) Thus the relationship of the players is 
much more intertwined, conflictive and also more amorphous 
than a triangle or issue network, and there are many more 
possibilities for interplays and power plays. (On paper 
there is a fourth co-chairman appointed by Cuomo, Peter 
Cohen, but he is not a player. See Chapter 13.)
While the implementation of the Holocaust project cannot 
be adequately analyzed as the creation of issue networks, two 
components of issue networks discussed by Heclo and King can 
be applied. Regarding the tendency of issue networks to 
build coalitions, King said this language no longer described 
American politics and that there were a decreasing number of 
cohesive blocs. Likewise, there is no coalition building 
between the members of the Holocaust Commission and other 
interest groups. The Commission, which would be the component 
of the Mutagon that might be considered part of an issue 
network, does not want to build coalitions. With regard to 
other interest groups creating major Holocaust.memorials in 
the United States, i.e., the national memorial in Washington,
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D.C. and the Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, the Commission 
views them as competitors— not allies. Nor have other 
museums in general been considered allies or part of a 
coalition, e.g. to lobby together for funding. As for other 
groups that have sought to be memorialized as victims of 
Hitler, the Commission sees the New York museum as a Jewish 
memorial and offers them only minimal recognition. There is 
perhaps a self-righteous sense of justness of purpose that 
precludes the Commission or its leaders from seeking out 
others to form a coalition or network.
Another aspect of issue networks, as defined by Heclo, 
is also applicable to the New York Holocaust Memorial 
Commission. As mentioned earlier, Heclo believes issue 
networks are less interested in material gain than iron 
triangles and often are more interested in intellectual or 
emotional commitment. This statement could be made with 
regard to the Commission leaders, with reservations. They 
are committed to the project emotionally and are not seeking 
material gain. However, as will be clarified later, they are 
also reaping their own political benefits from associating 
themselves with the project.
One characteristic of Heclo7s issue network analysis 
does not apply to the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, 
although it would appear to be the case. Heclo said issue 
networks prefer open arguments to closure. Despite the years 
of delay in completing their museum, the Holocaust Commission
11
seeks to complete their project as soon as possible. Unless 
they do so and come to closure, they will not gain 
professional prestige, prominence in the organized Jewish 
community, or other political advantages from their 
participation in the project. Furthermore, in addition to 
the opportunities for personal political gain, the past and 
present leaders of the project appear to be sincerely 
interested in the importance and necessity of their cause 
(like those in King's examples, op. cit.).
Heclo speaks of overlooking webs of influence, while we 
look for the few with power. In the case of the Holocaust 
memorial, there are, in fact, the few with power. They head 
a complex and changing Mutagon that cannot be analyzed by 
either an iron triangle or an issue network theory. While 
the political forces working to create the museum have some 
aspects that could be analyzed according to one or both of 
these theories, neither is suitable and a new concept is 
necessary.
This new so-called Mutagon concept can be stated as 
follows: Government policy for a long-term city-state
public-private project emerges from a changing polygon 
consisting of the interest group, the mayor, and the 
governor, with other elected and appointed officials 
involved to a lesser extent. Although the Mutagon is 
working for closure, it may instead create an impasse 
because of: 1. the changes within this polygon that
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occur over time (especially when a new major player 
enters or an old major player leaves); 2. the top-heavy 
structure of a political alliance that at some stages 
has two heads; and 3. the complex relationship among the 
polygon's web of players.
PRE-HISTORY OF THE MUTAGON
Using this new concept, the Mutagon, to analyze the 
structure of the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission and 
its political allies, this study addresses the issue of why, 
more than 46 years after the end of World War II and after a 
lengthy period of great interest in the Holocaust, there is 
still no major Holocaust memorial in New York City. Instead, 
this city, which has had the largest Jewish and the largest 
Holocaust survivor populations in the United States, has seen 
a series of failed attempts that began in 1946. Since 1981, 
a Holocaust Memorial Task Force, and then a Commission, 
originally appointed by Mayor Koch, has been working to 
create such an institution. However, more than ten years 
later, at the beginning of 1992, none yet exists and there is 
not even a hole in the ground. In order to analyze why the 
current project has been at such an impasse, it is necessary 
to examine the politics behind earlier and current attempts, 
how the issue of Holocaust memorialization was placed on 
United States and New York City governmental agendas, and the
13
project's changing structure of players, allies, and 
processes.
Related events that preceded Koch's creation of a 
Holocaust Commission will be reviewed to place the current 
project in historical perspective: e.g., the emergence of
the Jewish community as an interest group in the United 
States (Chapter 2) ; the increased importance of 
memorialization of the Holocaust for the Jewish community 
(Chapter 3) ; the many earlier attempts, beginning in 1946, to 
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City (Chapters 4, 5 
and 6); and President Jimmy Carter's national initiative 
(Chapter 7).
Earlier failed attempts to create a Holocaust memorial 
in New York City were structured much more simply than the 
Mutagon. They were begun by individuals and small, 
disorganized interest groups. They failed partially because 
all of Mayor Koch's predecessors from William O'Dwyer in 1947 
through Abraham Beame in 1977 publicly said they supported 
the idea of a Holocaust memorial, but none of them made the 
idea his own and aggressively led the effort. It always 
remained a private endeavor (although a small parcel of City 
land for a site was offered more than once).
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New 
York City began in 1946-1947. In Riverside Park at 83rd 
Street there is an engraved stone, placed there in October 
1947 and intended as a cornerstone, which says: "This is the
14
site for the American memorial to the heroes of the Warsaw 
Ghetto battle April-May 1943 and to the 6 million Jews of 
Europe martyred in the cause of human liberty." But 45 years 
later, neither an "American" nor a major New York memorial 
yet exists. They are both separate works in progress: The
national memorial is under construction on the Mall in 
Washington, D C. and slated for a 1993 opening, but the New 
York memorial is still not off the ground in Battery Park 
City.
When the first Holocaust memorial was being planned in 
Riverside Park in 1946-1947, the Jewish community was only 
loosely organized, its foremost purpose was the creation of 
a homeland in Palestine, and it was still in shock and denial 
over the losses of the Holocaust. Anti-Semitism was still a 
real threat in the United States, and accusations of 
Communist connections were also real and growing threats (See 
Chapter 4) . In retrospect, it is more remarkable that an 
effort at memorialization was begun in the political 
atmosphere of 1946-1947, than that it failed.
By the time of the second major attempt to create a 
Holocaust memorial in New York City in the 1960s, the Jewish 
community was much more organized than in 1947. A committee 
was again formed, and this time the effort had the backing of 
Jewish organizations, rather than individuals. Several sites 
and designs were considered by the memorial committee and by 
the City. Mayors were supportive, but there was still not
15
enough political advantage from such a memorial for the City 
administration to strongly back it. Other priorities in the 
organized Jewish community were also a factor in the failure. 
The community itself gave up the project and focused on 
helping Israel, especially after the 1967 Six Day War and the 
1973 Yom Kippur War.
By the end of the 1970s, the situation had changed, and 
memorialization of the Holocaust had gained increasing 
acceptance in the organized Jewish community. After this 
culminated with Carter's 1978 announcement of a national 
memorial, there was political advantage from strongly backing 
a Holocaust memorial in New York City. Koch, encouraged by 
his political entrepreneur Herbert Rickman, was then able to 
intervene and coopt the issue of Holocaust memorialization to 
gain political favor in the Jewish community in New York 
City.
In 1978 a presidential political entrepreneur proposed 
to President Carter that such a project might help him 
strengthen his position in the organized Jewish community on 
a national level. This external intervention by the Federal 
government for a national Holocaust memorial project in turn 
gave the then dormant New York project legitimacy and made it 
more important for New York City's established organized 
Jewish community. In 1981 the mayor of New York City created 
his own narrow interest group, a Task Force and then a 
Memorial Commission, for the purpose of building a memorial
16
and at the same time strengthening his position vis-a-vis the 
established organized Jewish community in New York City. The 
mayor's specific "interest group" included some of the old 
players who had been trying to create a Holocaust memorial 
for many years, but he added people who would give him 
control and influence, especially in the person of his 
powerful chairman.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS FOR THE MUTAGON'S IMPASSE
The study will analyze the internal and external reasons 
why the project has not yet succeeded. Internal reasons flow 
from the unwieldy and changing structure of the Mutagon 
responsible for implementation, and the length of time the 
project has dragged on. They include: changes in political
alliances over time (including new elected and appointed 
officials); having at the helm (for much of the time) both 
the mayor and the governor, sometimes with different agendas; 
other priorities (especially fundraising crises) in the 
organized Jewish community, which influence Commission 
members and potential donors; disagreement among the sub­
heads and subgroups that comprise the Commission; the 
politics of site selection; and the personalization of the 
project by one major player.
Notwithstanding these internal problems, a positive 
influence should have been the fact that since the 1970s the 
idea of memorialization had grown in the organized American
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Jewish community (including New York City). As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, this was because non-Orthodox 
segments of the community were seeking a new secular link 
with Judaism in the United States, the community generally 
had underlying fears of history repeating itself, and a 
number of new historic events brought these fears closer to 
home. However, although the idea of Holocaust
memorialization increased in importance, there still was not 
enough interest to successfully complete a project by the 
beginning of 1992.
The major external reason for failure to create the 
earlier Holocaust memorial projects in New York City (from 
1946 through the 1960s) was the lack of interest on the part 
of government officials who had given approval but not real 
commitment to helping with implementation. The issue was not 
"hot"; i.e., there was little political capital to be gained 
from supporting it. The increasing importance of Holocaust 
memorialization for the organized American Jewish community, 
which began gradually in 1961 and was heightened later in the 
decade and in the 1970s, acted as a catalyst for government
interest and intervention. Ironically, this very
intervention later held up the New York memorial project even 
more.
The Commission that Koch had originated became City- 
State in 1986, when Governor Cuomo retroactively became
"Founding Co-chairman" along with Koch, and the new structure
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of political allies was initiated. The dissertation will 
analyze the negative effects of this Mutagon in its new form: 
the State government's trying to influence the final outcome 
of the project, the governor's policies producing 
bureaucratic problems and delayed implementation, friction 
between the City and the State over the project, and the 
election and appointment of new State and City government 
officials disrupting the continuity of the project's 
implementation. Governor Cuomo's and BPCA's intervention to 
block a deal and to drastically increase rent for the museum 
resulted in delays and unexpected new decisions by the 
Commission.
As Pressman and Wildavsky said, there was the emergence 
in the "decision path of numerous diversions not intended by 
the program sponsors. The paths of required decisions, as we 
can see, were soon characterized by more unexpected elements 
than expected ones: they were anything but straight lines
leading directly to goals."12 Another diversion of the 
decision path was caused by "Black Monday" on Wall Street, 
October 19, 1987, and subsequent economic crises in New York 
City. The economic climate both dropped property values in 
Battery Park City and wiped out many potential donors, 
resulting in new decisions on the best way to fund the 
museum.
12Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation 
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press, 
1979, p. xix.
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In addition to these negative aspects, the study will 
also evaluate the positive effects of the mayor's, and later 
the governor's, intervention on the project in New York City. 
It will show how the gift of government resources such as 
land and money initially helped legitimize the project and 
attract more private money. Government support such as 
providing skills, and the indirect positive impact of the 
mayor's (and later the governor's) connection also at some 
stages helped to overcome bureaucratic problems within the 
government.
AGENDA SETTING
The dissertation will analyze the factors that led to an 
awareness that memorialization of the Holocaust has political 
value in the United States, and how politicizing this 
memorialization is in accord with the American political 
system. It will offer a new Mutagon concept for interest 
group politics that involve both city and state governments, 
going beyond iron triangle and issue network theories.
In addition to adding to the literature on the structure 
of interest group-government alliances, this Mutagon concept 
also builds on the established body of work on agenda setting 
and public policy, which are related to the structure of 
interest group politics. The changes in the complex 
coalition, i.e., the Mutagon, that is the political force 
behind the creation of the Holocaust memorial museum in New
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York City have affected the agenda setting for and delayed 
implementation of the project. The coopting of an idea and 
creation of a specific interest group by an elected official, 
and the subsequent usurping of the idea and group by another 
official, have led to more than ten years of stagnation.
This case study of the New York City Holocaust museum is 
a deviant case study13, because the project should have been 
destined for smooth sailing. Unlike earlier attempts in New 
York, the current project was placed on the agenda by the 
City administration (Mayor Koch) and then eagerly embraced by 
a well-established and organized Jewish leadership (including 
developers and other supporters of Koch). Rickman, the 
political entrepreneur who formally initiated this project 
for Mayor Koch in 1981, had as his precedent President 
Carter's creation of the President's Commission on the 
Holocaust three years earlier, which gave the City project 
added prestige.
Moreover, by 1981 memorialization of the Holocaust had 
become a hot item for the major Jewish American 
organizations. In the 1980s, the politics of memorializing 
the Holocaust became a "growth industry". Until the early 
1970s, it was not on even on their agendas. Nor was it a 
priority when it was finally placed there. After 1978, when
13As an example of a deviant case study, see Seymour 
Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union 
Democracy. The Free Press, New York, 1956, which analyzes why 
the political structure of the International Typographical 
Union, unlike most other unions, is democratic.
Holocaust memorialization was placed on the agenda of the 
United States Government, the idea became more important for 
the organized Jewish community and thus ripe for adoption by 
Koch. By that time a number of unrelated factors had
converged to make memorialization of the Holocaust an 
appropriate issue for elected officials and candidates to 
place on the agenda: e.g., the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973
Yom Kippur War had brought images of another Holocaust to the 
fore; Menachem Begin, who masterfully used the Holocaust for 
his own political purposes, became Prime Minister of Israel 
in June, 1977; leaders of survivor organizations, realizing 
their biological clocks were ticking fast, began encouraging 
other survivors to share their stories; the much-publicized 
television program Holocaust was the first major network 
airing on the (fictionalized) subject of the Holocaust in 
1978; children of survivors reached adulthood and began 
asking questions about their parents' past; secular American 
Jews who were disillusioned with Israel were seeking a 
substitute secular tie to Judaism; the United States Justice 
Department in 1977 set up a Special Litigation Unit to 
investigate and bring to trial Nazi war criminals living in 
the United States. When President Carter's people were 
searching for a domestic issue that would mend fences with
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Jewish voters in 1978, the issue of the Holocaust "arose in 
the primeval soup". It was an idea whose time had come.14
According to John W. Kingdon, patterns of public policy 
are determined by what gets on the agenda. His four stages 
for the setting of federal public policy are: setting an
agenda, specifying alternatives, choosing officially (e.g., 
by legislative vote), and implementing the choice. He says 
we need to know what made the soil fertile, rather than the 
origin of the seed, and that solutions often search for 
problems. Kingdon's model has three streams: problem
recognition, policy formulation and refinement, and politics. 
When these three streams come together at a critical time, an 
issue suddenly "gets hot" and policy entrepreneurs go into 
action.15 Kingdon's model will be used to analyze how 
memorializing the Holocaust got on the agenda of the United 
States government, and subsequently on those of New York City 
and New York State.
As a result of President Carter's agenda setting in 
197 8, by 1989, a major national Holocaust memorial museum was 
beginning to rise on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Meanwhile, 
in 1981, Koch, running for reelection, had followed President 
Carter's lead and created his own Mayor's Task Force on the
14 John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and Public 
Policies. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1984, pp. 122-
123.
15Ibid. , pp. 92-94.
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Holocaust. (He had expressed interest in creating a memorial 
at least two years earlier, but did not act on the issue.) 
GENESIS OF THE MUTAGON
Koch's intervention began when Rickman approached 
developer George Klein in the Spring of 1981, an election 
year, and suggested the creation of a Mayor's Task Force. 
Klein took the chairmanship and in July 1981, 28 Jewish
communal leaders, survivors, Holocaust scholars, and other 
prominent and wealthy Jews were named as members. In 1982 
this Task Force recommended a permanent commission, and in 
1983 the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission was 
appointed by Mayor Koch. In 1986 Governor Cuomo became 
(retroactively) a Founding Co-chairman along with Koch, and 
at this point the Mutagon changed its form and became two- 
headed. Cuomo was allowed to appoint additional Commission 
members and a co-chairman, and the name was changed to the 
New York Holocaust Memorial Commission. Because he offered 
to house the museum in Battery Park City, which he controlled 
through Battery Park City Authority, a State entity, the 
power structure of government intervention changed 
dramatically.
Mayor Koch, like President Carter, did not create his 
Holocaust Commission in response to pressure from Jewish 
interest groups. Instead, these two elected officials 
coopted the issue of the memorialization of the Holocaust and 
used it to please the organized Jewish community, and thereby
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obtain Jewish votes and financial backing for their 
respective upcoming elections. Carter, and then Koch, 
created a specific Holocaust memorialization interest group 
that could potentially bring in votes and money. When 
Cuomo's political entrepreneur, Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, 
decided that Cuomo, too, could and should have a piece of the 
pie, the City-State Mutagon became a reality.
Koch's coopting the project should have made it more 
likely to succeed than earlier efforts to create a major 
Holocaust memorial in New York City, because he had a vested 
interest in its success and gave it active governmental 
backing. As will be shown, however, a series of setbacks 
delayed completion of the memorial during Koch's term as 
mayor. The most significant setbacks were caused by the 
intervention of Governor Cuomo and several of his high level 
officials, after the two-headed polygon structure became a 
reality. When Koch left office at the end of December 1989, 
there was still not even a hole in the ground for his 
proposed Holocaust memorial and museum. His absence after so 
prominently linking himself with the project, and Cuomo's 
shifting interest as he looked toward a possible national 
election for President, will be analyzed as factors that 
impeded implementation.
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POLITICAL POWER AND THE MUTAGON
After Rickman, Koch's liaison to the established 
organized Jewish community, suggested the creation of a 
Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust in 1981 (an election 
year), Koch and Rickman chose George Klein as its chairman. 
He was not only a multimillionaire developer and major Koch 
campaign contributor but also a vice president of the New 
York Jewish Community Relations Council. At this time, the 
Mutagon had not yet grown another head, i.e., Cuomo. Koch, 
as founding chairman, was at the apex, with sole power of 
appointment. Klein, as sole chairman of the Task Force, ran 
the show, working closely with Rickman.
Political entrepreneurs such as Rickman and Klein (and 
other developers who were members of the Holocaust Commission 
and major contributors to Mayor Koch's campaigns) knew how 
to use their political resources to increase their power and 
promote their agendas. The creation of the New York City 
Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch, Klein and 
others the opportunity to use the issue of Holocaust 
memorialization to increase their potential influence in the 
organized Jewish community. They used their political 
resources efficiently to promote the idea and at the same 
time to increase their own power by associating themselves 
with the project and appointing members. These were 
professional political "players" who knew how to use the 
slack resources to their advantage. At Rickman's suggestion,
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Koch appointed Klein, his rich long-time friend as chairman. 
Klein was then in a position to encourage his friends, other 
wealthy developers, to be generous both to the effort to 
create a Holocaust memorial and to Koch's mayoral campaign.
To an extent, the "player" aspect of the Mutagon concept 
of government-interest group structure can be analyzed using 
Robert Dahl's and Edward C. Banfield's theories of citizen 
participation. Unlike iron triangle and issue network 
theories that analyze political alliances on a Federal level, 
these studies deal with power in local government. However, 
like iron triangle and issue network theories, these theories 
of local citizen participation and power do not account for 
changes in political alliances when projects are long-term; 
nor do they account for both a mayor and governor sharing 
power.
In Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American 
City16, an examination of political influence in New Haven, 
Dahl explores how the inequality of resources affects ability 
to influence government in the "democratic" American system. 
The political alliance behind creation of the New York 
Holocaust memorial can be analyzed according to Dahl's theory 
that New Haven's political system, like that of most 
pluralistic democracies, has three important characteristics: 
slack resources, or a gap between actual and potential
16Robert Dahl, Who Governs?. Yale University, 1961, pp. 
305-310.
27
influence; a small band of professional political players 
that organize their lives around political activity; and a 
built-in self-operating limitation of influence of all 
participants (e.g., when an incumbent loses an election). 
Dahl's analysis does not take into account, however, a 
situation such as that of the New York Holocaust museum 
project, which changed its structure over the years and for 
some time had two prime political players at the helm— Koch 
and Cuomo. In this case, the built-in self-operating 
limitation of influence that occurred when Koch lost his 
reelection bid in 1989 was distorted by Cuomo's earlier 
intervention and subsequent takeover of some of Koch's power 
vis-a-vis the project.
Likewise, Banfield's classic study of Chicago in the 
1950s17 is useful but limited for an analysis of the 
Holocaust project's Mutagon structure. His analysis of the 
politics of site selection is of special interest because 
from the beginning site selection was a major component in 
how the players' influence affected the implementation of the 
Holocaust museum. The location was originally the U.S. 
Custom House, and then more than one site was considered at 
Battery Park City. However, Governor Cuomo's intervention 
made the New York City situation more complex than the one 
analyzed by Banfield. Just when the City administration had
17Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1961.
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secured the Custom House as a site, Cuomo's political 
entrepreneurs dangled the promise of a better deal in Battery 
Park City (with Cuomo as project co-chairman). Koch's 
acquiescence and the Holocaust Commission's ensuing decision 
to change to this site led to further complications and 
stagnation.
Banfield's analysis of civic controversies in Chicago, 
to an extent, can also explain how creation of the Holocaust 
museum is affecting other Jewish institutions and groups in 
New York City who feel threatened by usurpation. According 
to Banfield, these controversies arise "out of the 
maintenance and enhancement needs of large formal 
organizations. The leaders of an organization see some 
advantage to be gained by changing the situation. They 
propose changes. Other large organizations are threatened. 
They oppose, and a civic controversy takes place."18
In the case of the New York City Holocaust project, the 
problem with this analysis is that is does not account for 
the possibility of two heads of the same organization seeking 
competitive advantages for themselves. In this case, the 
controversy is internal as well as with outside organizations 
that feel threatened. For example, when one founding co- 
chairman (Cuomo) proposed changes, the other one (Koch) could 
feel threatened. There is competitive "maintenance and
18Ibid. , p. 263.
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enhancement" with other institutions, and also within the 
Commission.
Banfield said informal centralization is attempted, in 
order to accomplish a major project. In order to do so, the 
actions of many people who have independent authority must be 
concerted for a proposal to be adopted: "The proponents of
the proposal try to concert these actions by exercising 
influence— by persuading, deceiving, inveigling, rewarding, 
punishing, and otherwise inducing; meanwhile the opponents 
exercise influence...."19 This model can only be used to an 
extent for the New York City project. While it is true that 
the proponents have in some ways and at some times concerted 
their actions to achieve their goal, at other times, the 
internal actions have been anything but unified. In fact, at 
times one part of the Mutagon, usually the governor (or his 
agency, BPCA), acted more like the "opponent exercising 
influence" than like a proponent. Unlike Dahl's and 
Banfield's analyses, the Mutagon is a changing construct 
which was two-headed during crucial years. Governor Cuomo 
and Mayor Koch were jointly in control, but were competing 
for power and not always working together in harmony for the 
benefit of the project.
19Ibid. , p. 307.
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HOW CHANGES IN THE MUTAGON CHANGED THE PROJECT
Because there was government intervention first by Mayor 
Koch, and then by Governor Cuomo, in efforts to create a 
Holocaust memorial museum in New York City, the content and 
philosophy of the project was affected. Their intervention 
and the location of the project in the United States, and 
specifically, in New York City, give the museum's concept a 
particular slant. Like interest group and citizen 
participation theories, theories of social construction of 
reality and political symbolism are useful but limited for 
analyzing how plans for the New York City Holocaust memorial 
project have evolved.
There are specific governmental demands and also a kind 
of self-censorship by the interest group to emphasize the 
positive aspects of the United States' historical record with 
relation to the event being memorialized. In addition, there 
has been an attempt by the governor's office, which has been 
resisted by the Commission, to make the museum less 
completely Jewish. As will be shown, this culminated in the 
First Amendment (i.e., separation of Church and State) being 
cited in the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement between BPCA and 
the Holocaust Commission.
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's theory of "social 
construction of reality" analyzes how the historical reality 
created in a museum is a reflection of where the museum is 
located. Their central hypothesis is that "knowledge" is
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different in different societies, and that a sociological 
study must deal with what is considered knowledge in a 
particular society. The authors state that "reality is 
socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must 
analyze the processes in which this occurs."20 In other 
words, "reality" is not the same everywhere.
Karl Deutsch calls his analysis the "feedback model of 
consciousness"21, rather than the "social construction of 
reality". However, the concept is virtually the same: 
groups (such as creators of memorials) select certain aspects 
of experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort 
the message being conveyed, to suit the preference of these 
groups. Deutsch speaks of the selective interests of the 
person who knows, and concludes that knowledge is a point at 
which subjective and objective elements meet.
Using Berger and Luckmann's and Deutsch's theories, it 
can be demonstrated that the specific conception and 
evolution of this Holocaust museum could only occur in New 
York City. In New York City the museum's viewpoint, or way 
of remembering, is influenced by the large, organized Jewish 
population. This concentration of nearly two million Jews,
20Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 
Garden City, N.Y., 1966, p.l.
21Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. The Free 
Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1963.
many of whom are prominent in government, real estate 
development, finance, the arts, public relations, higher 
education and other "worlds" that make New York "move and 
shake" gives the City an ambience that is uniquely Jewish in 
the United States (which does not negate the influence of 
other ethnic groups in what Mayor David Dinkins calls the 
"beautiful mosaic"). The humorous term "Jew York" arose with 
good reason. As Nathan Glazer said: "One could live a
completely Jewish life from a sociological point of view and 
yet have no connection with any Jewish institution, religious 
or non-religious. It was here [New York City], in other 
words that one could have only Jewish friends, eat Jewish 
food, follow Jewish mores and culture patterns, and yet have 
little consciousness of being a Jew."22
The "social construction of reality" and "feedback model 
of consciousness" theories are important tools for partially 
understanding the planned content of the New York Holocaust 
museum. However, unlike the Mutagon concept, they do not 
take into account the possibility of the imposition of a new 
"reality" or "consciousness" as a result of a changing 
political coalition. First Mayor Koch opened the door by 
providing an opportunity to create a Holocaust memorial. The 
leaders he chose to carry out the task expected to be able to 
significantly control the content of the memorial museum and
22Nathan Glazer, American Judaism. 2nd ed. revised, 
Chicago and London, 1972, p. 118.
make it uniquely Jewish. Because New York is such an 
ethnically Jewish city, they thought politicians and elected 
officials would approve of a particularistic Jewish 
memorialization of the Holocaust. They further thought that 
in New York City in the 1980s, the Holocaust was a powerful 
symbol which would give the powerful Jewish community the 
ability to make political demands for a uniquely Jewish 
approach. Koch, who needed to please Jewish sources of 
campaign money and influence (and may also agree with the 
parochial concept), approved of the narrow Jewish concept of 
the memorial.
Later, once the proposed museum became City-State and 
the Mutagon changed and became a two-headed structure, 
politics interfered and changed the "reality" or 
"consciousness". Berger and Luckmann's and Deutsch7s 
theories do not analyze such a situation. After Governor 
Cuomo intervened (by offering Battery Park City as a site), 
he learned too late how parochial was the scope of the 
planned museum and exhibits. Fearing criticism from 
separation of Church and State advocates, and requests for 
parcels of land or air rights from other religious groups, he 
tried to change the message of the "reality" of the museum. 
For example, he insisted that the name of the museum be 
changed, and "The Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial 
to the Holocaust" thus became "A Living Memorial to the 
Holocaust-The Museum of Jewish Heritage". Governor Cuomo7s
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office was concerned about the Jewish "image" the museum's 
original name conveyed. His association with it would be 
helpful with his Jewish voters in New York City and State, 
but could be detrimental if he decided to run for President. 
He decided to walk the tightrope of pleasing both his local 
and potential national electorates, by keeping the name but 
reversing it to minimize the Jewish component.
Distortion to change "reality" or "consciousness" can be 
both a cause and an effect of government intervention. For 
example, if the museum makes the recreation of history (i.e., 
the social construction of reality or feedback model of 
consciousness) too particularistically Jewish, a governor can 
renege on a promise of free rent on government land. 
Likewise, if the museum creators know they are subject to 
government intervention, they are likely to recreate history 
in a way that the government will accept.
Like other politicians before him, most notably 
President Carter, Mayor Koch captured the powerful symbol of 
the Holocaust soon after its emergence as a "hot issue" and 
began using it to gain approval from Jewish constituents. 
After the mayor was sure his constituency was in place, he 
formed the Commission. Once Koch appointed a Commission to 
carry out his idea for memorialization, leadership of this 
Commission in turn tried to use the power of the symbol to 
increase their own influence in the Jewish community and in 
their negotiations with the government. Governor Cuomo then
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got on the band wagon and pretended to be there from the 
beginning. At this point, despite the powerful political 
symbolism of the Holocaust, the project failed to go forward 
smoothly. The governor's office, in fact, took discretionary 
political action that stymied the project (and did not please 
his supportive audience).
Using the Mutagon concept, the dissertation analyzes the 
reasons for delays and restructuring plans. For example, one 
direct result of the delays caused by the Mutagon was a 
vicious circle: no visible progress because of insufficient
funds, and unsuccessful fund raising because there was no 
concrete progress. In addition to the structure of the 
political forces responsible for the project, the richness of 
Jewish culture, the high level of organization of the Jewish 
community, and the concentration of the population are 
discussed as possible reasons for delaying the project, 
rather than facilitating it. As Pressman and Wildavsky said: 
"People now appear to think that implementation should be 
easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do not 
occur or turn out badly. We would consider our effort a 
success if more people began with the understanding that 
implementation, under the best of circumstances, is 
exceedingly difficult.1,23
With few exceptions, thirty years ago, the Holocaust was 
spoken of in whispers or ignored. There were virtually no
23Pressman and Wildavsky, p. xix.
university courses, books, movies, television programs or 
Holocaust centers and museum exhibits. It has become a 
multimillion dollar industry here, with a national memorial 
museum rising on the Mall in Washington, D.C., a national 
association of Holocaust centers, a national network of 
children of survivors, national gatherings of survivors, 
national academic conferences, courses in many universities, 
public school curriculums in some states and cities, hundreds 
of fiction and non-fiction books, movies, and television 
programs. Yet, more than 4 6 years after the end of World War 
II, there is still no major Holocaust memorial in New York 
City, the center of the organized Jewish community in the 
United States.
The dissertation will analyze why this is so, including: 
the history of earlier attempts to create a Holocaust 
memorial in New York City; how memorialization of the 
Holocaust was placed on Jewish organizational and government 
agendas; how the idea was coopted by President Carter, Mayor 
Koch, and Governor Cuomo; the structure of the political 
forces behind the memorial museum project in New York City 
and how this structure has changed. It will explain how 
government intervened in efforts to create a Holocaust 
memorial in New York City, and how this intervention at first 
seemed to facilitate and but then impeded implementation of 
the project. A Mutagon concept of changing State-City and 
private political forces will be developed to demonstrate why
37
the project has not moved forward smoothly.
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PART ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 2: THE JEWISH COMMUNITY'S EMERGENCE AS AN INTEREST
GROUP IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER WORLD WAR II
"Jewish life without committees would be like lox without 
bagels." Albert Vorspan1
Before using the Mutagon concept to examine how 
government intervention and changing circumstances affected 
the attempt to create a Holocaust memorial museum in New York 
City between 1981 and 1991, it is necessary to understand the 
historical background and setting in which this intervention 
has occurred. The first effort to create a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York City was in 1946, and the first local 
government intervention on the issue of Holocaust 
memorialization was not until 1981, following the Carter 
Administration's in 1978. The intervention by Carter at that 
time and the subsequent intervention by Koch did not happen 
in a vacuum. Nor did Governor Cuomo's joining the band wagon 
in 1986, which altered the structure of forces behind the New 
York City memorial project.
These governmental interventions to create Holocaust 
memorial projects were directly related to two developments, 
the history of which must be traced to place the Mutagon in 
context. The first development, the rise of the American 
organized Jewish community as an interest group since the end
1My Rabbi Doesn't Make House Calls. Doubleday & Co. , 
Garden City, 1969, p. 23.
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of World War II, will be analyzed in this chapter. The 
second development, the emergence of Holocaust 
memorialization as an issue for this interest group will be 
analyzed in Chapter 3.
Although the dissertation is a case study of the efforts 
of a specific narrower interest group— the New York Holocaust 
Memorial Commission— to build a Holocaust memorial in New 
York City, background on the broader interest group, i.e., 
the established national organized American Jewish community, 
is relevant for the following reasons: 1. Unless this
broader interest: group was in place and influential, the 
Carter Administration would have had no reason to intervene 
on the issue of Holocaust memorialization (which gave Koch 
increased impetus for initiating a New York city project). 
2. From 1946 until 1978, various plans for Holocaust 
memorials in New York City were intended to be for a national 
memorial. 3. Almost every national major American Jewish 
organization has its headquarters in New York City, and 
government intervention in a project of interest to the 
organized Jewish community in New York City therefore has 
national implications. 4. After President Jimmy Carter 
created his President's Commission on the Holocaust in 1978 
and the Commission began deliberating on an appropriate 
memorial, New York City was considered as a possible site. 
(Ultimately Washington, D. C. was chosen instead. See
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Chapter 7.) 5. Koch/s intervention in Now York City very
closely resembled that of Carter on a notional level.
The effort of the American Jewish community to organize 
as an interest group after World War rI had the name two key 
items on the agenda as during the war: the rescue of Jews
from countries where they are endangered, and the creation of 
a Jewish homeland in Israel— with the emphasis on the latter.
However, after the war, the effort won intensified.
One reason for the organized American Jewish community's 
intensifying their attempt to become an influential interest 
group after World War II may have been their guilt feelings 
about not doing enough to influence the government to rescue 
Jews during the war. During the war, even after reports on 
the death camps had been received, organized efforts 
continued to emphasize a Jewish homeland, rather than rescue. 
The time frame of this dissertation begins in 1946, with the 
first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New York 
City. Therefore, what the organized Jewish community did or 
did not do during World War II is beyond its scope. However, 
their ineffectiveness in rescue efforts is mentioned and 
their activities during the war are summarized here, because 
they led to subsequent organizational skills after the war.2
2There is a considerable literature on the organized 
American Jewish community's rescue efforts (or lack of them) 
during World War II. See, e.g., books by Hauer, Feingold, 
Goldmann, Lookstein, Medoff, Morse and Wyman listed in 
Bibliography.
During the war and until Israel became a reality in 
1948, the issues of the creation of a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine and the rescue of the victims (refugees, and then 
survivors) of Nazi Europe were intertwined. The organized 
American Jewish community's strongest argument for the 
creation of a Jewish state was that it could provide a haven 
for Europe's Jewish refugees and survivors (and prevent the 
United States from bearing that burden). After the creation 
of the State of Israel, the organized Jewish community 
continued to link the need for a Jewish homeland with rescue. 
The argument has been that a secure Jewish homeland, Israel, 
is necessary to prevent another Holocaust and to rescue Jews 
from lands of oppression, especially the Soviet Union (and, 
again, prevent the United States from bearing that burden).
The first attempt to unify as an interest group was on 
January 23-24, 1943. Henry Monsky, the president of B'nai 
B'rith, invited delegates from 34 national Jewish 
organizations "to seek agreement on the role the American 
Jewish community would play in representing Jewish demands 
after the war." (This is incredible in retrospect. The 
genocide in Europe had been reported by then, but instead of 
clamoring for the United States government to rescue Jews 
during the war, the leaders of the organized American Jewish 
community were planning for afterward.) This was the first 
endeavor to create an umbrella organization that would serve
as a central channel to communicate the consensus of 
organized American Jewish opinion to the American government. 
The 32 organizations that sent representatives to this 
meeting formed the American Jewish Conference, which held its 
first session on August 29, 1943. The Conference, which
represented 1.5 million Jews directly and another million 
indirectly, overwhelmingly endorsed the 1942 Biltmore 
platform, which had called for a reaffirmation of the Balfour 
pledge to establish a Jewish homeland.3 Although this was 
at the height of World War II and the Holocaust, the major 
issue was creation of a homeland in Palestine. Throughout 
the war, the emphasis was on Zionism, with rescue efforts 
connected and secondary (because a homeland was necessary for 
the rescue of European Jewry).
The American Jewish Committee resigned from the American 
Jewish Conference almost immediately, and the American 
Council for Judaism was anti-Zionist. The American Council 
for Judaism "viewed any friendly gesture toward Israel by an 
American Jew as evidence of divided political loyalties."4
"Patrician" Jew Arthur Hays Sulzberger, owner of The New 
York Times, and others who feared being accused of divided
3Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One. Anchor Press, Garden 
City, 1978, pp. 21-33.
4Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist. Jewish Publication 
Society of America, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 311.
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loyalties, founded this anti-Zionist organization in the 
early 1940s.5
When the Zionist effort was organized as the American 
Jewish Conference in 1943, it was headed by Rabbi Stephen S. 
Wise, who had led the American Zionist movement from the 
beginning. After the more aggressive Rabbi Abba Hillel 
Silver took over in 1944, he formed the American Zionist 
Emergency Council to lobby on the issue. For the 1944 
presidential elections, both the Democrats and Republicans 
had strong pro-Zionist planks in their platforms.
The American Zionist Emergency Council began to do what 
an interest group does, lobbying elected officials and 
candidates on the issue of a Jewish homeland. It spread the 
Zionist message with a monthly political bulletin, Palestine. 
sent to more than 16,000 educational, political, and 
religious leaders. It also "orchestrated an extensive 
campaign of personal contacts" with editors, church and 
educational leaders, political candidates, congressmen and 
senators, and "at critical junctures flooded the White House, 
the State Department, and congressional offices with 
literally thousands upon thousands of letters and 
telegrams."6 The emphasis continued to be Zionist, rather 
than a plea to rescue Hitler's victims.
5Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America. Schocken, 
New York, 1984, p. 226.
6Urofsky, pp. 33-34.
After the war, the picture began to change, and the bid 
to organize as a powerful interest group was stepped up 
dramatically. Most experts on the American Jewish community 
support the idea that efforts to organize after the war were 
related to the realization that not enough had been done 
during the war. For example, Arthur Hertzberg said the 
American Jewish community learned that during the war they 
did not have enough power to rescue the Jews of Europe. He 
said that "during the Holocaust, Jews had not been powerful 
enough among all the factions and fractions of America to 
make the President and Congress feel their Jewish pain. In 
the 194 0s, this knowledge was not yet spelled out in public. 
Jews continued to speak the language of goodwill, and of 
'Americans all,' but Jews would spend the next two decades 
making sure that power in America was not the monopoly of the 
uncaring."7
Urofsky said of the early post-war years:
"American Jewry, stung by the full awareness of the 
Holocaust, moved from a passive endorsement of a Jewish 
homeland to a near-unanimous commitment to active work 
for its realization. . . .And in the face of vested 
interests opposed to the Zionist dream, American Jewry 
mounted one of the most intense and successful lobbying 
efforts in American politics....More than at any other
7Arthur Hertzberg, The Jews in America. Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1989, p. 300.
time in its history, American Jewry stood united behind 
the Zionists [in 1945-1948]. On the eve of Jewish 
statehood, 955,000 men and women formally belonged to 
one of dozens of Zionist organizations. In addition, 
millions of other American Jews endorsed the Zionist 
position through their membership in groups affiliated 
with the American Jewish Conference or through any of 
the more than fifty national agencies engaged in
practical work in Palestine or political support of
Zionism in the United States."8 
Seeking Jewish statehood was thus still the raison d'etre for
the stepped up lobbying from the end of World War II until
1947-48, as it had been during the war.
Another reason for the stepped up political activities 
of the organized Jewish community after World War II, which 
was related to their guilt, was the fact that this community 
had become by default the largest and most powerful Jewish 
community in the world. As Daniel Elazar said:
"American Jewry had become the foremost Jewish 
community in the world, larger by far than any other 
functioning Jewish community; indeed, it was ten times 
larger than its nearest functioning counterpart. It 
owned the bulk of the wealth that world Jewry could 
mobilize to undertake the tremendous tasks of relief and 
reconstruction confronting it as a result of the
^rofsky, pp. 94 and 126.
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Holocaust, tasks which increasingly came to be 
concentrated in the development of the new state of 
Israel....At the same time, American Jewry confronted a 
new situation at home: barriers against full
participation in American society rapidly fell 
away..."9
Elazar was explaining both a push and pull into becoming 
a powerful interest group. On the one hand, the American 
Jewish community had the responsibility, through guilt and 
default, of taking on a world leadership role to fight for a 
Jewish homeland, security at home, and the rescue of Jews in 
the aftermath of the war. On the other hand, after the war 
ended and the full impact of the genocide of the Jews of 
Europe was revealed in the United States, the atmosphere 
changed: overt anti-Semitism diminished, and the government
became more receptive to the demands of the organized 
American Jewish community.
Leonard Fein explained the general involvement of Jews 
in politics as follows:
"Politics, for Jews, is the displacement of Jewish 
motives onto public objects. What are those motives? 
To be a Jew means to belong to a people, not merely to 
adhere to a doctrine. It means, more specifically,to
9Daniel J. Elazar, Community and Polity:_____The
Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry. The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 166.
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belong to a people that has perforce developed special 
sensitivities, through the course of its wanderings, to 
the acts of rulers and governments. It means, 
therefore, that the Jew as Jew has learned to pay 
attention to the political, to engage with it in order 
to ensure that princes and parliaments do not, wittingly 
or casually, do harm to one's people."10 
Although his explanation does not deal specifically with the 
situation at the end of the war, it captures the reasons 
behind the intensified effort by the American organized 
Jewish community to create a strong interest group at that 
time.
In 1946 a new Zionist Political Action Committee was 
created. There is evidence that by 1947 the organized Jewish 
community had met with some success in making its presence 
known as an interest group seeking to influence the Federal 
government. Harry Truman, at least, took them into account 
during his campaign for President: "In November 1947 two
political advisers, James H. Rowe, Jr. and Clark M. Clifford, 
presented Truman with a state-by-state plan for a campaign 
strategy. Rowe acknowledged that 'Jews hold the key to New 
York, and the key to the Jewish voters is what the 
Administration does about Palestine.' But New York was
10Leonard Fein, Where Are We?: The Inner Life of
America's Jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1988, p. 222-223.
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probably the only state in which Jews would vote as a 
bloc."11 The issue continued to be a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine, and the large concentration of Jews in New York 
City, then the city with the largest Jewish population in the 
world, was a target for seeking the support of Jewish voters.
In November 1947 the United States and the United 
Nations accepted the partition plan that ultimately created 
Israel. According to Urofsky: "The success of the Zionist
effort in 1947 represented nearly five years of work, 
organization, publicity, education, and the careful 
cultivation of key people in different fields....securing the 
help of influential men and women in the press, the church, 
the arts, and above all, the government."12
For the 1948 presidential elections, President Harry Truman, 
Governor Thomas Dewey, and Henry Wallace all issued pro- 
Zionist statements. (Truman won 75 percent of the Jewish 
vote, with Wallace receiving 15 percent.)
Even the first attempt to create a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York in 1946 (see Chapter 4) had a Zionist 
orientation. The ceremony to unveil the cornerstone for this 
original (uncompleted) New York Holocaust memorial in 
Riverside Park was held on October 19, 1947, right before the 
United Nations vote to create Israel on November 29. Because 




was at least partially connected to Zionist efforts to
convince the public that a Jewish homeland was a necessity. 
This assumption there had been a Zionist connection to this 
first attempt to create a New York Holocaust memorial was 
verified when the unpublished memoirs of the man who had led 
this effort were discovered in an archive. He had written: 
"My decision to hold the dedication ceremony in September or 
October [1947] was chiefly influenced by the acute situation 
in Palestine where a bitter fight raged between the Jews and
the English which caused the United Nations to put the
Palestine question on the agenda before the Assembly in 
October, 1947. "13
In 1954, six years after the birth of Israel, an
official Jewish pro-Israel lobby was created. The Zionist 
factions' Emergency Committee, which fell apart after the 
1948 War of Independence, had been reorganized in 1949 as the 
American Zionist Council (composed of the fourteen leading 
Zionist organizations). In March 1954 the Council
established the American Zionist Committee for Public 
Affairs, an organization created specifically to lobby 
Washington on issues concerning Israel (called AIPAC-American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee from 1959). For the first 
time, pro-Israel lobbying was coordinated by a single office.
13Adolph R. Lerner, "The Case of the Memorial", 
Unpublished manuscript, undated, archives of YIVO Research 
Institute, New York, p. 4.
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Throughout the 1950s the American Jewish community 
continued to become more organized, with Israel the central 
issue. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations (Presidents' Conference) umbrella was formally 
established in 1959. Starting in 1955 leaders of twenty 
organizations began meeting on a regular basis and laying the 
foundation for the creation of the Presidents' Conference.14
The organized Jewish community in the United States 
today is being defined here as that part of the Jewish 
population (of just less than six million15) that is in some 
way connected with a constituent organizations of the 
Presidents' Conference. The Jewish community is not 
monolithic. Many Jews are unaffiliated and/or dissent from 
views represented by the Presidents' Conference or some of 
its constituents. Often these constituent organizations
140n March 5-6, 1955, representatives of the following 
20 national Jewish organizations met at the Shoreham Hotel in 
Washington: American Jewish Congress, American Trade Union
Council for Labor Israel, American Zionist Committee for 
Public Affairs, American Zionist Council, B'nai B'rith, 
Hadassah, Hapoel Hamizrachi, Jewish Agency, Jewish Labor 
Committee, Jewish War Veterans, Labor Zionist Organization of 
America, Mizrachi Organization of America, National Community 
Relations Advisory Council, Progressive Zionist League, Union 
of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Organizations, United Synagogue of America, United Zionist 
Labor Party, Zionist Organization of America, Zionists- 
Revisionists of America. ("Conference of Presidents" file of 
American Jewish Committee Library, New York)
15In 1988 the Jewish population of the United States was 
estimated at 5,935,000 by Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband 
and Jeffrey Scheckner, American Jewish Yearbook 1989. 
American Jewish Committee, New York, and Jewish Publication 
Society, Philadelphia, 1989, p. 233.
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disagree with each other. Although only about 4 0 percent of 
the Jews in the United States are affiliated with a Jewish 
organization today, the Conference of Presidents claims to 
speak for the Jewish community, mainly on issues of foreign 
policy. Since the Presidents' Conference can legitimately 
speak for only this organized 4 0 percent but there is no 
spokesperson for the unorganized others, the effectiveness of 
the organized Jewish community as an interest group must be 
traced through the Presidents' Conference.
Elazar said the Presidents' Conference was established 
because "increased American Jewish involvement in the 
concerns of the Jewish people as a whole [had] sharpened the 
need for a communal voice that speaks as one, at least in the 
field of foreign relations."16 He analyzed the Presidents' 
Conference as "a structural device that has been developed to 
coordinate a weak multiple-element oligarchy, in those areas 
in which the constituent groups are willing to coordinate." 
He defined oligarchy as when "a substantially closed group of 
individuals enjoy a virtual monopoly of power by reserving 
control over all significant decision making", and said 
oligarchy, in several varieties, is "far more prevalent in 
the American Jewish world than autocracy."17
According to the 1990 brochure of the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations:
16Elazar, Community and Polity, p. 216.
17Ibid. , 320-322.
"The purpose of the Presidents' Conference is to 
strengthen the US-Israel alliance and to protect and 
enhance the security and dignity of Jews abroad. Toward 
this end, the Conference of Presidents speaks and acts 
on the basis of consensus on issues of national and 
international Jewish concern, as the most all-embracing 
coalition of the world's largest Jewish community.... It 
also serves as the representative body to which 
officials of the Executive and Legislative branches of 
the American government, Israeli leaders, foreign 
statesmen and Jewish communities in other lands turn in 
dealing with issues of mutual concern."
From 1968 on, AIPAC, the official pro-Israel lobby, was 
permitted to inform Congress the Presidents' Conference (then 
with 22 member organizations) had endorsed, in principle, 
AIPAC's views. By 1974 the Conference of Presidents had 32 
member organizations, and by 1978, 37 members.18 In 1990
there were 46 constituent organizations, and eight official 
observers19. Memorialization of the Holocaust is not one of
18A review of the early t history of AIPAC and its 
relationship with the Conference of Presidents can be found 
in I. L. Kenen's Israel's Defense Line. Prometheus, 1981, pp. 
106-113.
19Affiliated organizations in 1990 were: AIPAC, American
Gathering/Federation Jewish Holocaust Survivors, American 
Jewish Congress, American ORT Federation, American Zionist 
Federation, American Zionist Youth Foundation, AMIT Women, 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Association of Reform 
Zionists of America, B'nai B'rith, Central Conference of 
American Rabbis, Emunah Women of America, Federation of 
Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot, Hadassah, Herut
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the "Major Areas of Activity" listed in the 1990 brochure. 
In fact, it is never mentioned. This topic is dealt with in 
the Joint Program Plan of the National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), a member organization of 
the Presidents' Conference (discussed later in the chapter).
Elazar said the President's Conference began to be 
eclipsed by AIPAC in the 1970s, and that "today a new balance 
is in the making".20 His analysis is inaccurate for two 
reasons: First, obviously, if AIPAC, the official pro-Israel
lobby, is informing Congress that the Presidents' Conference 
has endorsed its views, they are working together and not 
competing. AIPAC is, in fact, an important member of the 
Presidents' Conference. Second, the two groups are and have 
been closely linked for maximum strength as an interest
Zionists of America, Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish National Fund, Jewish 
War Veterans, JWB, Labor Zionist Alliance, Mercaz, NA'AMAT 
USA, National Conference on Soviet Jewry, National Committee 
for Labor Israel, National Council of Jewish Women. National 
Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, NJCRAC, Rabbinical 
Assembly,, Rabbinical Council of America, Religious Zionists 
of America, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of 
Councils for Soviet Jews, Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America, United Israel Appeal, United 
Synagogue of America, WIZO USA, Women's American ORT, Women's 
League for Conservative Judaism, Women's League for Israel, 
Workmen's Circle, World Zionist Organization/American Section 
and Zionist Organization of America. Observers are: 
American Jewish Committee, American Sephardi Federation, 
Council of Jewish Federations, Development Corporation for 
Israel, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Joint Distribution 
Committee, Poalei Agudath Israel, United Jewish Appeal.
20Daniel J. Elazar, People and Polity:______The
Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry. 1989, Wayne State 
University Press, Detroit, p. 78.
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group: AIPAC is the mechanism whereby the major Jewish
organizations can lobby by proxy, without registering as 
lobbyists or agents of a foreign government and thereby 
losing their tax-exempt status. Unofficially, member 
organizations of the Presidents' Conference ask their members 
to lobby their representatives and the administration. 
Officially, however, only AIPAC lobbies.
AIPAC has a reputation as one of the most effective 
lobbying organizations in Washington, dealing strictly with 
issues relating to Israel. Urofsky said of AIPAC: "I.L.
Kenen, and his successor, Morris J. Amitai, have made the 
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee a respected voice in 
Washington. When necessary, AIPAC can also call upon the 
national Jewish organizations for letter, telephone, and 
telegram campaigns to impress Congress or the White House 
with just how important Israel is to their constituents."21
One of the twenty original organizations that met to 
form the Presidents' Conference is NJCRAC. An umbrella in 
its own right, NJCRAC was founded in 1944 as a voluntary 
association of Jewish community relations agencies. (It 
originally had no "J" in its initials, because the word 
"Jewish" was then not part of its name. This reflected the 
organized Jewish community's fear, at that time, of 
displaying a high profile.) NJCRAC was founded by the 
Council of Jewish Federations, which is itself the umbrella
21Urofsky, p. 445.
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for local Jewish federations throughout the United States.22 
NJCRAC portrays itself as "the instrument through which its 
constituency of 13 national and 117 community Jewish agencies 
jointly determine: the issues of concern; what positions
they should take on them; how they can most effectively carry 
out those positions; which of the issues should be given 
priority attention in the coming year."
The umbrella organization describes the purpose of its 
Joint Program Plan (first issued annually in 1953) as "a 
product of the Jewish community relations field's national 
planning process. It is designed to serve as an advisory 
guide for use by member agencies as an aid in their own 
program planning. Each agency may accept or reject, modify 
or expand any of the Plan's recommendations, according to 
each agency's particular roles, scope, concerns, resources, 
priorities, and needs."23 NJCRAC is the component of the 
President's Conference under whose jurisdiction issues such
22For a detailed analysis of the complicated web of the 
organized Jewish community in the United States,see Elazar, 
Community and Polity.
23Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations. 
1989-1990, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory 
Council, New York, p. i.
In 1990 the constituent organizations were: American
Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith- 
Anti-Defamation League, Hadassah, Jewish Labor Committee, 
Jewish War Veterans, National Council of Jewish Women, Union 
of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America, United Synagogue of America-Women's 
League for Conservative Judaism, Women's American ORT; and 
local Jewish community relations councils and committees 
throughout the United States.
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as memorializing the Holocaust fall, and this topic first 
appeared in NJCRAC's Joint Program Plan for 1972-1973 (See 
Chapter 3).
By 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected President, 
both the Presidents' Conference and AIPAC were in place and 
working in tandem on their agenda for what was in the best 
interest of Israel, as perceived by the organized American 
Jewish community. Kennedy's election was a milestone in the 
organized Jewish community's effort to become a mainstream 
interest group, because the election of a Catholic (whom they 
had strongly backed) broadened the opportunities for 
political power by non-Protestants in the United States. As 
Charles Silberman said, Kennedy's election was:
"an event that symbolized the transformation of the 
United States from an essentially Protestant to a 
religiously pluralistic society. Since that time there 
has been a steady decline in prejudice of every sort, 
and Jews, among others have been the beneficiaries. The 
reduction in hostility toward Jews has been accompanied, 
in fact, by a growth in positive attitudes. In 194 0, 
for example, 63 percent of Americans said that Jews as 
a group had 'objectionable traits'; by 1981, when a 
Gallup poll asked Americans to rate Jews on a ten-point
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scale, 81 percent had favorable and only 8 percent had 
unfavorable opinions.1,24
Furthermore, because the Jewish community had so 
strongly backed Kennedy it was in a favorable position with 
his administration. (He received 82 percent of the Jewish 
vote; he carried New York by 384,000 votes, with Jewish 
precincts giving him a plurality of more than 800,000.) As 
Urofsky said:
"The understanding that marked relations between 
the Kennedy administration and American Jews reinforced 
the sense of belonging that characterized Jewish life in 
the early 1960s....In the closely fought election Jewish 
votes played a significant role, perhaps the significant 
role in electing the nation's first Catholic 
President. . . .Kennedy reportedly told David Ben-Gurion in 
New York in 1961, 'You know, I was elected by the Jews 
of New York, and I would like to do something for the 
Jewish people.'"25
Kennedy did not live to see the 1967 Six Day War, when 
he clearly could have paid this "debt". The war brought an 
enormous resurgence of support for Israel from the organized 
American Jewish community. In addition to lobbying 
Washington for help, a 1967 emergency fundraising campaign by
24Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews
and their Lives Today. Summit Books, New York, 1985, p. 109.
25Urofsky, pp. 333-336.
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United Jewish Appeal raised $240 million, and $190 million 
worth of Israel Bonds were purchased. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, the Six Day War was one of the earliest 
catalysts for the emergence of the organized American Jewish 
community's interest in memorializing the Holocaust.
By the late 1970s, the individual major Jewish 
organizations, the Presidents' Conference, and AIPAC were 
cohesive and working more aggressively and knowledgeably in 
the political arena. In addition, Jewish PACs (Political 
Action Committees) were raising money for targeted candidates 
who were pro-Israel. Kennedy's election, the 1967 Six Day 
War and 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the ethnic movement age of 
the 1960s had all increased the ability of the organized 
Jewish community to function as an effective interest group. 
Menachem Begin, who took over as Prime Minister of Israel in 
June, 1977, was a master at using the Holocaust for Zionist 
and his own Likud Party political purposes. This, and other 
events which will be analyzed, made the organized American 
Jewish community receptive to the idea of memorializing the 
Holocaust. This new receptiveness in the Jewish community 
opened a policy door for elected officials and candidates in 
the United States to make political use of the idea of 
memorializing the Holocaust. In order to utilize the issue 
effectively, President Jimmy Carter and then Mayor Koch 
created their own specialized interest groups to support such 
memorialization.
Carter desperately needed an issue to appeal to the 
organized Jewish community in 1978, when he created his 
President's Commission on the Holocaust. When he ran against 
Gerald Ford in 1976, the organized Jewish community (which 
cannot legally keep its tax-exempt status and support a 
candidate, but nevertheless informally makes its views known 
to its constituents) was wary of this Southern Baptist 
unknown. Ford, however, won only 28 percent of the Jewish 
vote. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, the American 
Jewish community then came to believe between 1977 and 1980 
that their 1976 fears about President Carter had not been 
unfounded. It was an effort by the Carter Administration to 
assuage these fears of the Jewish community— a community that 
was then ready to acknowledge the importance of memorializing 
the Holocaust— that led to creation of the President's 
Commission on the Holocaust in 1978.
Carter's attempt to capture the vote of the Jewish 
community in the 198 0 presidential elections did not succeed. 
Only 45 percent of the Jewish electorate voted for Carter, 
the "lowest Jewish vote for a Democratic candidate since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt brought Jews firmly into the Democratic 
fold". Fifteen percent of Jews voted for John Anderson in 
1980, and a high 39 percent for Ronald Reagan.26 Despite 
his initiation of a national effort to memorialize the 
Holocaust, Carter had a hard time keeping the Jewish voters
26Silberman, p. 345.
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voting Democratic in 1980. More than one in four Jewish 
voters who had voted for Carter in 1976 voted for Reagan in 
1980, and the Jewish Democratic traditional majority was 
reduced to a margin of four to three.27
Although Carter's creation of a national President's 
Commission on the Holocaust and subsequent U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Commission did not win him the Jewish vote (nor the 
presidency) in 1980, he will be recorded in American and 
Jewish history as the President who placed on the agenda of 
the United States government the issue of memorialization of 
the Holocaust (see Chapter 7). Carter's government 
intervention in an area that had previously been the private 
domain of the American Jewish community was the first step in 
the Federal, New York State, and New York City governments' 
ability to influence how the American Jewish community would 
memorialize the Holocaust.
SUMMARY
In order to place the Mutagon of political forces 
working to create a Holocaust museum in New York City in 
historical perspective, the emergence of the organized 
American Jewish community as an interest group has been 
reviewed. At the time of the first attempt to memorialize
27Theodore H.White, America In Search for Itself: The
Making of the President. 1956-1980. Harper & Row, New York, 
1982, p. 414. In New York State in 1980, the official vote 
compiled by the Federal Election Commission was 2,893,831 for 
Reagan, 2,728,372 for Carter, and 467,801 for Anderson.
the Holocaust in New York City at the end of World War II, 
the American Jewish community was not yet well established as 
an interest group. Efforts of the organized American Jewish 
community to lobby the United States Government to rescue 
Jews from Europe during the Holocaust were weak and 
ineffective. Perhaps to compensate for this, after the war, 
national Jewish organizations made a concerted bid to become 
a strong interest group. The Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations was formally established 
in 1959, and AIPAC, its pro-Israel lobby constituent, was 
created (with a different name) in 1954. Today they form the 
core of what could be called the organized American Jewish 
community as an the interest group (although statistics show 
there really is no such entity) . AIPAC and the Conference of 
Presidents have the kind of relationship with their agents in 
Congress and in the executive branch that can be analyzed 
using either iron triangle or issue network theory (see 
Chapter 1). The Jewish community members who are members of 
the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, however, are part 
of a much more complicated interest group-government 
relationship: a changing City-State-private coalition, or a
two-headed Mutagon.
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CHAPTER 3: WHEN AND WHY THE MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST BECAME
AN ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY
"Dear love, Auschwitz made me more of a Jew than ever Moses 
did." Dannie Abse1
In order to understand why a Mutagon of political forces 
would be interested in creating a major Holocaust memorial 
museum in New York City, it is necessary to trace the 
increasing significance of Holocaust memorialization for the 
organized American Jewish community. Memorialization of the 
Holocaust became the project of a complicated City-State- 
private Mutagon headed by the mayor of New York City and the 
governor of New York State after the issue had become 
important for this community. When President Jimmy Carter 
intervened on the issue in 1978, it was already beginning to 
be "hot" in the organized Jewish community, and Carter's 
placing it on the national governmental agenda made it even 
hotter.
Before the subject of Holocaust memorialization was 
placed on the Federal, and then the New York City and State 
agendas, it had to have become significant for the organized 
American Jewish community. Otherwise, President Carter's 
political entrepreneurs, and then those of Mayor Koch and 
Governor Cuomo, would not have chosen memorialization of the 
Holocaust as their agenda item for attracting Jewish votes
1"White Balloon", a poem, in Present Tense. March-April 
1990, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 40.
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and money. Therefore, before explaining how Holocaust 
memorialization evolved into the project of a City-State- 
private Mutagon in New York City, it is necessary to trace 
when and how this subject emerged and became important for 
the organized American Jewish community.
Interest in the Holocaust and its memorialization did 
not emerge instantly or follow a straightforward path. 
Various historical, psychological, political and cultural 
factors all interacted to bring about the organized Jewish 
community's gradual and growing interest in studying and 
memorializing the Holocaust. Some key events are possible to 
pinpoint, but, as will be demonstrated, not all historians of 
the Holocaust and the American Jewish community agree on 
which historical event was most significant. The community's 
interest in the Holocaust did not suddenly appear where it 
had not been before. Latent awareness was pushed to the 
forefront by specific occurrences and also by the passing of 
time.
Starting with the Adolph Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 
1961, and with more intensity during Israel's Six Day War in 
1967, the organized American Jewish community gradually began 
to face the Holocaust and its implications for their present 
and their future. There was a proliferation of books, 
college courses, movies, and commemorations, beginning slowly 
in the 1960s. (One of the few earlier exceptions was The 
Diary of Anne Frank, published in English in 1952, made into
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a movie in 1959, and dramatized on Broadway in between.) The 
popularization of the subject of the Holocaust culminated in 
the NBC miniseries Holocaust in April, 1978 (the month before 
President Carter announced his President's Commission on the 
Holocaust).
Once President Carter had made memorialization of the 
Holocaust an official program of the United States 
government, this action caused a reaction. The organized 
Jewish community jumped on the bandwagon, applauded the 
project, and made the issue of the Holocaust more prominent 
on their agenda. Holocaust survivor and Nobel Laureate Elie 
Wiesel said that when Carter made memorialization of the 
Holocaust government policy he changed the social psychology 
of the country. The subject became aggrandized in the Jewish 
community, and survivors who had been considered second class 
by the community suddenly gained new status.2 In the 1980s, 
after Carter's intervention, the number of books, movies, 
television programs, symposia, courses, and Holocaust studies 
institutions continued to grow more rapidly.3
interview with Elie Wiesel, New York City, August 8,
1990.
3David M. Szonyi, An Annotated Bibliography and Resource 
Guide, National Jewish Resource Center, New York, 1985, gives 
a comprehensive listing of bocks, audio-visual materials, 
exhibits, curricula, memorials, research centers, speakers 
bureaus, etc. In 1990, Social Studies School Service 
published its 3 2 page catalogue, "Teaching the Holocaust: 
Resources and Materials", which offers for sale to schools 
books, audio-visual materials, curricula, etc., only on the 
subject of the Holocaust.
After the organized Jewish community's general interest 
in the subject of the Holocaust emerged in the 19 60s, and 
before Carter intervened in 1978, the community had not been 
catalyzed into creating a major national memorial or a 
memorial museum. There had been small groups of individuals 
attempting to do so at different times in New York City since 
1946, but, for the most part, the major Jewish organizations 
were not enthusiastic about these projects (see Chapters 4- 
6). (No record was found of any attempt to create a major 
Holocaust memorial in the United States earlier than the 
first New York City 1946-1947 effort) . After 1973 the 
national organized Jewish community encouraged small local 
memorials in the Joint Program Plan of the National Jewish 
Community Relations Advisory Council. However, there was no 
national Jewish program or organizational platform for a 
major national memorial until after President Carter placed 
this specific item on the Federal agenda. As is documented 
in Chapter 7, in the case of the Federal Holocaust memorial, 
the organized Jewish community was a reactor and not an 
actor.
Not unlike John Kingdon's analysis of agenda-setting in 
the Federal government4 (see Chapter 7) , in the national 
organized Jewish community, too, an idea whose time had come 
rose in the "soup". Beginning in the 1960s and continuing
4John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and Public 
Policies. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1984.
through the early 1970s, the idea of memorialization of the 
Holocaust gradually took hold in the bureaucracy of the 
Jewish community. By the mid-1970s the concept of 
memorialization (but not a national memorial) was firmly on 
the community's agenda. Kingdon's three streams had come 
together: problem recognition, policy formulation and
refinement, and politics. These three streams came together 
at the critical time of two major wars during which Israel 
faced possible annihilation, and a policy window was created 
for the Holocaust. The problem was that Israel, which was
the focus for the American Jewish community, first had its
existence endangered by two wars and then used policies of 
occupation that diminished it as a symbol of Jewish identity 
for many secular American Jews. Policy formulation and
refinement resulted in the memorialization of the Holocaust 
becoming an important alternative and complement to Israel 
for the community.
This led to the politics of the organized American
Jewish community's supporting Israel's use of the Holocaust 
to excuse the country's behavior. Regarding Israel's 
utilization of the Holocaust as a rationalization (e.g., for 
its West Bank policies, requests for economic aid, or 
arguments against Arab countries receiving military aid) the 
organized American Jewish community, through the Presidents' 
Conference and AIPAC, has supported Israel's position. This 
position, especially after Menachem Begin became Prime
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Minister in 1977, has been that Israel deserved special 
treatment and could behave in a special way, because of the 
Holocaust. As Boaz Evron, an Israeli leftist writer, said: 
"The exploitation of the memory for these purposes has been 
developed into a fine art. Almost any Israeli official 
appearance abroad involves an invocation of the Holocaust, in 
order to inculcate in the listeners the proper feelings of 
guilt."5 Conor Cruise O'Brien, an Irish journalist, made the 
same point from his perspective as a non-Israeli and non-Jew: 
"Among Gentiles interested in Israel, there is impatience 
with Israeli Holocaust consciousness— and especially with 
what is seen as the exploitation of the Holocaust by Israeli 
leaders, since 1977 especially by Menachem Begin."6
The progression with regard to the organized American 
Jewish community's general interest in the Holocaust and 
specific interest in creating memorials was as follows: 
Until the 1960s, there was virtually no interest in 
commemorating the Holocaust or in creating memorials. The 
New York City effort that began in 1946 was an exception. 
Then the 1961 Eichmann trial and the 1967 Six Day War began 
changing this situation, and general interest in the 
Holocaust grew. Some communities such as Philadelphia
5Boaz Evron, "Holocaust: The Uses of Disaster", New
Outlook Discussion Paper, Israel, undated, pp. 8-9.
6Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Siege. Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1986, p. 318.
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created small Holocaust memorials or monuments in the 1960s. 
In New York City, a number of memorials were attempted by 
Jewish groups in the 1960s and early 1970s (see Chapters 4, 
5 and 6) . In the 1970s, the issue of memorializing the 
Holocaust began to be institutionalized in the organized 
Jewish community, and more localities began building small 
memorials. It must be emphasized, however, that the 
community did not request that the Federal government create 
a national memorial.
Although the community's interest in memorializing the 
Holocaust was gradual, most experts agree the 1967 Six Day 
War was the event that turned the tide. The connection 
between the Hitlerian Holocaust and the possibility of 
another in Israel was so frightening and blatant that it 
could not be ignored: Creation of a Jewish homeland, the
Zionist post-World War II argument in 1945-1947, had been for 
the purpose of bringing survivors of the Holocaust to 
redemption. Then, in 1967, this very redemption was 
threatened with the possibility of another genocide. Even 
the creation of a Jewish homeland in Israel seemed not to be 
saving the Jewish people from the possibility of 
annihilation. And if the Jews could be destroyed in Israel, 
perhaps they could also be destroyed in the United States. 
This was the reason the Six Day War so powerfully raised 
Holocaust consciousness in the American Jewish community.
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The connection between the Holocaust and the Six Day War 
in the minds of American Jews is accepted by most scholars. 
For example, historian Jacob Neusner said in 1979 that the 
Six Day War had marked the beginning of interest in the 
Holocaust. He said: "What turned an historical event into
a powerful symbol of contemporary social action and 
imagination was a searing shared experience. For millions of 
Jews, the dreadful weeks before the 1967 war gave a new 
vitality to the historical record of the years of 1933 to 
1945— the war and its result."7
Rabbi Irving (Yitz) Greenberg, Director of CLAL, The 
National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, and one 
of the first advocates of education about the Holocaust, also 
cited the Six Day War (and, to a lesser degree, the Eichmann 
trial) as the catalyst for interest in the Holocaust in the 
organized American Jewish community. He said that in the 
1950s the subject of the Holocaust was all but totally 
neglected by the community. "People were 'ashamed' of the 
'sheep to the slaughter' idea," he said. "I think a great 
deal of the credit for the turning point was the Eichmann 
trial. By turning point, I mean it moved the Holocaust from 
the sense of shame to the sense of pity, compassion and 
feeling. And it gave it significant publicity, although the 
ground was still not saturated, and the publicity was soaked
7Jacob Neusner, "A 'Holocaust' Primer" in National 
Review. August 3, 1979, pp. 976-977.
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up and didn't show up on the surface." (Greenberg's analogy 
compares the situation to planting seeds in dry soil, which 
needs to absorb water deep in the ground before irrigated 
topsoil can produce vegetation.)
In 1962, Greenberg, a professor at Yeshiva University, 
wanted to teach a course on the Holocaust there, but the 
faculty and administration showed little interest. He said 
he finally was able to "sell" the idea to the dean after he 
renamed the course "Totalitarianism and Ideology in the 
Twentieth Century". He said his research in 1962 found only 
one existent course on the Holocaust, at Brandeis University. 
Greenberg believes the Six Day War was the breakthrough. 
"There was a tremendous urgency that the Holocaust is coming 
again," he said. "I think 1967 opened the emotional 
floodgates."8
Holocaust historian Saul Friedlander also targets the 
Six Day War as the beginning of interest in the Holocaust 
here. "In the late 1960s, there was a change," he said. 
"It's difficult to explain. Elie Wiesel and Raul Hilberg 
couldn't find publishers in the early 1960s. Why the change? 
The Six Day War. There was a need for definition by the 
community. They were losing their Zionist dream, and this 
led to the centrality of the Jewish experience of the
interview with Rabbi Irving Greenberg, April 19, 1990, 
New York City.
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Holocaust. It wasn't meant to be that way, but two things 
came together and made it happen."9
Melvin Urofsky connected the Six Day War with the 
emergence of interest in the Holocaust in the organized 
American Jewish community as follows:
"The rapidity and extent of Israeli victory could 
only be matched by the reaction of American Jewry during 
the tense weeks of crisis in May and the actual days of 
fighting, and by the emotional outburst which erupted 
following the victory. But the joy of the victory must 
be seen in contrast to the gloom and despair which 
characterized American Jewry during May 1967....the 
imagery of the Holocaust dominated American Jewry— the 
fear that twice in their lifetime the Jewish people 
would be slaughtered and would be able to do nothing 
about it."10
Charles E. Silberman said of the connection between the 
1967 war and the Holocaust:
"To American Jews— indeed, to Jews everywhere— it 
appeared as though another Holocaust was in the making; 
equally important, it looked and felt as though once 
again the world would sit idly by while Jews marched to 
their death. Before 1967 American Jews had paid little
9Saul Friedlander, address, Society for the Advancement 
of Judaism, New York, February 4, 1990.
10Melvin I. Urofsky, We Are One. Anchor Press, Garden 
City, 1978, p. 350.
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attention to the Holocaust of the 1940s. Some, perhaps, 
felt guilty over their inability to prevent the dreadful 
event or, failing that, to rescue more than a handful of 
people; others needed the healing balm of time before 
they could come to terms with what had happened; most 
were simply too caught up in their own lives and in the 
exciting move from the margins of American society to 
its mainstream."
Silberman said the Holocaust was rarely mentioned, and that 
Wiesel's Night was rejected by more than six publishers 
although it had been acclaimed in France. He said that even 
after the Eichmann trial in 1961, "which turned the Holocaust 
into front-page news in American newspapers", discussion of 
the subject was "desultory".11 (Wiesel finally got his book 
published in English in 1960, and Eichmann's capture and 
trial at around the same time must have helped to make it 
popular.)
"Desultory", or unmethodical, is perhaps a good 
description: there were discussions, and even heated
arguments in some circles in the Jewish community. For 
example, Hannah Arendt's vindictive account of the Eichmann 
trial in The New Yorker (published as a book, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. in 1963) started a controversy that lasted 
throughout the early 1960s. Arendt's conclusion was that
11Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews
and their Lives Today. Summit Books, New York, 1985, pp. 182- 
183 .
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Jewish leaders, as well as Eichmann, were guilty, and that 
the Jews went to their death like sheep to the slaughter. 
However, reactions and arguments about specific books or 
occurrences are not the same as an organized effort to 
institutionalize the Holocaust and its memory as a primary 
and major issue for the organized Jewish community. This did 
not occur until later.
Leonard Fein, too, linked the Six Day War and awareness 
of the Holocaust. He said that in 1967, "The fear was 
precise, and 'another Auschwitz' was its name. Back then, no 
one yet knew how resourceful and how tough and how skilled at 
war the Israelis had become. So, when some Arab leaders 
boasted that the Jews would be driven into the sea, the Jews 
of America felt terror, as Jews."12 Michael Berenbaum, 
project director for the museum being built by the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Council in Washington, concurred about the 
important influence of the Six Day War. He also mentioned 
the "drive the Jews into the sea" statement of Arab leaders, 
and said: "American Jews felt their vulnerability and pulled
out all the stops."13
Samuel Norich, Director of YIVO Research Institute, 
believes both the 1967 and 1973 wars in Israel caused 
interest in the Holocaust to emerge in the Jewish community
12Leonard Fein, Where Are We?: The Inner Life of
America's Jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1988, p. 18.
13Interview with Michael Berenbaum, March 12, 1990, New
York.
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in United States. He wrote: "The memories, the literary and 
visual images of European Jewry's destruction took on a 
special valence in American Jewry's self-understanding during 
the 1960's and 1970's. The Eichmann trial and Elie Wiesel's 
books figured in this, but nothing figured more importantly 
than the visible danger, in 1967 and again in 1973, that 
Israel might be destroyed. We, all of us, brought the 
traumas of the 1940's to the events of the '60's and '70's, 
and we came to see the Jewish people as increasingly 
imperiled."14 Even though Israel was victorious in both 
wars, the fear of annihilation that came before the victories 
evoked the Holocaust and helped to institutionalize its 
memorialization in the organized American Jewish community.
Wiesel was the only Holocaust expert who said he did not 
believe the 1967 and 1973 wars had any influence on the 
emergence of Holocaust memorialization in the United States. 
He said: "We worked on it...My first book came out here in
1960, which means eighteen years, after all, [until Carter 
intervened]. In the meantime, I was teaching and writing, 
and other people were. In 1960 nobody read, nobody cared. 
Then it accumulated. There were television programs, the 
Eichmann trial in 1960, other trials later on. Things 
happened.... The Israel wars didn't have anything to do with 
it." Asked how the idea of Holocaust memorialization grew so
14Samuel Norich, "What Holocaust Centers Tell Us About 
Ourselves", The Forward. New York, March 6, 1987, p.5.
much since 1960, Wiesel said: "A convergence of events.
Between 1960 and 1979, there was a very small group of people 
who worked on this. Beginning in the 1960s, I would go 
around literally from conference to conference, from 
convention to convention, from community to community to 
speak about this. Because nobody else did. When other 
people began, I stopped. For the last twenty years or so, I 
don't really speak about this subject. But at that time, 
nobody did it, so I did. I didn't speak about museums or 
memorials— only about the need to remember."15 Although 
Wiesel said the 1967 and 1973 wars in Israel had no effect on 
the emergence of interest in the Holocaust in the United 
States (and seemed to imply he was taking credit for it), the 
wars were the very reason that the "very small group of 
people who worked on this" began to gain a sympathetic ear.
It is important to emphasize that before 1967 there was 
very little published here on the Holocaust. Wiesel's Night, 
copyrighted here in 1960, was one of the first works that 
talked about life inside the camps. (Other early books were 
The Diary of Anne Frank. 1952, and Raul Hilberg's The 
Destruction of the European Jews. 1961.) As Wiesel and 
others said, he had great difficulty finding a publisher 
here, although the work had already been successfully 
published in France. Except for Wiesel, most experts (e.g., 
those cited above) say the date for the emergence of interest
15Wiesel interview.
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in the Holocaust was the 1967 Six Day War (reinforced by the 
earlier Eichmann trial and the 1973 Yom Kippur War). There 
is no exact moment that the subject exploded on the scene, 
but evidence indicates the issue most dramatically started 
attracting the interest of the organized Jewish community 
after the 1967 war, and increased after the 1973 war. By the 
middle of the 1970s, commemorating the Holocaust was 
beginning to become a "hot" item in the organized American 
Jewish community.
Soon afterward, three unrelated occurrences helped to 
firmly entrench the issue of memorialization of the Holocaust 
in the agenda of the organized American Jewish community: 1)
In 1977, Begin became Prime Minister of Israel. More than 
any previous leader, he used the evocation of the Holocaust 
to defend Israel's existence and its policies. The major 
American Jewish organizations, led by the Conference of 
Presidents, followed suit. 2) In the summer of 1977, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services division of the 
United States Justice Department set up a Special Litigation 
Unit to prosecute alleged Nazi war criminals living in the 
United States. That year Congress also requested an 
investigation to determine whether United States government 
agencies had obstructed investigations and prosecutions of 
alleged Nazi war criminals; and on May 15, 3.978, the General 
Accounting Office of the House of Representatives issued its
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report.16 3) In March-April of 1978, NBC television 
broadcast the series Holocaust. which (albeit in a kitsch, 
soap opera format) brought the subject into living rooms 
across the country and gave it a national grassroots 
acceptability.
Perhaps the best evidence of formally placing a domestic 
issue on the Jewish agenda on a national scale is the Joint 
Program Plan of the National Jewish Community Relations 
Advisory Council (NJCRAC), the national umbrella organization 
under whose institutional jurisdiction an issue such as 
memorializing the Holocaust falls. NJCRAC first formally 
placed the idea of memorializing the Holocaust on its agenda 
in 1972-1973. That year there was a section entitled 
"Interpreting the Holocaust" in the organization's published 
annual Joint Program Plan. This short section encouraged 
local community relations organizations to observe the 
thirtieth anniversary of the uprising of the Warsaw 
Ghetto.17 While there were earlier various efforts to 
commemorate the Holocaust by organizations, local Jewish 
communities and survivor groups in the United States, 
placement of the idea on the agenda of NJCRAC
16Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscience: Seekers
of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America. State 
University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1984, p. 7.
17Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations. 
1972-1973, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory 
Council, New York, p. 11.
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institutionalized memorialization nationally in the American 
Jewish community for the first time. (In the 1961-1962 Joint 
Program Plan, there was a section on the Eichmann trial, 
recommending that Jewish community relations agencies 
"cooperate in studying and assessing all the effects of the 
Eichmann trial and in interpreting its meaning and its 
lessons."18 This is NJCRAC's only reference to the 
Holocaust in program plans prior to 1972.)
Beginning in 1973-1974, NJCRAC's Joint Program Plan had 
a section entitled "Commemorating the Holocaust". Among 
other recommendations, it suggested that local communities 
create "visual memorials to the Holocaust, such as permanent 
exhibits, monuments, plagues [and] signs...." and develop 
local archives (pp. 12-13). These recommendations were the 
same in the Joint Program Plan for 1974-1975 (p. 14), 1975- 
1976 (pp. 20-21), 1976-1977 (p. 16), 1977-1978 (p. 23) and
1978-1979 (p. 13). Only in 1979-1980, after President Carter 
had appointed his President's Commission on the Holocaust, 
was there a major shift in NJCRAC's section on the Holocaust. 
It had never before recommended or even mentioned creation of 
a national Holocaust memorial in the Joint Program Plan. Now 
that Carter had put the issue on the federal agenda, NJCRAC 
came out in support of it. (Afterward, the issue of 
commemorating the Holocaust continued to appear in the Joint
18Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations: 
1961-1962. "The Eichmann Trial", pp. 15-16.
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Program Plan. Depending on the year, it varied from a small 
"Continuing But Urgent" segment to a major section on 
"Lessons of Bitburg" in 1985-1986.)
Irving "Yitz" Greenberg described the eleven years 
between the Six Day War and the 1978 NBC Holocaust miniseries 
as "soaking the ground" (like a farmer preparing to plant 
seeds). "The miniseries never would have been produced or 
had the reverberations, but for this ten years before of 
saturating the ground," he said. "It took ten years of 
saturating the ground, building up a scholarly following, 
building up a religious consciousness. And then it was like 
striking a match, when you had saturation with benzene. And 
it blasted off."19 (At this point, the President's 
Commission began.)
In addition to the opinions of experts and the agenda of 
NJCRAC, another indicator of when memorializing the Holocaust 
became important for the organized American Jewish community 
is the coverage of the subject in books about the American 
Jewish community. When Nathan Glazer wrote his classic 
American Judaism in 1957, memory of the Holocaust was totally 
absent. As Neusner wrote in 1979, to point out the recent 
emergence of the topic at that time: "Describing American
Judaism in the mid-1950s, the great sociologist Nathan Glazer 
managed to write an entire book without making more than 
passing reference to the destruction of European Jewry. The
19Greenberg interview.
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contrast with the 197 0s is striking. Now there is no way to 
address the Jewish world without referring to 'the 
Holocaust. '"20
Even in the 1960s and for much of the 1970s, the subject 
of remembering the Holocaust was absent from most scholarly 
analyses of the American Jewish community. As Silberman 
said: "When Commentary conducted a symposium on 'the
condition of Jewish belief' in 1966, for example, its editors 
did not so much as mention the Holocaust in the five long 
questions it sent to the participating rabbis and 
theologians, nor did more than a handful of the thirty-eight 
respondents raise the question on their own." He said that 
by contrast, "In May and June of 1967, however, the Holocaust 
was on almost every American Jew's mind...."21
Six years before Neusner's article and seven years after 
the Commentary symposium, in 1973, the American Jewish 
Committee and the Jewish Publication Society of America 
published The Future of the Jewish Community in America, a 
book of essays prepared by leading academics for an American 
Jewish Committee task force on the future of the Jewish 
community of America. Although Neusner said there was no way 
in the 1970s to leave the Holocaust out, he was writing in 
1979. In 1973 it was still barely mentioned in a book by 




Daniel Elazar. Sidorsky, a prominent professor of Jewish 
history who edited this book, wrote that four recent major 
events "presumably" then affected the formation of identity 
in the Jewish community. "The first is the Holocaust, and 
although it may be claimed that memory has dimmed its impact, 
it may also be true that only now is the realization of the 
event, which traumatized awareness by its overwhelming 
enormity, becoming absorbed into consciousness."22
Sidorsky therefore recognized that the Holocaust had 
become somewhat important, but he was hedging his bets. 
Furthermore, the subject was virtually ignored by all of the 
experts on the American Jewish community who contributed 
chapters to his book. There was only one other reference to 
the Holocaust in Sidorsky's book, and it was a comment on the 
lack of interest in the subject. Seymour Fox said in the 
1973 book: "The Holocaust is barely mentioned in our
classrooms."23 (This was generally the case in the early 
1970s, as contrasted with special curricula in many states, 
beginning in the 1980s.) In an article entitled "Decision­
making in the American Jewish Community" in the same book, 
Elazar did not even mention memorialization of the Holocaust 
as relevant to decision-making (although he did refer to the
22David Sidorsky, David Sidorsky,ed., The Future of the
Jewish Community in America. American Jewish Committee and 
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973, p. 20.
23Seymour Fox, Ibid., 262.
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resettlement and rehabilitation of Europe's Jews).24 
Glazer's 1957 book, the 1966 Commentary symposium, and 
Sidorsky's 1973 book are typical of virtually all books on 
the American Jewish community between the end of World War II 
and the Yom Kippur War: the subject of the Holocaust or its
memorialization is not discussed as relevant or important for 
the organized American Jewish community. Between Sidorsky's 
writing in 1973 and Neusner's writing in 1979, there was a 
giant leap in interest in the Holocaust.
Soon after the 1973 war the picture had changed 
dramatically. The Israel wars were the catalyst for interest 
in the Holocaust not only because they evoked the possibility 
of another Holocaust, another genocide of the Jewish people. 
There was another side to the aftermath of the Six Day and 
Yom Kippur wars. Israel's image changed in the minds of many 
individual American Jews and non-Jews, including decision­
makers in Washington. Instead of the poor defenseless David, 
Israel had suddenly become Goliath.
The leaders of the organized community were able to use 
the new interest in the Holocaust in connection with their 
support of Israel's policies: for them, emergence of the
memorialization of the Holocaust was a way of saying, again, 
that Israel (i.e., the redeemer of the remnant of Holocaust 
survivors) was the victim, and not the victor or aggressor. 
During both wars, there was the fear that Israel might be
24Daniel Elazar, Ibid., p. 279.
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destroyed— that a new Holocaust would result in mass murder 
of Jews. This fear brought memories of the Holocaust out of 
the closet— even for people who had no personal 
recollections.
Linking the Holocaust with Israel helped the organized 
Jewish community hold the interest (and donations) of some 
American Jews who, in the wars' aftermath, questioned 
Israel's policies. When questions about the occupation and 
Israel's treatment of Arabs got in the way, community leaders 
could invoke the Holocaust. The Holocaust was easier to 
"sell" than post-occupation Israel, because there was no 
question of who was victimizing whom.
After the wars, many secular Jews who had considered 
Israel their strongest connection with Judaism became 
disillusioned with Israel's policies and were searching for 
a new non-religious link. Memorialization of the Holocaust 
became their new symbolic affirmation. This substitution of 
the Holocaust for Israel among some American Jews was not 
acceptable to the organized American Jewish community, which 
continued to support Israel and its policies. Therefore 
leaders of the community utilized memorialization of the 
Holocaust in connection with explaining the need for Israel's 
existence. This was one reason it became an important issue 
on the community's agenda. Today the organized American 
Jewish community still links the idea of memorializing the
84
Holocaust with the importance of the existence of a strong 
Israel.
Arthur Hertzberg said the Holocaust was evoked by the 
American Jewish community in the 1970s, in order to remember 
anti-Semitism and the vulnerability of Israel:
"The Holocaust was a shattering memory. It evoked 
guilt, compassion, and fear. It said to American Jews, 
in an essentially optimistic time, that being Jewish is 
to know that life itself is often about tragedy, 
suffering, and murderous hatred. Even the new State of 
Israel, the center of Jewish hope and power, was not 
merely about glory and triumph; it was endangered by 
Arab enemies. Jews were called to rally to Israel in 
the name of the slogan 'Never Again.'"25 
Hertzberg said in the 1950s and 1960s it was widely 
believed that the effort for Israel would somehow keep the 
next generation of American Jews Jewish. But then, he said, 
"In the 1980s, the observance even of the new Jewish mitzvah. 
the commitment to Israel, was becoming more tepid." 
Hertzberg said this cooling process was evident even at the 
time of the 1973 war. "American Jews were less involved than 
they had been in June 1967. Contributions were just as 
massive, but there were fewer volunteers among the young. 
Some American Jews had already begun to question Israel's
25Arthur Hertzberg, The Jews in America. Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1989, p. 382.
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policies. In 1973, a few hundred Jews had banded together in 
an organization that was named Breira ('alternative') to 
insist that Israel should make peace on the basis of a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza."26 (Breira and 
other alternative movements are not analyzed here, because 
they are not part of the organized American Jewish community 
as defined in Chapter 2— those organizations belonging to the 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations. The organized Jewish community attempts to 
discredit, rather than encourage, the activities of the 
alternative peace movement.)
The major American Jewish organizations did not 
substitute the Holocaust for Israel; they used the memory of 
the Holocaust to gain support for Israel, and they made space 
in their agenda for institutionalizing Holocaust 
memorialization. This was complemented, however, by the 
phenomenon of many American Jews shifting their focus from 
Israel to the Holocaust. It is difficult to paint a clear 
picture of this shift, because there was another influence: 
it happened at a time when Americans in general were 
searching for and finding their ethnicity. In 1960, John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy, an Irish Catholic, was elected President, 
and in 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. had "a dream". Black 
was becoming beautiful in the 1960s, and other hyphenated 
Americans were seeking their roots.
26Ibid. , p. 384.
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At this very time, Israel's occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza became painful for many American Jews in the wake of 
the 1967 and 1973 wars. Thus the prevailing mood of 
ethnicity in the United States at that time— reinforced by 
disillusionment with Israel— created both the need and 
opportunity for the Holocaust's emergence as an issue. As 
Fein said: "Along comes the Holocaust, and makes us special.
It's not the kind of special we'd have chosen, but there it 
is, ours by right, and awesomely substantial. If you have 
the Holocaust, what more do you need?"27 In other words, 
the Holocaust is a hard act to follow.
Jeshajahu Weinberg, Director of the museum being built 
in Washington by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, said: 
"Why the preoccupation with the Holocaust now? It is not 
enough to say that it was Wiesel, although he had an 
important role in popularizing the Holocaust in the United 
States. The issue matured in the mid-197 0s. Secular Jews in 
this country had a problem. During the 1970s, a period of 
flourishing ethnicity, secular Jews had a problem knowing 
what their center of ethnicity was." (The search for 
identity also helped Jewish ethnicity— including the subject 
of the Holocaust— flourish.)
Weinberg, an Israeli, said that since 1948 American Jews 
"thought that such support for Israel as financial, tourism, 
sending their children there for programs created the Jewish
27Fein, p. 63.
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content for them. But a few years after the Six Day War, the 
glory was over and there was the divisiveness of the politics 
of occupation." Weinberg said: "The stock of Israel
diminished and the Holocaust became the Jewish content for 
American Jews— a way to remain Jewish as a secular Jew." 
Weinberg said that American Jews who had projected all of 
their ideals on Israel and in the 1970s had become aware that 
Israel was not the idealistic country they had perceived it 
to be, adopted the Holocaust as its replacement."28
At a 1990 lecture, Hertzberg also connected emergence of 
interest in the Holocaust to the climate of ethnicity that 
was part of the 1960s in the United States, and to still 
unresolved fears of anti-Semitism among the American Jewish 
community. He asked:
"Why the emergence of the Holocaust in the American 
Jewish experience? The subject was treif [non-kosher] 
in the 194 0s, because American Jews were breaking out of 
ghettos. They didn't want to appear to be victims. It 
came on in the 1960s, because the role of Jews in 
America changed. It was the era of Kennedy, Blacks, 
Vietnam. It was easier to speak in your own name. The 
Holocaust is central here because anti-Semitism is the 
only way American Jewish consciousness can objectify the 
Jewish religion. Everything else in Judaism is
28Interview with Jeshajahu Weinberg, March 14, 1990,
Washington, D.C.
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subjective here. The only thing alienated American Jews
can get het up about is anti-Semitism, because it's a
threat to life and to their vision of themselves.1,29 
Thus, because of disappointment with Israel's policies, fear 
of anti-Semitism, and the climate of ethnicity in the United 
States, the Holocaust arose as the new symbol of Jewish 
identity.
Evidence of the rise of the issue of the Holocaust is 
the proliferation of "Holocaust centers", beginning in the 
late 1970's and 1980's. According to Norich, of the 84 
entities commemorating the Holocaust that are listed in the 
1985-1986 Directory of Holocaust Centers. Institutions, and 
Organizations in North America (published by the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Council), 41 of them did not exist in
1977.3° jn the jjjQgt recent Directory. published in 1988 
(after Norich's article), there are 98 listings of Holocaust 
institutions in the United States, including 19 museums, 48 
resource centers, 34 archival facilities, 12 memorials, 26 
research institutes and five libraries.31
The overwhelming institutionalization of memorialization 
of the Holocaust may, in fact, eventually bring about a 
weakening in some American Jews' ties to the Jewish
29Hertzberg, lecture, Society for the Advancement of 
Judaism, February 4, 1990.
30Norich.
31Directorv of Holocaust Institutions. U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Council, Washington, D.C., 1988, p. vii.
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community. If many Jews are secular, and the secular ethnic 
manifestation of organized Judaism emphasizes mass murder and 
the past, will future generations want to remain linked to
the Jewish community? Fein warned in 1988: "The danger is
that we will come (have come?) to see the Holocaust as the 
most important thing that ever happened to us, even the 
richest, the one most filled with consequence and 
implication. "32
As James E. Young wrote in 1991:
"Holocaust museums are increasingly becoming the 
centres for historical education, activism and 
fundraising. Consequently, instead of learning about 
the Holocaust through the study of Jewish history, many 
Jews and non-Jews in America learn the whole of Jewish
history through the lens of the Holocaust. Without
other kinds of museums to a Jewish past, even to current 
life in the Diaspora to offset them, Holocaust memorials 
and museums tend to organize Jewish culture and identity 
around this one era alone....As a result, not only will 
the Holocaust continue to suggest itself as a centre if 
American Jewish consciousness, but it will become all 
that non-Jewish Americans know about a thousand years of 
European Jewish civilization.1,33
32Fein, p. 62.
33James E. Young, "Holocaust Memorials in America: The
Politics of Identity", in Survey of Jewish Affairs, Vol. 10,
ed. William Frankel, Basil Blackwell, London, 1991 (page
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Referring to the centralization of memorialization of 
the Holocaust in the organized American Jewish community, 
Saul Friedlander asked: "Will this be the core in the
future, or can we go beyond it?"34
SUMMARY
Before 1960, the organized Jewish community was 
virtually unconcerned about memorializing the Holocaust. 
Therefore an American president, a New York City mayor or a 
New York State governor would not have sought to use this 
issue to gain political favor in the community. There was no 
overture from any elected official, no iron triangle or issue 
network, and no Mutagon of political allies dedicated to 
creating a memorial. The community's interest in the 
Holocaust emerged somewhat with the 1961 Eichmann trial, and 
then, much more powerfully, with the 1967 Six Day War. The 
1973 Yom Kippur War reinforced this. After the wars, the 
Holocaust began to replace, or at least join, Israel as a 
focus for secular American Jews. Israel remained the prime 
issue of importance for the major American Jewish 
organizations, but they integrated the Holocaust into 
rhetoric about Israel (especially after Begin became Prime 
Minister in 1977). Despite growing interest in commemorating 
the Holocaust, the organized American Jewish community did
proofs 1-13), p. 12.
34Friedlander, 1990 lecture.
not seek a national Holocaust memorial from the Federal 
government. Instead, as is detailed in Chapter 7, President 
Carter proposed the idea to them. After Carter announced 
creation of a national memorial in 1978, memorialization of 
the Holocaust became official United States policy and 
therefore even more important to the organized American 
Jewish community. This background is necessary for 
understanding what led to Mayor Koch's naming a Task Force on 
the Holocaust in 1981, followed by a Holocaust Memorial 
Commission in 1982, for the purpose of building a Holocaust 
memorial museum in New York City. When Governor Cuomo joined 
Mayor Koch as a "founding" co-chairman of the project in 
1986, the structure of the political forces responsible for 
carrying out the project, the Mutagon, changed into a polygon 
with two heads.
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CHAPTER 4: EARLY ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A MAJOR HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL IN NEW YORK CITYs 1946-1965
"This is the site for the American memorial to the heroes of 
the Warsaw Ghetto battle April-May 1943 and to the six 
million Jews of Europe martyred in the cause of human 
liberty."1
The Mutagon, the political alliance that has been 
endeavoring from 1981 to 1991 to create a Holocaust memorial 
museum in New York City, has a long and complicated pre­
history. Although memorializing the Holocaust was not 
formally on the agenda of the organized American Jewish 
community until 1973-1974, in 1946 and in the early 1960s two 
significant but unsuccessful commemorative efforts began in 
New York City. They did not succeed, primarily, because they 
were not projects backed by the organized Jewish community, 
the topic did not yet have any political value for American 
government officials, and the sponsoring groups thus had 
difficulty building the political alliances necessary for 
implementation. The first attempt, in 1946, was begun by one 
vigorous and dedicated person who had a small organization to 
use as a power base to try to interest others. Individuals, 
rather than Jewish organizations, backed the effort.
In the 1960s, by contrast, some major Jewish 
organizations joined the spearheading group. However, they 
did not give the project priority and appropriate political
1Plaque in Riverside Park, between 83rd and 84th 
Streets, dedicated October 19, 1947.
alliances were not forged. Ultimately both projects failed, 
but, as will be demonstrated, they helped to set the stage 
for later government intervention into memorialization of the 
Holocaust. When Mayor Edward I. Koch's administration 
intervened to "initiate" a memorial in 1981, the idea already 
had a history of 35 years of plans and attempts in New York 
City. Prior to Mayor Koch's tenure, interest groups came to 
New York City mayors to request a memorial. In the case of 
Koch, he coopted the idea, made it his own, officially 
intervened, and came to the Jewish community. He created the 
public-private political alliance that became the Mutagon.
An analysis of the pre-Koch attempts to create a 
Holocaust memorial in New York City will shed some light on 
why they did not succeed. Variables that account for the 
early failures to create a Holocaust memorial include: the
interest groups' inexperience in forming political alliances, 
the political climate, financial problems, lack of interest 
and other priorities in the Jewish community, the subsequent 
lack of political benefits for government officials, the 
psychological inability of survivors and other Jews to face 
the Holocaust, disagreements within the interest group 
seeking to create a memorial. The government did not 
intervene in those early attempts, because there was no 
serious interest yet in the organized Jewish community, and 
thus no political gain from coopting the project. Mayors and 
other elected officials gave lip service and limited
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assistance and promised to cooperate, but they did not make 
the project their own, as Koch later did.
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New 
York City (and probably in the nation) was in 1946-1947, in 
Riverside Park between 83rd and 84th Streets, along the 
Hudson River. The effort was coordinated by a group called 
American Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc. Mayor 
William O'Dwyer was Honorary Chairman of the National 
Committee of Sponsors, and Robert Moses, as Park 
Commissioner, was a member ex-officio. The mayor was 
supportive and designated a piece of City land for the 
memorial, but otherwise was not closely linked with the 
project. Powerful Park Commissioner Moses was also generally 
supportive of the idea. The list of sponsors was long and 
prestigious, including many congressmen, professors, Jewish 
and non-Jewish clergymen who lent their names but were not 
actively involved. Unlike later attempts to build Holocaust 
memorials in New York City, this project was not officially 
sponsored by a consortium of Jewish organizations or by the 
City; nor was the issue "hot". There was no iron triangle, 
issue network or Mutagon of political allies working together 
on the project.
This first attempt at a memorial was really a single- 
handed effort. The initiator and guiding spirit was Adolph 
R. Lerner, a Polish Jewish refugee who was a journalist and 
publisher. He was vice president of the National
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Organization of Polish Jews in New York, a group of refugee 
professionals.2 He had fled Vienna when the Nazis took over 
Austria in 1938, going first to France and then to the United 
States. During 194 3 and 1944 he worked at the official 
Polish news agency in New York, editing bulletins that 
arrived from the Polish underground.
Lerner had enough political savvy to know he could not 
do the job single-handed, and that he needed an interest 
group behind him. In January, 194 6, Lerner presented his 
idea for a memorial to the National Organization of Polish 
Jews in New York, suggesting that a memorial "in tribute to 
the Heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto and the six million Jews 
slain by the Nazis, be erected in New York City."3
On February 6, 194 6, Lerner used the organization's name 
to submit a written request to Mayor O'Dwyer, asking him to 
find an appropriate site for an "eternal light" memorial 
dedicated to the fallen heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto. In 
response, the mayor invited Lerner and a delegation from the 
National Organization of Polish Jews to City Hall, where they 
met with Comptroller Lazarus Joseph. (Rather than getting 
involved personally, the mayor delegated his Jewish 
comptroller.) A few days later, Lerner and two other members
2S. L. Shneiderman, "To Memorialize the Six Million: 
The Monument Controversy", Congress Bi-Weeklv. February, 
1965.
3A. R. Lerner, "The Case of the Memorial", Unpublished 
manuscript, undated, files of YIVO, New York, p. 1.
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were invited to visit Stuart Constable, Chief Designer of the 
Park Department. Constable told them Commissioner Moses had 
approved the proposal and would be glad to cooperate. At 
that meeting, Arthur Szyk, a member of the delegation, 
suggested that Jo Davidson would be the best sculptor for the 
project. (There is no record of why Davidson was chosen.)4
On April 18, Lerner received a letter from Moses which
said: "Frankly, I am not very sympathetic to the
idea of another ETERNAL LIGHT [a light above the 
Torah ark in synagogues, which was how Lerner had 
described the proposed memorial to O'Dwyer]. I am 
sure, however, that you can find a suitable place 
in one of the parks for a fitting Memorial, if it 
is to be designed by a first-rate sculptor, 
assisted by a competent architect. I understand 
that you have been considering Jo Davidson as the 
sculptor - you could not find a better man. It is 
impossible for me to make any final decision on 
the Memorial, or its location, until I see models 
and plans of the Memorial. The Art Commission 
will undoubtedly make the same request."5 
With Moses, who controlled the parks, lauding the committee's 
first choice of Davidson as the designer, the project seemed 




his committee did not seem to understand how to capitalize on 
their choice of Davidson and push the project through.
On April 27, 1947 "Eternal Light Monument in the City of 
New York in Memory of Six Million Jews of Europe" became a 
corporation. Lerner then invested time in trying to shore up 
what could have become the interest group angle of an iron 
triangle. He spent more than a year trying to get the 
support of all of the Jewish organizations, without success. 
"Individually nearly all the Jewish organizations made me 
believe that they were wholeheartedly for the project, but 
finally I came to the conclusion that all my efforts to bring 
them together for a unified action were in vain," he wrote. 
"I had several meetings with the representatives of the NCRAC 
[National Jewish Community Relations Council] member agencies 
who in general had expressed themselves in sympathy with the 
sentiment. . .but many of them felt that they were not directly 
concerned as organizations."6 This is evidence of the lack 
of interest of the established organized Jewish community in 
the subject of Holocaust memorialization at that time. As 
was stated in Chapter 3, NJCRAC did not place the topic on 
its agenda until 1973-1974, 26 years after Lerner sought
their support.
Davidson wrote to Lerner on April 16, 1947 that he would 
prepare a model, putting "my heart and soul into the creation 
of this Monument." He said: "Such a monument would be a
6Ibid. , p. 3.
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symbol of the Unconquerable spirit of all freedom loving 
people, and a warning to tyranny that we shall not forget." 
Davidson and Constable chose the site in Riverside Park, 
between 83rd and 84th Streets. Edward Banfield's or other 
analyses of the politics of site selection do not apply here: 
According to Lerner's account, Davidson said he and Constable 
had seen an old bearded Jew standing on that spot in
contemplation and decided it was ideal. On May 2, 1947,
Lerner received a letter from Moses stating this site had his 
approval. He also granted permission for a dedication 
ceremony.7 The City, however, retained veto power over the 
design.8
At a May 20, 1947 meeting, the name of the organization 
Lerner created was changed from the Eternal Light Monument to 
the American Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc. 
Two days later a certificate of the corporation's name change 
was filed with the New York State Secretary of State. Lerner
was reelected president at this meeting. On May 28, at a
meeting in Borough President Rogers's office, Lerner reported 
on plans for dedicating the Riverside Park site on October 
19. Efforts to raise funds for the dedication almost ended 
in failure, until a wealthy acquaintance of Lerner's named I. 
Rogosin joined the group, pledged $1000, and promised to get
7Ibid., pp. 3-4.
^olf Von Eckhardt, Eric Mendelsohn. George Braziller, 
1960, p. 30.
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most of the rest of the necessary $6000 from friends.9
On September 23, 1947, Moses wrote to Lerner: "You may
be sure you will have the full cooperation of the Park 
Department." Lerner said: "I was very happy about this and
felt a deep gratitude and love for [Moses]."10 Moses has 
been criticized for being an "anti-Semitic Jew" who did not 
even want to acknowledge his Jewishness. At this point, 
however, perhaps moved by the impact of Hitler's genocide of 
the Jews, he seemed genuinely interested in bringing a 
memorial to fruition.11 Despite his expressed support, 
however, there is no record of Moses trying to push the 
project through (as he did with so many other projects he 
decided he wanted).
On October 19, 1947 a ceremony was held at the site,
where a plaque (intended as a cornerstone) was dedicated. 
Soil from concentration camps and a proclamation from the 
Chief Rabbi of Palestine were among items placed in a box 
beneath the cornerstone. According to newspaper accounts, 
some 15,000 people attended the dedication ceremony. Lerner, 
then Chairman of the Memorial Executive Committee, was quoted 
in a September 17, 1947 press release that the memorial
"would be a living American symbol of democracy and
9Lerner, pp. 7-8.
10Ibid. , p. 11.
11Moses's anti-Jewish attitude is documented in Robert 
A. Caro, The Power Broker. Vintage Books, 1975, pp. 411-412.
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brotherhood, and would inspire the fulfillment of the world's 
obligations to those who survived the Nazi holocaust." As 
was stated in Chapter 2, Lerner had Zionist motives for 
dedicating the site right before the United Nations vote on 
the partition of Palestine. In his press release, Lerner 
seemed to be saying that the Holocaust was the reason the 
world (i.e., the United Nations) had the responsibility for 
creating a Zionist state.
The plaque in Riverside Park, surrounded by a metal 
fence, remains today, and says: "This is the site for the
American memorial to the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto battle 
April-May 1943 and to the six million Jews of Europe martyred 
in the cause of human liberty." Lerner's statement and the 
plaque seem to balance the distinctively Jewish aspect of the 
Holocaust with a more universal message of "democracy and 
brotherhood" and "the cause of human liberty". In the 
political climate of the 199 0s, when the ethnicity of groups 
is proudly displayed and Jews in the United States are less 
insecure about anti-Semitism, the statement that "the Jews of 
Europe died in the cause of human liberty" seems not only 
historically false but unfair to the victims. They did not 
"die" for "the cause of human liberty"; they were murdered in 
a rationally planned genocidal national policy, merely 
because they were Jews. The effort begun in 1946 never 
materialized beyond this plaque.
On November 26, 1947, the memorial committee met at the
101
Hotel Roosevelt. At that time Rogosin was elected Chairman 
of the Board and Lerner was appointed executive director, 
with a salary of $600 a month. An Advisory Art Committee was 
set up, and a decision was made to launch a fund raising 
campaign to raise $600,000. On March 11, 1948, the American 
Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc. wrote to Jo 
Davidson, sculptor and Eli Jacques Kahn, architect, to 
confirm arrangements for construction of a monument in 
Riverside Park. Davidson was supposed to deliver a scale 
model no later than July 1 of that year, which then needed 
approvals from the Art Commission, Park Department, and Board 
of Directors of the American Memorial committee. Davidson 
was to receive a maximum of $15,000, of which $5000 was 
enclosed. Kahn was to render preliminary architectural and 
engineering services, for a maximum of $5000. Subsequent 
stages were to be arranged after approvals of the scale 
model.12
In April, 1948, the campaign to raise $600,000 for the 
memorial was announced in a local newspaper.13 Mayor 
O'Dwyer wrote to Lerner on July 26, 1948 that "your campaign 
to obtain funds to erect this monument has my wholehearted 
approval and I am confident that our liberty-loving and 
generous citizens will respond to your appeal." He added:
12Lerner, pp. 19-2 0.
13"Drive Underway for Riverside Drive Memorial", West 
Side News. April 1, 1948.
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"This will not be a monument of bronze or concrete but rather 
a spiritual citadel inscribed: It shall not come to pass
again!1 Despite this glowing rhetoric, there is no evidence 
O'Dwyer helped with fund raising efforts or made any further 
commitment to the cause.
On October 20, 1948, a year after the Riverside Park
ceremony, the American Memorial to Six Million Jews of 
Europe, Inc. organized a first anniversary ceremony at City 
Hall. Emphasizing the need for funds was clearly on the 
agenda, because Lerner said in his address: "With the
encouragement of our great Mayor and of eminent leaders of 
our religious and cultural institutions I urge all of you to 
give us your continued financial and moral support to the end 
that the magnificent Memorial we are planning will rise 
before many months have passed."14
Models by Davidson and Eli Jacques Kahn went on exhibit 
at the Jewish Museum in November, 1948. Lerner said at that 
time, however, that the committee had asked other sculptors 
to submit models, and the committee had not yet made a 
decision.15 There is no further record, but this statement 
seems politically unwise, considering Moses's support of 
Davidson. Lerner seems to have lost his chance to have Moses 
as a staunch ally for the project. Davidson's original
14A. R. Lerner, Address, October 20, 1948, Archive of
YIVO, New York.
15The New York Times. November 23, 1948, fragment of
clipping in archives of YIVO, New York.
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design depicted the April 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising, and he 
did at least the one scale model that was displayed.16 The 
memorial committee was not pleased that, after months, 
Davidson's model was no more detailed than "the same little 
figures which he had in November 1947". The artist, however, 
insisted that the model be submitted to the City Art 
Commission. The Art Commission rejected the Davidson 
design.17 There is no available record of the reasons for 
their rejection, nor of any lobbying attempt on the part of 
the memorial committee.
After this initial impasse, the memorial committee held 
a competition for design of a memorial. Artists that 
included Davidson, and also Eric Mendelsohn and Ivan 
Mestrovic, Percival Goodman, William Zorach, Leo Friedlander, 
and Chaim Gross, submitted proposals. Models were exhibited 
at the Jewish Museum in October, 1949, and at the Museum of 
Modern Art for one month in January, 1950. On June 17, 1951 
the Art Commission unanimously backed the design by 
Mendelsohn and Yugoslav sculptor Mestrovic.18 On July 18 of 
that year, the American Memorial to Six Million Jews of 
Europe, Inc. announced approval by the Art Commission of this
16This is documented in press releases and news articles 
of that time; and in Wolf Von Eckhardt, Eric Mendelsohn. 
George Braziller, 1960; and in Bruno Zevi, Erich Mendelsohn. 
Rizzoli, 1985.




much more universal design. The sculpture was to be of an 
eighty-foot pylon of two tablets on which the Ten 
Commandments would be inscribed, a 100-foot wall of bas- 
relief depicting humankind's struggle to fulfill the 
Commandments, and a giant carving of Moses.
Although Lerner' s committee had obtained, a site from the 
City Park Commission, placed a cornerstone in a public 
ceremony attended by government officials and thousands of 
people, engaged a top rate architect-sculptor team, and 
received official approval of the City Art Commission, this 
first effort to create a major Holocaust memorial in New York 
City failed. The main reason for this failure was that the 
organized American Jewish community, and therefore, the 
government, did not have the subject of Holocaust 
memorialization on their agendas. Therefore there was no 
possibility of forming a strong interest group-government 
coalition to see the project through. According to S. L. 
Shneiderman, a journalist who was involved with the project, 
leaders of Jewish organizations urged at the time that any 
money raised in the American Jewish community should be used 
for rehabilitating survivors rather than creating a memorial, 
and this resulted in fund raising difficulties.19 If this 
is accurate, the organized Jewish community hindered, rather 
than encouraged, the effort to create the first Holocaust 
memorial in New York City.
19Ibid.
Lerner complained of always having to scrape for money. 
He expressed his "disappointment in not succeeding to move 
the leading Jewish civic and religious organization[s] to a 
unified participation in the project. Although the leaders 
of various religious groups of Jewish faiths joined as 
sponsors of the Memorial project, and also the leaders of 
various civic organizations became sponsors, I missed the 
active support of a number of leading civic Jewish 
organizations of which the attitude was rather aloof." In 
addition, he referred to disagreements within the committee, 
with Rogosin using a narrow base for fundraising and himself 
wanting a mass appeal.20 He also said the contract with 
Davidson and Eli Jacques Kahn "became a source of the most 
distressing intrigues and quarrels, and has created 
situations which never ceased to threaten to destroy this 
whole project."21 Rebecca Read Shanor said the project 
failed because of lack of funds, but she did not elaborate on 
why the funds were not forthcoming from the organized Jewish 
community.22 The fact that memorialization of the Holocaust 
was not on the community's agenda is the main reason there 
was not a forceful private-public coalition on behalf of the 
project, nor successful fund raising efforts.
20Lerner, pp. 16-17.
21Ibid., p. 19.
22Rebecca Read Shanor, The City That Never Was. Viking, 
1988, p. 219.
One reason the organized Jewish community did not 
aggressively support creation of a Holocaust memorial in the 
early 1950s was this was the time the Jewish Agency was 
negotiating with West Germany for reparation money for 
survivors of the Holocaust and for Israel. The community did 
not want to anger West Germany at a time when Israel was 
trying to extract hefty guilt payments. In March of 1951 
Israel Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had submitted a claim to the 
four occupying powers of Germany— the United States, Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union— for $1.5 billion, his price for 
Jewish property looted and burned by the Nazis. When the 
powers refused to deal with him and told him to deal directly 
with Germany, Ben-Gurion said he would do so. He then asked 
Jewish Agency Chairman Nahum Goldmann to negotiate with 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, Goldmann was 
promised more than $800,000,000. (There were also
negotiations with East Germany, but no agreement was 
reached.)
Another reason the community may have been cautious 
about supporting a Holocaust memorial was the then pervading 
political climate of the Cold War. The old ally, the Soviet 
Union, was now the enemy, and the old enemy, Nazi Germany, 
was now the new ally, in the form of the Federal Republic, or 
West Germany. The United States was from the end of the war 
even secretly bringing into the United States known Nazi war 
criminals (e.g., through Project Paperclip) to get a
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technological edge on the Soviet Union. In the paranoid 
climate of that time, the organized Jewish community was 
afraid an activity that was anti-Nazi, i.e., anti-German, 
could be construed as pro-Communist. They may also have been 
afraid a memorial would draw attention to the fact that so 
many resistance fighters and heroes had been Communists. 
This was not an atmosphere in which the conservative 
establishment Jewish organizations wanted to actively support 
and raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for a monument 
that would be both specifically Jewish and anti-German.
The organizations had reason to be cautious, because 
this was the era when Senator Joseph McCarthy began his 
infamous investigations of people he considered Communists, 
and many Jews were high on his list of targets. In March 22, 
1947, Truman issued Executive Order 983 5, which launched a 
program to search out "infiltration of disloyal persons" in 
the United States government. Between this time and the end 
of 1952, some 6.6 million people were investigated. 
Meanwhile, external events such as the 1948 Berlin blockade, 
the 1949 Communist victory in China and the Soviet Union7s 
explosion of its first atomic bomb, and the 1950 beginning of 
the Korean War were portrayed as signs of an international 
Communist conspiracy. As Howard Zinn said, the Truman 
administration "established a climate of fear— a hysteria 
about Communism— which would steeply escalate the military 
budget and stimulate the economy with war-related orders.
108
This combination of policies would permit more aggressive 
actions abroad, more repressive actions at home."23
McCarthyism made the Jewish community especially afraid, 
because it had a decidedly anti-Semitic element to it. By 
the summer of 1950, the prosecution of (Jewish) accused spies 
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg was a major component in the anti­
communist mood of the country; they were found guilty of 
espionage and executed on June 19, 1953. Naomi W. Cohen's 
history of the American Jewish Committee quotes a 1947 office 
memorandum of that organization which said: "For a number of
years, anti-semitic activists have assiduously promoted the 
smear that Jews are Communists. They have found this to be 
the most effective line with which they were left, since the 
decline of organizational activity. The acceleration of the 
anti-Communist campaign has come as a windfall to them, and 
our reports indicate a steady procession of anti-semitic 
operators from their regular sphere of activity onto the 
bandwagon of the general anti-Communist movement." Cohen 
named Gerald L. K. Smith, Conde McGinley, and Upton Close as 
among these "hatemongers".24
Many of those accused by McCarthy and others were 
Jewish, and Jewish organizations and individuals were thus
23Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century: A People's
History. Harper and Row, New York, 1980, p. 128.
24Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist: The American
Jewish Committee. 1906-1966. Jewish Publication Society, 
Philadelphia, 1972, p. 346. See Chapter 13, pp. 345-382.
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extremely sensitive to past and present accusations of 
"international conspiracy", Communist party membership, and 
disloyalty. Some major Jewish organizations bent over 
backward to prove their loyalty, even offering to sell out 
their suspect members. For example, in 1953 there was a 
letter of understanding between such organizations as the 
Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish War Veterans and American 
Jewish Commit^e and the House Unamerican Activities 
Committee, in which the Jewish organizations offered to draw 
up dossiers for the Committee.25
This was the political climate of the United States at 
the time that the group called the American Memorial to Six 
Million Jews of Europe, Inc. was trying to create a Holocaust 
memorial in Riverside Park. And New York City was one of the 
cities most affected by the Cold War and McCarthyism. It had 
a concentration of leftist, socialist, and Communist 
individuals and organizations, many of them Jewish. Although 
then Mayor O'Dwyer lent his support to the idea of the 1947 
project, he would not have dreamed of initiating the creation 
of a Holocaust memorial or aggressively supporting one: this
25"Part I: Open Letter to the Jewish People of the
United States" by the Editors; "Part II: Memorandum of the
ADL (July 3, 1953); "Part III: The Harap Testimony Before
the Unamerican Activities Committee, Jewish Life. September 
1953. Charles R. Allen, Jr., "A Talk with Velde 
Collaborators: An Interview that Reflects a Policy of
Appeasement by Three Jewish 'Defense' Organizations toward 
the McCarthyite Danger to Democracy", Jewish Life. October, 
1953, New York. Also, Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist. 
Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 354.
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was not the time for gaining political advantages from 
intervening and placing such a memorial on a governmental 
agenda. The major American Jewish organizations, themselves, 
were not aggressively supporting the idea nor backing it 
financially. To the contrary, there is evidence they were 
opposed, as such a project would take away from fund raising 
efforts for Israel and for resettlement of Jewish 
refugees.26
The Holocaust survivors, themselves, were in no mental 
or financial condition to organize the creation of a memorial 
in the decade following the war. Psychologically, it would 
take many years for some of them to begin talking about their 
experiences. (Some never were able to do so.) They were 
beginning new lives in a strange country with a different 
language— a feat that is difficult even without having 
suffered near death. In addition, as Elie Wiesel said, the 
survivors were considered "second class citizens" by the 
organized Jewish community at that time, and their leadership 
in such an effort would not have been well received by the 
community.27 As new Americans, survivors were also "walking
26Letter from A. R. Lerner to Emil Shneiderman, February 
24, 1965. Memo from S. L. Shneiderman to Richard Cohen,
American Jewish Congress, April 21, 1977 (about April 18
meeting). Memorandum from Victoria Free to Richard Cohen, 
"Notes from a press conference at the Jewish Community 
Relations Council-March 24, 1977", March 25, 1977. Archives 
of YIVO, New York (archival box filed under "American 
Memorial to Six Million Jews of Europe).
27Wiesel interview, August 8, 1990.
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on eggs" to show gratitude to their adopted country and to 
prove they had no connection with their countries of origin, 
most of which had become Soviet-bloc. They were looking 
forward rather than backward. (Survivors and survivor groups 
were involved in later efforts.)
A national fundraising drive for $500,000 to finance the 
Riverside Park memorial was not announced until September, 
1952, five years after the dedication ceremony. There has 
been no published history or analysis of why the project 
failed, and almost everyone active in this first attempt to 
create a Holocaust memorial is no longer alive. From the 
history of the project, the following factors emerge as 
components in the ultimate failure of the project: the Cold
War political climate of the time; financial problems, lack 
of interest and other priorities in the organized Jewish 
community; the subsequent lack of political benefits for 
government officials; the psychological inability of 
survivors and other Jews to face the Holocaust; disagreements 
within the interest group seeking to create a memorial; and 
inability to raise sufficient funds. The combination of 
these factors made it impossible to form a political 
coalition that might have moved the project forward at that 
time. A coalition such as the Mutagon, which followed the 
initiation of Mayor Koch's 1981 project, was not even a gleam 
in anyone's eye.
The paranoia caused by the Cold War and connected fear
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of anti-Semitism are likely reasons that statements the 
committee made about the project were not distinctively 
Jewish. The universal approach of the group sponsoring the 
memorial was underscored by Rabbi David de Sola Pool, a 
member of the Advisory Design Committee for the Memorial 
committee, who wrote: "The monument will seek to express, as
only an artist can, the aspiration of man toward the moral 
law of a universal God and the ideal of brotherhood and love 
among men." While he said that the Nazi atrocities must not 
be forgotten, he added: "The memorial is not 'a strictly
Jewish memorial.' It does, indeed, record the sacrifice of 
the six million Jews who lost their lives under Nazi rule. 
But the remembrance of them belongs to all men for whom 
nazism is repugnant and odious. Many Christians are 
associated with the memorial. . ..1,28
After the failure of the first project in 1952, ten 
years elapsed before a new effort was mounted. Meanwhile, 
the Cold War continued, but the domestic political scene was 
changing. In 1954 the Supreme Court had struck down the 
"separate but equal" doctrine with the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision. Rosa Parks had sat down in the white 
section of a bus in Alabama in 1955 and had been arrested. 
This set off a boycott and other actions that resulted, in 
November, 1956, in the Supreme Court's outlawing segregation
28D. De Sola Pool, letter to the editor, The New York 
Times, June 20, 1952.
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on local bus lines. In 1960 the first Catholic in American 
history was elected President. By the summer of 1963, 
Martin Luther King had told 200,000 black and white Americans 
assembled in Washington, D.C., "I have a dream...." In 
August, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting 
Rights Act into law.29
Between 1962 and 1965, in this new atmosphere of civil 
rights demonstrations and legislation, and ethnic pluralism, 
there was a second attempt to create a major Holocaust 
memorial in Riverside Park. The new struggles for human 
rights for Blacks in the United States and the new climate of 
ethnicity may have consciously or unconsciously influenced 
this renewed effort to memorialize the violation of the human 
rights of Jews by the Nazis.
This next effort in Riverside Park was not by the same 
people as the 1947-1952 attempt. In fact, two different 
groups were trying to erect two different memorials in 
Riverside Park in the early 1960s, both designed by sculptor 
Nathan Rapoport. Some leaders of Holocaust survivor groups 
were involved in this second attempt, although the real 
emergence of survivors as a visible united group did not 
occur for almost twenty more years. (It might be possible to 
do a rational analysis of competing interest groups to 
explain why one memorial in Riverside Park was not enough at 
this point. However, the following classic Jewish joke
29Zinn, pp. 152-162.
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explains the situation better, by placing it in the 
irrational context of Jewish communal life: A Jew was
shipwrecked on a desert island and build two mud huts. When 
he was rescued, he explained to his puzzled rescuers why he 
needed two of them. They were both synagogues, one of which 
he refused to enter.)
The first, broader based group consisted of Polish 
Holocaust survivors, the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance 
Organization (WAGRO), with the backing of 34 Jewish 
organizations. This WAGRO effort, which was the stronger of 
the two, was headed by survivor Vladka Meed, representing 
WAGRO and the survivors, and Benjamin Gebiner of the 
Workmen's Circle. Using the WAGRO organization headed by her 
husband, Benjamin Meed, as her base, Vladka Meed, along with 
Gebiner, brought together a coalition of 34 major and mostly 
minor survivor organizations to create the Memorial Committee 
for the Six Million Jewish Martyrs and Heroes.30 Rapoport's 
design for WAGRO, submitted to the group on October 13, 1964, 
was a Torah scroll, with bas reliefs of Holocaust episodes.
30In addition to WAGRO, memorial sponsors were: American
Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Jewish Labor 
Committee, Jewish War Veterans, B'nai B'rith, Workmen's 
Circle, Farband-Labor Zionist Order, New York Board of 
Rabbis, National Council of Jewish Women, Bergen-Belsen 
Association, Club of Polish Jews, Jewish Nazi Victims of 
America, Federation of Polish Jews, Association of Yugoslav 
Jews, United Galician Jews of America, United Rumanian Jews 
of America, World Sephardi Federation, World Federation of 
Russian Jews, World Federation of Hungarian Jews, Danish- 
American Jewish Committee, Bulgarian Claims Committee, World 
Federation of Ukrainian Jews. (Files of WAGRO, New York 
City.)
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According to the artist, "On this scroll is written in 
sculptural language the history of the Jews. It tells of 
martyrdom, fight and of liberation."31
On November 12, 1964, WAGRO and 25 representatives of 
Jewish organizations met with Mayor Robert F. Wagner and 
Parks Commissioner Newbold Lewis to request that a memorial 
be erected. As with Mayor O'Dwyer, a group approached the 
mayor; he did not intervene and approach the group. Besides 
the mayor, this group had already sought other political 
support in the State Legislature. New York State Senate 
Minority Leader Joseph Zaretzki accompanied them and spoke on 
their behalf. However, there is no further record of his 
involvement and the triangular political coalition never 
evolved.
Rapoport was present at the meeting with the mayor and 
gave him a photograph of the planned Torah scroll monument. 
At about the same time, WAGRO announced that pianist Artur 
Rubinstein would assume chairmanship of its memorial 
committee, the Memorial Committee for the Six Million Jewish 
Martyrs and Heroes.32 As is common for Jewish and other 
causes in New York City, a famous superstar had been enlisted 
to add glamor and gain publicity. This did not, however,
31Letter from Nathan Rapoport dated October 13, 1964,
files of WAGRO, New York.
32WAGRO translated reprint of articles in Yiddish Daily 
Forward. November 14, 1964 and The Dav-Jewish Journal.
November 15, 1964, files of WAGRO, New York.
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give the group enough clout to carry out their project.
In December 1964 WAGRO retained Rapoport to create a 
sketch and scale model of the sculpture, based on earlier 
diagrams and illustrations. The clay scale model was to be 
completed in approximately three months, and payment was to 
be $2000.33 On January 19, 1965, WAGRO called a meeting at 
the Statler Hotel in New York, which was attended by almost 
80 representatives of Jewish organizations and chaired by Dr. 
Joachim Prinz, president of American Jewish Congress. Prinz 
said the purpose of the meeting was "to create a broad 
organizational and moral basis for the efforts to erect the 
memorial". He pointed out there were memorials in Warsaw, 
Israel, Paris, Amsterdam and a new one in Philadelphia, but 
not in New York, the largest Jewish community in the world.
Vladka Meed, who spearheaded the project for WAGRO, 
reported on the group's warm reception by Mayor Wagner on 
November 13, 1964. She said the mayor had pledged his full 
support and reiterated the City's promise of the Riverside 
Drive site. There were, however, powerful opposing forces. 
She pointed out, that she was concerned about the position of 
the Commissioner of Parks, Newbold Morris. She reported that 
Morris had recently written to Rapoport and expressed his 
idea that "a public park is a place for enjoyment and 
recreation and not for exposing users of a park to the 
tragedy and horrors of one of the most dreadful chapters of
33Agreement, files of WAGRO, New York.
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human history". She said it was WAGRO's "unshaken belief" 
that the united Jewish organizations would be able to 
overcome these difficulties. (The major Jewish organizations 
were not, however, "united" in giving this project priority 
financial or political backing.)
At this meeting, Rapoport unveiled his model. It was to 
be two scrolls cast in concrete, 26 feet high and 40 feet 
wide. In addition to bas-reliefs representing the Holocaust, 
names of camps, ghettos, and sites of Jewish resistance would 
be inscribed. There would also be provision for an
auditorium, museum and library. Thus, as early as 1964, the
concept of a Holocaust memorial in New York City included a 
museum. The estimated cost was $1,000,000 (which seems too 
low) and members of WAGRO pledged the first $100,000.
The following resolution was adopted by the Conference: 
"Representatives of 32 major Jewish organizations 
assembled on the 19th of January, 1965 at the Statler 
Hotel, New York City, express their full support and
devotion to the idea of a proper Memorial for the Six
Million Martyrs and Heroes of the Holocaust, in New York 
City. This resolution is subject to the ratification by 
the respective organizations.
"The Conference authorized Dr. Joachim Prinz and 
WAGRO to form a Steering Committee from among the 
organizations, and to present to the Steering Committee
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a detailed program of further action."34
The second proposal for a Holocaust memorial in 
Riverside Park in the early 1960s was sponsored by a much 
narrower-based group, the Artur Zygelboim Memorial Committee, 
supported by some Jewish labor groups. The Zygelboim 
committee's proposal, which had been commissioned in 1962, 
was a figure with outstretched arms, engulfed in flames and 
thorns. It was much more specific than Rapoport's design for 
WAGRO. This sculpture commemorated the heroic suicide of 
Zygelboim, a Jewish Bundist labor leader who was a member of 
the Polish parliament-in-exile in London. When he learned 
about the death camps and his family's fate in 194 3, he 
killed himself to protest against the world's indifference to 
the mass destruction of Polish Jewry and the defeat of the 
Warsaw Ghetto fighters.35
Vladka Meed's warning to the WAGRO meeting about the 
negative attitude of the Commissioner of Parks was soon to 
prove accurate. At the New York City Art Commission's 
January 28, 1965 meeting at the home of its president, Arnold 
Whitridge, the Commission unanimously rejected both of 
Rapoport's designs for Riverside Park.36 The minutes show
34|,Conference of Jewish Organizations for the Memorial 
to the Six Million Martyrs and Heroes: Summary Report" [of
January 19, 1965 meeting], files of WAGRO, New York.
35Shneiderman.
36The Art Commission consisted of seven members appointed 
by the Mayor and four ex-officio members. Of the appointees, 
there had to be one painter, one sculptor, one architect and
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that submission 10894— Riverside Park, Manhattan, Warsaw 
Ghetto Monument Certificate 10803 (represented by Exhibits 
"2287-AV" and "AW") and submission 10895— Riverside Park, 
Manhattan, Zygelboim Memorial Certificate 10804 (represented 
by Exhibits "2287-AX" and "AY") were disapproved.37
Eleanor Platt, a sculptor who was an Art Commission 
member, was a forceful opponent. She wrote to other 
Commission members before the meeting: "The [Zygelboim]
figure is depicted in so tragic a posture that it does not 
seem to be appropriate for location on park land intended for 
recreation and relaxation. It does not seem to be desirable 
to confront children with sculpture of such distressing and 
horrifying significance, worthy as it might be in a more 
relevant place. I can reach no other conclusion than that a 
public park is not a proper place for it." She wrote that 
the Torah scroll sculpture was "excessively and unnecessarily 
large".
Platt also wrote that placement of either of the 
memorials "would set a highly regrettable precedent" because 
it might provide an opening for other "special groups" who
one landscape architect. The other three appointees were to 
have no connection with the fine arts. The Mayor was an ex­
officio member.
37Minutes, Special Meeting of New York City Art 
Commission, January 28, 1965, archives of YIVO, New York,
archival box filed under "American Memorial to Six Million 
Jews of Europe, Inc." A copy of the original disapproval of 
the Zygelboim Memorial Certificate 10804 is in the archives 
of The Bund, Zygelboim biographical files, New York.
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wanted to erect memorials on public land. She asked: "How
would we answer other special groups who wanted to be 
similarly represented on public land? In an attempt to treat 
all equally we could well end up with a profusion of such 
memorials and become responsible for a progressive violation 
of the basic concepts for park land use."38 An editorial in 
The New York Times supported the decisions of the Art 
Commission, on the basis that city parks are not the proper 
place for monuments. "Each new installation brings one more 
invasion of the open land that was carefully landscaped and 
preserved by men of vision as long as a century ago," the 
editorial said.39
Dr. Emanuel Scherer of the Zygelboim committee protested 
and said his committee would continue to press for the 
statue. After the Art Commission's rejection, however, the 
Zygelboim group transferred their effort to the creation of 
a memorial in the New Mount Carmel Workmen's Circle Cemetery 
in Brooklyn, where Zygelboim's ashes had been brought from 
London and interred on September 24, 1961. (In April 1972, 
a memorial stone with a flame motif on top of it was unveiled 
there.) The statue that Rapoport had designed for the WAGRO 
committee ultimately found a home in Israel in 1971, at the 
apex of Martyrs' Forest in the Judean Hills near Jerusalem.
38William E. Farrell, "City Rejects Park Memorials to 
Slain Jews", The New York Times. February 11, 1965, p. 1.
39"Memorials in the Parks", editorial, The New York 
Times. February 13, 1965.
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Mayor Wagner was sent a telegram of protest by the 
executive committee of Workmen's Circle, drafted at a special 
meeting. The telegram asked Wagner to intervene, reverse 
the Commission's decision, and "immediately to call a public 
hearing to determine whether the Municipal Arts Commission 
should not be reversed and censured."40 Dr. Prinz, chairman 
of the steering committee for WAGRO and 34 other Jewish
organizations supporting construction of the scroll
sculpture, sent a telegram to Wagner expressing "profound
shock" and urging the Mayor to intervene.
Rabbi Max Schenk, president of the New York Board of 
Rabbis, also sent a letter to the Mayor, referring to Platt's 
description of the memorial backers as a "special group". He 
said: "We Jews who live in New York do not consider
ourselves a 'special group.' We happen to be almost three 
million inhabitants of this city of eight million, an 
integral part of the warp and woof of America's greatest 
community." The memorial steering committee met on February 
15 at the Wellington Hotel to discuss their next step.41 
This next step was a February 24 meeting of the steering 
committee, headed by Rabbi Harold H. Gordon of the New York 
Board of Rabbis, with Wagner.
Platt had really stepped on a sore toe when she called
40Farrell, February 11, 1965.
41Farrell, "2 Jewish Leaders Protest Art Ban", The New 
York Times. February 12, 1965, p. 31.
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the Holocaust memorial committees, i.e., the Jews of New York 
City, a "special group". They considered themselves an 
integral and influential part of the City's power structure. 
Therefore, they expected speedy and adequate intervention 
from Mayor Wagner to reverse the situation. The mayor's 
response, however, was typically weak. He issued a statement 
on March 6, 1965, in which he said:
"The distinguished committee with which I met is 
not committed to any particular design, nor any specific 
structure, nor any designated location. This is a 
project in which I, personally, have been deeply 
interested. As far back as 1947 my late father [U. S. 
Senator Robert F.Wagner] enthusiastically supported such 
a memorial and it was my honor to represent him when the 
plot of ground was dedicated for this purpose on 
Riverside Drive. I have also been one of the first 
sponsors of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization 
(WAGRO) who initiated the present project.
"What happened during the Nazi period is 
unparalleled in the annals of mankind. The Six Million 
destroyed were part of all mankind. We fought a world 
war to defeat a government that made such horrors not 
only possible, but a reality. The world cannot afford 
to forget the Six Million. A memorial to these Six 
Million would serve to remind all of us of our share in 
the guilt of indifference and our responsibility to
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prevent a repetition.
"All New Yorkers are proud of our varied population 
and the major faiths to which they adhere. While the 
representatives of one of the major faiths seek the 
funds to establish the memorial I believe that it is a 
project in which the entire community should - and would 
want to - share. The Committee has assured me that it 
has taken the responsibility for raising the funds for 
the memorial. Similar memorials have been erected in 
prominent places in Paris, Philadelphia and Warsaw. I 
can assure the distinguished Committee and my fellow 
citizens that the City of New York will provide the 
appropriate site for this very necessary memorial in a 
location readily accessible to millions of residents and 
visitors.I|42
Wagner's weak reaction is evidence that once again a 
memorial committee did not have their political forces 
aligned and ready to move the project forward. Wagner 
clearly was not ready to take a stand and put himself in the 
forefront of efforts to create a Holocaust memorial in New 
York City. In making this statement, which never mentioned 
the unfavorable action of the Art Commission, Wagner promised 
the Steering Committee that the City would still provide a 
site. He made it clear that funding would be private and
42Press Release, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, 
For Release: PM papers, March 6, 1965 and AM papers, March
7, 1965. Files of WAGRO, New York.
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that a Holocaust memorial would be beneficial for the whole 
City and not only for the Jewish interest group that had 
approached him. He also made it clear that the location and 
design were both unspecified. Dr. Prinz, Steering Committee 
chairman, said the Mayor's statement was a confirmation "that 
a monument will be built in an appropriate and accessible 
place in our city." A spokesman for the Art Commission said 
the sponsors of the memorial would have to resubmit plans 
after a site had been agreed upon with the mayor.43
On February 24, 1965, the same day the Steering
Committee met with Wagner, Lerner, originator of the 1946 
project, wrote from Rome to his colleague Shneiderman. 
Lerner had read in the international edition of The New York 
Times that new models for a memorial had been submitted to 
the Art Commission. Lerner asked Shneiderman to inform Dr. 
Prinz "of all details about the history of the [first] 
Memorial project and without waiting and struggling for a new 
approval by the Art Commission, he should go ahead with 
building of a monument based on the [Mestrovic-Mendelsohn] 
models already approved....Also, if I would have the 
documents that I left with you, I would write to Mayor Wagner 
and remind him that the model of Mestrovic and Mendelsohn has 
already been accepted and therefore there is no necessity for
43Farrell, "Mayor Promises a Monument Site",- The New York 
Times, March 7, 1965.
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new models."44 There is no further documentation of whether 
Lerner's idea was pursued.
Lerner also asked Shneiderman a pointed question in his 
1965 letter: "I would be grateful if you inform me how it
happened that suddenly the Jewish organizations became 
interested in the erection of the Memorial - when I struggled 
for seven years to get their help the answer I got was 'it is 
more important to care for the living'."45 Lerner could not 
know then that this attitude had not yet changed and would 
continue to hinder efforts to create a Holocaust memorial for 
many years.
SUMMARY
Beginning in 1946 and again in the early 1960s, there 
were two unsuccessful attempts to create Holocaust memorials 
in Riverside Park in New York City. Neither project had a 
broad enough or strong coalition of political forces, and the 
respective mayors offered only a site and lip service. In 
the first case, the effort was really a "one man band" who 
created an interest group that was mostly on paper. At one 
point this group appeared to have the approval of both Mayor 
O'Dwyer and powerful Park Commissioner Robert Moses, which
44Letter from Adolph R. Lerner to Emil (S.L.) 
Shneiderman, Rome, Italy, February 24, 1965. Archive of YIVO 
Research Institute, New York, file labeled "American Memorial 
to the Six Million Jews of Europe, Inc."
45Ibid.
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might have made successful implementation possible. However, 
the Art Commission, which the group did not court, rejected 
the project of Davidson, the artist favored by Moses. 
Although it then approved Mendelsohn's model, Lerner could 
not raise sufficient funds, his weak coalition fell apart, 
and the project did not move forward.
The second major attempt, in the 1960s, had a somewhat 
broader base of major Jewish organizations. At an early 
stage it also had the support of a leader of the State 
legislature, as well as the mayor. However, as in the first 
case, all of these political allies offered little more than 
lip service. This coalition, like the first one, was too 
weak and never took hold firmly enough for the interest group 
to achieve its goal. Again the project was vetoed by the Art 
Commission. Mayor Wagner refused to intervene and the 
project did not move forward.
In both cases, the issue of Holocaust memorialization 
was not on the agenda of the organized American Jewish 
community, and therefore the interest group was not powerful 
enough to rally the required political forces. As will be 
demonstrated, the issue became politically "hot" in the 
1970s. This led to Mayor Koch's initiation of an alliance of 
political forces in 1981 to once again attempt to create a 
major Holocaust memorial in New York City. This changing 
alliance, or Mutagon, then remained at an impasse for more 
than ten years.
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CHAPTER 5: THE QUEST FOR A NEW YORK CITY HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
CONTINUES: 1965-1974
"The Six-Day War and other events of the sixties 
released the Holocaust genie from the bottle in which it had 
been trapped for over 20 years. But once the genie was out 
of the bottle, it could not be recaptured and stuffed back 
in...."
Aviva Cantor1
In 1965 a new phase began in the history of attempts to 
create a major Holocaust memorial in New York City. Like the 
earlier projects, this cannot be analyzed as an iron 
triangle, issue network, or a Mutagon. The City government, 
i.e. the City Council president and mayor, did intervene for 
the first time, both in site selection and in design of a 
memorial. However, this was not cooperative intervention at 
the request of an interest group that had formed an alliance 
with the government. Nor was it a step that was intended to 
win the organized Jewish community's favor. In fact, the 
community's and the memorial committee's reactions were 
vehemently negative at one point. (Unlike Mayor Koch in 
1981, then Mayors Robert F. Wagner and John Lindsay did not 
intervene to coopt the project and make it their own.)
The 1965-1974 time frame covered in this chapter was one 
of startling change in the organized American Jewish
1Aviva Cantor, unpublished manuscript (p. 973), Jews and 
Relationships: A Feminist Analysis. Chapter 15— "Denying,
Exploiting, Identifying with— And Doing Everything but 
Confronting— the Holocaust: Why American Jewry Became 'Holo-
centric'", forthcoming, Harper, San Francisco, 1992.
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community's interest in the subject of the Holocaust: At the
beginning, in 1965, before the 1967 Six Day War, the 
Holocaust was still not on their agenda. At the end, after 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the subject was getting hot, and for 
the first time commemorating the Holocaust had been 
officially placed on the community's agenda in 1973-1974 (see 
Chapter 3).
Meanwhile, the attempt to build a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York City went through a number of phases. 
Following the Art Commission's rejection of the Rapoport 
memorials and its aftermath, there was a brief and 
problematic interlude of government intervention by the City. 
First the City suggested and then reneged on a new location 
at Times Square. Then the City endorsed a new design for a 
memorial in yet another location, across from Lincoln Center, 
without consulting the Memorial Committee. The intervention 
became official and two-pronged on September 1, 1965 when
Mayor Wagner supported the suggestion of City Council 
President Paul Screvane that Times Square replace Riverside 
Park as the site of the Holocaust memorial. Screvane had 
suggested a paved mall between 45th and 4 6th Streets, south 
of the mall with memorials to Father Duffy and George M. 
Cohan. Screvane said: "A suitable memorial, at the
crossroads of the world, can be a constant reminder that 
unless each generation of Americans not only jealously 
safeguards, but enlarges, its inheritance of personal liberty
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and dignity, a retrogression to bigotry, intolerance and 
human degradation can occur." (Ironically, nineteen years 
later The Wall Street Journal would suggest that George 
Klein, co-chairman of the New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission and developer of Times Sguare through the Urban 
Development Corporation, build a Holocaust memorial there—  
rather than in Battery Park City. If the journalist knew 
this early history of site selection, he did not mention 
it.2)
This was not a decision made as the result of an 
interest group-government alliance of any kind. Instead, it 
was a case of the mayor and City Council president telling an 
interest group what the government had decided without the 
group's request or even their input. Leaders of the 
Committee for the Memorial for the Six Million were 
reportedly pleased with the idea of locating a Holocaust 
memorial at Times Square in 1965, even though they had not 
participated in the decision-making process for the 
relocation. Rabbi Max Schenk, President of the New York 
Board of Rabbis, said: "We feel this is ideally located."
Rabbi Harold Gordon, also with the Board of Rabbis, said the 
Committee was studying new sketches for submission to the Art 
Commission, and that the Committee expected to work closely 
with the Art Commission to get an idea of what kind of
2Raymond Sokolov, "Rm to Let. Landmark Bldg. 77,000 Sq. 
Ft.", The Wall Street: Journal. October 3, 1984, p. 28.
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memorial would be satisfactory.3 However, by November, 1965, 
the City had shifted the promised site to the northern end of 
Lincoln Square Park, across from Lincoln Center at Columbus 
Avenue and 65th Street. On November 23, the Committee wrote 
to Mayor Wagner and formally accepted this site.
Then, in December, for the first time, the City 
intervened in design selection, choosing Cain and Abel as a 
memorial theme without consulting the Committee. The 
Memorial Committee was appalled to learn that the City Art 
Commission had proposed a design for the Lincoln Square Park 
site, not approved by the Committee and deemed completely 
unsuitable. The Committee objected to both the theme of the 
design and the lack of participatory process. The interest 
group had not even been offered the opportunity for input or 
review.
The Committee met for three hours on December 3 0 to 
discuss the Art Commission's proposal. Dr. Joachim Prinz, 
Chairman of the Committee for the Six Million, told The New 
York Times after the meeting, "We are against the theme, not 
the art." The proposed memorial was a 30 foot high slab of 
granite or marble, on which would be a scene in bronze, 
depicting Cain slaying Abel (designed by sculptor Neil 
Easton). Objections by committee members were on the ground 
that Nazis were not brothers of the Jews, and that Cain's
3Martin Tolchin, "Times Square Memorial Urged", The New 
York Times. September 2, 19 65.
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murder of Abel was universal and not applicable. By saying 
they were not against the art, Prinz was clarifying that the 
Committee was not disputing the artistic quality of the 
design, but the subject matter.4
On December 30, Prinz released a statement that said: 
"The design proposed by the City Art Commission as a memorial 
to the Jewish victims of Nazi murder was never approved by 
the Committee for the Six Million. This Committee represents 
thirty-four national and local Jewish organizations that have 
joined hands in the effort to erect a fitting monument to the 
Jewish martyrs of 1933-45. The cost will be borne entirely 
by the Committee. The campaign for the erection of such a 
memorial was originated by the Committee. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, that the City Art Commission should 
consult closely with the Committee for the Six Million, and 
that together a fitting tribute to be erected in this city be 
agreed upon jointly." The statement said many members 
organizations of the Committee had rejected the design and 
theme when the Art Commission released it to the press 
earlier in the month, and that the Committee planned to 
conduct an international design competition.5
After their rejection of the City Art Commission's Cain
4"Monument to Jews Scored at Meeting", The New York 
Times, December 31, 19 65.
5"Statement Made by Dr. Joachim Prinz, Chairman of 
Committee for Six Million", December 30, 1965, files of
WAGRO, New York.
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and Abel motif for a Holocaust memorial near Lincoln Center 
in December 1965, the Committee to Commemorate the Six 
Million Jewish Martyrs more aggressively sought to create a 
Holocaust memorial at another site. There still was no 
alliance with the City government regarding a memorial. By 
March 16, 1966 Benjamin Gebiner, then acting chairman of the 
steering committee, said the committee was "wrestling with 
the Manhattan Borough President's office and the Parks 
Commissioner regarding a suitable location." These officials 
had feared the Lincoln Center location would obstruct 
traffic, and again wanted to change the site. The Committee, 
meanwhile, had decided the Riverside Park site was "hidden in 
the bushes", and they wanted a better, more prominent 
location.
Gebiner said he hoped to meet soon with Borough 
President Constance Baker Motley and Parks Commissioner 
Thomas Hoving or their representatives to resolve the 
question of a site. He added that afterward, there would be 
a design contest and a fund raising drive for the project. 
The committee also was planning a "memorial shrine" to house 
documents and artifacts. "We are in the initial stages of 
our project. But we are confident of struggling through 
these conflicts and achieving an appropriate memorial," 
Gebiner said.6 Gebiner, an attorney and officer of Workmen's
6Helen Sutton, "Memorial to Jews: Where and When?", New
York Journal American. March 16, 1966, p. 46.
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Circle, and Secretary Vladka Meed, a survivor representing 
the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization (WAGRO), wrote to 
the Art Commission on March 22, 1966. They said: "Our
committee did not authorize any person or any group to submit 
in our behalf for your consideration any model for the 
erection of a monument commemorating the six million martyred 
Jews, annihilated during the Nazi period. We call to your 
attention that a sculptor's model for such a monument, on the 
theme of Cain-and-Abel, was rejected by our committee." The 
letter asked for cooperation in erecting an appropriate 
monument.7 This was late in the game to begin building 
political bridges.
In August, 1966, Vladka Meed and Gebiner wrote from the 
Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs to 
its affiliated organizations to bring them up to date. They 
seem to have made progress in forging alliances that would 
move the project forward. The letter announced that the 
Steering Committee had chosen from a number of possibilities 
suggested by the City an area in Battery Park. The letter 
said:
"During the last few months, we have been engaged 
in discussions with the New York Dept, of Parks, for a 
suitable site on which to erect our proposed memorial. 
We must state that Commissioner Thomas Hoving was most
7Letter dated March 26, 1966 from Benjamin A. Gebiner 




"It was pointed out to us, that the previously 
assigned corner of Lincoln Center on 66th Street and 
Columbus Avenue, is a very small and noisy triangle with 
heavy traffic; a danger to any public gathering and 
unsuitable for a memorial.
"We also met with Borough President Motley. The 
Battery Park site was her suggestion.
"The several sites available in New York were 
considered by the Steering Committee at a series of 
meetings before the choice was made of Battery Park, on 
the basis of its unique historic significance and 
because it looks out on the Statue of Liberty and is 
visited daily by thousands of tourists and New 
Yorkers."8
Almost the same wording as the last paragraph was used, 
some twenty years later, to encourage acceptance of and then 
to describe the site of the Living Memorial to the Holocaust- 
Museum of Jewish Heritage, which the New York Holocaust 
Memorial Commission was planning at adjacent Battery Park 
City in the 1980s and early 1990s. Like the earlier attempts 
to create a major Holocaust memorial in New York City, the 
effort begun in 1965 failed. The history of these failed
®Letter from Benjamin Gebiner, "Chairman pro. tern." and 
Vladka Meed, "Sec'y pro. tern." to "Dear Friend", August 1966, 
stationery of Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish 
Martyrs, files of WAGRO, New York.
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projects documented and analyzed here is the pre-history of 
Mayor Koch's coopting the idea of Holocaust memorialization 
in 1981.
Gebiner and Meed's August 1966 letter (op. cit.) advised 
participating organizations that the Committee to Commemorate 
the Six Million Jewish Martyrs was organizing its own art 
committee of "prominent citizens". Rabbi Moshe Davidowitch, 
Chairman of the National Council of Art in Jewish life, was 
to be coordinator of the art committee, and David Lloyd 
Kreeger, a Washington attorney, Jewish community leader, and 
arts patron, was to be chairman. This was a belated but 
smart move: the Committee was actively asserting its own
expertise in the selection process for a design, by 
appointing leaders whose art credentials would impress the 
City Art Commission. In the same letter, Leon Joelson, 
"prominent industrialist" was named as chairman of a new 
financial committee and participating organizations were 
reminded to pay their dues of $100 for administrative 
purposes.9 The fact that both Kreeger and Joelson were 
prominent and wealthy should have helped the Committee's 
prestige, giving it more clout with both the organized Jewish 
community and elected officials.
While the participation of Kreeger and Joelson did not 
lead to successful implementation, after they became 
involved the Committee did have more say in the decision-
9Ibid.
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making process. (This may have been coincidental.) On 
October 13, 1966, Arthur Rosenblatt, design consultant to
Parks Commissioner Hoving (under Mayor Lindsay) , sent Gebiner 
a map of the suggested site for a monument. "I think the
site is a proper one as it is also adjacent to the Emma
Lazarus memorial tablet, and I suggest your committee
consider it," he wrote.10 Following a reply from Gebiner, 
on November 21, 1966, Rosenblatt sent him a letter of
agreement on the site. He enclosed a site plan of Battery 
Park marking the exact limits of the site, and asked for a 
meeting to discuss the choice of an architect and sculptor, 
and the method of financing the project. He reminded Gebiner 
the total cost, as well as perpetual maintenance, would be 
borne by the Committee.11
On February 18, 1967, the Committee issued a press
release announcing Kreeger's chairmanship of the art
committee, which consisted of seventeen architects, art 
historians, museum curators and others prominent in the art 
field.12 According to the press release, this committee
10Letter from Arthur Rosenblatt to Benjamin A. Gebiner, 
October 13, 1966, files of WAGRO, New York.
11Letter from Rosenblatt to Gebiner, November 21, 1966, 
files of WAGRO, New York.
12Members of the Art Committee were: Harry N. Abrams,
publisher of art books; H. Harvard Arnason, vice president of 
the Guggenheim Museum; Thomas S. Buechner, director of the 
Brooklyn Museum; David Finn, president of the Jewish Museum; 
Rene d'Harnoncourt, director of the Museum of Modern Art; 
Emily Genauer, art critic for the New York World Journal 
Tribune; Bruce Glaser, director of Gallery of Israeli Art;
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would commission the design of the memorial, in consultation 
with "leading Jewish historians and religious and cultural 
personalities". The press release also announced an 
educational and fund-raising campaign "to gather support for 
whatever proposal is finally approved". Kreeger was quoted 
that New York, "the world's political, business, and cultural 
center, with the largest Jewish population in the world, will 
at last have a suitable memorial for our generation and 
future generations."13
Records of this effort indicate it was much more 
sophisticated and organized that the former ones, more savvy 
in public relations, dealing with government officials, and 
raising money. However, an event intervened that changed the 
project's prospects for success: the June 1967 Six Day War.
Pressman and Wildavsky would call this a "diversion" in the 
"decision path".14 Thus the very event that nearly every 
scholar credits with creating an atmosphere that made the
Percival Goodman, architect; Robert Hale, retired from the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art; Dam Hunter, director of the 
Jewish Museum; Philip Johnson, architect; Louis I. Kahn, 
architect; Sherman E. Lee, director of the Cleveland Museum 
of Art; Abram Lerner, curator of the Hirshorn Collection; 
Thomas M. Messer, director of the Guggenheim Museum, Charles 
Parkhurst, director of the Baltimore Museum of Art; Meyer 
Schapiro, professor at Columbia University (and, at that 
time, at the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University).
13Press release, February 18, 1967, files of WAGRO, New
York.
14Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation 
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press, 
1979, p. xix.
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idea of Holocaust memorialization possible in the United 
States also took away the potential funding to make such 
memorialization possible at that time. Under the direction 
of the United Jewish Appeal, a massive fund raising effort 
was mounted, with an emergency campaign to support Israel 
during and after the war. In the wake of such crucial 
financial needs for living Jews, the idea of a monument to 
dead Jews seemed frivolous to Jewish communal leaders. The 
Six Day War raised consciousness of the Holocaust, but this 
new consciousness encouraged the organized Jewish community 
and individual American Jews to give money to support Israel- 
-not to give money to a project that memorialized the 
Holocaust.
Despite the dry financial prospects for its project, the 
Memorial Committee carried on its business throughout 1967- 
1968. A meeting was called for December 27, 1967 at the
Wellington Hotel, at which architect Louis Kahn of 
Philadelphia presented his design for a memorial to the 
participating organizations. With the Kreeger connection the 
Committee was able to interest this important sculptor. (At 
some time in 1967, the umbrella group's name on the 
letterhead changed from "Committee to Commemorate the Six 
Million Jewish Martyrs" to "Memorial to the Six Million 
Jewish Martyrs, Inc." This was only to make the language of 
the name smoother, and not a reflection of any substantive
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change in the committee.15) Department of Parks
Commissioner August Heckscher wrote to Gebiner on March 22, 
1968, formally advising him of the department's approval to 
erect a monument in Battery Park. His letter referred to an 
informal presentation that Kahn had already made to the 
Municipal Art Commission.16
On the same date, Gebiner and Vladka Meed wrote to 
representatives of participating organizations, informing 
them that Kahn's model had been delivered to Heckscher and to 
the New York City Art Commission for approval. A meeting was 
called for April 10, 1968 at the Wellington Hotel, "at which 
time detailed reports will be rendered about our 
accomplishments up to now and plans for the future will be 
made." The letter said that final arrangements would be 
discussed for a ground breaking ceremony to be held at 
Battery Park on April 21. The ground breaking was later 
announced for May 5, 1968.17
This time the Committee had made a conscious effort to 
win the required government approvals. The decision to use 
Kahn as the designer was not only aesthetic but political, 
according to Vladka Meed. She said the Kahn abstraction did
15Interview with Vladka Meed, May 7, 1990, New York.
16Letter from August Heckscher to Benjamin A. Gebiner, 
March 22, 1968, files of WAGRO, New York.
17"Dear Friends" letter dated March 22, 1968 signed by 
Gebiner and Meed, and "Dear Member" undated and unsigned 
letter, files of WAGRO, New York.
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not satisfy all of the survivors, some of whom wanted 
something more graphic. But with the famous name of Kahn and 
the abstraction, the committee thought they would have a 
better chance of getting through the City Art Commission. 
They therefore decided to go ahead with it.18 (It is
important to remember that the Art Commission had approved 
the Mestrovic-Mendelsohn design for Riverside Park in 1951, 
and this project was never carried out. Approval of the Art 
Commission was not a guarantee for successful completion of 
a memorial.)
The memorial was formally approved by the City Art 
Commission in March 1968, and by October of that year, a six- 
foot scale model was on display at the Museum of Modern Art. 
(The project architect for the Kahn design was Marshall
Meyers of Philadelphia.) A museum press release described 
the design as follows: "It consists of seven glass piers
each 10' square and 11' high placed on a 66' square granite
pedestal. The center pier has been given the character of a 
small chapel into which people may enter. The walls of the 
chapel will be inscribed. The six piers around the center, 
all of equal dimensions, are blank." The minimalist design 
of the proposed memorial prefigures Maya Ying Lin's Vietnam 
memorial in Washington, D.C. Architecture critic Ada Louise 
Huxtable characterized the design as "beautiful, and 
chilling". She said: "There is about it a silent, almost
18Vladka Meed interview.
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frozen formality, a crystalline sense of the eternal 
emptiness of death....This is architecture and, at the same 
time, sculpture, and it is symbolism of the highest order, 
timeless and contemporary."19
This new committee was operating in a political climate 
quite unlike that of the original 1947 attempt-— a climate 
that should have nurtured the concept of a Holocaust 
memorial. Civil rights and anti-Vietnam protests
reverberated throughout the country during the 1960s. The My 
Lai massacre on March 16, 1968 (which, on a smaller scale, 
was not unlike such Nazi massacres as Babi Yar or Ponar) may 
have increased at least subliminal consciousness of the 
Holocaust. In addition to civil rights and Vietnam movements, 
there were other groups standing up for their rights, e.g., 
a women's movement, a prisoners' movement, an Indian 
movement. As Howard Zinn said of this era: "There was a
general revolt against oppressive, artificial, previously 
unquestioned ways of living. It touched every aspect of 
personal life: childbirth, childhood, love, sex, marriage,
dress, music, art, sports, language, food, housing, religion, 
literature, death, schools."20 These movements,
particularly those bringing ethnicity to the forefront of 
American consciousness, should have provided fertile ground
19Ada Louise Huxtable, "Plan for Jewish Martyrs' Monument 
Here Unveiled", The New York Times. October 17, 1968.
20Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century: A People's
History. Harper and Row, New York, 1980, p. 237.
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for creation of a memorial which could be described as a 
manifestation of Jewish ethnicity in the United States.
Within this political mood of movements, ethnicity, and 
struggles to understand unnecessary killings in Vietnam, the 
Art Commission approved the design of the Committee to 
Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs in March, 1968. 
The leaders of this effort to create a Holocaust memorial do 
not recall making any connections between the civil rights 
struggles and revelations of war horrors of the time and 
their own project, nor do their limited available records 
provide any evidence. Gebiner said the upheavals of the 
1960s had nothing to do with the committee's work.21 
However, these crucial issues of that time, which affected 
both the consciousness and consciences of Americans in 
general, could not have been absent from the minds of the 
committee members.
Copies of correspondence show that the effort was 
organized as follows: A committee of participating Jewish
organizations was nominally behind the effort, including 
major national organizations, survivor groups, and the New 
York Board of Rabbis. Twenty-eight organizations are listed 
on the letterhead, whereas the 1347 letterhead listed only 
individuals. The return address of the Memorial to the Six 
Million Jewish Martyrs, Inc. is that of American Jewish
21Benjamin A. Gebiner, interview, April 26, 1990,
Bayside, New York.
143
Committee, which demonstrates that this memorial committee, 
unlike the one in the 1940s-50s, was linked to major Jewish 
organizations. However, this appearance of a broad and 
unified interest group of major Jewish organizations was more 
window dressing than reality. Correspondence reveals that 
crucial decisions were made by the Steering Committee, mainly 
by Gebiner (representing Workmen's Circle) and Vladka Meed 
(representing WAGRO and, from 1968, the Jewish Labor 
Committee), with strongest secondary support from American 
Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress. As documented 
above, the other components of the "broad base" of 
participating organizations received such news as site 
selection as a fait accompli.
The theme of the memorial was described by Art Committee 
Chairman Kreeger in a letter to Kahn: "The monument is
envisioned as one which will reflect and evoke the emotional, 
psychological, and historical impact of the tragedy of the 
period....It should also deal with man's struggle to retain 
his dignity under the most horrendous of circumstances, and 
express hope for a better future, where man will not merely 
survive but prevail."22 The theme thus was to be both 
particularistic and universal.
The cost of the memorial was projected to be at least 
$1,300,000, but the dedication ceremony originally scheduled
22Rebecca Read Shanor, The City That Never Was. Viking, 
1988, p. 219.
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for April 1968 never took place. Asked why, Gebiner said: 
"We were confronted with a terrific budget....it pertained to 
the question of raising millions of dollars. And it didn't 
move." He said that not only did the New York Jewish 
community never succeed in voluntary efforts to raise the 
money needed for creation of a monument here, but that it was 
also the fault of the Holocaust survivors living here. "I 
also accuse the survivors who had among them many people of 
great means who talked a lot about monuments and the 
Holocaust, but when it came to brass tacks there was no 
response," he said. "And it began to peter out little by 
little and that's all."
Gebiner's analysis is not fair to the survivors he 
accused, because the memorial was not their responsibility, 
but that of the organized Jewish community. They were only 
a small part of the community, and there were non-survivors 
with equal or greater wealth who contributed substantially to 
other Jewish causes but not to this one. The most 
significant reason for failure to raise funds was probably, 
as already stated, the Six Day War. Gebiner said something 
else, however, that was more to the point: "Every major
organization that participated in this committee had their 
own problems for raising money for their own causes and own 
organization." This statement highlights two problems: 1.
It was extremely difficult for a new organization to come on 
the scene and raise funds for a new cause, in competition
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with the highly structured Jewish communal organizations that 
were already in place. 2. These organizations, although they 
put their names on a letterhead, had other priorities for 
which they were already raising funds. Gebiner singled out 
American Jewish Committee as the only organization that 
contributed a considerable amount of money to the memorial, 
but all they paid was part of Kahn's fee of some $17,000. 
The reasons the memorial failed, he said, were lack of money, 
self-sacrifice and devotion.23 To put it another way, it 
failed because the interest group behind it was very narrow 
and the major Jewish organizations had no real commitment to 
push for it. Without the backing of the organized Jewish 
community, it held no political value for elected officials, 
and it was therefore difficult for the small interest group 
to build a public-private coalition for successful 
implementation.
Insufficient funding was clearly a major issue. On 
October 23, 1968, Jerry Goodman, then of the American Jewish 
Committee, reported to Bertram Gold, the organization's 
Executive Vice President, on a small meeting of Memorial 
Committee members. Raising the necessary $1.5 million had 
been discussed, and an appeal for large gifts had been 
suggested (with a small number of people underwriting the 
entire project). This would be supplemented by a public
23Gebiner interview.
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subscription campaign.24 Soon afterward, Kahn presented the 
Memorial Committee with his bill, for a total of $17,687.93, 
some of which had been owed to him for more than a year.25
Kreeger wrote from Washington to Gebiner on December 3, 1968 
of his embarrassment at the delay in paying Kahn's bill. He 
urged that each of the constituent organizations contribute 
from $500 to $2 500 in the next two weeks, and he suggested 
that a chairman should be selected "who has been active in 
Jewish and philanthropic affairs in the New York area."26 
His suggestions were not followed.
By July 18, 19 69 not much had happened in the fund
raising area. Goodman wrote to Kreeger on that date about a 
meeting of "some of the national [Jewish] agencies involved, 
or interested". He said: "At that meeting the problem was
put squarely on the agenda and while several ideas were 
analyzed, the most concrete proposal was made by Bert Gold. 
While it is very tentative, he has succeeded in interesting 
a few leaders of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in 
New York to discuss the project and see if it can be 
connected to their work, and their fund-raising. At the
24Memorandum from Jerry Goodman to Bertram Gold, October 
23, 1968, Records Room of American Jewish Committee, New
York.
25Bill from Louis I. Kahn to Committee to Commemorate the 
Six Million Jewish Martyrs, November 6, 1968, Records Room of 
American Jewish Committee, New York.
26Letter from Kreeger to Gebiner, December 3, 1968,
Record Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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present stage there is no commitment, merely a willingness to 
talk. . . .At the same time, Ban Gebiner has been urged to 
secure money from several of the agencies to settle the 
short-range debt to Lou Kahn.”27
The idea of the Federation's involvement did not seem to 
get anywhere. The leaders of Federation would consider such 
a project competitive with their ongoing local programs and 
United Jewish Appeal commitments to Israel. As explained 
earlier, they used the Holocaust to fund raise for Israel and 
immigration, not to fund raise for a memorial. In June, 
1971, Kreeger and the American Jewish Committee were still 
corresponding about where to find the relatively small amount 
of money for Kahn. Between May and November of 1971, Gold 
wrote to all of the major American Jewish organizations, 
asking for contributions to the memorial, especially to pay 
Kahn. In the end, he received some money from them, and 
American Jewish Committee paid the rest of the money due.
By December 16, 1971, Kahn had finally been paid and the 
Memorial Committee tried to go forward. At a meeting that 
night, a fund raising campaign task force was set up under 
Julius Schatz of American Jewish Congress. Schatz reported 
that someone connected with the Bergen-Belsen survivors had 
pledged $25,000 and WAGRO had promised to match this. The 
Farband had committed themselves to a campaign to raise
27Letter from Goodman to Kreeger, July 18, 1969, Records 
Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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$50,000, and The Forward Yiddish newspaper had committed 
itself to a fund raising campaign. The major Jewish 
organizations, none of which had made a commitment, would be 
"approached for a financial commitment". The projected' date 
for completion was April 1973, the 30th anniversary of the 
Warsaw Ghetto uprising.28
All of this scrambling for funds never produced the 
necessary financial backing, because the major American 
Jewish organizations had other priorities and never gave the 
idea of a Holocaust memorial the necessary funding. The 
small amounts promised by the smaller groups mentioned above 
could not get the job done. According to Gebiner, Israel was 
always the first priority, and the memorial could not compete 
for financial attention.
Vladka Meed concurred that Israel was the first 
priority. She said: "The momentum for the Kahn project
ended with the 1967 war emergency campaign. Then we started 
again, and again there was an emergency in 1973." She did 
not, however, blame the major Jewish organizations for the 
project's failure. "You can't accuse the organizations," she 
said. "To create such a project, you need individuals with 
money. You need a group of dedicated people with financial 
resources to complete the project." (A survivor herself, she 
did not say, as Gebiner did, that those individuals should be
28Memorandum from David Geller to Bertram Gold, December 
17,1971, Records Room of American Jewish Committee, New York.
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survivors.) Meed also pointed out that the project had not 
really gotten underway before the emergency of the Six Day 
War. "When the Jewish community faced other priorities and 
the construction of the memorial hadn't really started, there 
were emergency campaigns and none of the national 
organizations were able to undertake financing the memorial," 
she said.
Even while the meager fund raising efforts continued 
until the end of 1971, Gebiner and Vladka Meed had already 
written to Mayor John Lindsay on May 18, 1971 thanking him 
for his cooperation but calling a halt to their activities. 
They wrote:
"At this moment, the American Jewish community is 
confronted with the responsibility of standing by the 
side of Israel and Soviet Jewry, and is rendering every 
possible assistance to insure their survival. It is 
incumbent upon us, therefore, to desist at present from 
any other major fund raising. We are sure that you 
understand our attitude and the responsibility on our 
part.
"We are, therefore, asking that the City of New 
York, and you as the mayor, publicly announce that this 
site will be reserved for the above project, so that at 
a future date, when the crises are lifted, and hopefully 
it will be soon, we can resume our sacred work to create 
a remembrance and a reminder that our six million Jews
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did not die in vain."29
Ten days later, Marvin Schick, Assistant to the Mayor 
for Intergroup Relations, replied to Gebiner and Vladka Meed: 
"As your letter indicates the Mayor believes that Battery 
Park is a suitable site for the Memorial. In view of your 
decision not to proceed right now with the project, we 
believe that it would not serve any purpose for the Mayor to 
make a public statement now." He said the Mayor had asked 
him to be available to meet with them about "this noble 
endeavor which is so much needed to remind our people of what 
happened a generation ago and also to teach them of the evil 
that can result from group hatred."30
Mayor Lindsay clearly did not want to make a public 
statement in support of a moribund project, and he had 
assigned his liaison to the organized Jewish community to 
smooth things over for him. At that time the strong support 
of a Holocaust memorial would not have given him much credit 
with the organized Jewish community. When Schick was 
questioned about the episode (for this study) in 1990, he 
either could not or did not want to remember details.
Thus, in the era of movements, the movement to 
memorialize the Holocaust did not succeed. Gebiner, Vladka
29Letter from Benjamin A. Gebiner and Vladka Meed to 
Mayor John V. Lindsay, May 18, 1971, files of WAGRO, New
York.
30Letter from Marvin Schick to Benjamin A. Gebiner and 
Vladka Meed, May 28, 1971, files of WAGRO, New York.
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Meed and others active on the committee stated in interviews 
that the June 1967 Six Day War, and then the 197 3 Yom Kippur 
War, interrupted the project, because many committee members 
and the major Jewish organizations felt all fundraising 
should instead be directed toward Israel's needs. They did 
not seem angry or bitter about past failures, and were 
looking forward to the completion in the 1990s of Holocaust 
memorials in Washington, D.C. and New York City.
Julius Schatz, who was involved with the memorialization 
effort in the 1960s (representing American Jewish Congress), 
was one of those who mentioned the Six Day War as a prime 
reason fundraising efforts for the memorial failed. He also 
recalls that there were continuous heated discussions about 
a monument versus a museum. Finally, there was an agreement 
to "go for whatever was possible in terms of money." At that 
point the money situation required a monument rather than a 
museum.31
An undated and unsigned draft in Vladka Meed's files,
which seems to be written in 1973-74 and addressed to
representatives of participating organizations, recommended 
that fund raising cease. The letter said:
"For the past year and a half, our committee has 
endeavored to launch a fund raising campaign for
$1,000,000 to construct the monument. What has
31Telephone interview with Julius Schatz, New York City, 
March 19, 1990.
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happened? During these crucial months Israel has been 
attacked by the Arab world supported by the Soviet 
Union. Every dollar and every tangible support have 
been expended to keep Israel alive and to preserve the 
security of her 2 1/2 million people. America has been 
in the midst of a severe financial crisis, and a stock 
market which has been heading into a tailspin.
"In the face of these unforseen crises, the 
steering committee for the Memorial for the 6,000,000 
has unanimously recommended a suspension of the campaign 
to raise a million dollars for the monument. To do 
otherwise would be an interference with the massive 
efforts to ensure Israel's urgent requirements for 
defense and survival."
The draft also said:
"We favor at this time a decision to launch a more 
modest campaign to create a museum and center which 
would encourage research, exhibits, visitation and 
remembrance. We pledge to fulfill the sacred task of 
remembrance of our 6,000,000 martyrs and we further 
pledge that at such time when Israel's existence is 
ensured, we will then reactivate our campaign to build 
a monument in New York City worthy of the heroism and 
sacrifice of our 6, 000, 000.1,32
A letter dated May 1974 may be the final version of the
32Undated draft, Files of Vladka Meed, WAGRO, New York.
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above draft. This letter addressed to "Dear Friend and 
Colleague" recapitulated the history of ten years of efforts, 
beginning with Nathan Rapoport's rejected design for 
Riverside Park in 1964. It said that a broad coalition of 
Jewish organizations had decided to pursue two goals: a
suitable monument on a desirable site, and a memorial center 
for activities and programs related to the Holocaust. The 
Memorial Center committee failed because of the huge sum of 
money required. The Monument Committee had tried to raise 
$1.5 million for the Kahn memorial in Battery Park. (This 
was not a "huge" sum, as the letter said. In fact, it was a 
small amount for a major piece of public art.)
"This necessitated the reorganization of the committee 
to create a new structure with professional staff and a major 
fund-raising campaign. There were numerous meetings with 
leaders of national Jewish agencies and unproductive searches 
for a campaign chairman and fund-raiser," the letter said. 
It mentioned the difficulty of raising even the $17,000 owed 
to Kahn for his preliminary work, saying that only four 
organizations helped to pay it: American Jewish Committee,
WAGRO, American Jewish Congress and ILGWU (International 
Ladies Garment Workers Union— which is not listed as a 
participating organization on the letterhead).
The letter went on: "With the worsening economic
situation, cost estimated for the monument increased as 
inflation mounted. Israel's struggle for survival in recent
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years (The Six Day War, War of Attrition, and Yoxn Kippur War) 
and the crisis of Soviet Jewry have further complicated our 
task by making it more difficult to raise funds." It also 
pointed out another setback: Louis Kahn had died on March
17, 1974.
Unlike the draft, the letter did not call for a 
suspension of the campaign to raise money for the memorial. 
Instead, it said the committee was stalemated. "We are 
unable to proceed further without the firm commitment and 
financial help of the organized Jewish community toward a 
monument or memorial center. Nevertheless, it is our hope 
that you will give serious thought to alternatives and arrive 
at practical ideas to help create a project which will 
memorialize the heroism and martyrdom of the Six Million in 
a dignified and meaningful manner." The letter was signed by 
the Executive Committee: Benjamin Gebiner, Chairman; Vladka
Meed, Secretary; Julius Schatz, American Jewish Congress; 
David Geller, American Jewish Committee; and Joseph Mlotek, 
Workmen's Circle.33
Schatz said that after the committee had given up on 
Battery park because of the lack of funds, they approached 
the Jewish Museum on Fifth Avenue, with architectural designs 
for a Holocaust library to be built on top of an addition to
33Letter from Executive Committee of Memorial to the Six 
Million Jewish Martyrs, Inc. to representatives of 
participating organizations, May, 1974, files of WAGRO, New 
York.
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the museum. The museum, or its parent organization, the 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, never acted on the 
proposal.34 A memo dated June 13, 1972 in Vladka Meed's
files verifies that the committee contacted Dr. Gerson Cohen, 
then Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary, about 
this idea.35 People connected with the Seminary said the 
idea was rejected because the Seminary wanted to remain an 
autonomous institution.
SUMMARY
During the years 1965-1974, the political climate of 
movements and ethnicity was ripe for the creation of a 
Holocaust memorial in New York. In 1965 Mayor Wagner and the 
City Council president intervened in the project to mandate 
site changes, and the Art Commission arbitrarily imposed a 
monument design without consulting the Memorial Committee. 
Neither the interest group nor the government entities tried 
to build a political coalition to get the job done. The 
Memorial Committee seemed not to know how to build political 
alliances to achieve their goal, and the City officials did 
not include the interest group in the decision-making 
process. After the Memorial Committee refused to accept the 
Art Commission's design in 1966, both the City government and 
the committee began acting more like an iron triangle. In an
34Schatz interview.
35Vladka Meed files, WAGRO, New York.
effort to win over City officials, the Memorial Committee 
named a blue ribbon art committee and contracted 
internationally famous sculptor Louis Kahn to design a 
memorial. Mayor Lindsay's Park Commissioner and the
Manhattan Borough President both cooperated with the
committee to find a suitable site, and the Art Commission
accepted the Kahn design. However, memorialization of the
Holocaust had not yet emerged as an important issue for the 
organized Jewish community and the interest group, which 
seemed impressive on paper, was in reality very narrow. When 
the 1967 Six Day War, and then the 1973 Yom Kippur War, got 
in the way of fund raising efforts, the committee itself 
decided to temporarily abandon the project. When Koch 
launched his political alliance to create a Holocaust 
memorial museum in 1981, he inherited a pre-history of this 
and earlier failed attempts.
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CHAPTER 6: FINAL EFFORTS TO CREATE A HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
BEFORE MAYOR KOCH TAKES OVER THE IDEA: 1975-1978
"The days when people held their breath at the mention 
of the Holocaust are gone. As are the days when the dead 
elicited meditation rather than profanation.91 Elie Wiesel1
When Mayor Edward I. Koch interceded in the issue of 
Holocaust memorialization and announced his Mayor's Task 
Force on the Holocaust in July, 1981, there was no interest 
group in New York City actively seeking to create a memorial. 
The Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, Inc., the 
last such group, had dissolved itself three years earlier. 
Vladka Meed's and Benjamin Gebiner's May 1974 letter had not 
definitively killed the Memorial Committee, but on June 29, 
1978 it was officially dead. On that date, the Warsaw Ghetto 
Resistance Organization (WAGRO) wrote to the Memorial 
Committee (attention: Vladka Meed) saying that the work of
the committee should end. The letter said:
"For years we have had the opportunity of working 
together with your committee trying to establish a 
permanent memorial in New York City. Unfortunately, we 
were not successful, although we know that honest and 
sincere attempts were made by your committee. As 
matters have developed lately, we know, an overall 
national committee will be created to establish a 
permanent memorial under the auspices of President
1Elie Wiesel, A Jew Today. "A Plea for the Survivors" 
(1975), Vintage Books, 1979, New York, p. 241.
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Carter. Therefore, we think, the work of the Memorial
for the Six Million Jewish Martyrs should be concluded." 
The letter pointed out that WAGRO was one of the major 
contributors to the Memorial Committee, and requested that 
available funds be returned to WAGRO. It concluded that 
WAGRO was looking forward to working with Vladka Meed or the 
memorial committee to establish a permanent memorial in the 
United States.2
This letter from WAGRO is signed by Robert Born, 
Treasurer, and Hirsh Altusky, Executive Secretary. It could 
have been signed by Benjamin Meed, who is Vladka's husband 
and also president and founder of the organization. When 
WAGRO headed a coalition of Jewish organizations to try to 
create the rejected Rapoport memorial in Riverside Park, 
Vladka Meed was secretary of the project and was representing 
WAGRO. After 1968, she worked for the Jewish Labor Committee 
and considered that entity, rather than WAGRO, the Jewish 
organization with which she was most closely affiliated. Now 
WAGRO, as one of the participating organizations but no 
longer the spearheading one, is writing to her as executive 
secretary of the Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, 
Inc. The illusion of the "broad base" of support has come 
full circle. While the major American Jewish organizations 
had given the project lip service, most of the real work was
2Letter from Robert Born and Hirsh Altusky of WAGRO to 
Vladka Meed of Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, 
June 29, 1978, files of WAGRO, New York.
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done by Vladka Meed and Gebiner, with Julius Schatz of 
American Jewish Congress and several staff members of 
American Jewish Committee the only representatives of major 
Jewish organizations who gave consistent support. American 
Jewish Committee was the major source of limited emergency 
money for the project. (See Chapter 5.)
It is significant that the 1978 letter ending the 
Memorial Committee indicates the idea of a major memorial in 
New York City was shelved because President Carter had 
announced his President's Commission on the Holocaust in 
1978. The influence of the Federal project on the one in New 
York City will be analyzed in Chapter 7. It is important to 
note here, however, that in 1978 President Carter's 
intervention on a national level had an indirect effect on 
the effort to create a memorial in New York: it was the
final death blow to an already dying project.
Before Carter's intercession in 1978, there were yet 
other Jewish community efforts to create a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York City during the 1970s. WAGRO itself 
(not the Memorial to the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, Inc.) 
tried to establish a Holocaust memorial in New York City at 
that time. An undated WAGRO memorandum, which is probably 
from 1975, says "it is high time that the city which is the 
home of the largest Jewish community in the world should have 
a permanent shrine and museum of the Holocaust to serve as a 
reminder to the world that the impossible and unspeakable
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could happen again if we do not teach future generations of 
the horrors of the Nazi era." The memorandum proposes that 
a building being sold by New York City be acquired for this 
purpose. The building (parcel no. 18, section no. 1, block 
197, lot 1) is located on the northeast corner of Lafayette 
and White Streets, and is a 3-story former firehouse, Engine 
Co. 31.
The memorandum wants to "involve in this project the 
entire Jewish community of New York. Above all, this museum 
should serve to present a warning to future generations that 
the atrocities of World War II must not be repeated against 
any people, regardless of race, color or creed." In the 
closing paragraph, "We appeal to all men of good will who 
sympathize with our objectives to lend us their support. We 
are urging the people of the City of New York and the entire 
Jewish community to help us realize this dream."3
By this time, in around 1975, commemorating the 
Holocaust was already on the agenda of the National Jewish 
Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC). The 1973 Yom 
Kippur War had reinforced the Holocaust consciousness that 
emerged with the 1967 Six Day War. However, nothing ever 
developed regarding this proposal, according to WAGRO's files 
and WAGRO president Meed. Perhaps one important reason was 
that it was a narrow-based effort led by a survivors' group.
Memorandum from WAGRO, undated, but reference to 3 0 
years after Holocaust places it circa 1975, files of WAGRO, 
New York.
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As Elie Wiesel said, until President Carter placed the issue 
of Holocaust memorialization on the agenda in 1978, the major 
Jewish organizations did not consider survivors an important 
interest group within the greater Jewish community.4
Meanwhile, WAGRO soon started yet another effort to 
obtain space for a Holocaust memorial center, at the New York 
Cultural Center at Columbus Circle (according to 
correspondence in their files). On December 9, 1976,
Benjamin Meed wrote to Charles G. Bluhdorn, Chairman of the 
Board of Gulf and Western Industries. He congratulated him 
for buying the building and donating it to the City of New 
York, but expressed "sadness" that WAGRO was "undercut" from 
its own attempts to obtain the building. The letter said: 
"Within the last two months the abovementioned building was 
called to our attention [as a site for a Holocaust center] 
and we visited it several times. We met with Mr. John J. 
Rowan, Vice President of New York Urban Servicing Co., Inc. 
Meetings were held on several levels within the Jewish 
community to work out plans of purchasing and maintaining 
such an institution. Naturally, our basic obstacle was 
obtaining the necessary funds and we are afraid we missed a 
unique opportunity." Meed asked Bluhdorn to include "our
^Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York. 
Also see his A Jew Today, chapter entitled "A Plea for the 
Survivors" (written in 1975), Vintage Books, 1979, New York, 
pp. 218-247.
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project of remembrance" in the cultural center. A copy of 
this letter was sent to Mayor Abraham D. Beame.5
Meed tried to form a political alliance with Mayor Beame 
to achieve his goal. He actively pursued the mayor to gain 
his ear and approval, but neither he nor his WAGRO group had 
enough power or influence to win the mayor's support. At 
that time, along with the copy of the letter to Bluhdorn, 
Meed sent Beame a letter with a "special appeal" to include 
WAGRO as a "participating group in the New York Cultural 
Center. I feel that if you agree in principle, the details 
should be worked out in conference." He requested a meeting 
with the Mayor or his representative, and with the 
Commissioner of Cultural Affairs.6
Michael Mehlman, then Administrative Officer for the 
Department of Cultural Affairs, answered Meed's letter on 
December 29, 1976. (The level of the respondent to WAGRO's 
letter to Beame is an indication the issue was not high on 
the mayor's agenda.) Mehlman said it was premature to make 
decisions about public use of the building at the present 
time, and that the interest of WAGRO would be considered in 
due time.7 (i.e., "Don't call us, we'll call you.") In
5Letter from Benjamin Meed, President, WAGRO, to Charles 
G. Bluhdorn, December 9, 1976, files of WAGRO, New York.
6Letter from Benjamin Meed to Mayor Abraham D. Beame, 
December 10, 1977, files of WAGRO, New York.
7Letter from Michael Mehlman to Benjamin Meed, December 
29, 1976, files of WAGRO, New York.
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response to a letter and phone call, Meed received another 
letter from the Department of Cultural Affairs on January 19, 
1977, this time from Janet Langsam, Deputy Commissioner. She 
reiterated it would be difficult to then discuss programmatic 
uses of the building. She suggested: "There are,
fortunately, many other attractive real estate opportunities 
in the City of New York which I am sure you can explore and 
I hope the fact that you were not successful in acquiring the 
New York Cultural Center will not dampen your enthusiasm for 
a most worthwhile endeavor."8 This was a polite "goodbye" 
to Meed from the Beame administration. (i.e., "Don't call 
us, and we won't call you.") The political alliance WAGRO 
sought with Beame at that time never got anywhere.
At around this time, a powerful new player arrived on 
the Jewish communal scene in New York City: the Jewish
Community Relations Council of New York (JCRC). This 
umbrella and coordinating body was organized in 197 5 and 
officially established in 1976. The lineup of players was a 
formidable list of New York City movers and shakers: The
first president was Richard Ravitch, a developer who later 
became Chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA) and head of Koch's Charter Revision Commission. Real 
estate developer Jack Weiler was honorary president, and 
developer George Klein (who later would head Koch's Task
8Letter from Janet Langsam to Benjamin Meed, files of 
WAGRO, New York City.
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Force cn the Holocaust) was a vice president. Other vice 
presidents included Maxwell M. Raab, Daniel S. Shapiro, and 
Laurence A. Tisch. Irvin D. Husin was secretary and Irving 
Silverman was treasurer. Malcolm Hoenlein, a masterful 
political entrepreneur who went on to run the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, was the 
executive director.
The officially stated purpose of JCRC was "to serve as 
the central coordinating and resource body for the 
metropolitan area Jewish community. By 1990, as the umbrella 
agency for 62 major civic, communal, educational and 
religious organizations, the agenda of the JCRC was a 
catalogue of Jewish activities, issues and programs
reflecting the concerns, needs and aspirations of the Jewish 
community of New York. The broad range of issues addressed
by the JCRC include: Israel and international concerns,
domestic and urban affairs, government relations, intergroup 
relations, anti-Semitism and discrimination, Jewish security 
and neighborhood stabilization."9
One of the unofficial, unstated purposes of JCRC was to 
serve as a power base for politically hungry Hoenlein and his 
wealthy and well-connected backers, who were, for the most 
part, developers. These developers who backed the founding 
of JCRC in 1976 became more powerful in the City after Koch
information sheet, Jewish Community Relations Council 
of New York, 1990.
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won the mayoral election in 1977 and took office in 1978. 
After Koch took office, only three years after the height of 
New York City's 1975 financial crisis, he made deals and 
alliances with developers that made them one of the most 
influential groups of "movers and shakers" in the City. Most 
of these developers are Jewish, and were appointed by Koch to 
the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission when he 
created it in 1982.
One hallmark of the Koch administration was its 
giveaways to developers. Jim Sleeper describes the Koch era 
as one of "abdication of government's legitimate 'police 
powers' over burgeoning development" and "abandonment of any 
civic mission broader than what 'development' might 
define".10 Between the time the development boom began in 
1981 and 1987, about 45 million square feet of new commercial 
space were built in Manhattan. The Koch administration made 
developers enormously wealthy and powerful by offering tax 
incentives ($1.3 billion in 1981-87), zoning variances (e.g., 
greater building density and height in exchange for public 
amenities), and sale of City property to the highest bidders 
without regard for planning. Developers, in turn, were among 
the largest contributors to Koch's campaigns. For example, 
in 1985 half of the $9 million in campaign gifts to Koch and 
the other members of the Board of Estimate (i.e., the
10Jim Sleeper, "Boom and Bust with Ed Koch", Dissent, A 
Special Issue: In Search of New York. Fall 1987, New York,
p. 437.
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Comptroller, City Council president, and five borough 
presidents) came from 175 donors, most of them developers, 
brokerage houses, and their attorneys.11
One of the developers who backed the creation of 
Hoenlein's JCRC, its first vice president George Klein, soon 
emerged as an important force among developers in New York 
City. His office building at 59th Street and Park Avenue, 
begun in 1977, was the first new office building in New York 
City in five years (following the financial crisis of 1975). 
Hoenlein and Klein began seeking power in the Jewish 
community and influence in City Hall at around the same time, 
and found an open door after Koch was elected in 1977. 
Someone close to the situation said that Klein and Hoenlein 
"made each other" politically in New York's organized Jewish 
community.
The reciprocal close relationship between Klein and 
Hoenlein enabled them to help each other build a pyramid of 
power in the establishment organized Jewish community, and in 
their dealings with the Mayor's office. Klein became Koch's 
personal friend, and Herbert Rickman, Koch's liaison to the 
organized Jewish community, was also closely connected with 
Hoenlein and Klein. (Dahl's analysis of how a pyramid of 
power is created and reinforced applies here. See Chapter 
8 .)
11Ibid. , p. 448.
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JCRC soon got into the act of creating a Holocaust 
memorial in New York City. At a March 24, 1977 press
conference, JCRC president Ravitch listed among issues of 
concern for the Jewish community of New York a serious effort 
to commemorate the Holocaust. (JCRC was an affiliate of the 
NJCRAC community relations umbrella, which had been 
suggesting this since 1973-74 in its Joint Program Plan.) At 
that time, JCRC had 2 0 constituent member organizations and 
50 others with applications pending. S. L. Shneiderman, who 
had worked on the 1947 Holocaust memorial ceremony in 
Riverside Park, was present at the press conference. He 
interjected at the press conference that he had archives on 
previous attempts to establish a Holocaust memorial, and 
"some of the organizations you [JCRC] represent killed 
it. »12
On April 7, 1977, Ravitch sent letters to Shneiderman, 
Benjamin Meed and "a selected group of individuals" to meet 
in his home, 1021 Park Avenue, on Monday, April 18 to hear 
Gideon Hausner, chairman of Yad Vashem in Jerusalem (and 
prosecutor at the trial of Adolph Eichmann). The purpose of 
the meeting was to "discuss the conceptual framework and 
preparatory steps for initiating a 'living' [Holocaust] 
memorial." The letter also said:
12American Jewish Congress memorandum from Victoria Free 
to Richard Cohen, "Notes from a press conference at the 
Jewish Community Relations Council-March 24, 1977", March 25, 
1977, Archive of YIVO, Files of American Memorial to Six 
Million Jews of Europe, Inc., New York.
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"Over the past thirty years, numerous attempts have 
been made to create a proper memorial to the six million 
martyrs of World War II. For a variety of reasons, New 
York City remains the only major Jewish community in the 
world without a commemoration of the Holocaust. [This 
was an exaggeration for two reasons: New York was not
the only one, and it was not without any commemoration.]
Recognizing the unique opportunity presented by the 
creation of the Jewish Community Relations Council and 
the fact that the passage of time mitigates against the 
possibility of this long sought dream becoming a 
reality, representatives of the Survivors' organizations 
and other concerned persons approached the JCRC to 
undertake this project.
The General Assembly of the JCRC authorized the 
President to appoint an organizing committee to explore 
the possibilities and develop plans."13
This meeting raises a number of questions: Which
representatives of which survivor organizations had 
approached JCRC, or did JCRC, in fact, approach the 
survivors? Was JCRC's takeover of the project approved by 
the Committee to Commemorate the Six Million Jewish Martyrs, 
which did not officially cease functioning until a year 
later? Was JCRC stepping in to institutionalize the effort
13Letter from Richard Ravitch, JCRC, dated April 7, 1977 
to Benjamin Meed (in WAGRO files) and to S. L. Shneiderman 
(in YIVO archive), New York.
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and render powerless any potential attempts by smaller groups 
(such as WAGRO or the earlier Zygelboim committee)? Was 
JCRC, then a new umbrella group, using the issue of 
memorializing the Holocaust (which had then recently begun 
getting "hot") as a means of making itself more important in 
the Jewish community and with the City government? Was there 
already any informal discussion between JCRC and Edward I. 
Koch, who was to run for mayor that coming Fall?
No files, archives or interviews provided concrete 
answers. However, there is an unconfirmed report that when 
Koch ran for mayor for the first time in 1977, creation of a 
Holocaust memorial in New York City was on his laundry list 
of items of interest to the organized Jewish community. 
Manny Behar, who worked on the 1977 campaign, said he wrote 
this item into the campaign platform, but no evidence is 
available. Behar did not, however, remember any connection 
between the idea and JCRC's project.14 If Koch, in fact, 
did make mention of a Holocaust memorial in 1977, he then 
shelved the idea until 1981. Hoenlein (saying he did not 
remember) refused to discuss JCRC's early history regarding 
a Holocaust memorial, and the organization's files from 1977 
were not accessible.
The presence of Hausner, chairman of Yad Vashem , at the 
Spring 1977 JCRC-sponsored meeting is an indication that
^Telephone discussion with Manny Behar, December 20,
1990.
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Ravitch took the idea of a memorial seriously. Of all of the 
Holocaust memorials in the world, Yad Vashem Heroes and 
Martyrs Memorial Authority in Jerusalem is recognized as the 
memorial, complete with exhibitions, historical and art 
museums, archives, shrines and artifacts. Yad Vashem is a 
government museum, established by law in 1953 for the purpose 
of commemorating "the disaster and its heroism and to promote 
a custom of joint remembrance of the heroes and the victims." 
It is still the major Holocaust memorial, not only in Israel, 
but in the world. (Yad Vashem has been described as "second 
only to the western wall in its sacredness as a shrine of the 
Israeli civil religion. It is the place to which foreign 
dignitaries are taken to celebrate and solemnize their 
relationship to Israel by sharing its identification with the 
victims of the Holocaust. Yad Vashem is the major memorial 
to the Jews and Jewish communities destroyed in the 
Holocaust. It is maintained as a religious institution. 
Visitors are expected to cover their heads...."15)
Ravitch recalled that the subject of a memorial came up 
after one of the survivor groups joined the newly formed 
JCRC. (Based on the history of this issue, it is likely the 
group was WAGRO.) Ravitch agreed JCRC should do something in 
New York, and this led to the meeting in his apartment. 
"There was a city-owned site on 43rd Street and First
15Charles S. Leibman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil 
Religion in Israel. University of California Press, 1983, p. 
151.
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Avenue," he said. "I remember that in a relatively 
compressed period of time I had an architect by the name of 
Davis, Brody do some sketches. I also had a meeting with Dr. 
[Yitzhak] Arad of Yad Vashem, and we got [Ernest] Michel very 
much involved. I even remember flying to Florida once with 
him to try to solicit a major contribution from a wealthy guy 
in Miami. We were on the verge of some very serious fund 
raising for this. All we wanted from the City was the 
conveyance of that property."16
Ernest Michel, a German Holocaust survivor who for many 
years headed Federation-UJA's fundraising operation in New 
York City, has been active until today in efforts to create 
a memorial. He is co-chairman of development of the current 
Commission. Ravitch was on Koch's original Task Force, but 
was not active on the issue after he became MTA director in 
1981.
The timing of the meeting in Ravitch's home should have 
been conducive to the success of a Holocaust memorial 
project: On April 7, 1977, the very day Ravitch sent out
invitations to the April 18 meeting, Yitzhak Rabin announced 
his resignation as the Prime Minister of Israel. On May 17, 
1977 Menachem Begin's Likud Party became the largest party in 
the Israel Knesset, and Begin formed a cabinet in June. 
Begin, much more than the earlier Labor government, used 
Holocaust rhetoric to verify the existence of Israel and
16Richard Ravitch, interview, May 4, 1990, New York.
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defend its policies. His election, combined with the 1961 
Eichmann trial and the 1967 and 1973 wars, can be pointed to 
as a turning point in increased awareness of the Holocaust in 
the organized American Jewish community. Furthermore, 
Hoenlein, the JCRC director, was close to Begin's Likud 
Party. This combination of circumstances, however, was not 
enough to make the JCRC initiative successful.
Shneiderman, who attended the meeting in Ravitch's home, 
reported on it to Richard Cohen, then Public Relations 
Director of American Jewish Congress. Shneiderman had been 
invited as the correspondent for the Israeli newspaper A1 
Hamishmar and the New York Yiddish Jewish Daily Forward, but 
he also seems to have been "spying" for American Jewish 
Congress. He said the meeting was "devoted to a project of 
establishing a 'Living Memorial to the Six Million Jewish 
Martyrs.'" According to Shneiderman, there were about 3 0 
people, including representatives of survivor groups and 
religious organizations, and "probably potential contributors 
to a fund of about 25 million dollars for the erection of a 
building, preferably in the vicinity of the United Nations." 
He said that Ravitch had outlined the project as an institute 
for research on the Holocaust, with archives, a library, a 
museum, exhibits, and auditoriums for lectures. Shneiderman 
added that, as far as he knew, there were no representatives 
of American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith or YIVO. (This information was important for American
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Jewish Congress, which was, no doubt, keeping tabs on 
potential competing organizations.)
According to Shneiderman's report, the various 
participants at the meeting were seeking to protect their own 
"turf" and particular interests: Benjamin Meed, whose WAGRO 
ran yearly Holocaust commemorative services on Yom HaShoah (a 
day of Holocaust commemoration designated by the Israel 
government as the 22nd day of the Hebrew month of Nisan) , 
suggested that the projected memorial have a meeting room for 
30,000 people to house his commemoration. Eli Zborowski, a 
resistance group survivor who heads the International Society 
for Yad Vashem, suggested the new institution be called 
Friends of Yad Vashem. Both proposals were rejected. As 
Banfield said of civic controversies in Chicago, 
controversies arise "out of the maintenance and enhancement 
needs of large formal organizations. The heads of an 
organization see some advantage to be gained by changing the 
situation. They propose changes. Other large organizations 
are threatened. They oppose, and a civic controversy takes 
place."17 Like civic organizations, the major Jewish 
organizations have as one of their prime concerns their own 
"maintenance and enhancement", and their self-serving stances 
at this meeting reflect this.
17Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 263.
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Shneiderman wrote that Michel announced he was attending 
in a private capacity, as a survivor. When asked if UJA 
would directly support a fund raising initiative for a 
Holocaust memorial, Michel answered with a categorical "no", 
according to Shneiderman.18 (Michel said thirteen years 
later that he never had any negative reaction from 
Federation-UJA leadership about building a Holocaust 
memorial, and that some leaders of Federation-UJA have been 
major supporters of the current project.19 However, this is 
not the same as Federation's putting the issue on their 
agenda and making an allocation for it— something that was 
never done in New York City.)
Shneiderman also said in his report that completion of 
the 1947 monument was prevented by "active opposition" from 
the UJA and the Jewish Federation (then separate 
organizations). He added that Jewish Agency representatives 
had hinted Ben-Gurion was opposed in 1947, because a 
Holocaust memorial would hamper fund raising efforts for 
Israel. No empirical evidence to prove of disprove his 
allegations has been found. Shneiderman reported that when 
he told participants at the meeting the "painful" story of 
the Riverside Drive attempt in 1947, most of those present
18Memorandum to Richard Cohen, American Jewish Congress, 
from S. L. Shneiderman, "Living Memorial for 6 Million Jews", 
April 21, 1977, archive of Yivo Research Institute, file of 
American Memorial to Six Million European Jews, New York.
19Interview with Ernest Michel, May 8, 1990, New York
City.
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were "astonished". Ravitch announced at the end of the 
meeting that he would immediately open a bank account for the 
JCRC project, and hinted the first seed money would be a 
seven figure sum.20
By the Fall of 1977, JCRC and its executive director, 
Hoenlein were clearly in the lead in efforts to establish a 
Holocaust memorial in New York. This was when Koch first ran 
for mayor and won, but no records or interviews substantiated 
any collaboration between him and JCRC on this issue at that 
time. On September 26, 1977, Ravitch wrote to Benjamin Meed 
as one of "a few key individuals" to come to a meeting in 
Michel's office to discuss the design and conceptual 
framework of a proposed Holocaust memorial. Ravitch would be 
reporting on developments of the past few weeks, "in hope 
that we can then develop plans to bring this to fruition." 
(The date of the meeting was inadvertently omitted from the 
letter.)
On November 6, 1977, Yitzhak Arad, Chairman of the
Directorate of Yad Vashem, wrote to Hoenlein at JCRC, 
outlining how he thought JCRC should proceed with the 
memorial. Responding to a request by Ravitch, on December 
12, 1977 John Zuccotti of the law firm of Tufo, Johnston,
Zuccotti & Allegaert reported on the State and City 
regulations that would affect JCRC's proposal to build a 
Holocaust monument and museum. The proposed site was on
20Ibid.
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City-owned land at the southeast corner of First Avenue and 
Forty-second Street. In addition to outlining the 
complicated demapping and Uniform Land Use Review Procedure 
(ULURP) processes, Zuccotti warned of organized opposition. 
He predicted this would come from the community, objecting to 
the loss of playground space, and from the United Nations, 
over loss of potential development space. (Kurt Waldheim, 
whose own Nazi past was later exposed, was then Secretary 
General.)
Zuccotti analyzed the situation with a keen 
understanding of the political implications of pursuing the 
project. He wrote to Ravitch: "In addition, the opposition
may invoke the argument that the monument is a mere give-away 
of City land to a special interest group. Notwithstanding 
its lack of merit, the argument may have some impact on the 
relevant political actors. This is because they will be 
sensitive both to the suggestions of local ethnic or 
religious groups that the City provide them with land for 
some pet project, regardless of its merit, and to the 
constraints imposed on the City by the fiscal crisis. JCRC 
should take exceptional care, both in the land disposition 
agreement and in its public relations effort, to elaborate 
the importance of the monument to the intellectual and 
cultural life of the City and to its tourist industry, and to
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articulate fully the value of the consideration being given 
for the land."21
Zucotti's political savvy is impressive. This is the 
first documentation of a Holocaust memorial committee in New 
York City's having a sense of the project's effect on other 
interest groups. This is not a case of worrying about anti- 
Semitic reactions, as in the 1946-1950S attempt. It is a 
case of being sensitive to the interests of competing groups- 
-both those that would not want the memorial intruding in the 
neighborhood, and those who would want the City to give them 
the equal opportunity to build a memorial or similar project. 
Banfield's "maintenance and enhancement needs" again applies. 
JCRC was proposing changes which could threaten other large 
organizations. If they opposed, a civic controversy would 
take place.22 Zucotti was warning JCRC that they should try 
to avoid such a controversy.
The next month, Koch took office as mayor of the City of 
New York, and a new chapter was about to begin in the long, 
long saga of efforts to create a Holocaust memorial. At this 
point, however, the New York City story took a detour through 
Washington, D.C. Ravitch said that when he learned the 
President's Commission on the Holocaust was to be formed, and
21Letter from John E. Zuccotti to Richard Ravitch, 




then it began with Wiesel as chairman, he concluded it was 
"absolutely silly" to try to compete with a Presidential 
Commission dealing with this and planning a national 
memorial. "I thought we'd never raise the money in 
competition with what they were doing, and the project was 
sort of aborted," he said. "The last thing I remember is 
having a conversation with Elie Wiesel, and saying the 
symbolism of having the memorial across the street from the 
United Nations was overwhelming, and that's what I thought 
the Presidential Commission ought to recommend."23 After 
this discussion with Wiesel (which must have been in 1978), 
Ravitch said JCRC dropped the idea of pursuing a Holocaust 
memorial. No empirical evidence indicates JCRC tried to make 
a political alliance with Mayor Koch after he took office in 
1978, in order to carry the project forward.
Ravitch, however, was not the only New Yorker who 
thought the President's Commission on the Holocaust should 
recommend that the national memorial be in New York City. On 
September 29, 1978, Mayor Koch wrote to President Jimmy
Carter, offering him full support for creation of a National 
Holocaust Memorial. Koch then asked Carter to consider 
locating the memorial in New York City. He enumerated the 
reasons this would be a good idea: Families of many New
Yorkers were touched by the Holocaust and it would have an 
enthusiastic community? New York has the largest Jewish and
23Ravitch interview.
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survivor communities outside of Israel; most national Jewish 
organizations are headquartered in New York; New York is the 
diplomatic capital of the world; New York City has been known 
as a haven for the oppressed; New York City is an amalgam of 
many heritages.
"In short," Koch wrote, "a Holocaust Memorial located in 
New York City would not only serve as a reminder of the 
world's past indifference to human rights, but as a visible 
symbol of continuing efforts to protect and promote human 
dignity and rights." Then, with typical Koch chutzpa, he 
said he had "taken the liberty of enclosing a list of people 
who, in my opinion, would be particularly helpful in planning 
and realizing the Memorial." He closed by telling Carter not 
to hesitate "to ask my help and the help of all New Yorkers 
in bringing the National Holocaust Memorial to completion. 
I look forward to working with you on this."24
No response from Carter was found, but history records 
that the national Holocaust memorial was destined for 
Washington, D.C. and not New York City. Before analyzing 
Koch's intervention in the issue in New York City, by 
creating his own Holocaust Commission, the next chapter will 
examine how its precursor, the President's Commission on the 
Holocaust (and subsequent U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council) 
came into existence.
24Letter from Mayor Edward I. Koch to President Jimmy 




When Carter's President's Commission put the issue of 
Holocaust memorialization squarely on the agenda of the 
United States government in 1978, there had already been a 
history of 32 years of failed attempts to create a memorial 
in New York City, the center of Jewish life in America. 
Leaders of the last efforts before Carter's seemed to 
understand better than their predecessors that political 
alliances are necessary in order to carry out a project that 
requires governmental cooperation and approval. However, they 
still were not successful. WAGRO failed to get Mayor Beame 
to intercede and make space for a Holocaust memorial in the 
Columbus Circle cultural center in 1977. JCRC, which was 
established in 1976 as an umbrella organization for community 
(including government) relations, began a different effort in 
1977 to build a memorial near the United Nations. WAGRO 
became a member of JCRC and encouraged this move. A number 
of the founders of JCRC were wealthy and power-hungry 
developers, who became much more wealthy and powerful after 
Koch took office at the beginning of 1978 and became their 
staunch political ally. One of these developers, JCRC 
officer and Koch ally George Klein, later became chairman of 
Koch's Task Force on the Holocaust. After Carter announced 
in 1978 that he would create a national Holocaust memorial, 
JCRC abandoned the idea of building a major memorial in New 
York City. Thus, by the end of 1978 there was no interest
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group of any kind operating to create a Holocaust memorial in 
New York City.
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PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF CREATING A HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM IN NEW YORK CITY
CHAPTER 7: PRESIDENT CARTER INTERVENES AND PLACES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIALIZATION ON THE GOVERNMENT'S AGENDA
"The Holocaust memorial was born out of politics and it was 
born out of domestic political crisis." Presidential Aide 
Mark Siegel1
In 1977-1978, President Jimmy Carter was in trouble with 
the organized Jewish community. The efforts of his high 
level staff members to "mend fences" after his hard line 
statements and decisions on Israel led to his intervening on 
the issue of Holocaust memorialization and subsequently 
creating the President's Commission on the Holocaust in 1978.
Carter's problems began on March 9, 1977, only two
months after his inauguration. That afternoon he told a Town 
Meeting and press conference in Clinton, Massachusetts that 
a Palestinian homeland was one of the major elements for 
peace in the Middle East, and that United States policy 
called for Israel's return to the pre-1967 borders with only 
insubstantial changes. The Conference of Presidents of Major 
American Jewish Organizations (Presidents' Conference), which 
claims to speak for the organized Jewish community, expressed
interview with Mark Siegel, March 16, 1990, Washington,
D.C.
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its displeasure to the Carter Administration both publicly 
and privately.2
As a result of the organized Jewish community's profound 
indignation about the March, 1977, Town Meeting, Carter named 
Mark Siegel as his liaison to the Jewish community. Siegel, 
who was deputy to Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, assumed 
this additional responsibility. "That Spring, I was 
determining in a very systematic way how the community could 
be involved in the decision-making process with respect to 
the Geneva peace conference," he recalled. "I laid out a lot 
of political steps so that the Jewish community would have 
trust and confidence in the President and the Administration, 
because at some point in this process faith would be 
required. It was not going to be easy. I sequenced a lot of 
things. One of the things I said the President should push 
for was passage of the Genocide Treaty, as a confidence- 
building measure. Other measures were regular meetings with 
the community, with major Jewish organizations."3
At this point, Siegel hit upon an idea that was to make 
history and ultimately have a crucial effect on efforts to 
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City. "I was aware 
that the United States was the only western country that did 
not have an official memorial to the victims of the
2"Report for the Year Ending March 31, 1978: Conference




Holocaust," he said. "I suggested in a memo to Hamilton 
Jordan that went on to the President that it was long 
overdue, and that it would be well received in the 
community." When they responded favorably, Siegel asked 
Ellen Goldstein, who was working for Chief Domestic Policy 
Advisor Stuart Eizenstat, for a briefing memo on kinds of 
memorials. He said she responded quickly that many countries 
had memorials, but the United States did not. She added that 
none was being planned or publicly discussed, and this would 
be a very novel idea. "She proceeded to do a good deal of 
research on it, talking about the kinds of memorials that 
existed around the world", Siegel said.4 The idea was then 
shelved until March, 1978.
Meanwhile, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, then Chairman of 
the Presidents' Conference, said on June 7, 1977 he was
concerned by what appeared to be an "erosion" of Carter's 
"commitment to Israel." He said American Jews were "worried 
about the expectations Carter is raising in the Arab world." 
Three days later, The New York Times reported in an article 
by Bernard Gwertzman that Carter was "stung" by the criticism 
of American Jews and was taking steps to repair the
4Mark Siegel, Stuart Eizenstat and Ellen Goldstein all 
said in March 16, 1990 interviews that a national Holocaust 
memorial was Siegel's idea originally. Siegel's first memo 
has not been found by any of them or by the Carter Library. 
However, the Carter Library does have a copy of Ellen 
Goldstein's June 21, 1977 reply to the Siegel request for a 
briefing on Holocaust memorials. His original memo to Jordan 
and Carter must have been written between March and June 21, 
1977.
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relationship. His creation of the President's Commission on 
the Holocaust the next year was part of his attempt to do so.
On July 6, 1977, Carter met with more than 50 American 
Jewish leaders to discuss his views on Israel and peace in 
the Middle East. Afterward, Schindler, speaking as Chairman 
of the President's Conference, said he was reassured.5 On 
August 8, 1977, however, Carter announced that the United
States was in contact with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and that the PLO would be an acceptable 
participant in the Geneva peace talks. He said the PLO would 
only have to say they recognized United Nations Resolution 
242, and that the Palestinians have additional status than 
that of refugees. The Presidents' Conference reported it was 
"deeply disturbed by this deterioration in the American 
position."6 On October 1, 1977, the situation deteriorated 
further. The Carter Administration and the Soviet Union 
released a joint statement on the Middle East, calling for 
Palestinian representation at the Geneva Peace Conference, 
and speaking of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people." Schindler sent a telegram to Carter, saying he was 
"profoundly disturbed", and this was "a shocking about-face 
of the President's public pledges."7
5"Report for the Year Ending March 31, 1978: Conference





In early 1978, President Carter announced his proposal 
to sell jet warplanes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as a 
package. He stated at a White House press conference on 
April 25, 1978 that if Congress rejected the sale of planes 
to any of the three countries, he would withdraw the entire 
package.8 Siegel said that in early 1978 he was growing 
increasingly uncomfortable with his role as liaison to the 
Jewish community. "It was my clear opposition to the sale of 
the F-15s to Saudi Arabia, and it was expected of me to sell 
this sale to the Jewish community, and it became untenable 
for me," he said. "Ultimately in March 1978 it led to my 
resignation, which unlike most resignations of public figures 
was not an exchange of happy letters. I laid out my views in 
a resignation that was guite public. At that point there had 
been great tension developing within the Jewish community on 
a range of issues— a Palestinian homeland, the Geneva peace 
conference, the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, and there was 
a real crisis in relations between the White House and the 
American Jewish community." Siegel said he was "afraid my 
resignation fueled that fire," because people thought it 
proved their fears about the Administration. After he left 
in early March, relationships between the Carter
8David Friedman, "Senators say if Carter wants all or 
nothing on his plane package deal he way wind up with 
nothing", Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 
April 26, 1978, vol. 45, no. 82, New York, p. 1.
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Administration and the organized Jewish community therefore 
deteriorated further.
Siegel places the initiation of "the politics of the 
Holocaust memorial" at this point, March 1978. He had put 
forth the idea almost a year earlier, but there had been no 
action on it. "As the situation [vis-a-vis the Jewish 
community] continued to deteriorate in March and April, 1978, 
apparently what happened in the White House was to decide 
what to do to repair this hemorrhage," he said. "And the 
idea of the Holocaust memorial was resurrected at that point. 
And I must say I was not pleased, because what was done was 
at the height of the battle with the Senate over the F-15s, 
a very ugly battle with [Carter's National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew] Brzezinski making a number of unfortunate comments 
[e.g., that he would "break the back" of the Jewish lobby on 
Capitol Hill] that some people determined to be anti- 
Semitic. 1,9
A memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stuart Eizenstat, 
dated March 28, 1978, corroborates Siegel's recollections.
She wrote: "Some time ago, Mark Siegel asked me to research
a question he had concerning a U. S. memorial for the victims 
of the Nazi holocaust. The results of my research are 
contained in the attached memo [from Goldstein to Siegel, 
dated June 21, 1977] . While many countries outside of
Eastern Europe have memorials or plans for memorials, there
9Siegel interview.
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is in the United States no official memorial or plans for a 
memorial. Even though some of these countries had no 
concentration camps within their borders, many of their 
citizens are survivors of such camps. The United States 
certainly has its share of Nazi survivors as well."
Goldstein's memo said a column by William Safire on 
March 27, dealing with Nazis and Skokie, Illinois, had 
reminded her of Siegel's original request. "I have no idea 
how far Mark's idea or proposal, if indeed he had one, 
travelled in the White House, but I bring it to your 
attention now," she wrote. "If the Administration were to 
advance, in some way, the construction of a memorial built 
with private and/or public moneys, it might be an appropriate 
gesture in honor of Israel's thirtieth anniversary and a 
symbol of the United States' support of Israels' [sic] birth 
and continued life. The idea deserves consideration on its 
merits, although such a move might appear to some people to 
be glib public relations."
Eizenstat hand wrote on the memo that it was an
interesting idea and he wanted to sit down and discuss it.10
Thus it is possible to pinpoint the date when a national
Holocaust memorial became "an idea whose time has come" and 
was placed on the agenda. It is also possible to document
10Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stuart Eizenstat, 
Subject: Holocaust Memorial, March 28, 1978, The White
House, Washington, D. C., archive of the Carter Library, 
Atlanta (DPS-Eizenstat Collection).
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that the initiation of the idea was for political purposes. 
As John W. Kingdon said, patterns of public policy are 
determined by what gets on the agenda. He asks why, after 
many years, a particular time proves right for an issue to 
emerge. He lists four stages: an agenda is set,
alternatives from which a choice will be made are specified, 
an authoritative choice is made (e.g., by legislative vote), 
and there is implementation. Participants (parties, elected 
officials, staff, and media) and processes (problem 
recognition, policies generated, and politics of reelection) 
affect both agenda settings and alternatives.11
According to Kingdon, we need to know what made the soil 
fertile, rather than the origin of the seed. He rejects 
incremental theories, and is closer to the "garbage can" 
model. He says solutions often search for problems. In the 
case of a national Holocaust memorial, the soil was made 
fertile for at least four reasons: 1. Carter desperately
needed a positive issue to mend fences with the Jewish 
community. 2. The idea of memorializing the Holocaust had 
recently emerged as a pertinent issue in the organized 
American Jewish community. 3. The idea had even become 
"Americanized" by the airing to a mass audience of the 
miniseries Holocaust on NBC television at about that time; 
the number of books being published on the subject had also
11 John W. Kinadon.Agendas. Alternatives and Public 
Policies, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 184.
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increased. 4. The issue of the presence of Nazi war 
criminals in America had been placed on the national agenda 
in 1977, with the creation of a Special Litigation Unit in 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Systematic 
denaturalization and deportation hearings of accused Nazi war 
criminals (some of whom had worked for the United States 
Government) were beginning.12 A memorial was a much less 
embarrassing way for the government to address the Holocaust.
Kingdon's model for the processes of Federal agenda 
setting has three streams: problem recognition, policy
formulation and refinement, and politics. These three 
streams operate largely independently, but come together at 
critical times: a problem is recognized, a solution is
available, and the political climate is right for a change. 
There is an opportunity for pushing a proposal, a policy 
window, at the time that an issue suddenly "gets hot"13. 
Policy entrepreneurs willing to invest resources in the hope 
of future return then go into action. (There is a "tipping 
point" in coalition-building, with people and groups joining 
for fear they will be excluded from possible benefits.)
Kingdon's model can be used to analyze the Carter 
Administration's decision to memorialize the Holocaust as
12See Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscious: 
Seekers of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America. SUNY 
Press, Albany, New York, 1984, pp. 3-8, 103-138; and Charles 
R. Allen, Jr. Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts...Action:
A Basic Handbook. Highgate Press, New York, 1986.
13Kingdon, pp. 92-94.
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follows: In 1978, the issue "got hot". A policy window had
opened and the streams came together: the problem of
addressing the Holocaust in a way that would divert attention 
from a much more volatile item already on the agenda (the 
beginning investigations of utilization of Nazi war criminals 
by the government) and from Carter's foreign policies that 
had enraged the organized establishment Jewish community; the 
policy of Holocaust commemoration; and the politics of 
reelection, of finding a domestic issue that would appeal to 
Jewish voters, whose support for Carter had badly eroded. 
The need for such an issue had been placed on the agenda, 
policy entrepreneurs went into action as documented above, a 
Holocaust memorial in Washington was chosen from the 
alternatives, an official act created the President's 
Commission on the Holocaust, and the implementation phase 
began.
Following Goldstein's memorandum to him, on April 4, 
1978 Eizenstat wrote a note by hand to "B", mentioning that 
the idea of a memorial should be discussed with Hyman 
Bookbinder, American Jewish Committee's Washington 
representative, and others, "to make sure it will be well 
received."u This further documents that the purpose of the 
project was to appeal to the Jewish community, with whom 
Carter was having problems. The Carter Administration
uNote from Eizenstat to "B", April 4, 1978, Carter
Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS-Eizenstat collection.
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initiated the creation of a political alliance with the 
organized Jewish community on the issue of Holocaust 
memorialization, for the purpose of improving his image and 
winning their support.
Eizenstat (and White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz) next 
wrote a memorandum to Carter on April 25, 1978. The subject 
was "Holocaust Memorial". The memo stated there was no 
official American Holocaust memorial and that there was then 
stronger support than ever to create one, "among many 
Americans— not just Jewish-Americans. Reasons they listed 
included the recent television program, Holocaust; the 
creation of memorials in other countries; and the aging of 
the "thousands of concentration camp survivors in this 
country". Only the first reason would probably make "many 
Americans" amenable to the idea, and even this cannot be 
proven. Nevertheless, these were Eizenstat's
rationalizations to Carter.
He added there would soon be a White House celebration 
of Israel's 3 0th anniversary, and that the creation of the 
State of Israel was closely tied with the Holocaust. "If you 
are interested in pursuing an official U.S. memorial to the 
Holocaust victims, that date would seem an appropriate time 
to announce plans for such a memorial," Eizenstat wrote. 
"The memorial would serve not only as a reminder to all 
Americans of the millions who died in the Holocaust, but also 
of the birth of Israel and its continued life."
The memorandum said there were questions to be resolved 
about what the memorial should be, where it should be 
located, how it should be funded and what would be the role 
of the Federal government in sponsoring or maintaining it. 
It then recommended a fifteen member committee of 
"distinguished Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish" to be 
appointed by the President to resolve those questions, and to 
make recommendations within six months. It concluded that 
there should be "sufficiently wide support" so that private 
funds would be used to pay for the building, and in whole or 
in part, for the maintenance. "We do not believe that any 
federal dollars will need to expended. However, for other 
reasons, we might want to have the government contribute 
toward the memorial, if not through direct expenditures then 
at least through the gift of land." (It would follow from 
the above history of the situation that these "other reasons" 
would be to please the alienated organized Jewish community.) 
There is a handwritten notation on the memorandum: "I
concur— and so does Cy, Z. B." (indicating that Brzezinski 
and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were consulted and 
approved of the plan) .15
Eizenstat said in an interview that the idea of a 
President's Commission on the Holocaust came to his attention 
through Goldstein, who got the idea through Mark Siegel. He
15Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat and Bob Lipshutz to the 
President, "Subject: Holocaust Memorial", April 25,1978, The
Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS-Eizenstat collection.
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said, "As one who lost relatives in the Holocaust, it seemed 
compelling to me. I mentioned it to President Carter and 
sent him a memo [above]. The President's major concern was 
financial. It didn't take a lot of arm twisting. We talked 
about the idea of a Commission and a suitable memorial. He 
asked who should be the chairperson, and I said that only one 
person, Elie Wiesel, was suitable. I called Wiesel, and he 
was out of the country. When I found him, he was very 
excited, agreed, and came to see the President."16
Wiesel, who later resigned as chairman, said the 
Commission was created for political purposes. He said that 
in the beginning it was a political act, because Carter 
wanted to ingratiate himself with the Jewish community and he 
realized this subject was important. Wiesel said that 
Carter's desire to get the Jewish vote was behind the idea, 
and that Eizenstat was the person who engineered it.17
Asked whether the purpose of creating a Holocaust 
Commission was political, Eizenstat hedged and said: "Every
decision has political and substantive aspects. Sometimes 
you make a decision that is not political, or you try to 
minimize the politics. This, to me, was long overdue, 
because of revisionism, lack of records, and survivors dying.
16Interview with Stuart Eizenstat, Chief Domestic Policy 
Advisor for President Carter, March 16, 1990, Washington,
D.C.
17Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York
City.
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I felt it was extremely strong substantively, or I would not 
have recommended it even if it had good political aspects. 
Politically, it showed the Presidents sensitivity to Jewish 
concerns at a time when some Jews were still not comfortable 
with a Southern Baptist. It was not done for political 
reasons, but we knew it should be popular in the Jewish 
community.1,18
Siegel was more direct about the political implications 
of the President's Commission on the Holocaust: "The
Holocaust memorial was born out of politics and it was born 
out of domestic political crisis. I know that's the case. I 
know that's what happened," he said. He added that it went 
on to do very good things, he was happy it is being built, 
and "every time I go by that site I feel wonderful." 
Nevertheless, it was created for political purposes.19
As Eizenstat had suggested in the April 2 5 memorandum to 
Carter, the President announced at the May 1, 1978 Israel
3 0th anniversary celebration at the White House that he was 
appointing a commission to recommend to him an official 
American Holocaust memorial. He followed Eizenstat's lead, 
both in tying the memorialization of the Holocaust to Israel, 
and in connecting the memorialization to the United States, 
and to a broader symbol of human rights violation. At the 




Menachem Begin and 1000 invited guests, (most of whom were 
American Jewish community leaders, government officials and 
rabbis), Carter referred to the Holocaust as "the ultimate in 
man's inhumanity to man". He said the six million Jews 
murdered by the Nazis died in part "because the entire world 
turned its back on them", and that a memorial would "insure 
that we in the United States never forget." He added that 
"we will never waver from our deep friendship and partnership 
with Israel and our total, absolute commitment to Israel's 
security. "20
The creation of a President's Commission now moved 
quickly, especially since during the last week of April, 
Senator Wendell Anderson (D-Minn.) had introduced a bill to 
establish a national memorial to victims of the Holocaust. 
This bill would have authorized the President to appoint an 
eleven-member commission to develop plans for design, 
construction and location of a memorial. Evidence indicates 
the President's staff wanted to "beat the Senate to the 
punch" so credit would not be diluted. This is proven most 
directly by a July 20, 1978 memorandum from Eizenstat and
Lipshutz to Tim Kraft, which included the following 
paragraph:
"We would like to get a memo to the President shortly 
after his return from Bonn, (emphasis in original) Senator
20Helen Silver, "Carter Moves to Create a Memorial to the 
Victims of the Holocaust", Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily 
News Bulletin. May 3, 1978, p. 3.
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Anderson, who had introduced legislation to form a similar 
commission before the President's announcement, is getting 
pressured to pursue his legislation because of apparent White 
House lack of interest. David Rubenstein and Ellen Goldstein 
from Stu's staff will be available to assist you and your 
staff in preparing a memo for the President.”21
An earlier memorandum from Goldstein to Eizenstat on May 
2, 1978 also indicates pressure to initiate the
implementation phase. Handwritten across the top is a note 
(most likely by Eizenstat): "Ellen: Please set up [a staff
meeting] ASAP. Let's move on this." This memo, too, 
mentions the proposed Anderson legislation. Goldstein said 
the staff should "move quickly and wisely" to fulfill 
Carter's "public commitment" to create a Holocaust 
memorial."22 A day earlier, the day of the White House 
ceremony, Eizenstat had written to Carter, telling him he had 
spoken with several senators and congressmen, who thought 
announcement of a Holocaust commission was a good idea and 
appropriate at that time. On the bottom of this memo, Carter 
wrote by hand: "Stu, Bob— Be careful not to make any
21Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat and Bob Lipshutz to Tim 
Kraft, "Subject: President's Holocaust Memorial Commission" ,
July 20, 1978, p. 5, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga. , DPS- 
Eizenstat files.
22Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu Eizenstat, 
"Subject: Presidential Commission on the Holocaust
Memorial", May 2, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS- 
Eizenstat files.
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promises— JC".23 The President thus was willing to make 
vague commitments, but not ready to back them with concrete 
and specific action.
Carter's staff, however, was ready to move ahead with 
specific action. They began creating a political coalition, 
under their control, that would get the project started. On 
May 10, 1978, Goldstein wrote to Eizenstat, presenting a
"rough agenda" of issues that needed to be resolved before 
the Commission could be named and begin to work. She was 
concerned about the choice of Commission members, and said: 
"Clearly, the most important issue to settle is whether the 
Commission is to be a 'blue-ribbon' panel, but there are also 
other issues about Commission members that must be resolved: 
Jewish and non-Jewish proportion, bi-partisan participation, 
federal arts officials, etc. She included a list of possible 
candidates. As a possible chairman, she suggested Arthur 
Krim, who had the following qualities: "keen political
skills, articulate moderator, Democrat, consummate 
fundraiser, and he is highly regarded and respected." 
Political considerations were thus clearly spelled out in 
black and white. (Furthermore, Eizenstat's statement that 
Wiesel was the "only person" considered "suitable" for the 
chairmanship was not accurate.24)
23Memorandum from Stu Eizenstat to the President, May 1, 
1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga, DPS-Eizenstat files.
24Eizenstat interview op. cit.
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Goldstein then implied that the Administration staff, 
rather than the Commission, would be making some crucial 
decisions: "We may want to further influence the
Commission's decision concerning what the. memorial should be, 
where it should be located and how it should be funded. Many 
believe that, in order for it to be an 'official' memorial, 
it must be in Washington. It is also accepted that the 
memorial should not be just a marble statue, but educational 
as well. However, the Commission must be careful not to add 
further to the competition and rivalry, both for funds and 
recognition, in this area." She said funding would be 
private, but the government "must have a significant role in 
this effort."25 Goldstein did not explain what she thought 
this "significant role" should be.
By July 20, 1978, the project had moved forward.
Eizenstat and Lipshutz wrote a memorandum to Tim Kraft, 
saying they had contacted members of the Jewish community 
about the choice of Elie Wiesel as chairman of the 
Commission. They wrote: "Wiesel is the undisputed expert on
the holocaust period and his appointment would be without 
controversy, but his political and fundraising abilities are 
not clearly established." Again, the considerations were 
political. Also included was a list of recommendations for
25Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu Eizenstat, 
"Subject: Briefing Memorandum Re: Memorial Commission
Meeting", May 10, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta, Ga., DPS- 
Eizenstat files.
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advisory board members, and for the Commission itself. The 
memo said the Commission should include camp survivors, a 
rabbi, and recognized leaders, including representatives from 
the arts. They pointed out they had included four women and 
a black.26
On September 9, 1978, Eizenstat and Goldstein sent
President Carter another memorandum, recommending that he 
sign a congressional resolution (H. R. 1014) that designated 
April 28 and 29 as "Days of Remembrance of Victims of the 
Holocaust". They suggested that the President's Commission 
on the Holocaust, which he had promised to appoint on May 1, 
also be announced at the same time.27 Linking the 
announcement of the President's Commission with the 
Congressional resolution reinforced the creation of an iron 
triangle of sorts for nationally memorializing the Holocaust.
On September 18, Lipshutz and Eizenstat sent Carter a 
memorandum with their list of 24 recommended Commission 
members, with Wiesel as chairman. (Coincidentally, the Camp 
David accords providing a framework for peace between Israel 
and Egypt were signed the day before.) Then, on November 1, 
1978, Goldstein sent Eizenstat, Lipshutz and Ed Sanders (then 
liaison to the Jewish community) a memorandum with specific
26July 20, 1978 memorandum op. cit.
27Memorandum from Stuart Eizenstat and Ellen Goldstein 
to The President, "Subject: Enrolled Resolution H. R. Res.
1014-Days of Remembrance of Victims of the Holocaust", 
September 9, 1978, Carter Library, Atlanta.
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political considerations regarding the public announcement of 
the Commission: 1. Announcement would be on Monday, at the
recommendation of the Press Office. (Monday is a usually a 
slow news day, and thus good for getting press coverage.) 
2.Courtesy calls would be made to Congressional offices. 3. 
It was necessary to think about the possible roles of the 
religious press and the Washington Jewish community. In 
addition, it stated Wiesel was chairman and Irving "Yitz" 
Greenberg would be the Commission's executive director. The 
34-member Commission included survivors, Holocaust scholars, 
elected officials, and other prominent Jews and non-Jews.28 
(Wiesel said Carter's Commission continued to be political
28Memorandum from Bob Lipshutz and Stu Eizenstat to The 
President, "Subject: President's Holocaust Commission",
September 18, 1978. Memorandum from Ellen Goldstein to Stu 
Eizenstat, Bob Lipshutz and Ed Sanders, "Subject: Holocaust
Commission", November 1, 1978, Carter Library, Special
Advisor-Moses Collection, Atlanta. Members of the
President's Commission on the Holocaust were: Elie Wiesel,
Chairman; Congressman James J. Blanchard, Hyman Bookbinder 
(American Jewish Committee's Washington Representative), 
Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Professor Robert McAfee Brown, Dr. 
Gerson Cohen (Chancellor of Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America), Senator John C. Danforth, Professor Lucy Davidowicz 
(Holocaust historian), Kitty Dukakis, Benjamin Epstein (Anti- 
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith), Rabbi Juda Glasner, 
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, Professor Alfred Gottschalk 
(Hebrew Union College), Congressman S. William Green, Father 
Theodore Hesburgh (University of Notre Dame president), 
Professor Raul Hilberg (Holocaust historian), Senator Henry 
M. Jackson, Professor Norman Lamm (head of Yeshiva 
University) , Frank R. Lautenberg, Congressman William Lehman, 
Senator Claiborne Pell, Arnold Picker, Rabbi Bernard Raskas, 
Hadassah Rosensaft (survivor) , Bayard Rust in, Marilyn Shubin, 
Isaac Bashevis Singer, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, Senator 
Richard B. Stone, Sigmund Strochlitz (survivor), Mark 
Talisman (UJA-Federation Washington representative), Telford 
Taylor, Glenn E. Watts, and Congressman Sidney Yates. There 
was also an advisory board of 27 additional people.
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after its creation, because there was not a single 
Republican on it.29 However, at least one member, 
Congressman S. William Green, was a Republican.)
On November 1, 1978, President Carter signed Executive 
Order 12093, officially establishing the President's 
Commission on the Holocaust. The charge of this Commission 
was to submit a report "with respect to the establishment and 
maintenance of an appropriate memorial to those who perished 
in the Holocaust, to examine the feasibility for the creation 
and maintenance of the memorial through contributions by the 
American people, and to recommend appropriate ways for the 
nation to commemorate April 28 and 29, 1979, which the
Congress has resolved shall be 'Days of Remembrance of 
Victims of the Holocaust.'"30
By signing this Executive Order, which created an 
interest group and included means of memorialization 
designated by both the President and Congress, Carter created 
an iron triangle with a twist. According to iron triangle 
theory, there is a solid trilateral bond formed by the 
interest group, its advocates in Congress, and in the 
executive branch agency. Government policies emerge from 
this closed triangle of interests, with congressmen passing 
favorable legislation, agency bureaucrats implementing these
29Wiesel interview, August 8, 1990.
30Report to the President: President's Commission on the
Holocaust. September 27, 1979, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., p. 1.
203
mandates, and special interest groups supporting the helpful 
elected officials (e.g. with votes and campaign 
contributions).
Harold Seidman said there was no significant weakening 
of the of triangular alliances that unite interest groups 
with their agents in Congress and in the executive branch's 
bureaucracy. He said that "[congressional] staff develop 
alliances with the executive branch bureaucracy and the 
bureaucracies representing interest groups."31
The reason Carter's Holocaust memorialization iron 
triangle had a twist is that Carter created the interest 
group, and the executive sought out alliances both with the 
interest group and with Congress. According to Seidman, the 
relationship between an agency and its constituency (i.e., 
the interest group) is based on mutuality of interests, 
generally established by provisions of laws enacted by 
Congress.32 In the case of the Holocaust Commission, the 
iron triangle was somewhat different than that analyzed by 
Seidman. Here, the President, rather than Congress, 
initiated the legal means for uniting forces to accomplish 
his goal. He even created an interest group, and then 
included ten members of Congress as part of the 34-member 
Commission, or interest group "angle" of the triangle.
31Harold Seidman, Politics. Position and Power. 1980,
Oxford University Press., p. 43.
32Ibid.
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Seidman did not account for such a blend: in his model,
Congress is one angle and the interest group is another angle 
of the triangle. In the case of Carter's Holocaust 
Commission, almost a third of the interest group are also 
members of Congress. (Likewise, the New York Mutagon has a 
blend of elected officials as interest group members.)
The main purpose of the Commission was to recommend a 
suitable memorial to Carter, and its first meeting was held 
February 15, 197 9 in Washington. As Commission member and 
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz told his constituents: "There
are no constraints on what we may recommend other than the 
limits of our own imagination and the requirements of good 
taste. We are free to recommend that the funds for such an 
endeavor be public or private or both. If a physical 
structure— be it a monument or a museum— is going to be 
constructed, we can suggest that it be built in Washington or 
New York or any other location we deem suitable."33
On March 25, 1979, Solarz held a public hearing in his 
Brooklyn district to hear what his constituents recommended 
as an appropriate memorial. On April 6, 1979, another member 
of the Commission and of Congress, Rep. Green, conducted a 
similar hearing in his Manhattan district. Herbert Rickman, 
Special Assistant to Mayor Edward I. Koch, said he testified 
at the Green hearing that the national memorial should be in
33Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, "Remembering the 
Holocaust", Community Report. undated (February or March, 
1979), Washington D.C. and Brooklyn, N.Y.
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New York City. "We fought against having it in Washington. 
We fought to have it here in New York," he said. "I remember 
testifying for the City and organizing others to testify for 
the City at a hearing in New York by the President's 
Commission. We made a very telling argument that this is the 
largest Jewish city, largest survivor city in the United 
States— that it really belonged here. Also because of the 
heavy tourist concentration, that it belonged here. When we 
went down to defeat on that, then we began in earnest to plan 
for it [a different memorial] in New York City."34
Records of the two hearings reveal that most of the 
scholars, authors, religious and organizational leaders and 
survivors who testified did not address the issue of 
location. Because they were testifying before a Presidential 
Commission, they seem to have taken for granted that the site 
would be Washington, D.C. There are only three people whose 
recorded testimony made a "pitch" for New York City as site 
of the proposed memorial, and Rickman's is the strongest. 
His prepared remarks for the March 25 Solarz hearing, 
speaking on behalf of Mayor Koch, said: "How appropriate
such a memorial would be in the City which is the center—  
symbolically and factually— of immigration to the United 
States. New York City is also the center of Holocaust 
research. Nowhere else can one find resources such as those
■^Interview with Herbert Rickman, March 30, 1990, New
York.
of our academic and intellectual communities and our great 
libraries and archives. Nowhere else are there centers such 
as the YIVO Institute, Leo Baeck Institute, Yeshiva 
University or the Oral History of the Center for Holocaust 
Studies. .. .Not only does New York have the largest Jewish 
community of any city in the 4,000-year history of the Jews; 
among our residents is also the largest group of Holocaust 
survivors. Obviously, New York is the place where such a 
living memorial belongs, in a setting both appropriate and 
enduring."35 According to handwritten notes from the 
April 6 Green hearing, Rickman presented similar remarks 
there. Notes from the April 6 testimony of Malcolm Hoenlein, 
then Executive Director of the Jewish Community Relations 
Council of New York (JCRC), reveal that he, too, advocated 
New York as the site. His reasons included: New York City
is the major center of scholarship of the Holocaust, the 
media center, the business capital, and has 17 million 
visitors per year. He said the commitment of the mayor was 
paralleled by that of the whole Jewish community, and that 
all groups were ready to join the effort.36 Congressman 
Marvin Greisman, who then represented the Lower East Side,
35,,Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch (Delivered by Herbert 
P. Rickman, Special Assistant to the Mayor)", March 25, 1979, 
Brooklyn, N.Y., Archives of U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Commission, Washington, D.C.
36Untitled and unsigned handwritten notes from April 6, 
1979 hearing held by S. William Green, archives of U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, Washington, D.C.
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sent a letter to Green outlining his proposal to establish a 
Holocaust Memorial "both in the nation's capitol [sic] and in 
New York City - the heart of America". More specifically, he 
said the memorial should be on the Lower East Side.37
In all of the testimony available from the 1979 
hearings, only Rickman, Hoenlein and Greisman advocated that 
the national memorial be in New York City. All three of them 
had an obvious vested interest: it would have been a real
coup for the mayor and for the head of the umbrella of local 
Jewish organizations, and, of course, for the Congressman 
representing a heavily Jewish district. For many others who 
testified— e.g., heads of other Jewish institutions, most 
with their own programs for Holocaust education— a new major 
institution could be viewed as competition. They therefore 
would have had no desire to push for its location in New York 
City.
It is significant to note that George Klein did not 
testify nor send a written statement for either hearing, 
according to the records of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Commission. There is no documentation, but it is common 
knowledge in Jewish communal circles in New York City that 
Klein and Hoenlein were extremely close. Klein was a 
founding vice president of the JCRC, which Hoenlein created 
as a power base for himself and its founders, many of whom
37Letter from Congressman Marvin Greisman to Congressman 
S. William Green, April 5, 1979, files of U. S. Holocaust
Memorial Commission, Washington, D.C.
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were real estate developers. Klein was also close with Mayor 
Koch, who described him as a "old friend".38 Rickman, 
Koch's political entrepreneur to the organized Jewish 
community, was in a position to bring together Hoenlein, 
Koch, and Klein to launch the Mayor's Task Force on the 
Holocaust, after the national project selected Washington as 
its site. It is likely that Hoenlein encouraged Klein to 
become involved with the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust 
in 1981, although no one seems able to or wishes to recall 
the exact circumstances through which this occurred. Because 
of the interconnection between the players, Rickman's and 
Hoenlein's appearance at the 1979 hearings could be said to 
be setting the stage for Klein's entrance on the scene two 
years later. JCRC had dropped the idea of creating a New 
York City Holocaust memorial in 1978, after Carter announced 
the national project. Now both Koch (and Rickman) and JCRC 
wanted the national project to be located in New York City, 
so they could have a piece of the pie.
Although Rickman said he tried hard to have the Federal 
Holocaust memorial located in New York City (and Mayor Koch 
wrote to President Carter so requesting, as documented in 
Chapter 6), this possibility apparently was never realistic. 
Rabbi Greenberg, the first director of the President's 
Commission, said: "I don't think it's correct that New York
38Interview with Edward I. Koch, May 18, 1990, New York
City.
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was considered. I wasn't privy to the first conversation
that Stuart Eizenstat had with President Carter, but the idea 
of New York City as an alternate to Washington for the 
Federal memorial was never seriously discussed." He said the 
idea of a national memorial in New York "didn't make any 
sense at all." Greenberg explained that in the thinking of 
the President's Commission, "the Federal government was 
Washington, close to the White House, and New York was a 
different constituency, if you will."39
Hyman Bookbinder, a member of the Commission, recalled 
that the idea of New York City as a location was quickly 
dismissed. "At the very first meetings, there was a question 
of location," he said. "But this was one of the first things 
decided and is in the minutes. The decision was made that 
the memorial was national and should be in Washington.1,40 
Eizenstat concurred: "I think it was always assumed the
memorial would be in Washington, but it was up to the 
Commission, which was monitored by presidential staff."41 
At its second meeting on April 24, 1979, the President's
Commission recommended the memorial should be in Washington, 
it and approved this decision at a third meeting on June 7.
39Interview with Irving Greenberg, New York, April 19,
1990.
40Telephone interview with Hyman Bookbinder, March 16, 
1990, Washington.
41Interview with Stuart Eizenstat, Washington, D. C., 
March 16, 1990.
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On September 27, 1979, the President's Commission
presented its official report to President Carter. The 
report said: "Location: The Commission resolved that the
memorial should be built in Washington, D. C. , the capital of 
the country and the seat of government, for the materials to 
be presented by it affect all Americans...."42
On October 7, 1980, Public Law 96-388 was enacted by the 
96th Congress, establishing the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Council, which would "plan, construct, and oversee 
the operation of, a permanent living memorial museum to the 
victims of the holocaust"....and "develop a plan for carrying 
out the recommendations of the President's Commission on the 
Holocaust in its report to the President of September 27,
1979....1,43 This set in place the second implementation 
phase (following that of the President's Commission's work) 
of the Federal plan to create a Holocaust museum. (The 
government was to provide the site, but funding was, for the 
most part, to be private.)
SUMMARY
Carter's creation of the President's Commission on the 
Holocaust and subsequent United States Holocaust Memorial 
Council are analyzed here only as background for the related 
creation of the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust and New
42Report to the President. September 27, 1979.- p. 11.
43Public Law 96-388, Washington, D. C., October 7, 1980.
York City Holocaust Memorial Commission. When Carter 
intervened on the issue, he did so for political reasons, to 
ingratiate himself with the disgruntled organized Jewish 
community. He created an iron triangle of sorts, with 
members of Congress also part of the interest group— the 
President's Commission on the Holocaust. There were efforts 
by the City to have the Federal memorial placed in New York. 
When these efforts failed, they led to an agenda-setting 
stage for a major Holocaust memorial in New York City. The 
Federal enactment of Public Law 96-388 in October, 1980 gave 
a legal precedent and added legitimacy to Koch's efforts to 
establish a Mayor's Task Force in 1981.
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Chapter 8: MAYOR KOCH INTERVENES AND CREATES THE MAYOR'S
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL TASK FORCE
"George Klein is an old friend, he's a very proud Jew, he's 
a very rich man, and he was an immediate candidate to be 
involved— by virtue of all of that." Edward I. Koch1
The complicated Mutagon of political forces trying to 
create a Holocaust memorial in New York City in the late 
1980s and early 1990s began as a unilateral act by Mayor 
Edward I. Koch in 1981. Unlike President Jimmy Carter's 1978 
initiative, the beginning of Koch's involvement with 
Holocaust memorialization is difficult to document. There 
is no "smoking gun" of staff memoranda in the Municipal 
Archives (where they legally should be, if they existed). 
Staff memoranda in the Carter Library make it possible to 
trace the allegedly step-by-step political thinking behind 
the creation of the President's Commission. In New York, 
where the cast of players was much smaller (mainly Koch and 
his Special Assistant Herbert Rickman, probably with behind- 
the-scenes maneuvers by Jewish Community Relations Council- 
JCRC head Malcolm Hoenlein) , the absence of such 
documentation is evidence that decisions were informal and 
oral. A high level JCRC staff member who worked with Rickman 
confirmed there would be no written records about the genesis 
of such a project in New York City (as there are for the 
Carter Administration).
interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.
It is also difficult to pinpoint the origin of the idea 
for three other reasons: 1. The President's Commission, and
even the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council which succeeded it, 
had been set in place before Koch announced creation of his 
Task Force in July, 1981. The existence of the Federal 
project, by virtue of its very existence and because of 
factors analyzed in Chapter 7 and this chapter, affected and 
sometimes intervened in the New York City process. 2. New 
York City is the Jewish capital of the United States. It has 
the headquarters of most of the national Jewish 
organizations, the largest number of Holocaust survivors 
outside of Israel, the largest and most concentrated Jewish 
population, and historically has been the seat of Jewish 
American culture. This wealth of Jews and things Jewish, 
which has created a density and diversity of minor and major 
Jewish organizations that are often at each other's throats, 
frequently results in organizations and their affiliated 
"machers" (leaders) seeking and taking undeserved credit. 3. 
In New York City, unlike Washington, D. C. , there was a 
record dating back to 1946 of attempts to create a memorial. 
Koch, therefore, unlike Carter, was not starting with a 
"clean slate". Although this was the first time a New York 
City mayor created a Jewish interest group for a Holocaust 
memorial project, interest groups had tried to influence five 
other mayors before Koch. Historically, they were actors,
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but with the Koch Administration, they became reactors. As 
will be demonstrated, Koch made the idea his own.
The recollections of Rickman, Koch's political 
entrepreneur who created his Holocaust Task Force and 
Commission, do not fit the chronology of the documentable 
facts: Rickman said: "Elections were in 1977 and Koch was
elected. During the transition, I had a firm commitment in 
my own mind that we were going to create a memorial. I 
reached out to the survivors, such as Ben Meed and others. 
No one was encouraging at the time, because of their 
bitterness over earlier experiences. They said it would take 
a miracle. The mayor had given me the tacit okay to go 
ahead, although he was not very involved. The idea was that 
it had to be Jewish and not just bricks and mortar. The 
concept from the very start was a living memorial." (In 
other words, it would be a museum rather than a monument, and 
the historical framework of the museum and its component 
educational programs would have a particularistic Jewish 
approach to the Holocaust.) "We then began in the early days 
of the administration, in 1978, to assemble people, ideas, 
talking to leaders of the community, to gauge the support."2
There is no evidence that such early discussions took 
place. Neither the files of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance 
Organization (WAGRO), the Municipal Archives, nor other
interview with Herbert Rickman, March 30, 1990, New
York City.
available files in JCRC or elsewhere show any record of a 
meeting between Meed, JCRC leaders, or other survivors or 
community leaders and Rickman at this time. Although no 
staff memoranda exist regarding creation of a Holocaust 
memorial during the early Koch years (before April 1981), 
there should have been copies of letters, especially in the 
WAGRO files, if such a meeting had taken place. If Rickman 
had written to or spoken with Meed, who heads WAGRO, in 1978, 
there is no available documentation. Meed's first specific 
recollection is of a June or July 1979 meeting. The first 
letters on file are from Meed to Koch on June 26, 1979 and to 
Rickman on July 17, 1979 (see below). Since the written
record in Meed's archives shows Meed corresponded with 
elected officials about this issue for many years, the 
absence of records of such correspondence with Koch or 
Rickman before June 1979 could indicate Rickman's recollected 
chronology is not accurate. If there was informal oral 
discussion, no one but Rickman remembers it. While it is 
possible and even likely such an item would be included, no 
one and no archive had written evidence.
The only other person with an early recollection of the 
subject is 1977 Koch mayoral campaign aide Manny Behar, who 
said the idea of a Holocaust memorial was included in the 
"Jewish laundry list" of Koch's Jewish New Year message that
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year. Behar, then a college student, said he wrote it in, 
and that Koch was never consulted about it.3
The first available record of Koch's public expression 
of support for a memorial was April 1979, two years before he 
set his Holocaust Memorial Task Force in place. At the 
commemoration of the 3 6th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising, sponsored by WAGRO on April 22, 1979, Koch said in 
front of thousands of attendees: "Yes, Mr. Meed, a living,
permanent memorial to the victims of the Holocaust must rise 
here in New York City. It belongs here. And here it will 
eventually be built. I support this undertaking as a Jew, as 
a New Yorker, as mayor of this city, and as a human being 
who, with all of you, is totally committed to commemorating 
the searing inhumanities of the Holocaust, so that never 
again will they befoul and shame the history of mankind."4
WAGRO's annual Holocaust memorial service, which has 
drawn thousands of participants each year, may have helped to 
convince Koch that creating a memorial was a good idea 
politically. Meed said Koch became involved with the idea of 
a memorial because of his annual participation in the WAGRO 
commemoration. "I think the commemoration had a tremendous
telephone interview of Manny Behar, December 21, 1990.
4Remarks by Mayor Edward I. Koch at commemoration of the 
36th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, Temple Emanu- 
El, Fifth Avenue, New York, 1:30 p.m. on April 22, 1979.
Municipal Archives, New York, record group Mayor Koch, 
subgroup Herbert Rickman.
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influence on Koch," he said.5 Meed was referring to the 
emotional content, which may have influenced Koch. However, 
the huge attendance with standing room only and thousands of 
people listening to loud speakers outside would also 
influence any astute political candidate such as Koch. These 
attendees at the WAGRO memorial service were potential voters 
and political contributors, and they were committed to 
commemorating the Holocaust.
Shortly after the 1979 WAGRO memorial ceremonies, then 
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin stepped briefly into the 
picture. He wrote to Meed on June 14, 1979 that he had told 
Koch about Meed's idea of using the Cultural Center at 
Columbus Circle for a Holocaust memorial. Goldin said Koch 
had suggested that Meed send the City a written proposal.6 
(Meed had originally presented this idea to the Beame 
administration in 1976. See Chapter 6.) On June 28, 1979, 
Meed sent such a proposal to both Koch and Governor Hugh L. 
Carey. He wrote: "The purpose of this memorandum is to
present a proposal for the establishment of a suitable 
memorial in New York City to the Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust in World War II." He pointed to the precedent of 
the President's Commission:
interview with Benjamin Meed, May 7, 1990, New York
City.
6Letter from Harrison J. Goldin to Benjamin Meed, June 
14, 1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
"The significance of commemorating the victims of 
the Holocaust recently has been given an added 
recognition by the President and Congress of the United 
States in establishing, on November 1, 1978,' the
President's Commission on the Holocaust and its 
Advisory Board [of which Meed was a member]. This 
Commission expressed itself in favor of setting up a 
living institutional memorial which would contain 
meeting spaces, archives, libraries, exhibitions, and 
other educational facilities related to the Holocaust. 
This memorial most likely will be created in Washington.
"We, however, believe that a similar memorial 
should also be created in New York City, the site of the 
United Nations as well as the site of the largest single 
Jewish urban community in the world."7
The letter went on to state that WAGRO had "conducted an 
extensive review of the different opportunities in New York 
City for the implementation of the proposal to establish a 
suitable memorial", and had concluded the New York City 
Cultural Center at Columbus Circle was "the most promising 
opportunity". It closed by saying: "Recently we have
congratulated President Carter for taking the initiative in 
establishing the President's Commission on the Holocaust. 
Similarly, we are now looking toward Governor Carey and Mayor
^Memorandum from Executive Committee of WAGRO to Mayor 
Koch and Governor Carey, "Subject: Holocaust Memorial in New
York City", June 28, 1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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Koch in expectation of their support and leadership in 
establishing a Holocaust memorial in the city of New York."8 
Meed's appeal to both the mayor and the governor could be 
seen as a clue to the way the issue would develop in 1986, 
with both elected officials heading the Mutagon responsible 
for building a memorial.
In a letter dated two days earlier, June 26, 1979, Meed 
had written to Koch asking for an appointment to discuss the 
New York Cultural Center at Columbus Circle as the site for 
a permanent Holocaust memorial.9 This idea was later
vetoed by the donor of the building. On September 21, 1979, 
the president of Gulf and Western Foundation, which was about 
to give the Columbus Circle Cultural Center property to the 
City, wrote to Koch and said the company refused to have it 
used as a Holocaust memorial. The letter said: "As worthy
as such a memorial might be, it would be a complete 
perversion of the reason we bought the building in the first 
place."10 (The reason for the purchase and gift to the City 
was for use as a cultural center.)
Although Rickman said the Koch Administration was 
thinking about a Holocaust memorial from the very beginning 
of his first term, which began in January 1978, there is no
8Ibid.
9Letter from Benjamin Meed to Mayor Koch, June 26, 1979, 
files of WAGRO, New York.
10Letter from Samuel J. Silberman to Koch, September 21, 
1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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substantial evidence of Koch's interest in a memorial until 
his April 22, 1979 speech and his response to Meed's June 26 
and June 28 letters. Meed's letters that year may have 
planted the seed, following Carter's intervention on the 
issue a year earlier, but Koch still did not act for two more 
years. Furthermore, Meed was not a major player in the 
organized Jewish community in 1979. His power base, WAGRO 
and the annual commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, 
was connected with but not particularly important to the 
community. (After he headed the first International 
Gathering of Holocaust Survivors in Jerusalem in 1981 and the 
first American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors in 
1983, he became more prominent.) Koch thus did not act in 
response to Meed's suggestion that he create a Holocaust 
memorial. When he did initiate a memorial project in 1981, 
it was not at the request of Meed or of other leaders of the 
organized Jewish community. When he finally acted on the 
issue, he took the lead, coopted the idea and made it his own 
at a time that was politically expedient. As head of his 
effort, he chose George Klein, a major developer who was his 
close friend, political ally, and a founding officer of 
Hoenlein's JCRC.
Meanwhile, in response to Meed's June 26, 1979 letter 
about Columbus Circle, a meeting with Rickman evidently took 
place on July 16. On July 17, Meed wrote to Rickman, 
thanking him for the meeting of the day before, at which they
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had discussed "the proposal for a holocaust memorial in the 
city of New York". This letter is the first available 
written evidence that the Mayor's office was thinking about 
a New York City Holocaust Commission. Meed wrote: "I should
also like to refer to the proposal to establish a Mayor's 
Commission on the Holocaust." (Meed then suggested that 
survivors, including WAGRO members, be part of the 
commission, and he offered to recommend specific names.)11
Koch's intervention in 1981, in creating a Holocaust 
Task Force and subsequent Commission, was both beneficial to 
survivors in particular and the organized Jewish community in 
general, and to Koch himself. It was not an iron triangle or 
an issue network. Instead it was the initial stage of the 
ensuing Mutagon, a polygon of political forces that changed 
over time and created an impasse for ten years. It was a 
two-way reciprocal political contact between the organized 
Jewish community of New York City and the mayor. The 
community, especially Chairman Klein and the survivor 
community, gained prestige from this recognition by the mayor 
of the importance of a major memorial project. The 
survivors, whom even the organized Jewish community had 
treated as "second class citizens" (whether out of guilt or
11Letter from Benjamin Meed to Herbert Rickman, July 17, 
1979, files of WAGRO, New York.
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fear of their being different12) suddenly became first 
class. Klein had a visible and prominent role as the 
community's leader for the project. But Koch, too, gained 
prestige among his constituents in the organized Jewish 
community by intervening and making the project officially 
one of the City government.
Koch's intervention in Holocaust memorialization was 
mutually beneficial for him and Jewish communal leaders. As 
Robert Dahl said of "democracy and power" in his analysis of 
New Haven: "The relationship between leaders and citizens in
a pluralistic democracy is frequently reciprocal: leaders
influence the decisions of constituents, but the decisions of 
leaders are also determined in part by what they think are, 
will be, or have been the preferences of their 
constituents."13 According to Dahl, leaders need the 
support of subleaders and of voting constituents, so they 
shape their policies to insure a flow of rewards to those 
whose support they need.14
Edward C. Banfield also analyzed how government 
intervenes and creates its own interest group to advocate its 
ideas. He said the situation is often a "two-way street":
12Interview with Elie Wiesel, August 8, 1990, New York 
City. See also his book A Jew Today. Vintage Books, New 
York, 1979, chapter entitled "A Plea for the Survivors", pp. 
218-247.
13Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Democracy and Power in an
American City). Yale University, 1961, pp. 89-90.
14Ibid., p. 102.
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Organizations that want something from government use "civic 
leaders" or civic organizations as their intermediaries to 
political leaders, and political leaders also use "civic 
leaders" as intermediaries, for example, by appointing them 
to commissions (such as the Holocaust Commission). Often the 
political leader has already made up his mind as to what the 
decision of a commission will be, and he "uses his 
intermediaries for other purposes than those that are 
publicly announced" (e.g., to obtain campaign contributions). 
According to Banfield's classic study of how influence and 
power operated in Chicago in the 1950s, political leaders use 
these civic leaders for the following purposes: to
communicate or negotiate with constituent groups, to create 
a favorable climate of public opinion, to legitimate plans, 
to disarm criticism and direct it away from themselves.15
Dahl's and Banfield's analyses can be applied to Koch's 
Holocaust memorial project to an extent. In the case of the 
New York City project, however, there is another dimension to 
the reciprocity or two-way street. As in their cases, 
Rickman's decision to encourage Koch to support a Holocaust 
Memorial Task Force and subsequent New York City Holocaust 
Memorial Commission was based on Rickman's determination that 
this was a preference of a powerful constituent group— the 
organized Jewish community. Dahl's and Banfield's analyses,
15Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 276.
224
however, do not take into account another aspect of the New 
York City case. Rickman and Koch went one step further: 
they crafted from this larger interest group, the organized 
Jewish community, a Task Force and then Commission that 
included powerful and wealthy Jews whom they were also 
courting for another purpose— real estate developers and 
attorneys.
Thus the reciprocity between Koch and the real estate 
development-related members of the Commission worked on two 
levels at the same time: on one level, they began a project
to help each other memorialize the Holocaust; and on a second 
level, at the same time, they were working together to become 
wealthy. Koch gave them tax incentives and zoning 
concessions, and they gave Koch the bulk of his campaign 
contributions. Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett said of 
Koch's connections to Klein and other rich and powerful real 
estate developers: "The dollars rolled into the 1981 Koch
campaign coffers in the millions, primarily from the very 
real estate interests that had gotten fat on the tax 
abatements granted by his administration. It didn't hurt 
that the man collecting contributions as Koch's campaign 
finance chairman was the former deputy mayor who'd awarded 
the abatements, Peter Solomon."16 (Both Rickman and Koch 
said they personally are committed to memorializing the
16Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed
Koch and the Betrayal of New York. Harper & Row, New York, 
1988, p. 182.
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Holocaust17, and their project's political expediency does 
not negate this.)
While there is no written record of how the idea of the 
Task Force originated, both Rickman and Meed said the idea
came from Rickman, on behalf of Koch. Meed said: "I met
with Herb Rickman. I remember it was in a coffee shop near 
City Hall, and we discussed the creation of such a 
commission. Herb Rickman was the man who kept the contacts. 
He came to me." Meed does not remember the date of the 
meeting to which he referred.18
After July 1979, no record has been found about creation 
of a Holocaust Commission or Task Force until April 22, 1981, 
an election year. The idea seems to have fallen between the 
cracks for two years. Koch said:
"If you're the mayor of the City of New York, you
have to be bouncing a thousand different things in the
air at the same time. Then it depends on what the 
pressures are, who talks to you, whether something 
suddenly becomes predominant because the editorial 
writers are writing about it. I cannot tell you what 
the pressures were at that time. I only know that there 
were several things that I've always wanted to be 
identified with, as having been instrumental in creating 
them. One was the Holocaust museum, doing it here in
17Rickman interview; Koch interview.
18Meed interview.
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New York City, I thought it was very important. The 
second one I always wanted to do something about was a 
ticker tape parade for the Vietnam veterans and a 
monument to them. I did both the ticker tape parade and 
monument, and the Holocaust museum— at least I moved 
them along."19
Rickman said he was "hazy" on the details and had not 
looked at the files in years. He blamed the announcement by 
Carter of creation of his President's Commission on the 
Holocaust for "sidetracking" the New York project. He said: 
"I know the community knew we were doing it and there was 
excitement about it. And then, lo and behold, word came that 
there was a commission that had been created by Carter to 
determine where this would take place— and we got sidetracked 
because we then tried to get the [national] memorial in New 
York. "20
Carter's initial announcement was May 1, 1978. The
first proof of preliminary discussions between Rickman and 
Holocaust survivors (i.e., Meed) is June-July, 1979, and the 
Task Force was not formed until two years after that. This 
discrepancy in timing cannot be accounted for. It is 
evidence that Mayor Koch's creation of a Holocaust Memorial 
Task Force was not placed on the agenda as early as Rickman 




1981, perfect timing to help Koch in his bid for reelection 
that fall. After 35 years of requests by Jewish individuals 
and organizations for help from a mayor in creating a 
Holocaust memorial in New York City, this mayor was now 
making the issue his own. To use an analysis similar to 
Dahl's (above), Koch's decision to create the Task Force was 
determined in part by what he thought his Jewish constituents 
wanted, or what he thought would be most effective in
arousing and mobilizing public opinion on his behalf.
After Koch's political entrepreneur, Rickman, had been 
influenced by what he thought the organized Jewish 
constituency wanted, he finally began by April, 22 1981 to 
set the agenda for a Holocaust Memorial Task Force on the 
Holocaust. This is the date of the first available 
memorandum on the subject.21 This memo has neither a "to" 
or "from" on it, but its placement in Rickman's section of 
the Koch records at the Municipal Archives indicates he was 
at least involved. Since the subject is a meeting with
George Klein and both Rickman and Koch give Rickman credit 
for asking Klein to head the project, it is likely the memo
is from or possibly to Rickman.
The memorandum states the Task Force should exist for 
four to five months, beginning with a target date for its
21Unsigned memorandum, "Meeting with George Kline [sic] 
Re: Holocaust Memorial Task Force", April 22, 1981,
Stationery of the Office of the Mayor, Municipal Archives, 
Mayor Koch Accession Record Group, Special Assistant Herb 
Rickman Subgroup, New York.
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announcement on May 3, 1981. The Task Force's scope would be 
to determine the nature, site and financing of a Holocaust 
memorial, and to recommend a permanent body for developing 
the memorial. A press conference was planned for May 3, with 
clearance needed from all members before the public 
announcement. The memo reported that Klein wanted political 
officials to be included as members "to demonstrate the 
seriousness (and political clout) of the task force". These 
elected officials were to be listed as "ex-officio", with 
"lay members" as the Task Force members. An executive 
committee would be designated to do much of the work.
According to this memo, Klein seemed to think he had a 
lot of influence regarding the initiation of the Task Force. 
He not only asked for inclusion of political officials, but 
also said he would like the first meeting of the Task Force 
to be held at Gracie Mansion. Klein was, however, mentioned 
in another section of the memorandum, entitled "Issues to be 
cleared with the Mayor". The issue that needed to be cleared 
was Klein's "involvement with [Republican] Richard 
Rosenbaum's campaign". This section of the memo demonstrates 
that the creation of the Task Force indeed included political 
concerns.
"Klein wasn't anyone's idea but mine," Rickman said. 
"And it wasn't because Klein was a developer. At that time 
developer was not a nasty word, and Klein was not the 
developer that he is now. He was only a beginner. It was
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because Klein was a survivor. He certainly had a passion and 
a commitment. It was not an easy sell in those days— no one 
wanted it. And we very much wanted access into money, and we 
thought that he would give us that access. And the survivors 
felt strongly about him. They knew him, they knew his 
reputation. And I checked very carefully. There were no 
negatives on him. In that period, he did not have the 
stature that he has now. And he certainly was not a major 
figure in the development community, as he is now. If we did 
not have his expertise in building and development, lord only 
knows how much it would have cost us in the long run."22
Koch explained the choice of Klein much more succinctly: 
"He's an old friend, he's a very proud Jew, he's a very rich 
man, and he was an immediate candidate to be involved— by 
virtue of all of that."23 Koch had chosen his rich "old 
friend", a prominent developer closely tied with JCRC and the 
organized Jewish community, rather than Ben Meed, whose 
influence and power base were limited to survivor 
organizations.
Klein, in fact, is not a survivor, as Rickman stated. 
He was born in Vienna, and came here as a small child with 
his parents after Kristallnacht, November, 1938. His 
credentials among leaders of survivor organizations stem from 




Vaad Hatzalah) during the war. Although Rickman said Klein 
was not a "major figure in the development community" in 
1981, in fact he was a major figure from at least 1977. His 
office building at Park Avenue and 59th Street, begun that 
year, was extremely important to the future of real estate 
development in New York City. This project gave Klein 
prestige as an important developer, because it was the first 
new office building begun there in five years (following the 
fiscal crisis) .24
On July 6, 1981, Koch sent out letters of appointment to 
the Mayor's Task Force. As Dahl says of New Haven Mayor 
Lee's creation of a Citizens Action Committee for urban 
redevelopment, Koch's task force was supposedly a structure 
of citizen participation, but it was deliberately created by 
a mayor to endorse his proposals.25 One function of both 
Lee's and Koch's group of subleaders was to sell the project 
to the community, to assure acceptability.
Koch said Rickman was responsible for Task Force
appointments: "Probably Rickman did that. These are leading
New York Jews." These 28 "leading New York Jews" were
invited to Gracie Mansion on July 22, 1981 for the first
meeting of the Holocaust Memorial Task Force. Task Force 
members were: George Klein, Chairman (President, Park Tower
24"First New Office Building in New York City in 5
Years", The New York Times. August 4, 1977, Section 2, p. 1.
25Dahl, Who Governs?. "Chapter 10: Leaders in Urban
Redevelopment", pp. 115-140.
Realty Corp.) ; Elie Wiesel, Honorary Chairman; Rabbi Chaskell 
Besser (Agudah Israel and close to Klein); Kenneth J. 
Bialkin, National President of Anti-Defamation League of 
B'nai B'rith and attorney (partner, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher); 
Leonard David (Founder and a Director, Colonial Penn Group); 
Yaffa Eliach, Holocaust scholar (Center for Holocaust 
Studies, Brooklyn); Murray Finley (President, Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers' Union); Judge Marvin Frankel 
(managing partner, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn); Alan 
Greenberg (Chief Executive Officer, Bear Stearns & Co.); 
Rabbi Irving Greenberg (Director of National Jewish Resource 
Center and ZACHOR Holocaust Resource Center); Judah Gribetz 
(partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander); Ludwig Jesselson 
(President, Phibro Corp.); Leonard Lauder (President, Estee 
Lauder, Inc.); Benjamin Meed (President, WAGRO); Bess 
Meyerson; Ernest Michel (Campaign Director, UJA-Federation); 
Rabbi Israel Mowshowitz (former President, New York Board of 
Rabbis); Richard Ravitch, past President of JCRC (Chairman, 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority); Rabbi Alexander 
Schindler (President, Union of American Hebrew 
Congregations) ; Rabbi Arthur Schneier (Chairman, World Jewish 
Congress— American Section) ; Irving Schneider (Executive Vice 
President, Hemsley-Spear Corp.); Beverly Sills (General 
Director, New York City Opera); Bernice Tannenbaum (immediate 
past national President, Hadassah); Laurence Tisch, 
President, JCRC (Chairman of the Board, Loews Corp.); Peggy
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Tishman (past Vice President, Federation of Jewish 
Philanthropies of N.Y.); Marvin Traub (Chairman of the Board, 
Bloomingdales); Walter Weiner (President, Republic National 
Bank of New York); and Solomon Zynstein, President of 
American Federation of Jewish Fighters, Camp Inmates and Nazi 
Victims (president, Zynn Fashion). The Advisory Council 
consisted of Rickman; Henry Geldzahler, Commissioner of the 
Department of Cultural Affairs; Malcolm Hoenlein, JCRC 
Executive Director; Karl Katz, Director of the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art's Office of Film and Television; and Howard 
Rubenstein, President of Howard Rubenstein Associates.
With few exceptions, none of the people named to the 
Task Force were expert in Holocaust education. Only Wiesel 
(whose position was merely honorary), Eliach and Greenberg 
were Holocaust scholars. Eliach, Meed, Zynstein and Michel 
were survivors, with Michel also heading the UJA-Federation's 
fundraising operation in New York City. Rabbis represented 
each of the three major branches of Judaism. Other than 
that, the members were mainly men who were wealthy and well- 
connected in both the Jewish and business, financial, real 
estate or legal communities. (When the ensuing Commission 
was formed, many more developers were appointed by Koch.) 
Only five of the 28 Task Force members were women. In 
addition to the famous and glamorous Meyerson (not yet 
Cultural Affairs Commissioner) and Sills, Eliach was a 
scholar and survivor, and Tannenbaum and Tishman were
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communal leaders— the latter also from a real estate 
developer's family.
Whereas President Carter's political entrepreneurs who 
initiated the national project in Washington, D.C. insisted 
the members of the President's Commission of the Holocaust 
include non-Jews, Koch, on the contrary, appointed only Jews 
to his Task Force. He said of this decision: "This is the 
Jewish Holocaust. The Museum in Washington is not." He said 
there were no pressures from other groups to be included, and 
that the project was all privately funded.26 (He did not 
mention that the possibility of using City land, which has 
monetary value, would also give the project public funding.)
Rickman insists there was nothing political about the 
appointments or about the timing of creating the Task Force. 
However, during the months preceding the 1981 mayoral 
election, any such action was political per se. Koch's 
naming these prominent and mostly rich members of the Jewish 
community to a Holocaust Memorial Task Force at that time 
could only have helped him win the 1981 election with 75 
percent of the vote, including 73 percent of the Jewish 
vote.27 It is also likely to have helped him obtain 
campaign contributions from wealthy members of the organized 
Jewish community, although no study has been made of any
26Koch interview.
27In 1977, Koch won 65 percent of the Jewish vote. 
Figures were provided by Jerry Skurnik, Director of 
Operations for both campaigns.
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correlation between announcement of the Task Force and 
contributions. (Board of Elections records on campaign 
contributions are destroyed after five years.) Klein was at 
the very top of Koch's list of contributors when he ran for 
election in 1981 (and for governor in 1982).28
Following the Task Force's Gracie Mansion breakfast 
meeting on July 22, a press release the next day announced 
that Koch had named this committee to develop a plan for 
creation of a permanent Holocaust memorial. The press 
release said Koch had "acted at the request of a number of 
Jewish groups and communal organizations in announcing the 
formation of the task force at that time." There is no 
evidence to support such a statement. It was, in fact, 
Rickman, who initiated the project on Koch's behalf. This is 
consistent with Dahl's analysis of Mayor Lee's deliberately 
creating a Citizens Action Committee to support his 
proposals. Koch's Holocaust project was initiated by the 
mayor, and was then eagerly embraced by the organized Jewish 
leadership. They did not come to him with the idea.
The July 23 press release said Koch had asked the Task 
Force to report to him by December 1, 1981, with
recommendations on the nature of the memorial, its location, 
how to fund raise to build it, and the method of continuing 
the work of the Task Force and carrying the project forward.
28Edward I. Koch, Mayor. Warner Books, Simon and 
Schuster, 1984, pp. 297-298.
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It concluded with a quote from Koch: "The city of New York, 
which has the largest Jewish community of any city in the 
4,000 year history of the Jews, also has the largest group of 
survivors of the Holocaust outside Israel. Here we must have 
a living memorial to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, a 
place in which to pledge a renewal, a reaffirmation of the 
oath: never again."29 This is not a bad "campaign pitch" 
in what he himself has just described as the city with "the 
largest Jewish community of any city in the 4,000 year 
history of the Jews."
Klein, and other developers in New York City who became 
members of the Holocaust Commission and major contributors to 
Mayor Koch's campaigns, were in a position to effectively use 
their political influence and build upon this strength to 
then gain even more influence and power. Some members of the 
Commission, and especially Klein, used their political 
resources to the fullest. The members of Koch's Task Force 
had the political resources for influencing government, and 
the political savvy to use these resources to increase their 
influence even more.
The creation of the Holocaust Memorial Task Force and 
subsequent Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch, 
Klein and others the opportunity to use the issue of 
Holocaust memorialization to increase their potential
29Press Release, Office of the Mayor, July 23, 1981, no. 
203-81, Municipal Archives, files of Mayor Koch, subfile, 
Rickman, New York.
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influence in the establishment organized Jewish community and 
New York City's developer community (the two of which often 
overlap). They used their political resources efficiently to 
promote the idea of a memorial museum in the community and 
with elected officials. At the same time they were able to 
increase their own power in the community and in the 
political arena by associating themselves with the project. 
Membership in the Task Force gave them more status as 
"players", and as professional political players, they knew 
how to use the slack resources to advantage.
As Dahl said, a political resource is only a potential 
source of influence, and most citizens hardly use their 
resources. The more active the form of participation, the 
fewer people who participate. Those with political 
confidence are more likely to make an attempt, and these 
people are the "better off". Dahl said: "The large
contractor who constructs buildings, streets, highways and 
other expensive projects is likely to participate more 
through financial contributions than party activity."30 
This could be a description of Klein and other developers on 
the Task Force.
At the suggestion of Rickman, Koch had appointed Klein—  
a rich and prominent developer, philanthropic Jew, and 
friend— as chairman of the Task Force. Klein was then in a 
position to encourage his friends, other wealthy developers,
30Dahl, Who Governs?. p. 295.
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to be generous both to the effort to create a Holocaust 
memorial and to Koch's mayoral campaign. Reciprocally, Klein 
was later to get with Koch's backing millions of urban 
renewal dollars for his Times Square redevelopment project. 
Klein thus had the opportunity to use slack resources with 
high efficiency, gaining influence with Koch and the Jewish 
community, and thus building up his own resources even 
further with the community, Koch, and his development 
projects. Koch said there were many developers named to the 
Holocaust Memorial Commission (that succeeded the Task Force) 
because of Klein's connections. He said of the heavy 
developer involvement: "That's for money. You have to raise
a lot of money for this. And George Klein is a developer, so 
they would be his personal friends."31
According to Dahl, the political systems of most 
pluralistic democracies have three important characteristics: 
slack resources, or a gap between actual and potential 
influence; a small band of professional political players 
that organize their lives around political activity; and a 
built-in self-operating limitation of influence of all 
participants. Using slack resources with high efficiency 
leads to more actual influence, and this creates building 
blocks for obtaining even more resources.32
31Koch interview.
32Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 305-310.
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While Koch was using the Task Force and later Memorial 
Commission for his own political ends, Klein and some of the 
members who had the skills of political players were thus 
able to use their appointments to build up and upon their own 
resources. For example, in addition to Klein, Meed also used 
his connection with the New York project to increase his 
resources in the Jewish community. As head of WAGRO, a chief 
organizer of the 1981 World Gathering of Holocaust Survivors 
and a member of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council in 
Washington, he was able to add his affiliation with the Task 
Force to increase his power among survivor organizations. He 
also was able to use the new strength given to survivor 
organizations by all of these activities to increase the 
power of survivor organizations in the organized American 
Jewish community. By 1987, the American Gathering/Federation 
of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, which grew out of the World 
Gathering, was a member of the Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations.
Two Advisory Council members, Hoenlein and Rubenstein, 
are also examples of political players who used the Task 
Force to expand their resources efficiently. As Executive 
Director of JCRC and a close ally of (JCRC Vice President) 
Klein's in the Jewish community, Hoenlein volunteered to 
provide staffing for the fledgling Task Force. He was thus 
able to work behind the scenes and recommend appointments to 
the subsequent Commission through Klein. This increased his
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power in the organized Jewish community. Rubenstein's 
political public relations firm had the Koch campaign and 
many developers (including George Klein's Park Tower Realty) 
as important accounts. His connection with the mayor 
increased his power with the developers, and vice versa. His 
firm's volunteer public relations work for the Task Force and 
subsequent Holocaust Commission gave him a vehicle for 
further connecting himself with the interests of all of these 
clients, and his power increased. The built-in self-
operating limitation of influence occurred for Koch and 
Rickman when Koch lost his reelection bid in 1989. Dahl's 
analysis of this characteristic of "pluralistic democracy" 
does not take into account, however, a situation such as that 
of the New York Holocaust museum project, which changed its 
structure over the years and for some time had two prime 
political players at the helm— Koch and Governor Mario Cuomo. 
In this case, the built-in self-operating limitation of 
influence that occurred when Koch lost his reelection bid in 
1989 was distorted by Cuomo's earlier intervention and 
subsequent takeover of some of Koch's power vis-a-vis the 
project (see Chapter 10) . (The use of the Holocaust memorial 
project as a tool for building power does not mean the above 
political players were not also committed to the 
memorialization of the Holocaust for its own sake.)
As chairman for the Task Force, Klein, guided by Rickman 
and Hoenlein, began this newest attempt to create a Holocaust
memorial. On October 2, 1981, he wrote to Task Force members 
that "we want to proceed with all deliberate speed to carry 
out the mission of the Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust 
Memorial." He said that since the July 22 meeting in Gracie 
Mansion "we [he does not identify who "we" are] have explored 
possible locations, financing and various ideas, and there 
are some exciting possibilities." Klein's letter recommended 
dividing the work into four committees: Content of the
Memorial, Location, Funding and Budget, and Inventory of 
Resources (to avoid duplication of what was already available 
in New York City). He then announced that four people had 
already agreed to chair three of these committees: Judah
Gribetz for Inventory of Resources, Rabbi Irving Greenberg 
for Content of Memorial, and Irving Schneider for Location. 
It was perhaps a preview of the fundraising problems that 
were to ensue that the Funding slot was not filled. 
Interestingly, the letter says, "I am discussing with some 
members the Chairmanship of the Funding Committee." The "I 
am", however, is crossed out by hand and "we are" is 
substituted. The use of "I am", changed to "we are" only at 
the last minute could be another preview of problems to 
follow. Most Commission members interviewed did not want to 
be quoted but said that a major problem in the history of 
creation of the memorial museum was George Klein's failure to 
delegate responsibility and his view of this as "his" 
project.
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Klein said in the letter that committees would meet in 
early October, with the entire Task Force meeting toward the 
end of October and again in November. He said the goal was 
an end of the year report to the Mayor, but he would need 
"full cooperation to meet our timetable." The letter added 
that Klein's 499 Park Avenue office would be the temporary 
mailing address for the Task Force, and that Rabbi Greenberg 
and Hoenlein had agreed to supply staffing.33
There is no further archival material until January 20, 
1982. A letter with that date informed Task Force member 
Meed that a public hearing would be held on February 1, 1982, 
regarding the creation of a memorial, at the request of Mayor 
Koch. The letter said notices of the hearing had been sent 
to "every Jewish organization, community and Holocaust group 
in the City," and asked Meed if he would be able to attend 
and help chair the meeting. The letter added that the draft 
report, which was to have been finished by the end of 1981, 
was almost complete, and would be sent for Meed's comments 
"shortly" .34
The only available report with a date at more or less 
this time is entitled "Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: 
Ideas for a NYC Holocaust Memorial Center". It is dated
33Letter from George Klein to Task Force members, October 
2, 1981, files of Municipal Archive, New York City, Record 
Group Mayor Koch, Accession 82-27, Subgroup Special Assistant 
Herb Rickman.
34Letter from George Klein to Benjamin Meed, January 20, 
1982, files of WAGRO, New York City.
December 1981, and appears to be a report of the committee 
headed by Rabbi Greenberg, which was to have explored content 
of the memorial. The report recommends that a Holocaust 
memorial center should address: the culture of European
Jewry that was destroyed, a detailed factual account of the 
destruction or European Jewry (including resistance) , and how 
this could have happened in "the supposedly civilized 
twentieth century". The report calls for an exhibition 
center for the general public, a scholarly archive that would 
become "America's Holocaust scholarship center", and a 
survivors' space, with personal taped memoirs and 
memorabilia. It says that "only through a sophisticated 
holistic approach can this museum fully realize the idea of 
uniting the scholarly and the popular", and adds that the 
proposal can be scaled down according to funds and can be an 
ongoing project with additions in years to come.35 This 
modest preliminary proposal eventually became a Mutagon at an 
impasse: a grandiose project that included a complicated and
changing political alliance; intricate real estate deals; the 
hiring of top level sophisticated fund raising, public 
relations and design professionals; and a projected budget of 
more than $100 million.
35"Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: Ideas for a NYC
Holocaust Memorial Center", no author cited, December 1981, 
(Record Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special 
Assistant Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.
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The Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force held hearings 
on February 1, 1982 in the Board of Estimate Chamber at City
Hall, with Klein as chairman and Rickman making opening
remarks. Rickman said the purpose of the hearing was for the 
Task Force to "solicit opinions from all concerned New 
Yorkers on this vital memorial." He made it clear, however, 
that this memorial was not for "all" New Yorkers, but for the 
Jewish community. He said: "It is our hope that this
memorial to the Jewish martyrs of the Holocaust will
encourage other groups who perished through genocidal 
campaigns during this century to establish memorial task 
forces along similar lines, and we will be proud to work with 
them as we have with the Jewish community."36 This was a 
politically polite way of excluding the Armenians, Gypsies, 
homosexuals, Poles, Ukrainians, and any other group that had 
ideas about being included in this exclusively Jewish 
memorial.
After the hearing, which had given interested parties 
the opportunity to present their ideas, and thus added a 
veneer of "participatory democracy", the Task Force moved 
forward and recommended the establishment of a permanent 
Holocaust Memorial Commission.
36"Remarks by Hon. Herbert P. Rickman, Special Assistant 
to the Mayor, Introducing Public Hearings of Mayor's 
Holocaust Memorial Task Force", February 1, 1982, (Record
Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special Assistant 
Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.
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SUMMARY
The first available record of Koch's public expression 
of interest in creating a Holocaust memorial was in April 
1979, although he may have included the issue in his Jewish 
"laundry list" of campaign promises in 1977. Koch's special 
assistant, Rickman, met with WAGRO head Meed in July 1979 and 
the subject of creating a Holocaust Commission was discussed. 
Koch did not act on this idea until Spring 1981, an election 
year. When he did so, he chose to head his Mayor's Task 
Force on the Holocaust millionaire real estate developer 
George Klein, who was a founding vice president of JCRC. Of 
the 28 members, most were wealthy men with connections to 
both the Jewish and business-finance-real estate communities. 
Banfield's and Dahl's analyses of local power can be applied 
to an extent. However they do not account for a second 
agenda between the players, nor for the changes in political 
alliances over time. In addition to forming an alliance to 
create a Holocaust memorial museum, Koch and Klein were also 
helping each other gain power and money through real estate 
deals and campaign contributions.
Koch's Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force met for the 
first time on July 22, 1981, and held a public hearing on 
February 1, 1982. The political alliance between this Task 
Force and Koch was not an iron triangle or issue network; it 
was the initial stage of a Mutagon. It can best be described 
as a reciprocal arrangement or two-way street between the
mayor and New York City's organized Jewish community, 
especially the developer community and JCRC. This Task Force 
was the first step in an evolving political alliance, a 
Mutagon, that for more than ten years created an impasse 
rather than successful implementation of a major Holocaust 
memorial museum in New York City.
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CHAPTER 9: THE TASK FORCE BECOMES THE NEW YORK CITY
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL COMMISSION
"There is not anybody I know who is opposed to a museum 
of the Holocaust in New York City. [But for] an enormous 
neo-Renaissance palazzo— dedicated to a manifestation of 
power, money and nothing but money— to be transformed into a 
museum of the Holocaust is displeasingly, offensively 
ironic." Brendan Gill1
On September 14, 1982 Mayor Edward I. Koch's
intervention in the effort to establish a Holocaust memorial 
in New York City was formalized. This effort, which had been 
unsuccessfully attempted by Jewish community groups and 
individuals since 194 6, was now officially a "permanent" 
project of the government of the City of New York. At this 
point Koch was fully in control of the project, for which he 
created the interest group and chose or approved its co- 
chairmen and members. At this initial stage, the Mutagon's 
structure was simple: Koch and his political entrepreneur, 
Herbert Rickman formed a political alliance with an interest 
group they had created, for the purpose of creating a 
Holocaust memorial museum. The chairman of the interest 
group was developer George Klein, who both received political 
favors (for his development projects) from Koch and returned 
these favors in the form of major campaign contributions.
1Brendan Gill, chairman of the New York Landmarks 
Conservancy and a leader in efforts to revive the Custom 
House, as quoted in The New York Times by David W. Dunlap, 
"Plans for Custom House are Presented to Board", August 2, 
1984.
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During the last week of August and the first week of 
September, 1982, Koch sent letters to prospective members and 
officers of the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission. 
The letters said a permanent Commission was being created 
upon recommendation of the temporary Task Force, and stressed 
the importance of New York City as the site of a major 
memorial: "Because New York City is regarded by all as the
cultural and spiritual nucleus of American Jewry and is home 
to the largest number of Holocaust survivors, it is fitting 
that a Memorial be erected....It is tragic that the City with 
the largest Jewish population in the world outside the state 
of Israel, still does not have a fitting memorial to the six 
million martyrs lost in the Second World War."2
The letters said the first meeting of the Commission was 
scheduled for September 14 in City Hall, and that a press 
conference with the mayor would follow. Invitees were asked 
to call Herbert Rickman, the Mayor's Special Assistant (and 
the project's midwife), to tell him whether they would serve 
and whether they would attend this first meeting.
According to Rickman, the mayor's office "had always 
said from the beginning that we did not want the dollars and 
cents to come from government. It had to be privately 
raised. We were very clear on that. What the City was 
offering was our services, help in the selection of a site,
2Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 82-27, Subgroup Special 
Asst. Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York City.
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and the imprimatur of the administration— plus the help in 
putting together the Task Force. And as we put together the 
Task Force, we also prepared to put together the Commission." 
Except for the possibility that a site would be City-owned 
land and the time Rickman and others put in while on the City 
payroll, it is true no public money was involved. Rickman 
said developer George Klein, who had headed the Task Force, 
informed him he would not continue alone at this point and 
wanted a co-chairman.
Rickman said he then began the search for one, and at 
that time Henry Morgenthau, the father of Manhattan District 
Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, was being hailed as having 
been the only Jew in government during World War II who spoke 
up about saving Jews from extinction. (The elder Morgenthau 
had been President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of the 
Treasury and did have an important role in urging rescue 
efforts. It is unclear why Rickman said he was then "being 
hailed". As mentioned in Chapter 8, Klein's father, too, had 
an important role in rescue efforts, through the Orthodox 
Vaad Hatzalah. Ironically, they had in common as their 
qualifications for being co-chairmen their fathers' histories 
and their political support of Koch.)
Rickman continued: "And I knew Bob [Robert M.
Morgenthau] then to be a very passionate Zionist. I 
recommended him to Klein, and Klein thought it was wonderful. 
And I went in to the mayor and the mayor thought it was a
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terrific idea. I called Morgenthau and he accepted it. So 
that was the dual chairmanship at that point."3 Koch said 
Morgenthau was appointed "because of his name, and his 
stature and his desire".4 However, he was also a Koch-allied 
Democrat, to balance Klein. (Klein was a political ally of 
Koch's but was known in the organized Jewish community as a 
prominent Republican and a strong supporter of President 
Ronald Reagan.) Morgenthau refused to be interviewed and 
said he had "no inside information" on the Commission. He 
said he became Co-chairman, because the mayor asked him and 
he said "yes".5
At the September 14 meeting in City Hall, Klein said the 
proposed Holocaust memorial would be "strictly Jewish", and 
would be financed through an endowment fund because it was 
"too holy for fundraising". He mentioned as two possible 
locations the Huntington Hartford Museum at Columbus Circle 
and the U.S. Custom House at Bowling Green. Klein announced 
that he and Morgenthau were to serve as co-chairmen, with 
Elie Wiesel and former United States Senator Jacob Javits as 
honorary chairmen. Koch's title became Founding Chairman.
3Interview with Herbert Rickman, March 30, 1990, New
York City.
interview with Mayor Edward I. Koch, May 18, 1990,
offices of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman, 
New York City.
telephone conversation with Manhattan District Attorney 
Robert M. Morgenthau, December 21. 1991.
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Klein said he had asked the YIVO Institute for Jewish 
Research on Fifth Avenue and 86th Street and the Center for 
Holocaust Studies Documentation and Research in Brooklyn to 
sell their buildings, join the memorial museum to be created, 
and contribute funds from their property sales to the 
Commission's planned endowment fund.6
A press release from the mayor's office said the 
Commission had more than 100 members and Mincludes Holocaust 
survivors, scholars, rabbis, business, political and cultural 
leaders and interested citizens." The press release said the 
Task Force report, released at the September 14 meeting, 
recommended "a memorial with a museum, archives and 
educational facilities. The proposed memorial center will be 
housed in an existing building in the city and established 
with between $30 million and $40 million in private funds." 
Possible components of the memorial were to be: a museum
with exhibits on the Holocaust and Jewish life before Hitler; 
computer data banks, video consoles and other equipment to 
encourage active participation by visitors; archives,
including written and oral testimonies; a monument outside; 
a special area inside for prayer, mourning and contemplation; 
an educational program for schools and the general public.
The press release said: "The Commission will cooperate
and coordinate its efforts with other Holocaust Centers
6First meeting of New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission, City Hall, September 14, 1982, remarks by George 
Klein from author's notes.
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across the country, especially with the planners of the 
proposed national Holocaust Memorial in Washington, D.C., 
and, if possible, with Holocaust centers around the world. 
The commission may invite existing centers of Holocaust study 
and research in New York City to join the Memorial center."7
Thus the Mutagon entered its second stage, with two co- 
chairmen, both Koch's political allies in a broader arena, 
heading the Koch-created interest group. Koch, as mayor, 
represented the government side of the Holocaust project's 
political alliance; but as titular "Founding Chairman" and 
the real creator of the Commission, he also represented the 
interest group side. This duality of Koch's role is but one 
manifestation of the Mutagon's complex relationship among the 
polygon's web of players.
As will be demonstrated in later chapters, many of the 
goals articulated by Klein and the mayor's press release at 
the original meeting did not come to fruition: Klein's
"holy" endowment fund was eventually supplemented by a 
massive and growing (and not sufficiently successful) fund 
raising campaign with well-paid professionals and 
consultants; the cost of $30 to $40 million dollars increased 
by more than an additional $100 million when the idea of 
building a museum from scratch eventually replaced the plan
7Press Release, Office of the Mayor, September 14, 1982, 
no. 244-82, Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 82-27, Subgroup 
Special Asst. Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York 
City.
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for a museum in an extant building; solely private funds were 
augmented by air rights donated by the State. The Huntington 
Hartford Museum at Columbus Circle, which Klein mentioned as 
a possible site, had already been ruled out by owners Gulf 
and Western, and they would not acquiesce; the Custom House, 
then only a gleam in Klein's eye, was obtained and later 
abandoned by the Commission. The Commission, instead, opted 
for Battery Park City, which changed the Mutagon dramatically 
and added Governor Mario Cuomo as a retroactive "Founding Co- 
Chairman", equal to Koch.
Other projections for the future also did not come to 
pass; The YIVO institute was not interested in merging, and 
the Brooklyn Center did not do so until 1990, after serious 
financial problems made independence impossible. Cooperation 
with the Washington, D.C. project turned into competition, 
with some key staff people playing "musical chairs" (e.g., 
New York consultant Jeshajahu (Shaike) Weinberg became 
director in Washington, and New York project director David 
Altshuler came from Washington). In September 1982, however, 
none of these developments (nor the fall of Commission 
members Bess Meyerson, Ivan Boesky, Associate Chairmen Donald 
Manes and Stanley Simon, and finally of Koch, himself) were 
foreseen. The Mutagon was only at the beginning of its 
tortuous path, which led to ten years of impasse.
With the exception of Associate Chairpersons, who were 
all current or past City, State and Federal elected officials
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(and many of whom were coincidentally Jewish) , all of the 
appointees named to the New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission were Jewish.8 The Associate Chairpersons were 
appointed by virtue of their office, and not on their merit 
as individuals.
Rickman said: "We labored long and hard to create a
very balanced Commission, and I'm very proud of that because 
we did most of the work in our office (i.e., on government 
time, with the government creating the interest group). We 
made certain we had representation from the survivor 
community and from every major sector of the Jewish 
community— Zionists, non-Zionists, Reform, Orthodox, left 
wing, right wing. It truly reflected the community as a 
whole— even geographically. We strove to have representation 
from the outer boroughs as well. They were appointed by the 
mayor, but I worked on them with George and then we submitted
Associate Chairpersons were Attorney General Robert 
Abrams, Congressman Joseph Addabbo, State Senate Majority 
Leader Warren Anderson, Former Mayor Abraham Beame, City 
Council President Carol Bellamy, former Governor Hugh Carey, 
City Council Majority Leader Thomas Cuite, Senator Alphonse 
D'Amato, State Assembly Minority Leader James Emery, State 
Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink, Staten Island Borough 
President Anthony Gaeta, Brooklyn Borough President Howard 
Golden, City Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin, Congressman S. 
William Green, former Governor Averell Harriman, former Mayor 
Vincent Impellitteri, former Mayor John V. Lindsay, Queens 
Borough President Donald Manes, Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, State Senate Minority Leader Manfred Ohrenstein, 
State Comptroller Edward V. Regan, Bronx Borough President 
Stanley Simon, Manhattan Borough President Andrew Stein, 
former Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Sr. , and former Governor 
Malcolm Wilson.
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them to the mayor and we had no problem with any of them."9 
According to Rickman, he and Klein chose the people to serve 
on the Commission, with Koch's approval.
The Commission was not as "balanced" as Rickman said it 
was. The 66 members appointed to the original Commission 
(not including the Associate Chairpersons) can be divided in 
four categories: 1. high level officers and philanthropists
of the organized Jewish community; 2. developers, real estate 
attorneys and high level members of the financial sector 
(with these two categories often overlapping); 3. less than 
ten Holocaust survivors; 4. only three Holocaust scholars. 
The first category included Morris B. Abram, Julius Berman, 
Ivan F. Boesky, Rabbi Chaskell Besser, Kenneth J. Bialkin, 
Rabbi Gerson Cohen, Dr. Saul Cohen, Rabbi Alfred Gottschalk, 
Judah Gribetz, Marvin Josephson, Rabbi Norman Lamm, Herman 
Merkin, Paul Milstein, Richard Ravitch, Abraham Ribicoff, 
Judge Simon Pifkind, Felix Rohatyn, Howard J. Rubenstein, 
Lewis Rudin, Dr. Raymond Sackler, Irving Schneider, Rabbi 
Arthur Schneier, Daniel Shapiro, Leonard Stern, Bernice 
Tannenbaum, Herbert Tenzer, and Peggy Tishman. With the 
exception of the rabbis, most of these people are also part 
of the second category. Other New York "movers and shakers" 
included union leader Barry Feinstein, close Koch associates 
Kenneth Lipper and Bess Meyerson, Brooklyn College president 
Robert Hess, and Beverly Sills. Survivors included Sam
9Rickman interview.
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Bloch, Jack Eisner, Yaffa Eliach, Ernest Honig, Leon Jolson, 
Benjamin Meed, Ernest Michel and Eli Zborowski, and child of 
survivors' leader Menachem Rosensaft (Bloch's son-in-law). 
The scholars of the Holocaust were Henry Feingold, Rabbi 
Irving Greenberg, and survivor Yaffa Eliach. Only seven 
members were women.
The vast majority of the Commission was comprised of 
Jewish men who were rich and/or well-connected to Jewish 
money (especially in the real estate development and 
financial sectors) and establishment Jewish organizations in 
New York City. The survivor community was not as well 
represented, and many of the appointed survivors, themselves, 
were wealthy and/or well-connected. Scholars of the 
Holocaust, who should have been prominent in such an 
undertaking, were scarcely included. (One of the three, 
Yaffa Eliach, could triple in the categories of scholars, 
survivors and women.)
Not only was the Commission not nearly as broad-based as 
Rickman stated, but the "left wing" he spoke of was nowhere 
in sight. The members were, in fact, very linked to the 
generally conservative establishment Jewish organizations and 
Koch supporters. Rosensaft, a Labor Zionist who was later 
criticized for meeting with Palestine Liberation Organization 
leader Yasir Arafat, could be considered "left wing", but he 
was invited as head of the children of survivors network, 
which was not at all a "left wing" organization.
Because it was comprised of so many powerful and rich 
New Yorkers in general and members of New York's Jewish 
community in particular, and because it was officially 
empowered by the mayor (who was also part of the interest 
group), the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission was 
seemingly in a position to move government and accomplish its 
goal and create a memorial. The relationship was one of 
tacit mutual cooptation: high level leaders of the Jewish
community were getting the mayor to build them a Holocaust 
memorial, and the mayor was getting these leaders to back him 
politically and financially. The leaders and the mayor could 
pretend the idea of the Holocaust memorial museum was pure, 
noble, and above politics, while, in fact, it was an integral 
part of the mayor's political outreach to the community. The 
structure of this political alliance cannot be analyzed as an 
iron triangle or an issue network; at this stage the Mutagon 
was still a mutual admiration society, or a reciprocal two- 
way street (complicated by the fact that the mayor created 
and was part of the interest group).
By the Spring of 1983, Koch's Commission was in full 
swing. Not unrelated was the first American Gathering of 
Jewish Holocaust survivors, which took place in Washington, 
D.C. on April 11-14. The presence of President Reagan at 
this event and the surrounding publicity for an event at 
which thousands of survivors met for the first time in the 
United States made the idea of a Holocaust memorial even more
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acceptably "American", legitimate, and important. Moreover, 
since this event specifically heightened attention for the 
national memorial being planned in Washington, D.C., it is 
likely that Rickman and Klein realized their own New York 
project needed an immediate boost of publicity.
On May 3, 1983, before consultation with or approval by 
the Commission, Klein wrote to Gerald Carmen, Administrator 
for the General Services Administration (GSA), requesting 
that the Custom House be the site of a memorial. The letter, 
which began "Dear Gerald", said:
"Relative to our recent discussion, I am at this 
time formally requesting, on behalf of the New York City 
Holocaust Commission, the use in whole or in part of the 
Old Customs [sic] House located at Bowling Green.
"As you know, our Commission, initiated by Mayor 
Edward I. Koch, seeks to establish in New York City a 
museum and memorial dedicated to the millions of victims 
of the Holocaust. I am certain that you agree that such 
memorial is appropriate and would surely be welcomed by 
many people as a fitting tribute.
"We, of course, are prepared to abide by all 
applicable federal standards related to the use of the 
building and are prepared to submit a formal proposal in 
the near future...."
Copies of the letter were shown being sent to Senators 
Moynihan and D'Amato, Congressman Theodore Weiss, local GSA
Director William Diamond, and Commissioner Richard Hasse.10 
By trying to win support from congressional allies and an 
executive agency, Klein, representing the Mutagon, was trying 
to form an iron triangle on a Federal level so the Commission 
could achieve the local political goal he was seeking—  
obtaining the Custom House. This iron triangle, or solid 
trilateral bond formed by an interest group, its advocates in 
Congress, and in the executive branch agency, had as its 
interest group angle the Mutagon— the local interest group- 
government alliance. To complicate the case further, 
Senators D'Amato and Moynihan, who were approached as the 
congressional angle of the triangle, were also Commission 
members. As was often the case, according to many Commission 
members, Klein acted first (in consultation with Rickman or 
Koch) and then asked for rubber stamp approval from the 
Commission. This approval was formally granted at a meeting 
of the Commission that took place in City Hall on June 8, 
1983, with Mayor Koch and 53 members and associate 
chairpersons (or their representatives) attending. Minutes, 
which were sent to Commission members on June 24, included 
the following information: Klein presided, with co-chairman
Morgenthau sending his regrets, because of "unavoidable 
circumstances".
10Letter from George Klein to Gerald Carmen, May 3, 1983, 
Record Group Mayor Koch Acc'n 87-45, Subgroup Special Asst. 
Herb Rickman, Municipal Archives, New York City.
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According to the minutes, in addition to Koch, former 
Mayors Wagner and Beame (Commission Associate Chairmen), 
Council President Bellamy, Bronx Borough President Simon, 
Comptroller Goldin, and Governor Cuomo's representative, 
Rabbi Israel Moshowitz, pledged their support of the 
Commission"s activities. The State Department of Education 
had approved the incorporation of the Commission as a not- 
for-profit corporation (on June 3) , and procedures should be 
complete and filed with the Secretary of State by June 17, 
1983. Dr. David Blumenfeld had been appointed as Executive 
Director of the Commission, which was now headquartered at 
the offices of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC). 
The Law Department of the City of New York had ruled the 
Commission is "an official City commission" and is entitled 
to use the seal of the City of New York on its letterhead. 
(The "schizophrenic" private-public status of the Commission, 
of which JCRC headquarters and a City seal were components, 
will be analyzed in Chapter 15.)
Most significant in the minutes was information about 
the Custom House. Klein reported that "A number of sites 
were given consideration, but it was determined that the Old 
Customs [sic] House located at Bowling Green would best serve 
the requirements of a memorial museum." (Who did the 
"determining" is not addressed.) The U.S. Custom House was 
vacated by the Federal government in 1973 when customs 
service operations were moved to the World Trade Center.
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Built in 1907, it is considered one of the finest examples of 
Beaux-Arts architecture in the United States.
Klein said that a letter of intent to lease space had 
been sent to the GSA and that on June 3 a meeting had- been 
held in the Regional Director's office, which requested that 
the Commission prepare and submit a proposal for use of the 
space. He then introduced Charles Forberg, an architect, who 
presented "preliminary concepts" of the museum. The minutes 
said: "Using schematic charts and blown-up photographs of
the Old Customs House, Mr. Forberg indicated that space 
requirements would consist of the second (rotunda) floor, the 
first floor and the lower level. This would allow five 
floors above for federal government use. One basic 
prerequisite is to develop a plan whereby the Holocaust 
museum center space is a self-contained unit, that separate 
ingress and egress be provided for the federal facilities and 
for the Holocaust Memorial facilities." Klein, whose 
business depended on his ability to sell proposals for 
development, clearly knew how to present his proposal to the 
Commission in a professional and persuasive manner.
The minutes said: "After discussion, clarification and
further elaboration of the preliminary plan, it was 
unanimously approved that the Co-Chairmen, George Klein and 
Robert M. Morgenthau, or either of them, be authorized to 
further develop a proposal and to enter into discussion with 
the General Services Administration and the New York City
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Department of Parks, in behalf of a corporation to be formed, 
to be known as the New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission, Inc., with a view towards obtaining a lease for 
such space in the Old Customs House and for use of Bowling 
Green Park as may be needed for the establishment of a 
Holocaust memorial and museum. Assurances were given that no 
decision would be reached without the final approval of the 
full Commission and that other sites would not be precluded 
from consideration should the need arise.”
The minutes added that Klein "cited the urgency for 
financial support of the project", and he asked members of 
the Commission to serve on one of four committees: Finance,
Building Contents and Program, Building Construction and 
Development, Memorial Park (in front of building).11
The Certificate of Incorporation, to which the minutes 
referred, was signed by the State Attorney General's office 
on June 8 and by Donald J. Sullivan, a Justice of the Supreme 
Court, on June 10, 1983, and then filed with the Secretary of 
State, under Section 402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation 
Law. The purposes of the corporation included (but were not 
limited to) the following functions: "(a) To perpetuate the
memory of the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust; to 
commemorate the victims of the Holocaust not only as they 
died, but as they lived; to communicate the uniqueness of the
11"New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General 
Meeting-Official Minutes, June 8, 1983" with cover letter
dated June 24, 1983.
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Jewish experience in the Holocaust; to teach the history and 
lessons of the Holocaust to all people for generations to 
come. (b) To create a Holocaust memorial in New York City, 
(c) To conduct lectures, seminars and other educational 
programs and to publish articles, papers and research 
materials. (d) To raise funds...." Signators, as initial 
directors of the corporation, were: Klein, Morgenthau, Dr.
Irving Greenberg (who headed Zachor/National Jewish Resource 
Center in New York and was an early director of the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Council), Judah Gribetz (an attorney 
active in Democratic politics and Jewish communal affairs), 
Benjamin Meed (survivor and head of WAGRO Warsaw Ghetto 
Resistance Organization), and Ernest Michel (survivor and 
head of the Jewish Federation's fundraising). The firm of 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, represented by Ira Millstein and 
other associates, provided free counsel for the incorporation 
and other legal matters.12
On December 6, 1983, the Holocaust Commission sent to 
the GSA Regional Office a memorandum regarding the 
Commission's "informal proposal" to lease space in the Custom 
House. The stated purposes were somewhat different than 
those listed in the Certificate of Incorporation: "a. To
perpetuate the memory of the 6,000,000 Jews who were murdered 
by Nazi Germany in the Holocaust. b. To commemorate the
12Certificate of Incorporation of New York City Holocaust 
Memorial Commission, Inc., files of the Commission, New York 
City.
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lives of the victims of the Holocaust by creating a record of 
Jewish life, society and culture in Europe. c. To portray 
the arrival of Jewish immigrants to New York City and to 
restore to memory the vigorous traditions and lifestyles 
which formed a trans-Atlantic bond between European Jewry and 
the Jewry of New York City. d. To support and encourage the 
widest dissemination of educational materials and curriculum, 
so that future generations would gain knowledge of the 
history and lessons of the Holocaust. e. To provide for 
appropriate commemorative ceremonies and remembrance programs 
honoring the memory of those who died in the Holocaust." 
Portrayal of Jewish immigration to New York City was not 
mentioned in the earlier document, and may have been an 
attempt to "Americanize" the image of the museum for the GSA 
and the Federal government. An intended use of space was 
appended, including square footage figures prepared by 
architect Forberg. The request was for 86,200 square feet 
for the Commission's project, and referred to a November 18, 
1983 letter from GSA to the Commission, regarding the project 
and the square footage available.13
On February 11, 1984, three months after GSA's letter to 
the Commission and nine months after Klein's (first name 
basis) letter to GSA administrator Carmen, GSA officially and
13Memorandum to GSA, Region 2 from New York City 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, December 6, 1983, "Re:
Informal Proposal to Lease Space in the Old U.S. Custom House 
at Bowling Green", files of Commission, New York City.
264
publicly announced the availability of space. A display ad 
in the real estate section of The New York Times said of the 
Custom House: "The U.S. General Services Administration is
offering to lease approximately 80,000 square feet of space 
on three floors of the building, including the Rotunda, to a 
non-profit cultural/educational institution. The space will 
be offered on an "as is" basis and the potential user will be 
required to rehabilitate it for its intended use— subject to 
architectural control by the government." Proposals were to 
be received no later than May 9, 1984.14 The Commission had 
thus begun their "homework" of creating a Federal iron 
triangle of support nine months before availability of the 
space was publicly announced.
Soon after the GSA's official announcement, Klein and 
Morgenthau (who always co-signed Klein's letters, although he 
was never as involved as Klein) took credit for this 
availability. They wrote to Commission members on February 
24, 1984: "After an arduous effort on the part of our
Executive Committee, and with the superb help of government 
officials and friends, we are pleased to inform you that the 
GSA has finally consented to offer for lease approximately
80,000 square feet to a non-profit cultural/educational 
institution." But the battle was only beginning, because 
other "cultural/educational institutions" were also
14The New York Times. February 11, 1984, New York City.
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interested in the space and trying to align their own 
political allies.
One weapon in the Commission's arsenal was a slick 24 
page brochure describing the need for a memorial museum, 
Jewish beginnings in lower Manhattan (site of the Custom 
House) , the suitability of the Custom House as a site, 
intended components of the memorial museum, architectural 
drawings of the museum in the Custom House, plans for 
reaching out to the community and networking with other 
Holocaust institutions, and, of course, the prestigious list 
of members and officers, headed by Founding Chairman Edward 
I. Koch. This was to serve as a public relations and fund 
raising tool in the Commission's effort to win the Custom 
House. The new brochure was announced in the February 24 
letter, and described as the basis for the proposal to be 
submitted to GSA by May 9, 1984.
The letter also said: "Obviously, during the next two
months much must be done. Building plans must be formulated, 
our fundraising effort must commence and public support must 
be encouraged. We, therefore, will be calling on our 
Commission members to lend us their assistance. By such a 
coordinated effort, we are confident that we stand an 
excellent chance of being successful. We now have the real 
opportunity of achieving our goal of building a 'living
266
memorial7 which is both impressive and befitting our great 
city.''15
Rickman said: "We had pretty much targeted the Custom
House Building, and the Mayor was in agreement with me that 
it was a suitable site. The Custom House became our target. 
We thought that would be the best site possible for the 
memorial. And what we did was, we pretty much put it on hold 
as far as the Feds were concerned. I reached out to Senator 
Moynihan7s office and they were very supportive [as was 
Senator D7Amato7s office]. The American Indian [museum] were 
trying to get hold of it then. It wasn7t so much that we 
were stopping American Indian, but we had a strong commitment 
to keeping it in Washington Heights and to making sure it 
expanded its operations there and became an important vital 
part of the community." (A 1978 letter from Koch to the 
director of the Museum of the American Indian stresses the 
importance of this policy for the Koch Administration.16)
Koch, Rickman, Klein and others on the Commission used 
their influence, which their affiliation with the Commission 
had increased, to gain the support of a broad range of 
elected officials. Since many of these officials were
15Letter from George Klein and Robert M. Morgenthau to 
Commission members, February 24, 1984, files of Senator
Manfred Ohrenstein, New York City.
16Rickman interview. Regarding Indian museum, see letter 
from Mayor Koch to Dr. Roland W. Force, June 1, 1978, Files 
of Mayor Koch, Subgroup Rickman-1978, Municipal Archives, New 
York City.
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already connected with the Commission as Associate 
Chairpersons, it was easy to create a Federal iron triangle 
of support and the "sell" was not difficult. D'Amato, who 
was close to the Republican Reagan Administration, and Klein, 
a high level contributor to Reagan, were influential in 
getting the Federal government to agree to lease the space. 
D'Amato told the JCRC at the time: "I am convinced that this
much-needed and long-awaited memorial to six million people 
would find an appropriate home in this historic structure." 
He said: "In New York City, we now have the leadership and
the means to place before Christian and Jew, young and old, 
a living memorial to the people who where exterminated by the 
Third Reich."17 (D'Amato used the word "people" instead of 
the more specific and appropriate word "Jews" two times in 
two consecutive sentences.)
In the next few months, the Commission leadership 
continued to solicit support from elected officials, 
favorable press, and private funding from contributors in the 
Jewish community. On May 8, 1984, a meeting of the
Commission was held in the Tent Room of the Regency Hotel, 
"to bring the Commission up to date on the progress being 
made regarding our site (Custom House) acquisition proposal". 
Klein asked for and received formal approval to make a 
proposal to the Federal government to lease approximately
17Eric Greenberg, "Custom House in N.Y. may become 
Holocaust memorial", The Jewish Week. March 9, 1984, New York 
City.
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100,000 square feet at the Custom House "for the creation, 
development and building of a memorial to the Holocaust."18 
Again, the full Commission meeting was a rubber stamp 
procedure, after Rickman, Morgenthau, a few others, and 
mostly Klein had already placed "all the ducks in a row".
One purpose of creating the Commission was to have a 
body of leaders from the Jewish establishment linked to the 
Mayor, and in a position to demonstrate their approval for 
decisions he and Special Assistant Rickman had already made. 
(Koch was generally close to the organized Jewish community, 
outspokenly pro-Israel and anti-Jessie Jackson, and accused 
of engendering black-white— which often was black-Jewish—  
polarization.) Like Robert Dahl's analysis of Mayor Lee's 
Citizens Action Committee for redevelopment19, the main 
function of Koch's (and later also Governor Cuomo's) 
Holocaust Memorial Commission was to sell the project to the 
community and to assure acceptability (and funding). Both 
groups are supposedly structures of citizen participation, 
but they were deliberately created by a mayor to endorse his 
proposals. As Dahl said, the relationship between leaders 
and citizens is often reciprocal in a pluralist democracy: 
leaders influence decisions of constituents, but leaders'
18New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General
Meeting-Official Minutes, May 8, 1984.
19Robert Dahl, Who Governs?. Yale University, 1961.
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decisions are also influenced by what they think constituents 
want.20
In the case of the Commission, the situation was 
somewhat different than Dahl's analysis. One community 
leader— George Klein— had as large a role in shaping policy 
as the mayor and Rickman in this two way street. 
Furthermore, as time went by and the Mutagon political 
coalition changed, the mayor was no longer in control of the 
Commission or the project. The many changes in structure of 
the alliance and the length of time that passed led to 
impasse, rather than implementation.
In the beginning, in the case of the Holocaust 
Commission, Koch and Rickman thought the organized Jewish 
community wanted a Holocaust memorial, and, more 
specifically, they then thought the Custom House would please 
the Jewish leadership. Klein certainly wanted it there, and 
pushed hard for it at this point. At the May 8 meeting, he 
"indicated that the Commission is indeed fortunate that the 
Custom House, a quality, landmark building, is being made 
available for public use." He said the May 9 deadline for 
proposals had been extended to May 24, 1984. He also said 
that because the Federal government had allocated $28 million 
for general renovation and many supplies would be donated for 
the museum, only $5 million was needed to build it. Klein 
added that the Federal government could not grant use of the
20Dahl, Who Governs?. p. 90.
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facility without the approval of the mayor of New York City 
(the creator and Founding Chairman of the Commission).21
Construction Committee Chairman Irving Fischer, a 
developer, reported that a team of architects and engineers 
led by James Stewart Polshek had inspected the Custom House, 
with work donated by developers on the Commission, including 
Klein. Klein announced that he and Leonard Stern had each 
agreed to make $500,000 contributions over the next five 
years, and introduced a newly hired professional fund raiser, 
Bernd Brecher. Klein said the goal was $40 million— $15 
million for renovation and $25 million for an endowment fund 
to preclude yearly fund raising. He asked that the Executive 
Committee be empowered to determine a realistic amount of 
rent for the GSA proposal before submitting it.
(This "Executive Committee" was not defined on paper. 
It changed over the years, but always consisted of Klein, 
Morgenthau, Rickman, the official incorporators, and a few 
others. Generally, Klein and Rickman made the decisions and 
then rounded up enough members of the Executive Committee to 
make the decision official and "democratic". The names 
listed on the New York City Holocaust Memorial Museum's 
Provisional Charter, granted April 27, 1984, are Klein,
Morgenthau, Irving Greenberg, Judah Gribetz, Benjamin Meed 
and Ernest Michel— the same as those on the June 1, 1983
210fficial Minutes, May 8, 1984, op. cit.
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Certificate of Incorporation of the New York City Holocaust 
Memorial Commission.)
Between July and October 1984, when GSA made its 
decision about the Custom House, letters on file indicate 
there was a letter-writing campaign orchestrated by either 
the Commission, the mayor's office, or both. William 
Diamond, GSA Regional Director received letters of support 
for a Holocaust museum from Jewish organizations and elected 
officials that included: National Jewish Community Relations
Advisory Council, American Jewish Congress, Senator Moynihan, 
Senator D'Amato, Mayor Koch, and Governor Mario Cuomo. 
Executive Director Blumenfeld said the Commission had 60 
letters of endorsement from major Jewish organizations.22 
At this stage, there was a Federal iron triangle of political 
forces aggressively working to obtain the Custom House, with 
the local Mutagon as the interest group angle of this iron 
triangle. Ironically, while Cuomo had sent a letter to 
Diamond urging that the museum be in the Custom House, his 
political brokers were already beginning to think about 
siting the project in Battery Park City and making the 
governor Koch's equal partner.
Meanwhile, five other groups were also vying for the 
space, and one serious contender emerged to challenge the
22Copies of letters listed are in files of author. 
Blumenfeld statement in "Hope Rises for N.Y. Holocaust 
Memorial" by Julius Liebb, Jewish Press. October 5, 1984, New 
York, p.2.
272
Holocaust Commission in seeking support from the local 
Community Board, elected officials, and the press. At a 
Community Board 1 meeting on July 31, 1984, most of the six 
competing applicants made presentations, with Executive 
Director Blumenfeld appearing for the Commission. The other 
proposal under serious consideration by GSA was that of an 
arts consortium, to make the Custom House a cultural and 
educational center. Plans included an Ocean Liner Museum, 
seven theaters, restaurants and a half-price ticket booth. 
The consortium included the Alliance of Resident Theatres/New 
York, the Byrd Hoffman Foundation, the Center for Arts 
Information, the Cultural Council Foundation, the Dance 
Theater Workshop, the Kitchen Center, the Ocean Liner Museum 
and the Theatre Development Fund. The Community Board did 
not make a recommendation at the meeting, but complained they 
had only learned of GSA's plans to lease the space one week 
earlier.23
A New York Times editorial, Governor Cuomo's head of 
the New York State Council on the Arts— Kitty Carlisle Hart, 
Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts Frank 
Hodsoll,and others publicly supported the arts consortium. 
Hart's support may have been a precursor of Cuomo's later 
recommendation that the Holocaust project be housed 
elsewhere, in his Battery Park City. The Times said: "But
23David W. Dunlap, "Plans for Custom House Are Presented 
to Board", The New York Times. August 2, 1984.
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is the Customs House, extravagantly decorated with statuary 
symbolizing civilization's triumphs, appropriate for a 
Holocaust memorial? In the midst of its celebratory art, 
somber revelations of depraved inhumanity may seem 
discordant, even trivialized.1,24 Hart said: "I would like
to express my support for the proposal which would bring 
together under one roof some of the most respected and 
productive arts organizations in New York."25 The Wall 
Street Journal said: "Perhaps the mayor should consider
putting the city behind a fresh and dramatic plan instead of 
encouraging the commission to pay rent in perpetuity to the 
federal government for a space that would never, legally or 
sentimentally or architecturally, be its own." The article 
suggested that Klein use part of the property he would 
develop in Times Square (through the Urban Development 
Corporation) and build there as a Holocaust memorial a 
replica of a wooden Polish synagogue.26
GSA's decision, scheduled for August, was delayed until 
October. Meanwhile, Blumenfeld spoke at Community Board l's 
public session on September 12, 1984, to advocate the
Commission's project. Despite his oral and written
2A"What to Do With the Customs [sic] House", editorial 
in The New York Times. August 11, 1984.
250wen Moritz, "A split on Bowling Green", New York Daily 
News. June 30, 1984.
26Raymond Sokolov, "Rm to Let. Landmark Bldg. 77,000 Sq. 
Ft.", The Wall Street Journal. October 3, 1984, p. 28.
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arguments, the Board voted eighteen to three in favor of a 
cultural center. The Board's vote was only a recommendation. 
Endorsements for the Commission, on the other hand, came from 
the elected officials who also sat on the advisory board of 
Diamond, the GSA regional administrator who was to make the 
final decision.
On October 17, after six months of lobbying and 
competition between the Holocaust Commission and the arts 
consortium, GSA announced the Commission would be awarded a 
lease in the Custom House. Diamond said the Commission was 
chosen because its "proposal was the strongest and the best 
deal for the Government, based upon the amount of money 
offered." He said the Commission would provide $5 million 
toward the restoration of the building, and that a twenty 
year renewable lease had not yet been negotiated.27 The 
facts that Koch, Cuomo, Moynihan, D'Amato and Congressman. Ted 
Weiss sat on Diamond's advisory board, all endorsed the 
Commission's project, and all but Weiss were on the 
Commission, were clearly in the Commission's favor. Their 
Federal iron triangle had prevailed.
Rickman said of the GSA decision: "We won the Customs 
House, despite local criticisms from people like Brendan Gill 
who felt it was ill-suited for our purpose and they wanted to
27Joseph Berger, "Custom House Will be Museum on 
Holocaust", The New York Times. October 18, 1894, p. B3.
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use it for other purposes."28 The year 1984 thus ended on 
a high note for the Commission. It had $47,719 in the bank 
for operating expenses (as opposed to $2 3,741 a year 
earlier)29, and now that the Custom House was in its hands, 
it was going "full steam ahead" to complete the Holocaust 
memorial museum by Spring 1986.
SUMMARY
In September 1982 Mayor Koch launched his New York City 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, headed by developer George 
Klein and Manhattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau. 
At this stage the Mutagon was still a reciprocal two-way 
street between the Commission leaders and the mayor, as his 
earlier Task Force had been. Of the 66 members named to the 
Commission, all were Jewish and most were rich men well- 
connected to the organized Jewish community; many were real 
estate developers and their attorneys. In May 1983 Klein 
single-handedly (with Koch's approval) wrote to the GSA 
requesting the Custom House as the Holocaust memorial museum 
site. A Federal iron triangle of political forces was 
mobilized to obtain this site, including Congressmen, 
Senators, and other elected officials, major Jewish 
organizations, and board members of the GSA. The Mutagon— at
28Rickman interview.
29Report by Eisner and Lubin, Certified Public 
Accountants, March 21, 1985, New York City.
that stage, the mayor's office and the Commission— was the 
interest group angle of this Federal iron triangle. In 
October 1984, despite strong opposition from an arts 
consortium, the Holocaust Commission was chosen to be awarded 
a lease for the Custom House. Governor Cuomo was among the 
elected officials who supported the Commission's bid.
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CHAPTER 10: GOVERNOR CUOMO INTERVENES AND THE HOLOCAUST
COMMISSION BECOMES CITY/STATE
"The Custom House, I believe, is a particularly fitting 
site for this significant endeavor." Mario Cuomo, July 27, 
19841 "Objections have been raised that this building is an 
inappropriate place to house the museum." Mario Cuomo, April 
5, 1985.2
The early part of 1985 was an ambivalent and pivotal 
time for the Holocaust Commission, influenced by the 
intervention of Governor Mario Cuomo in processes that since 
the Spring of 1981 had been the province of the Koch 
Administration. By the beginning of 1985, Governor Cuomo's 
political broker began negotiating with the Commission for 
the site of the memorial museum to be changed from the Custom 
House to Battery Park City. The work of the Koch 
Administration and New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission Co-Chairman George Klein to create a Federal iron 
triangle of forces and obtain the Custom House was about to 
be negated. Likewise, Koch's reciprocal two-way arrangement 
with New York City's organized Jewish community, the 
beginning stage of a changing polygon, was about to change 
drastically. The Mutagon was about to become a monstrous 
polygon of political forces with two heads sometimes at odds 
with each other.
1Letter to William Diamond, GSA Administrator.
2Michael Oreskes, "Battery Park City Offers Holocaust 
Museum a Site", The New York Times. April 5, 1985, p. Al.
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Cuomo's public reason for intervening and grabbing a 
piece of the "Holocaust pie" was his belief in the importance 
of memorializing the Holocaust. It is not possible to 
document the reasons behind the public stance, but they 
appear to have been: 1. to take away some of the glory from
his old rival, Koch; 2. to ingratiate himself with the 
organized Jewish community; 3. to find a suitable public 
museum, in keeping with his plan to give Battery Park City "a 
soul"; 4. to seek a different use for the Custom House, more 
in keeping with his own purposes.
Cuomo's chief power broker for the change was Meyer S. 
(Sandy) Frucher, who was his close friend and president of 
Battery Park City Authority (BPCA). Assisting Frucher were 
Ellen Conovitz, the Governor's Appointments Secretary, who 
has close ties to the organized Jewish community, and Rabbi 
Israel Mowshowitz, the Governor's director of community 
affairs, whose unofficial title was liaison to the organized 
Jewish community. (As a former president of the New York 
Board of Rabbis, Mowshowitz had been named to Koch's Task 
Force and original Commission in his own right. He later 
also served as Cuomo's representative on the Commission.)
Perhaps Frucher (who also has close ties to the 
organized Jewish community) saw himself as a latter-day 
Stuart Eizenstat, performing for Cuomo the same act of 
ingratiation with the Jewish community that Eizenstat 
organized for President Carter in 1978 (see Chapter 7) .
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Cuomo, however, already had good relations with the Jewish 
community in New York State. The idea of making him 
prominent in a major Holocaust memorial project— which was on 
a scale to compete with the national memorial— may have been 
to give him a more national connection with the Jewish 
community, in the event he would decide to run for President.
Frucher could not give a specific date for his entrance 
into the project, and recalled it as follows:
"At a point in time there was a lot of controversy 
associated with going to the Custom House. I saw a 
piece in the paper and it described the controversy. I 
read in the newspaper there was a lot of controversy 
associated with the Holocaust museum going to the 
Custom House. So I did two things: One, I had lunch
with Brendan Gill [chairman of the New York Landmarks 
Conservancy] to determine whether or not there was any 
great opposition to the notion— or his opposition within 
that community— about this Holocaust museum. He said 
no, it was really the location [in the Custom House]. 
He thought the building wasn't appropriate although the 
project was appropriate. I then met with the head of 
the Municipal Art Society, Kent Barwick, and determined 
the same thing from Kent. And then I called the 
governor and said that there might be a proposed 
compromise associated with all of this— and that is to 
somehow move them to Battery Park City, and thereby save
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the Custom House. The governor said that he thought it 
was a good idea and I should pursue it. And then I met 
with George Klein, and a subsequent meeting with Klein, 
[Robert M. ] Morgenthau and Judah Gribetz. We walked 
around the site. The initial proposal was to put them 
in a park that was to be in the southern tip of Battery 
Park. In the master plan there was an idea for a public 
institution in the park, like a museum."3 
No doubt Frucher, who was one of Cuomo's top political 
advisors and closest friends and "plugged in" to the Jewish 
community, also discussed with the governor the political 
benefits of such a move. He insisted for the record, 
however, that his primary motive was other than political. 
Asked whether his deal with Koch, Klein and Morgenthau for 
the governor to become Koch's equal "Founding Co-chairman" 
was for political purposes, Frucher said: "I was not
unmindful of the fact that making him a co-founder had some 
residual benefits. But it wasn't being driven by that. It 
was being driven by inequities and unfairnesses. If the 
State was going to be the principal player in securing the 
land and putting it together, at that point it became 
necessary and appropriate to have the governor do it. But I 
was not unmindful of the political benefits."4 The State




would have no other reason for becoming the "principal 
player", except for the purpose of giving the governor 
political benefits with the Jewish community, but Frucher 
would not say so.
Almost from the beginning of 1985, there were two 
simultaneous scripts being played out with regard to site 
selection. Publicly, the Custom House venture proceeded, 
with its Federal iron triangle of forces in place. Quietly, 
meanwhile, Frucher was negotiating with Commission co- 
chairmen Klein and Morgenthau and Koch's political broker, 
Herbert Rickman, to create a two-headed Mutagon and move the 
site of the Holocaust museum to Battery Park City. In mid- 
January, 1985, there was already a public clue that 
negotiations with BPCA were underway. In New York Magazine's 
"Intelligencer" column, philanthropist Brooke Astor was 
reported to be lobbying against placing the Holocaust museum 
in the Custom House. She reportedly told both Koch and 
Morgenthau she was opposed, and then said the mayor agreed 
with her. Koch then told the magazine "he hadn't told Astor 
he was against the memorial— only that 'everyone has pointed 
out that there are problems with that site and there may be 
alternatives.'" New York then went on to report: "One of
those is Battery Park City. The president of that state 
development, Sandy Frucher, said he is talking with 
Morgenthau and the commission's co-chairman, developer George 
Klein, about putting the museum on a three-acre site there.
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'We proposed this before,' he said. 'Now that they have one 
bird in hand, they're looking at our offer.'"5 (There is no 
evidence of any earlier offer by Frucher.)
Five weeks later, The Jewish Week. the Jewish 
Federation-linked establishment newspaper reported: "The
memorial commission is negotiating a lease with the U.S. 
General Services Administration for the Custom House after it 
was chosen last October to occupy the site over several other 
museum commissions and arts groups. Designs for a three- 
level 'living museum' include a chapel and meditation room, 
video and computer-based study centers and exhibit space 
devoted to the rise of Nazism, Jewish resistance and the 
birth of the State of Israel." The article said renovation 
of the Custom House was already underway, and that the museum 
was expected to open in about three years (a year and a half 
more than the original Spring 1986 target.) Commission 
director David Blumenfeld is quoted, defending the site as 
"very appropriate". He also said that "the fact that it was 
a customs house fits in with the immigration theme. The 
beauty of the murals and the building in a way commemorate 
the beauty of European Jewish art and of the old world 
ambiance." BPCA was not mentioned in this story.6 The two
5Mary Anne Ostrom, "Intelligencer: Mrs. Astor Argues
Against Holocaust-Shrine Site", New York Magazine, January 
14, 1985, New York City, p. 10.
6Adriel Bettelheim, "City's Holocaust Museum seeks 
exhibits, funds" The Jewish Week. February 22, 1985, New York 
City, p. 13.
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articles reflected the two-pronged negotiations then taking 
place: one between Koch's office and Commission leaders and 
the Governor's office, and the other between Commission 
leaders and the General Services Administration (GSA). The 
appearance of the Custom House story in the Federation-linked 
Jewish Week at that time is an indication this was the 
negotiation the Commission wanted publicized.
On March 1, 1985, the Commission was still communicating 
with the GSA, providing information that had been requested. 
A proposed schedule of meetings between Commission and GSA 
personnel was included, with dates running to May 21, 1985. 
That date was said to be the deadline for lease negotiations, 
extended from February 20.7 (This extended deadline bought 
time for a decision regarding BPCA.) A March 3 story in the 
Daily News said that "the memorial commission is still 
negotiating a home for the museum. Although use of the 
Customs House at Bowling Green was approved by the General 
Services Administration, the state is negotiating for a 
possible site in Battery Park City."8
In the midst of these wheelings and dealings for a site, 
the New York City Holocaust Memorial Museum (which is 
different from the Commission) became a legal entity. On 
February 15, 1985, the Trustees of the New York City
7Letter from David L. Blumenfeld to John M. Marcic, GSA, 
March 1, 1985, Commission Files, New York City.
8John Webb, "To keep the memories alive" Daily News. 
March 3, 1985, New York City, p. 12.
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Holocaust Memorial Museum signed a "Statement of 
Organizational Action of Trustees in Lieu of Organization 
Meeting". Signators were the same as those who incorporated 
the Commission: Klein, Morgenthau, Dr. Irving Greenberg,
Judah Gribetz, Benjamin Meed and Ernest Michel. The 
Statement elected officers, who were: Koch, Founding
Chairman; Jacob K. Javits and Elie Wiesel, Honorary Chairmen; 
Morgenthau and Klein, Co-chairmen of the Board; Blumenfeld, 
Secretary and Executive Trustee; and Ira M. Millstein, 
Counsel. These men constituted the "Board of Trustees", 
which the by-laws said could not exceed 25 people. They were 
empowered to designate from their number three or more 
trustees to constitute an Executive Committee. The first 
officers were appointed by Koch (who thus still controlled 
the Mutagon), and thereafter the trustees were to elect the 
officers at annual elections.
Although the Commission and the Museum were officially 
two separate entities, the same men controlled both, and Koch 
was in command. Now, the governor wanted to step in and take 
away as much of that command as possible. The politics of 
site selection became crucial, because whoever controls the 
site of the museum has tremendous power over the Commission 
and the Museum Board of Trustees. By accepting Battery Park 
City as the site, Koch, Klein, Morgenthau and company would 
allow Cuomo to suddenly wield power in a project where he 
formerly had virtually none.
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The political importance of site selection is analyzed 
by Edward C. Banfield, who presented six case studies of 
political influence in civic controversies in Chicago: 
construction of a branch hospital, the merger of county and 
city welfare departments, extension of rapid transit lines, 
construction of the Fort Dearborn Project civic center, 
creation of a permanent branch of University of Illinois, and 
creation of an exhibition hall. All of these case studies 
are similar to each other and to the creation of the 
Holocaust museum, in the use and intermeshing of influence by 
public officials, interest groups, media and private 
entrepreneurs. Banfield analyzes many factors that influence 
the choice of the site for his six case studies: e.g., how
they will affect business, elected officials, neighborhoods, 
the alternative sites not selected, government services.9
Site selection has been a major component of creation of 
the Holocaust museum from the beginning. Consideration of 
how the site of the museum would affect elected officials was 
crucial, because the Custom House site was chosen by the 
Koch-affiliated Commission leadership, and Battery Park City 
was chosen by the governor's political broker. As part of 
the deal for the land, he was to become an equal "founding 
co-chairman" (retroactively) with Koch. The choice of
Battery Park City thus enhanced the governor's position and
9Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1961.
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diminished Koch's. (The effects on business, the
neighborhood, and the site not chosen were less important in 
this case than in Banfield's study. With or without a new 
Holocaust museum, both Battery Park City and the Custom House 
had the capacity to flourish— neither site solely depended on 
it.)
Banfield's questioning whether the "scientific" 
evaluation of a chosen site is important for public relations 
and/or as a means of stalling initiation of a project is also 
relevant for an analysis of the Holocaust project. Experts 
evaluated the Custom House and deemed it highly suitable, a 
conclusion that was publicly seconded by all elected 
officials and Commission leadership. This "scientific" or 
"expert" evaluation was used for public relations, to promote 
the obtaining of and public acceptance of the Custom House. 
Initiation of the project was then stalled while the experts 
determined that in fact Battery Park City would be a better 
location. A public relations campaign was then launched by 
the Commission to convince the organized Jewish community 
that this second site was better.
Meanwhile, encouraged by the leadership of the 
Commission, on February 25, 1985, City Councilwoman Susan
Alter's (D-Brooklyn) resolution, which placed the Council's 
"moral support" behind the concept of establishing a 
Holocaust Memorial, was approved by the City Council. Alter 
said the resolution (no. 1063-A) did not cite the Custom
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House, because it was not meant to focus on a specific 
project.10 She did not say publicly that the Commission's 
indecision between the Custom House and Battery Park City at 
that point precluded her from being specific. Most of those 
who testified at Alter's hearing were Commission members, 
including Rickman, Klein, Meed, Michel, former Congressman 
Herbert Tenzer, Judge Simon Rifkind, Rabbi Judah Nadich, 
Henry Feingold, and Menachem Rosensaft.11
Because Alter's hearing was intended as a gesture of 
support for the Commission, she did not invite testimony from 
representatives of groups that would be expected to be 
negative, e.g. emigre Polish or Ukrainian societies. The 
testimonies, in fact, were orchestrated by David Blumenfeld, 
who then was the Commission director. Just as an iron of 
triangle of support for the Custom House was built on a 
Federal level with GSA and members of Congress, in this 
instance the Mutagon— i.e., the Commission and the mayor's 
office— was using the City Council to give the appearance of 
local unity and acceptance of the project. (The Alter 
resolution was merely good public relations, as a resolution
10Stewart Ain, "Council approves concept of city 
Holocaust memorial", Long Island Jewish World. February 28, 
1985.
11"New York City Council Adopts Resolution Urging City 
to Establish a Holocaust Memorial Center", Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency Daily News Bulletin. March 1, 1985, New York City, p. 
4.
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by the City Council then had no power to impact on the 
Mutagon.)
The Federal iron triangle and local support, however, 
had already been undermined by the governor's intervention. 
Exactly how Cuomo got into the act with his Battery Park City 
offer is not clear, except that Frucher was his broker. 
Koch's explanation was: "We needed them [the governor]. The
Holocaust is bigger than anybody I know of, and the more 
people you can bring in, and help, the better off you are. 
So the issue became where would it be— before a decision was 
made that the Custom House was not the best place. And we 
needed Battery Park City. You can't do Battery Park City 
without the governor, and the governor was very desirous of 
being involved. So it was a natural marriage made in 
heaven.1,12
This explanation makes it sound like Koch and the 
Commission decided Battery Park City would be a good 
location, and then they sought out the governor. However, 
according to Rickman and others, Frucher, on behalf of the 
governor, sought out the Commission and "made them an offer 
they couldn't refuse". Frucher corroborated this. He said 
he not only had the idea for moving the project to Battery 
Park City, but that he also evolved the idea from the 
museum's standing alone in the park to its being part of an
12Interview with Mayor Edward I. Koch, New York City, May 
18, 1990.
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apartment building, and thereby generating some revenue for 
the Commission. Frucher said he went to Klein with his idea 
for a museum-apartment complex, and Klein liked the idea. 
"During the course of that, two things happened," Frucher 
said. "One, if it was going to become a State project, it 
seemed appropriate to reconstitute the Commission; and the 
mayor, who had originally been the founder, in this new 
construct would share the honorary founder role with the 
governor. "13
Koch would not or could not say exactly how the governor 
got involved. "I can only tell you everyone agreed Battery 
Park City would be a better place than the Custom House," he 
said. "You'd start from scratch and build your building. In 
the Custom House, there was the problem of murals that are 
extraordinary, but don't fit in, and they'd have to stay 
there." Asked whether the governor came to him and the 
Commission, or they came to the governor, Koch said: "I
think this was probably all done through Klein and Morgenthau 
doing it, but I don't have a recollection of how we brought 
the governor in. I suspect it was they who initiated it."u
It was not, however, Klein and Morgenthau but Frucher 
who "brought the governor in". Frucher said: "I made the
offer of Battery Park City to the Holocaust Commission, but 




personally spoke to the governor about it and to Michael Del 
Giudice, who was the secretary at the time. There was an 
effort to do it within the chamber. Del Giudice served as an 
intermediary and we were able to work it out so that the 
State was able to do it.1'15
Unlike Koch, Rickman (the Mayor's Special Assistant 
responsible for the project) specifically stated the 
initiative was the governor's. "The Reagan Administration 
awarded us the Custom House, and no sooner did that happen 
than the governor interceded," he said. "And the governor at 
the time, as we understood it, had strong interest in using 
the Custom House for his offices, or for offices that would 
be part of the State Executive. The building would be shared 
by the governor's office and some other institution. The 
Indian Museum was again being mentioned. And we were given 
an offer that we could not refuse— and that was Battery Park 
City— which means a complete shift to a different kind of 
institution."16
Rickman, like Koch and Frucher, cited the problems with 
the incongruity of the architecture and decoration of the 
Custom House and the theme of the Holocaust. He said: "The
deal of the governor and the State was a brilliant one for 
us. Not only did we get a site in a very attractive
15Frucher interview.
16Interview with Herbert Rickman, New York City, March 
30, 1990.
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location, but we got a commitment to do the exterior shell of 
the building. The State was going to do nothing in the 
interior, but they would do the building as part of the deal. 
As I remember it, Battery Park [City] Authority had in its 
mandate the creation of a museum. And they had a lot of 
leeway here. So we were not just going to get a site. We 
were going to get either the entire exterior or help toward 
the entire exterior. It meant a great deal of production 
cost reduction.1,17 (There is no record of the State or BPCA 
offering to provide the exterior of the building. The 
promise was for air rights above the museum, where the 
Commission could build an apartment house to offset the 
museum costs, and token rent of one dollar per year.)
The possibility of the new site was announced on April 
5, 1985 in The New York Times, with Cuomo prominent in the 
lead sentence, as he "announced plans yesterday to put a 
museum and memorial to Holocaust victims in a new apartment 
building at Battery Park City." The governor is mentioned 
four times in the article, before Koch is finally named in 
the sixth paragraph. At this point, in the print media, the 
governor has taken over as the prime player, and Koch's
17Ibid.
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position vis-a-vis the project has diminished.18 The 
Mutagon was evolving and changing shape.
In a July 27, 1984 letter to GSA Administrator William 
Diamond, Cuomo had written to "express my wholehearted 
support and endorsement of the proposal of the New York City 
Holocaust Memorial Commission to acquire leased space for the 
establishment of a 'living memorial' in the U.S. Custom 
House." He wrote at that time: "The Custom House, I
believe, is a particularly fitting site for this significant 
endeavor. Not only is the Custom House's grandeur and size 
ideally suited to a memorial of this importance, it is a 
building endowed with a feeling of tradition and Old World 
dignity which reflects the venerability of pre-war European 
Jewish civilization so brutally destroyed by the Nazis....I, 
therefore, urge you to approve the leasing of the U.S. Custom 
House to the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, so 
that it can be put to the noble purpose for which it is 
preeminently suited."19
By April 5, 1985, Cuomo was telling the press,
"Objections have been raised that this building [the Custom
180reskes, The New York Times, op. cit. See also, Kevin 
Freeman, "New Location Approved in Principle for NYC 
Holocaust Museum and Memorial", Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
Daily News Bulletin. April 12, 1985, p. 3; and B. George
Allen, "Proposed Holocaust hall at Battery", New York City 
Tribune. April 10, 1985.
19Letter from Governor Cuomo to GSA Administrator William 
Diamond, July 27, 1984.
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House] is an inappropriate place to house the museum.1,20 
Since nothing in the Custom House had changed in the nine 
months since Cuomo had written the letter to Diamond, the 
change must have occurred in the heads of Cuomo's political 
entrepreneurs who dealt with the Jewish community. They 
determined that a connection with memorializing the Holocaust 
would be politically good for Cuomo, because of the power of 
that subject for the Jewish community. They then found a way 
of linking him with the project underway: by making a
generous offer of land and air rights to the Commission, in 
exchange for Cuomo's becoming founding co-chairman.
As Banfield said of the structure of influence, 
government is decentralized from a formal standpoint, and has 
many possibilities for absolute vetoes. Therefore,
government could not function without an informal centralized 
network of influence. Political leaders are willing to pay 
a price to such people of influence as newspaper publishers, 
civic leaders, and other elected officials, in order to get 
their support. Chicago Mayor Daley and others "paid" to 
overcome decentralization, and they "traded" with other 
people who had influence. Cuomo and his entrepreneurs did 
likewise with Koch and the Commission. None of the players 
was willing to explain why Koch, who was getting full 
political credit for creation of the Commission and the 
planned Holocaust museum, was suddenly so willing to share
20Oreskes, op. cit.
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the limelight and the political benefits of the project with 
Cuomo. However, circumstances had placed Klein in a unique 
position to wield considerable "political influence" with 
both the mayor and the governor. After a bitter Democratic 
primary battle for mayor in 1981 and another for governor in 
1982, Koch and Cuomo were far from close political allies. 
Klein, who was Koch's friend and at the top of his list of 
contributors to both of those campaigns, surely must have had 
an important role in bringing them together for the Holocaust 
Commission and museum.
In 1982 Klein had been designated as the developer of 
the Times Square redevelopment project in Manhattan. He was 
strongly backed by Koch, and both the mayor and governor 
endorsed and praised the project, which is connected with the 
State Urban Development Corporation (UDC). In 1984, the 
project came before the City Board of Estimate for approval, 
and both the governor and mayor testified glowingly on its 
behalf. In 1984, Klein's agreement with UDC made him liable 
for all site acquisition costs up to the modest sum of $88 
million. Anything beyond that would be reimbursed, with 
interest, by the City, and Klein also had to pay about $25 
million for subway improvements. The Village Voice said that 
Klein, "the heir to the Barton's candy fortune must see this 
as the sweetest deal of his life."21 (It may be
21D.D. Guttenplan, "Klein's Square", Village Voice. 
December 15, 1987, New York City, p. 20.
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coincidental that BPCA, the State agency responsible for the 
new site for the Holocaust museum, was organized as a 
subsidiary of UDC.)
Klein's position as the designated developer for a 
highly visible huge project that involved both the mayor and 
the governor gave him leverage to act as a middle man between 
them. They had both placed their bets on him to make a 
success of the Times Square project, and thus to increase 
their own political positions. Thus, in early 1985, Klein 
was in a unique position to make a "shiddach", a betrothal 
agreement, between the mayor and the governor about the 
creation of a Holocaust museum.
The wheeling and dealing— in Banfield's term, the 
political influence— that led to the Commission's accepting 
Cuomo's proposed site change is reflected in an article in 
The New York Times; "Mr. Frucher has been negotiating 
aspects of the plan for months with the Holocaust Commission 
and developers. He said the Holocaust Commission would be 
renamed the New York City/New York State Holocaust Memorial 
Commission. Either directly or through a nonprofit 
subsidiary, the commission would sign a lease with the 
Battery Park City Authority for the site at the southern end 
of the complex." The article said an architect's rendering 
had been done by James Stewart Polshek, dean of the Columbia 
School of Architecture, showing an apartment tower with a 
residents' separate entrance over the museum. Frucher is
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quoted that the ground breaking is expected in the Fall of 
1986, making the site change a fait accompli before the 
Commission voted.22
This vote formally took place on May 2, 1985, when a 
general meeting of the Commission was held at the Regency 
Hotel on Park Avenue. The executive committee of the 
Commission, which was empowered to make final decisions, had 
already approved the change of site, "in principle, subject 
to further negotiations", during the week of April 8.23 
Once they had made their decision, they rounded up all of 
their heavy players in the luxurious setting of the Regency's 
Tent Room to get their decision rubber stamped. Seated at 
the head table were Rickman, Rabbi Mowshowitz (representing 
Cuomo), Senator Javits, Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin, 
Morgenthau and Klein. Former Mayors Beame and Wagner were 
also present. (Neither Koch nor Cuomo attended.)
Phil Rosen, an attorney from Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 
presented a legal report: BPCA would control the land until 
2069, giving a developer group that included some members of 
the Commission the right to build a 525,000 square foot 
building. 400,000 square feet would be a residential 
building and 125,000 would be a memorial museum. The 
residential portion would either be sold as condominium units 
or rented, depending on market conditions. Profits would go
220reskes, op. cit.
23Freeman, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, op. cit.
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first to the developer group to pay back costs, and the 
remainder would be used by the Commission as a full-term 
endowment for the museum. BPCA would give the Commission two 
separate leases, one for the apartment building's land and 
one for the museum. Rosen said the advantages of "this 
scheme" are "terrific". The new building would be built as 
the Commission wished, and once construction costs were paid 
back, there would be an endowment forever. Rosen added it 
was "politically advisable", because the State and City 
governments want it, and the Federal government is amenable. 
He said BPCA had already voted the week before and approved, 
with a letter of intent, and the mayor, governor, and New 
York City Legal Department had given full approval. Rosen 
added that the approval of the Public Authority Control Board 
was also needed, and they would meet on May 8. He said 
zoning approval was needed by May 20. The GSA deadline for 
the Custom House was May 21, and the Commission wanted the 
BPCA deal approved by May 20.
Klein announced that a group of developers, which he 
said represented 80 percent of the developers in New York 
City, had agreed to "join forces and oversee completion of 
the project". They included himself (Park Tower Realty), 
Zeckendorf, Fred Rose, Burt Resneck, Mack, and Leonard Stern. 
He said the risk was whether the apartments would sell, but 
if all went well, the Commission could build a major museum, 
have an endowment fund, and not raise a great deal of money.
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Polshek then gave an architect's report, pointing out 
that Site 14, the designated site at the southernmost tip of 
Battery Park City, was "forever protected by sea and land, 
with a view of Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty. He 
explained the museum would have its own identity and seem 
separated from the apartment tower. He made a strong pitch 
for the project, emphasizing that buildings in New York are 
"often wedded together invisibly" and that the 34 story high 
apartment tower would be a "background building". This 
explanation was always used by Commission leaders whenever 
critics of the project pointed out the incongruity or even 
the obscenity of putting a luxury apartment tower above a 
memorial to the Holocaust. (It is a reflection of the 
impotence of the full Commission that they read of Polshek's 
plan in The New York Times before they heard about it from 
Commission leaders.)
After Polshek spoke, Klein presented another reason for 
moving the site. He said the Custom House rental would be 
$600,000 annually and BPCA was charging only $1.00 per year. 
Although he did not enumerate how, he said that the total 
savings to the Commission would be $7 to $8 million a year, 
if they chose Battery Park City. He asked that someone move 
that the Commission approve entering into a lease with BPCA, 
and said the Commission would be converted into a New York 
City-New York State Commission. The mayor and the governor 
were to become founding chairmen, and both were to have
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rights of appointment to the Commission. In other words, 
there would be two heads instead of one— a City-State-private 
Mutagon would be created.
During a question and answer session, Klein said the 
developer group, not the Commission, would have legal 
responsibility for the financing of the apartment building. 
"No one will make any profit," he said. "This is not a 
gimmick. The developer group will assist in the development. 
The bank won't accept the signature of the Commission— it has 
no money." Someone asked whether the Commission could build 
a museum without an apartment house at Battery Park City, if 
enough money were raised. Klein said "no". He said the 
State was giving the Commission the ability to build 
apartments— which is usually done with bidding— without 
bidding. There was to be an arbiter to determine what the 
cost would be to build the apartment tower. The Commission 
would get the rights to build the museum free, and pay a fair 
price for the right to build the apartment house, for which 
they had the air rights.
The motion to move to Battery Park City was made by 
Senator Javits, and seconded by Cuomo's representative, Rabbi 
Mowshowitz (which would seem to present a conflict of 
interests, on his part). It said: "Resolved, that the
Commission continue its discussions with Battery Park City 
Authority and commence lease negotiations with the Authority 
for a ground lease of Site 14 at Battery Park City." The
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motion was accepted unanimously. Mowshowitz then said the 
governor had initiated the idea, and he asked for a formal 
motion to thank him (which showed exactly where his interest 
was). This was agreed to, only after it was decided to also 
thank Koch. Klein closed the meeting by stating the 
Commission was determined to open the memorial museum in two 
and a half to three years.24 At the end of 1985, the 
Commission had only $115,000 in assets, $50,000 of which came 
from a special grant from the New York State Legislature.25
After the May 1985 meeting of the full Commission, which 
voted to move the site to Battery Park City, there is no 
record of any action until 1986. On August 21, 1985,
however, Eric Lane, New York State Senate Democratic Leader 
Manfred Ohrenstein's counsel and liaison to the governor's 
office, wrote to Del Giudice, the governor's Secretary. Lane 
said he was "writing to make some suggestions with respect to 
the planned proposal to reconstitute the New York City 
Holocaust Commission into a New York State and City Holocaust 
Commission." Lane pointed out Ohrenstein's role in creating 
a Holocaust exhibit and resource center in the New York State 
Museum, for which the Senator had obtained $300,000 in State
24,,New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, General 
Meeting, Official Minutes, May 2, 1985" and "Memo from
Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, May 3, 1985 meeting of 
NYC Holocaust Commission".
25,lNew York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, Inc. , 
Report as at December 31, 1985, Eisner & Lubin, Certified
Public Accountants", New York City.
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appropriations. He then suggested that Ohrenstein be 
appointed by the governor as one of the co-chairpersons of 
the new board.
On February 24, 1986, the six directors of the
Commission gave their unanimous written consent for the name 
to be changed to the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission. 
This removed the word "City" from the title, and, in effect, 
also removed Koch as sole titular head of the project. It 
was no longer a "City" commission, and therefore he was no 
longer in charge. The name change was officially approved by 
the State Commissioner of Education, who had granted the 
Commission's provisional charter, on March 7, 1986.
On April 21, 1986, a special meeting of the Board of
Trustees of the museum (then called The Museum of Jewish 
Heritage), and a concurrent meeting of the Board of Trustees 
of the Commission were attended by trustees Klein, Greenberg, 
Meed and Michel. The following resolutions were adopted: 
State Senate Minority Leader Ohrenstein, whose district is 
Manhattan, was elected a trustee and a co-chairman of the 
board of both corporations; Cuomo was elected a Founding 
Chairman of both corporations; the lease between BPCA and the 
corporation, dated January 16, 1986, was approved; any one of 
the co-chairmen of the boards could execute the lease; and 
David Altshuler was elected project director of the 
corporation.
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As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the 
addition of Ohrenstein, as well as Cuomo, complicated the 
structure of the Commission and the roles of the players. The 
Mutagon not only gained a new retroactive Founding Co- 
chairman (Cuomo), but also a new Co-chairman head. Frucher 
said Ohrenstein was appointed by Cuomo because he "had been 
so intimately involved with sustaining the Holocaust 
Commission through legislative action and because he had a 
strong personal feeling about it, felt strongly that he 
should be one of the three co-chairs." Frucher described 
Ohrenstein's appointment as "a combination of institutional 
as well as political realities". He then was more explicit, 
saying, "Fred went to the governor and insisted on it. I 
engineered that with Klein and Morgenthau."26 It must have 
been a difficult selling job, because Koch said he was not 
especially happy about it. He said: "Manfred Ohrenstein
imposed himself. By that I mean he was not my choice."27
About a month after the new appointments, on May 23, 
1986 the Provisional Charter of the New York City Holocaust 
Memorial Museum (granted April 27, 1984) was amended to
change the name of the corporation to the Museum of Jewish 
Heritage. Then, in October, 1986, there was a second 
petition for amendment to the Provisional Charter, requesting 




Memorial to the Holocaust". The reason for the name change 
could best be summed up by a comment by project director 
Altshuler at a June 16 meeting of the Commission: "How can
you sell luxury apartments over a museum named the Holocaust 
Museum?"28
At this June 16 meeting, the new names of the Commission 
and museum were announced by Klein. He said Cuomo, now a 
"founding co-chairman", had appointed 50 new commission 
members, many from outside New York City. Altshuler was 
introduced as the new project director, and Shaike Weinberg, 
formerly of Bet Hatfutsot Museum of the Diaspora in Tel Aviv, 
as consultant. (Weinberg later left the New York project and 
became director of the museum being built in Washington, 
D.C.) Projected completion for the museum was in three 
years, Spring of 1989.
Klein said there was now a developers committee of "90 
percent of the big developers in New York City", and that the 
museum would cost about $90 million, with about $10 million 
in materials donated by construction firms. He said the 
apartment tower would cost about $100 million, and that 
income from sales should be about $160 million (assuming 
prices went up in the future) . The shortfall to pay for 
completion of the museum was $20 to $25 million. Klein also 
said the Commission had embarked on an endowment fund
28Notes of author, Commission meeting, Regency Hotel, New 
York City, June 16, 1986.
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campaign to pay for operating costs forever. They were 
trying to raise $40 million, and had already raised $8 
million.29
At this point, after Cuomo had rewarded "everyone and 
anyone" with appointments to the Commission, the full 
Commission became even more of a rubber stamp. Cuomo- 
appointed members were from as far away as Buffalo and never 
came to meetings. Some of the newly appointed legitimate 
Holocaust experts were from out of the State or even from 
other countries. For the most part, Cuomo appointed people 
who were from New York State (outside of New York City) and 
were in three categories: 1. anyone who Conovitz was
convinced had credentials making him or her knowledgeable 
about the Holocaust (and some were "lightweights" at best);
2. Jewish communal leaders from throughout the State to whom 
Cuomo owed political favors (in payment for campaign help);
3. a small number of Holocaust survivors.
The pivotal event of 1986 was the public lease signing 
ceremony between the Commission and BPCA, on September 4 (see 
Chapter 11). Fund raising efforts were intensified, 
especially toward the end of the year. Meir Rosenne, 
Ambassador of Israel to the United States, was even brought 
to speak at a high level fund raising supper given by Mr. and 
Mrs. Ludwig Jesselson (who themselves pledged $500,000) on
29"Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
Report on NY Holocaust Memorial Commission meeting 6/16/86", 
New York City, June 17, 1986.
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December 17. This was the apex for the Commission, which 
began showing signs of trouble by the end of the year. By 
December 31, 1986, the Commission had $1,674,148 in
contributions and $7,432,900 in pledged donations for a total 
of $9,107,048. In addition to Klein, Commission members S. 
Daniel Abraham, Leonard Stern, Peter Kalikow and Howard 
Ronson each pledged $1 million.30 Klein had previously 
pledged $500,000, and was now doubling his commitment. 
However, as will be shown, at about this time the project 
gradually began to deteriorate.
SUMMARY
At the beginning of 1985, BPCA head and Cuomo's 
political broker, Sandy Frucher, began courting the Holocaust 
Commission away from the Custom House and toward Battery Park 
City. While the Commission and its Federal iron triangle of 
forces that had obtained the Custom House appeared to be 
going forward with that deal, a second deal was being made to 
move the site to Battery Park City and make the governor an 
equal founding co-chairman with Koch. Frucher made the 
Commission a deal they could not refuse, with air rights for 
an apartment tower over the museum and a museum rent charge 
of a symbolic one dollar per year. The decision to move to 
Battery Park City, which was approved by the full Commission
30New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, Year End 
Fundraising Status Report, December 31, 1986.
in May 1985, was made official by the Board of Trustees on 
April 21, 1986. It is unclear why Koch agreed to share his 
project with Cuomo, but Klein was in a position to act as a 
middle man. With Cuomo as a new Founding Co-chairman and 
Ohrenstein as the governor's newly appointed Co-chairman 
(serving with Klein and Morgenthau), the project became that 
of a City-State-private Mutagon with two heads and three sub­
heads. A public lease signing ceremony at Battery Park City 
on September 4, 1986 was the Commission's high point.
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CHAPTER 11: THE HOLOCAUST MUSEUM AS A REAL ESTATE DEAL
"The profits from this [condominium] are being used— a 
la MOMA— to pay for the construction of the museum. I find 
something profoundly disquieting about this arrangement.... 
Clearly some mixes are incompatible. One wouldn't add a 
condo at a cemetery, at the Lincoln Memorial, at Treblinka 
itself." Michael Sorkin1
The deal that Governor Mario Cuomo and Battery Park City 
Authority (BPCA) offered the New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission at first seemed like a dream come true for the 
Commission. This intervention by New York State, which 
changed the site of the project and the structure and size of 
the political alliance, later became a nightmare, after 
circumstances changed and the State reneged on promises. The 
Mutagon, the changing polygon of political forces attempting 
to implement the Holocaust museum, was becoming embroiled in 
an impasse. As will be demonstrated, both the more 
complicated structure of the political alliance and the 
extended time frame for the project's implementation resulted 
in a stalemate.
The plan to move to Battery Park City was probably 
difficult for Mayor Koch to accept (although he did not admit 
this when interviewed), because he was forced to share the 
political glory associated with the project with Cuomo. But 
George Klein and the other leaders of the Commission, who 
were trying to create what they deemed the best possible
1Michael Sorkin, "Reconstructing the Holocaust", The 
Village Voice. June 23, 1987, New York, p. 94.
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museum at the least cost, were overjoyed with the governor's 
offer. Battery Park City, the biggest and most expensive 
real estate venture in New York City, was real estate 
development at its apex, and this was where Klein wanted to 
be.
It was at this point that the plans for the museum took 
off in a new direction and became a real estate venture, 
created by a two-headed Mutagon of political forces. (The 
Commission subsequently dropped the word "City" from its name 
as part of the deal with Cuomo and became the New York 
Holocaust Memorial Commission.) The Mutagon not only had two 
heads, Koch and Cuomo, but these two heads were both playing 
dual roles. They were dealing with the Commission as 
respective heads of New York City and New York State, but 
they were also part of the Commission— its Founding Co- 
chairmen.
Once Klein had jumped at BPCA President Meyer S. (Sandy) 
Frucher's idea of a luxury apartment tower on top of the 
Holocaust museum— following the Museum of Modern Art's method 
of the tower paying for the costs of the museum— there was no 
serious opposition from the executive committee. If such an 
arrangement seemed obscene, or at least inappropriate, any 
whispered questions were drowned out by Klein's enthusiasm 
and ability to promote the plan. From the very beginning, he 
had architect Polshek's firm portray it in two and in three 
dimensions, and then emphasize how the entrances were
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different and the complex would seem like two different 
buildings. Mega-developer Klein knew how to sell a new 
development project to his "clients", the Commission.
In private discussions among cynics familiar with the 
Commission's project (i.e., support staff, Jewish 
journalists, and a few members who were not developers) , 
there were sarcastic comments about naming the apartment 
complex "Treblinka Tower" and the surrounding streets 
"Auschwitz Avenue and Birkenau Boulevard". This reflected 
their gut feeling that the idea of the combination of luxury 
apartments and a Holocaust museum was not a fitting setting 
for memorializing Hitler's six million Jewish victims. 
However, ideological and philosophical discussions had no 
place in the meetings of the executive committee, presided 
over by developer Klein. The only serious discussion about 
the combination was about whether the market value of the 
apartments would be affected because of their location over 
a museum with an unpleasant theme. This was a real estate 
deal.
Since this deal was for a site in Battery Park City, 
some background on BPCA is necessary: A public benefit
corporation, BPCA was created by the New York State 
Legislature in 1968 to develop Battery Park City, a 92 acre 
landfill site at the bottom of Manhattan, along the Hudson 
River. It is bounded by Pier A and Battery Park on the south 
and Chambers Street on the north. In 1979, following a
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hiatus caused by New York City's fiscal crisis, BPCA prepared 
a development "Master Plan" that zoned the property for 
different types of development: 42 percent residential, with
14,000 housing units; nine percent commercial, with six 
million square feet of office space opposite the World Trade 
Center; 3 0 percent open space, including public parks, plazas 
and esplanade; and 19 percent streets and avenues.
The Master Plan and design guidelines were prepared by 
BPCA and Cooper, Eckstut Associates. The designs of private 
developers who respond to BPCA's Requests For Proposals (RFP) 
must follow these Master Plan guidelines. Battery Park City 
includes the $2.5 billion World Financial Center, a four- 
building office complex of 6 million square feet that houses 
the headquarters of Merrill Lynch & Company, Dow Jones & 
Company, the Home Insurance Company, American Express 
Company, and Oppenheimer & Company.
In 1979 then Governor Hugh Carey, Koch, and Richard 
Kahan, then president and chief executive officer of both the 
State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) and BPCA, signed a 
memorandum of understanding. This allowed the UDC to condemn 
the site, which was City-owned landfill. (UDC is a State 
agency which condemns City property to be used for 
redevelopment.) UDC then owned the land, which was released 
from the City's financial and planning control. The City 
received in exchange one dollar and future profits and tax
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equivalents. Ownership was to revert to the City after BPCA 
bonds and funds advanced by the State had been paid off.2
Revenue collected by BPCA from the commercial and 
residential developments is the principal source for 
repayment of outstanding bonds in the amount of $200 million 
issued in 1972 and $185 million issued in 1986. The revenue 
will also support $400 million net in bonds issued to provide 
funds for low and moderate income housing, under the Housing 
New York Program. This program, passed into law in 1986 by 
the State Legislature, (section 1974 of the Public 
Authorities Law), created the Housing New York Corporation, 
to develop low income housing. It also authorized BPCA to 
assign excess revenues to secure bonds and notes issued by 
the Housing New York Corporation for use by the City of New 
York to subsidize low income housing. When Battery Park City 
is complete, there will be a working population of about
31,000 in the offices and 20,000 to 30,000 residents in the 
apartments.3
Olympia & York Developments Ltd., the Canadian-based 
company owned by the Reichman family, developed and manages 
the four office towers. Although the family was instrumental
2Brendan Gill, "The Sky Line: Battery Park City", in
The New Yorker. August 20, 1990.
information on BPCA from "Battery Park City Fact 
Sheet", office of Ellen Rosen, BPCA, New York City, 1986; and 
Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New 
York. 1986-1987. Gail S. Shaffer, Secretary of State, Albany, 
N.Y., pp. 713-714.
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in rescue efforts during the Holocaust and is philanthropic 
to Jewish causes, Olympia & York is one of the few Jewish 
development companies in New York City that did not donate 
money to or become involved with the creation of the 
Holocaust museum in Battery Park City.
The supposed implementation phase of the Holocaust 
memorial museum began in August 1986, when the Holocaust 
Commission and BPCA began to plan jointly for a public lease- 
signing ceremony on September 4 at Site 14, the southernmost 
site. This was designed as a highly visible event, which 
would engender good press and stimulate fund raising. 
Personal letters of invitation were sent to all past and 
potential contributors. In addition, 2,000 invitations were 
mailed to Commission members, elected officials, survivor 
organization leaders, major Jewish organizations leaders, top 
contributors to United Jewish Appeal/Federation, clergy, the 
Mayor's personal list, the Jewish Community Relations Council 
list, museum associates, BPCA invitees, Community Board One, 
Holocaust organizations, financial sector leaders, university 
presidents and union leaders. Phone calls were made to 
elected officials, the Executive Committee, the developers 
committee, major contributors and other key people associated 
with the projects. (The developers committee included most 
of New York's successful Jewish developers: Larry Fisher,
Eugene Grant, Peter Kalikow, Earl Mack, Martin Raynes, Burton 
Resnick, Howard Ronson, Frederick Rose, Stephen Ross, Jack
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Rudin, Larry Silverstein, Sheldon Solow, Jerry Speyer, 
Leonard Stern, Robert Tishman, Fred Wilpon, William 
Zeckendorf Jr. and Morton Zuckerman.) Howard Rubenstein's 
office sent out a press advisory and coordinated the press 
operation, working with press personnel from BPCA and new Co- 
chairman Senator Manfred Ohrenstein's office.4
A long agenda for the event was organized. Speakers 
included: Frucher; "Founding Co-chairmen" Governor Cuomo and
Mayor Koch; Co-chairmen Klein, Morgenthau and Ohrenstein; 
Senator Alfonse D'Amato; Elie Wiesel; Ernest Michel; and 
architect James Stewart Polshek. Rabbi Haskell Lookstein, 
president of the New York Board of Rabbis, gave the 
invocation, and Cantor Joseph Malovany chanted a concluding 
memorial prayer. The press release said ground breaking was 
"anticipated" in Spring 1987, with an opening "projected" for 
1989.5
Meanwhile, J. Philip Rosen of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 
the Commission's pro bono attorney, was examining the leases 
for the museum and for the apartment tower. He wrote to 
members of the executive committee on August 29, clarifying 
certain points in the leases. He emphasized that the base
4"Memorandum to George Klein, Robert Morgenthau, Manfred 
Ohrenstein et al from David Blumenfeld, August 20, 198 6, re: 
Lease Signing Ceremony".
5Press release, "Lease Signed for Site of Holocaust 
Memorial Museum at Battery Park City", BPCA, September 4, 
1986.
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rent for the land for the museum was $1.00 per year.6 One 
paragraph discussed the right of the Commission to assign 
completion of the apartment tower to a developer, The lease 
provides for this, only with the consent of BPCA. The lease, 
however, specifically forbids assignment to Klein or his Park 
Tower Realty. "The Authority wanted this express prohibition 
in the Lease so that even the appearance of any sweetheart 
arrangement between Mr. Klein, as co-chairman of the 
Commission, and the Authority is avoided," Rosen wrote. He 
also emphasized that the scheduled completion date of all 
buildings was to be December 15, 1989.7
The 165 page lease for the apartment tower at Site 14, 
which was signed with great fanfare on September 4, is 
between BPCA and the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, 
Inc. The scheduled construction commencement date was April 
15, 1988,8 and the lease was to expire on June 17, 2069.
From commencement of the lease until "Rent Commencement 
Date", base rent rate was $1.00 per anum. For each lease 
year (or portion thereof) from rent commencement date up to 
but not including the first appraisal date, base rent was 
$1,234,800 per anum. For the lease year commencing on the 
first appraisal date and for each lease year until the end of
6Letter from J. Philip Rosen to Executive Committee, 
August 29, 1986, New York City, p. 1.
7Ibid., p. 3 .
8Lease between BPCA and New York Holocaust Memorial 
Commission, signed September 4, 1986, p. 4.
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the term, rent was to be an amount per annum equal to six 
percent of the fair market of the land— not less than 
$1,234,800. For 15 years thereafter, base rent would not 
exceed $1,420,020 per annum.9
The second lease, for the museum, (which was also signed 
at the ceremony) is between BPCA and "Museum of Jewish 
Heritage"— not the Holocaust Commission. (These are two 
separate legal entities, although their boards of trustees 
are identical.) The Commission is responsible for the 
completion of the apartment tower (either by building it or 
finding an outside developer to do so) and the museum board 
is responsible for building the museum. Under Article 3, 
section 3.01 (a) the museum lease says: "For each Lease Year 
beginning on the Rent Commencement Date and continuing 
thereafter throughout the Term, Tenant shall pay to Landlord, 
without notice or demand, the annual sum of $1.00 per annum 
(collectively, the "Base Rent") . "10 The term is until 2069. 
Thus, BPCA expects to collect fair rental from the Commission 
for the apartment tower, but only $1.00 per year from the 
museum. Neither the Commission nor the museum was paying any 
money for the lease of the land from BPCA. The museum and 
the air rights to build the apartment tower over it were to 
cost the museum only $1 a year.
9Ibid., p. 16.
10Lease between BPCA and Museum of Jewish Heritage, 
September 4, 1986, New York City, p. 9.
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The purposes for use of the land for the museum were set 
out in Section 23.01 of the lease: "Subject to the
provisions of law and this Lease, tenant shall use, occupy 
and operate the Premises on all Business days during Business 
Hours continuously and without interruption throughout the 
Term as a museum, conference center, exhibition area, library 
facilities, archives and facilities for exhibitions, 
scholarly research and other purposes consistent with the 
purposes specified in Tenant's Certificate of Incorporation, 
in accordance with the Certificate or Certificates of 
Occupancy for the Premises, the Master Development Plan and 
the Design Guidelines, and for no other use or purposes."11 
Through the terms of the lease, the State, through its 
entity, BPCA, imposed on the Commission and the museum the 
regulations concomitant with choosing New York State land as 
a site.
In an earlier section, the lease had said: "'Business
Days' shall mean any day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or 
a day observed as a holiday by either the State of New York 
or the federal government and, as long as New York Holocaust 
Memorial Commission, Inc. is the Tenant, the following Jewish 
holidays: Rosh Hashanah (both days), Yom Kippur, Succoth
(first two (2) days), Shmini Atzereth, Simchas Torah, 
Passover (first two (2) days and last two (2) days) and
11Ibid. , p. 51.
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Shavuoth (both days).")12 As will be demonstrated in a 
later chapter, this definition of "business days" was to 
cause future friction between the governor and the 
Commission.
As soon as the lease was signed, raising money and how 
to go about developing the site became the two most important 
topics in discussions about implementation. At a meeting of 
the executive committee immediately following the lease 
signing, Klein said he estimated the museum would need $85- 
$95 million to open. He anticipated $65 million from the 
sale of apartments, and thus said $3 0 million more was needed 
in donations. In addition, he wanted $30 million donated for 
an endowment fund, for perpetual expenses and upkeep. He 
suggested setting an announced fund raising goal of $75 
million. The possibility of "flipping", or selling rights to 
develop the apartment tower to a developer, was also 
discussed.13
At an October 6, 1986 meeting of the executive
committee, professional staff and "Commission invitees" held 
in Klein's office, he announced that the proposed budget for 
the museum until May 31, 1987 was $7,795,000. This included 
$3 million for architects and consultants, $1,181,000 for a 
"design team", $1,750,000 for "exhibit fabrication", $869,000
12Ibid. , p. 1.
13Notes of author, September 4, 1986 meeting at BPCA
construction office, following lease signing.
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for research, collections and administration, and about 
$1,000,000 for construction and "soft costs". A list of "top 
prospects" for donations was handed out, and a "Division of 
Top Prospects" was divided among Klein, Morgenthau, and 
Michel.14
By December 1986, the project was already not being 
implemented in a manner that boded success. One significant 
clue to the Commission's problems was a December 1 letter 
from architect Polshek to Klein. He wrote:
"I am concerned about the future of The Museum of 
Jewish Heritage and the Memorial to the Holocaust. As 
we both agreed when we spoke last week, there is a 
general ennui— a sense of drift and lack of direction.
"For the past year and a half since we have been 
working together, your energy and leadership alone have 
held the effort together. But since the signing of the 
lease, you have become more and more isolated and the 
Executive Committee more fragmented. Obviously Fred 
Ohrenstein and Bob Morgenthau can put little time into 
this— this leaves you alone. The perception is that you 
have time, money, staff, and freedom from conflicts of 
interest— all enabling you to be a one-man band, raise 
30-40 million dollars, oversee the design of the
14"Memorandum from George Klein, Robert M. Morgenthau, 
and Manfred Ohrenstein to Executive Committee, Professional 
Staff, and Commission Invitees", September 12, 1986, New York 
City.
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building and exhibits and be the political and spiritual 
arbiter of its content. This is obviously absurd. You 
cannot be expected to do this and I do not believe any 
one person— even you— could do it under any 
circumstances."
Polshek then went on to say this was a once-in-a- 
lifetime opportunity that should not fail. He offered the 
following suggestions for implementation: reorganize the
executive committee, with only five or six committed people 
that meet once a week with an agenda that includes progress 
reports on all phases of the project; hire an executive 
director; develop an immediate short term fund raising 
strategy; call in all pledges at once; get the Commission to 
commit itself to moving ahead to the point of actual 
construction.
He concluded: "It has always been my observation that
nothing tests the reality of a project or moves it along 
better than the necessity to spend money. The aura of 
reality created by the forward movement of architectural, 
engineering and exhibition design documents will energize the 
entire effort."15
Implementing a Holocaust memorial museum in New York 
City, the center of the organized Jewish community in the 
United States, sounds like it should be an easy job: The
15Letter to George Klein from James Stewart Polshek, 
December 1, 1986.
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large Jewish population, concentration of Jewish wealth, 
largest survivor population outside of Israel, and highly 
organized structure of the community should all contribute to 
the project's being politically beneficial to the governor, 
mayor and other elected officials, and therefore easy to 
implement. By December, 1986, however, the implementation 
had hit a number of snags.
Perhaps this was inevitable. As Pressman and Wildavsky 
said: "People now appear to think that implementation should
be easy; they are, therefore, upset when expected events do 
not occur or turn out badly. We would consider our effort a 
success if more people began with the understanding that 
implementation, under the best of circumstances, is 
exceedingly difficult."16
The implementation phase was difficult for some of the 
very reasons that sound as though they should have made it 
easy: Because the Jewish population of more than two million
is so vast, many Jews in the New York City metropolitan 
region are blase about their affiliation with the organized 
community. In a small town with a small, isolated Jewish 
community, Jews often feel the need to "belong", but in New 
York City this need is often met simply by living in the 
ethnically Jewish "atmosphere" (with synagogues, cultural 
events, ethnic food and restaurants, organizations, many
16Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation 
(Second, expanded edition), University of California Press, 
1979, p. xix.
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other Jews, etc. easily and plentifully accessible). Thus 
the large Jewish population does not necessarily mean that 
most individuals in this population are largely active, 
affiliated Jews who would be financially or otherwise 
interested in supporting the project.
As the center of organized Judaism, New York City is a 
difficult locale to initiate a new, competing organization or 
major project— competing for both financial contributions and 
attention. Even the large concentration of survivors does 
not necessarily contribute to success, because their number 
is great enough to have their own competing groups and power- 
hungry leaders. Polshek also alluded to another serious 
problem with implementation: Klein made this project too
much his own personal effort, which some potential major 
contributors and other Jewish leaders resented.
Thus the governor stepped into what Frucher and his 
other advisors said was politically important for him in the 
organized Jewish community, but he also stepped into a 
project that only seemed easy to implement on the surface. 
Pressman and Wildavsky explained why some of the above 
factors can cause delays and retrogression in implementation: 
"Our normal expectation should be that new programs will fail 
to get off the ground and that, at best, they will take 
considerable time to get started. The cards in this world 
are stacked against things happening, as so much effort is
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required to make them move. The remarkable thing is that new 
programs work at all."17
In the case of the Holocaust museum, the new program 
worked as well as Pressman and Wildavsky's "normal 
expectation"— for at more than five years after the first 
lease was signed, it did not get off the ground. The main 
reasons are enumerated above. In addition, there was a 
vicious circle that impeded implementation: no visible,
concrete progress (e.g., a temporary exhibit or lecture 
series in another location, a ground breaking ceremony) 
because there was not enough money; and insufficient success 
with fund raising because there was no concrete progress. 
This was compounded by the lack of a master plan for fund 
raising. Polshek had alluded to all of this in his letter.
At a December 4, 1986 meeting of the executive 
committee, there was a sense that the project was drifting. 
Klein announced that the Commission needed three to four 
million dollars in the bank to move forward, that Polshek had 
been owed half a million dollars for many months, and that 
interior designers Chermayeff and Geismar (who had been hired 
for the project) would also need to be paid. He described 
the project as in a "crisis stage". When the need for a 
finance committee and chairperson was emphasized, Klein kept 
coming back to himself and to other developers, rather than 
expanding the fund raising base. This, again, was a
17Ibid. , 109.
323
reflection of his personalizing the project too much for its 
successful implementation.
Government intervention was the subject of two informal 
discussions (non-agenda items) at the meeting. The week 
before, Governor Cuomo's office had conveyed his displeasure 
(or that of his attorneys) with the name of the museum, "The 
Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial to the 
Holocaust". Now that he was, in effect, the landlord, his 
intervention regarding the name could not be ignored. 
Although the reasons for his complaint were not spelled out 
in detail, they were with regard to the emphasis on "Jewish 
Heritage" and a possible Church and State conflict. 
Eventually, pressure from the governor's office forced the 
Commission to change the name of the museum to "A Living 
Memorial to the Holocaust: Museum of Jewish Heritage". (The
name was officially changed in November 1987 at a special 
meeting of the board of trustees of the museum, and the next 
month a petition for an amendment to the provisional charter 
was filed with the Regents of the University of the State of 
New York. This was granted on April 22, 1988.)
The second item of government intervention concerned 
Koch, rather than Cuomo. Klein, Morgenthau and Michel said 
they were meeting with him soon to ask him to seek donations 
from potential big givers, principally the developers with 
whom he had close relations. They were also going to ask the 
Mayor to host a fund raising breakfast for developers on
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January 10, 1987 in Gracie Mansion. The possibility of a
dinner at Gracie Mansion for big givers a little later, in 
March or April, was also discussed. (This event did take 
place on March 23, 1987, with Henry Kissinger as guest 
speaker.) Any fund raising help from the governor was said 
to be contingent on compliance with his pressure for a name 
change.
At the meeting, Klein rattled off a lot of numbers about 
the lease for the apartment tower— that the lease was at a 
rate of $40 per square feet, and that current bids were for 
as much as $60 to $117. He reminded the Commission the lease 
allowed them to either build the apartment building 
themselves or "flip" a set of plans and a contract. At one 
point his numbers had the Commission making $35 million for 
doing nothing, and at another point the Commission could lose 
money. As he said, it all depended on the market. In other 
words, at that point the project's financial success was not 
assured and was nothing but a speculative real estate 
deal.18
The next year, 1987, could be called the Commission's 
year of "professionalization". Commission Executive Director 
David Blumenfeld, who had become superfluous, was eased out 
and the Commission no longer had a director. Instead, the 
museum director, David Altshuler, was in charge (with Klein
18Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
"Report on this evening's executive meeting of Holocaust 
Commission," December 4, 1986, New York City.
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still the unofficial ultimate authority) Altshuler's three 
year contract for $125,000 per year, plus moving expenses and 
twenty percent in lieu of benefits, was approved by the 
executive committee in November 1987.
Jeshajahu Weinberg had been hired as a consultant for 
the New York project in the summer of 1985 and was a key 
member of the professional team in 1987. He said he came at 
the request of George Klein, who wanted him because of his 
experience and reputation in creating The Museum of the 
Diaspora in Tel Aviv. Weinberg said he told Klein that Klein 
couldn't "run the shop" and create a museum without a person 
on staff who knows the Holocaust. Weinberg therefore brought 
in Altshuler (who had worked on the Washington Holocaust 
museum project) as the project manager. Earlier, Klein had 
played the role of project manager. Weinberg said of 
Blumenfeld's departure: "He didn't know museums from a hole
in the wall. Clearly he was not the guy to create a museum." 
He was carried for a long time until he ultimately resigned 
in 1988.
Like o ther S W i i C  d id not want to be quoted, Weinberg said 
one of the major problems with professionalizing the project 
was Klein's personalizing it. "George Klein is the moving 
spirit. With him, the project stands or falls", Weinberg 
said. He said Klein is much too possessive about the project 
and doesn't give the director enough leeway. "He [still] 
acts as the project director very much and keeps David
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[Altshuler] as deputy," Weinberg said. "He shouldn't. David 
is talented and should have the power of decision. Klein is 
very restrictive."19 (In October 1988, Weinberg left his 
consultancy on the New York project and became a consultant 
for the Washington museum, of which he became director in 
April 1989.)
Besides Altshuler and Weinberg, professionals working on 
the New York museum project in 1987 included Ralph Schwarz, 
Senior Advisor; Karl Katz (of the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art), Museum Consultant; a grant secretary, a research team 
with associated free lancers; a Hall of Learning coordinator 
and computer specialist, with consultants; Polshek's 
architectural firm; Chermayeff and Geismar's exhibit design 
firm; David Edell and Linda Low, specialists in Jewish 
Federation big gifts, as fund raising consultants; and Luisa 
Kreisberg, a specialist in museum publicity, as public 
relations consultant.
In addition to the expanded staff and consultants, a 
Survivors Steering Committee and a Young Leadership 
Association were created (both for fund raising). A slick 
new booklet was created, primarily as a fund raising tool, 
and a news brochure began to be issued every other month. 
Fund raising was the prime concern: the campaign was headed
by Peter A. Cohen, who was then Chairman and CEO of Shearson
19Interview with Jeshajahu Weinberg, Washington, D.C., 
March 14, 1990.
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Lehman Brothers, Inc., Stephen Robert, Chairman and CEO of 
Oppenheimer and Company, Inc., and Rosa Strygler, a survivor. 
The announced goal was $100 million, with $70 million for 
construction and $30 million for an endowment fund. At a 
January 12 meeting, the Survivors Steering Committee agreed 
to raise $5 million among survivors.
At a September 15, 1987 meeting of the executive
committee, only a few members were present, along with many 
of the newly appointed staff and consultants. Klein asked 
for approval to sell the air rights for the apartment tower, 
and, since there were no objections, he said he then assumed 
he had the approval of the executive committee. He said 
Frucher had told him BPCA was about to seek a RFP for a major 
hotel on the southernmost parcel east of the museum, and that 
in the next six to eight months there would be RFPs for the 
space between the north and south sections of Battery Park 
City, which were undeveloped. Klein said that based on this 
information, he thought the timing was right for selling the 
air rights for the apartment tower. He said he thought it 
was "impractical" for the Commission to build the apartments, 
and that flipping the contract would yield about $110 per 
square foot for property for which the commission was paying 
only $40 per square foot. Klein said the Commission would 
therefore make about $28-30 million. There was discussion
328
about a November 9 symbolic ground breaking ceremony, to 
coincide with Kristallnacht.20
Then an unexpected event occurred, which was to have a 
major negative impact on the project: Black Monday on
October 19, 1987. After the stock market crash and
subsequent loss of high-paying Wall Street jobs, luxury 
residential property in the Wall Street area, such as Battery 
Park City, dropped in value. Thus the bargain price the 
Commission had agreed to pay BPCA for the right to build the 
apartment tower was no longer a bargain. The November 9 
ground breaking did not take place. At a November 12, 1987 
meeting of the executive committee, there was still some talk 
about flipping the air rights for the apartment tower. Klein 
said that before Black Monday the profit would have yielded 
$30 million, but now there was no assurance as to what 
property value was or would become. An RFP was being 
prepared, but Klein now said there was "no rush" to sell.21 
On December 31, 1987, the total in contributions was
$3,770,646, with $7,888,308 in receivables, for a total of
20Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, "Exec. 
Committee Meeting of NY Holocaust Commission 9/15/87", 
September 24, 1987, New York.
21Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, "Exec, 
committee meeting NY Holocaust Memorial Commission, this 
morning", November 12, 1987, New York.
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$11,658,95422— far short of the necessary amount, which 
continued to escalate as time went by.
Klein's push to sell the air rights in September was 
followed by his being in "no rush" to do so in November, as 
a result of Black Monday. An unexpected occurrence caused 
unexpected decisions to emerge: besides the changed decision
on the air rights issue, there would be no further discussion 
of a possible ground breaking on November 9. Another serious 
effect of the crash was its influence on fund raising 
activities, drying up or reducing some potential 
philanthropic sources. As Pressman and Wildavsky said, there 
was the emergence in the "decision path of numerous 
diversions not intended by the program sponsors. The paths 
of required decisions, as we can see, were soon characterized 
by more unexpected elements than expected ones: they were
anything but straight lines leading directly to goals."23
During 1988 more "diversions not intended by the program 
sponsors" made the lines leading to their goals even more 
circuitous: the site changed, Frucher left the BPCA
presidency, and the original deal of $1.00 per year rent for 
the museum increased dramatically (see Chapter 12) . In 
January, Altshuler sent a memorandum to the staff, with 
copies to Commission chairmen and others, recommending
22New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, End of Month 
Statement— December 31, 1987.
23Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 112.
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breaking ground and beginning construction in the Spring. He 
said there would be a crucial executive committee meeting 
around March 15, which would decide whether to break ground 
and begin construction in early June. In the meantime, fund 
raising efforts would be stepped up.24
At the March 15, 1988 meeting of the full Commission, a 
resolution was passed to authorize ground breaking and 
beginning of construction for June 1988. A second resolution 
authorized the launching of a capital campaign with a goal of 
$70 million, plus $30 million for an endowment fund; and a 
third, the establishment of inter-institutional links with 
related institutions.25 The executive committee then met on 
March 29 to agree on how to implement these resolutions. A 
decision was reached to have the ground breaking take place 
on November 10, 1988.
SUMMARY
In 1986, after Governor Cuomo offered the Holocaust 
Commission the opportunity to own free air rights for an 
apartment tower over their museum (and pay only $1 per year 
rent for the museum), the Commission moved forward to 
consummate the deal. Leases for both the museum and the
24The Museum of Jewish Heritage, Memo from David 
Altshuler to Staff Planning Group, "Preparations for Decision 
to Break Ground and Begin Construction", January 18, 1988, 
New York.
25New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, Minutes, 
Meeting held March 15, 1988, Regency Hotel, New York.
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apartment tower were signed with great fanfare at the Battery 
Park City site on September 4, 1986. The governor, the new 
Co-chairman of the Mutagon, thus gained power in the polygon 
of forces trying to create the Holocaust museum. At this 
point the coalition of political forces, the Mutagon, was top 
heavy and "incestuous". The government angle had two 
government officials at the helm and the interest group angle 
had three Co-chairmen. The two officials in charge of the 
government angle, however, were also officers of the interest 
group angle. Moreover, two of the three Co-chairmen of the 
interest group were also elected government officials; and 
Koch's political entrepreneur, Herbert Rickman, and Cuomo's, 
Frucher, were members of the executive committee of the 
Commission.
During the following year, the Commission became more 
professional with increased staff and consultants, but 
raising money continued to be a problem. Despite, the 
increase in professionals, Klein continued to try to "run the 
show". He was, however, subject to the wishes of the 
powerful second head of the Mutagon, Cuomo. Cuomo's office 
began pressuring for a name change, to make the museum appear 
less Jewish, and therefore less subject to a Church-State 
conflict. The Commission acquiesced. In September 1987 
Klein told the Commission the time was ripe for selling the 
museum's air rights. However, after Black Monday on October 
19, he reversed this, and a planned November 9, 1987 ground
breaking ceremony never took place. Ground breaking was put 
off until June 1988, and then until November 1988. The 
longer the implementation phase languished, the more external 
and internal circumstances interfered and impeded the 
Mutagon's success.
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CHAPTER 12: NEW YORK STATE AS A FICKLE LANDLORD
"When a man you like switches from what he said a year 
ago, or four years ago, he is a broad-minded person who has 
courage enough to change his mind with changing conditions. 
When a man you don't like does it, he is a liar who has 
broken his promises.®8 Franklin P. Adams1
With plans progressing for a November 10, 1988 ground 
breaking ceremony at Site 14, both the New York City and New 
York State Founding Co-chairmen of the Mutagon intervened and 
delayed implementation plans again. Commission co-chairman 
George Klein announced to the executive committee on June 27 
that they had been offered a new deal by the governor and 
Battery Park City Authority (BPCA), based on a connection 
made by the mayor's office. NOGA, a Swiss firm, wanted to 
build a luxury hotel in Manhattan. (NOGA is owned by an 
internationally known philanthropic Jewish leader, the Swiss 
head of the World Sephardi Federation, Nessim Gaon.) Gaon had 
approached City Hall, and Koch deputy Robert Esnard had 
introduced him to BPCA, because such a project in Battery 
Park City would give New York City funds for low- and middle- 
income housing. BPCA president Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, who 
was also part of the Mutagon as a member of the New York 
Holocaust Memorial Commission's executive committee, then 
recommended Site 14, site of the museum and apartment tower.
1Nods and Becks. 1944, quoted in The Cynic's Lexicon by 
Jonathan Green, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984, p. 2.
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At this point in the new deal the two heads of the 
Mutagon, Koch and Cuomo, were working in tandem: the deal
seemed good for both of their images, as well as for the 
City, the State, and the Commission. Frucher, representing 
Cuomo and BPCA, suggested that the museum move to Site 13 
(immediately to the north) and be free-standing, with the 
capability of selling the Site 14 air rights to NOGA. Klein 
said the market for selling air rights for an apartment tower 
was "very soft", and recommended this as a good deal. There 
would also be savings in building the museum, because without 
the apartment tower, the foundation could be shallower.
Mr. Gaon was to enter into a letter of intent with BPCA 
for the purpose of building a hotel or apartment house. BPCA 
would then give a letter to the Holocaust Commission, 
changing the site and giving a lease at $1 per year for 86 
years. The Commission would then enter an agreement with 
NOGA for transfer of the 400,000 square feet of air rights. 
NOGA would pay $30 million for the transfer and a separate $2 
million donation. BPCA would also make the same offer to 
other developers. A State Environmental Impact Study (EIS) 
was necessary, with a ULURP (Uniform Land Use Review 
Procedure) for the hotel but not the museum, according to the 
BPCA attorney. Both projects would need to be approved by
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the State Public Control Authority, which oversees the 
issuing of bonds for Battery Park City.2
Based on this new deal, in September 1988 the Commission 
was proceeding with plans for a November 10 ground breaking 
at Site 13, rather than Site 14. Newspapers reported on 
September 25 that the Koch administration had reached a 
preliminary agreement with NOGA, in which the Swiss company 
could build a hotel at Battery Park City in exchange for a 
$50 million payment to BPCA, most of which would be passed on 
to the City to build low- and middle-income housing, and an 
additional $3 0 million payment for the Holocaust museum.
At this point, however, Cuomo, one of the Mutagon's 
political allies, decided to withhold his support from this 
particular deal (although not from the Holocaust museum 
project). Cuomo's press officer announced the governor had 
not endorsed the deal. This reflected a conflict between 
Cuomo and the other Founding Co-chairman of the Mutagon, 
Koch. The governor felt City Hall had intervened on his 
turf, by unilaterally releasing information on the deal to 
the press. Possibly there was also friction between Cuomo 
and Frucher, although no one will admit this. At about the 
same time, Frucher, who had gotten the governor involved in 
the Mutagon for the Holocaust museum project, and had 
encouraged the NOGA deal for BPCA, announced he was leaving
2Memo to Senator Ohrenstein from Rochelle Saidel. 
"Report on Executive Committee Meeting of New York Holocaust 
Memorial Commission", June 28, 1988, New York.
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BPCA to take a job with Olympia and York (developers of the 
World Financial Center in Battery Park City).3
Ultimately the ground breaking scheduled for November 
10, 1988 did not take place, because Cuomo, one of the
leaders of the Mutagon, at odds both with Koch (the other 
Founding Co-chairman) and with the Co-chairmen of the 
Commission, took control as the central decision-maker and 
blocked it. The governor prevented actors under his 
authority from acting (e.g., the Department of Environmental 
Conservation did not act to approve an EIS). This prevention 
of requisite action, in turn, stopped the Holocaust 
Commission from carrying out the action of breaking ground. 
The governor had said the announcement of the ground breaking 
was "surprising and premature", and that substantive 
questions needed answers before the project proceeded.4 By 
blocking the NOGA deal, one head of the polygon of political 
forces creating the Holocaust museum project was at least 
delaying the project, if not ultimately killing it. However 
the governor did not sever himself from the Mutagon 
coalition. Iron triangle and issue network theories do not 
account for such a situation in a political coalition.
3Thomas J. Lueck, "City and State at Odds on Battery 
Park Hotel Plan", The New York Times. September 25, 1988, New 
York, p. 38, and Neil Barsky, "Holocaust museum and hotel
linked", Daily News. September 25, 1988, New York, p. 16.
4Ibid.
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As Banfield said, in any given situation, there may be 
an actor who is autonomous and cannot be controlled.5 In the 
case of the museum, the mayor, the governor, and Commission 
co-chairmen developer Klein, District Attorney Robert M. 
Morgenthau, and State Senate Minority Leader Manfred 
Ohrenstein, all had structures of control which were linked 
with each other in varying ways outside of the project. For 
the Holocaust museum, they were all supposed to be leading 
the effort and working together. However, because he 
controlled the site, Cuomo was able to act autonomously and 
create an impasse. Banfield said: "Control over an actor
may be secured only by an exercise of power. Or, to say the 
same thing in another way, power is the ability to establish 
control."6 Clearly, by intervening in the NOGA deal, the 
governor established that he (and not the mayor or Klein or 
anyone else) could act autonomously and take control of the 
Holocaust project. He was supposed to be an integral part of 
a political coalition created to carry out the project, but 
at this point he became the obstacle.
Frucher recalled the NOGA deal as follows:
"I got a phone call from City Hall that said there 
was someone in New York who was looking to do a five 
star hotel, that was interested in doing it possibly at
5Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p. 310.
6Ibid., p. 312.
the tip of Battery Park [City]. I met with this 
gentleman. His name is Nessim Gaon. He came in and 
said he wanted to build a five star hotel. Initially we 
talked about doing it and having within it the Holocaust 
museum. Then one thing led to another and the architect 
Jim [James Stewart] Polshek came up with the idea of 
moving it to a second site. Gaon would purchase the 
second site as part of the deal and would pay the 
Holocaust museum $30 million. In exchange for that, he 
would get additional FAR [Floor/Area Ratio] on his site 
which would allow for him to recoup some of those 
dollars. We renegotiated the deal. The deal was 
probably one of the most lucrative deals that we had at 
Battery Park City. Unfortunately during my transition 
the deal was undone. That's the story."
Frucher said his leaving BPCA "killed" the Holocaust museum 
project.7 It at least weakened it, because he had been the 
project's broker with the governor, wearing the hats of both 
a government official and a Commission executive committee 
member.
Museum director David Altshuler agreed that Frucher's 
departure was detrimental. He said other high level members 
of Cuomo's staff considered the NOGA-BPCA-Holocaust 
Commission deal Frucher's "self aggrandizement". He said
interview with Meyer S. (Sandy) Frucher, New York City, 
February 4, 1991.
339
others on the governor's staff were not "so happy" with 
Frucher's NOGA deal, and that after he resigned someone 
(unnamed) went to the governor and said NOGA was dirty. This 
was compounded because "Sandy went over to the developers" 
and took a job with Olympia and York.8
Asked whether BPCA, i.e. the governor, reneged on the 
deal with the commission, Frucher remained loyal to his old 
friend, Cuomo. He said: "Yes, BPCA and the State did renege
on the deal with the Commission. I don't know if it was the 
governor. I don't know who drove that." Frucher said there 
were many rumors, and "people on the outside" questioning 
NOGA's integrity. He said he raised that issue with 
Morgenthau, "who checked [NOGA] out, and they checked out." 
Frucher said there was a rumor about other real estate people 
(e.g. Peter Kalikow or Jerry Speyer) in the area wanting to 
stop the hotel, but he could not confirm this. Whether the 
governor "drove" the reneging or it was one of his high level 
advisors (e.g., Fabian Palomino, then Chairman of the Board 
of BPCA and a very close personal friend of Cuomo's) is not 
important, because the governor must have approved the move.
By November 1988, after the governor's stonewall, the 
situation had deteriorated rapidly and the implementation 
phase was not moving forward. On November 2 Altshuler sent 
a memorandum to executive committee members, telling them a
8Interview with David Altshuler, New York City, December 
20, 1990.
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decision had been made the night before to postpone the 
ground breaking for the museum. (The letter does not say who 
made the decision; it was most likely Klein, with co-chairman 
Robert Morgenthau's, Koch operative Herbert Rickman's and 
Altshuler's agreement. Ohrenstein was not consulted.) A 
"Dear Friends" letter, which accompanied the memorandum, was 
sent to a wider mailing list. It said:
"We are writing to inform you that our 
groundbreaking, scheduled for November 10, has been 
postponed. As you may know from having read the papers 
a few weeks ago, we are awaiting approval by the Battery 
Park City Authority and the Governor's office of a plan 
that will result in a site change for the Museum to a 
plot immediately adjacent to the one it was originally 
to occupy. To date, the review of the plan has not been 
completed, and it would be imprudent for us to break 
ground without those approvals. As you know, we had 
chosen November 10 as our groundbreaking date to 
coincide with the 50th anniversary of Kristallnacht, 
although actual construction was and still is scheduled 
to begin in the spring.
"We are very excited about the pending plan, for 
its successful conclusion will provide us not only with 
a freestanding Museum adjacent to our original site but 
also with a major addition of $30 million to our capital 
campaign, permitting us to build and maintain the
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institution we have so long anticipated. We are 
confident that in the very near future, when we do break 
ground and begin construction, we will have reason to 
rejoice, for we will at long last be on our way to 
realizing our dream of honoring the six million who died 
by erecting a permanent structure of public education 
that will memorialize them by remembering how they 
lived. We know we can count on your continued good 
support in this important endeavor."
The letter was signed by co-chairmen Klein and Morgenthau.9
Reading between the lines, the letter said the governor 
had intervened and prevented the ground breaking from taking 
place. This type of action cannot be analyzed as part of an 
iron triangle or issue network of support. Instead, an 
integral part of the Mutagon of political forces had used his 
autonomous authority to cause detrimental delays for a 
project he was supporting. The leaders of the Commission 
were fearful this intervention could not only delay but could 
possibly terminate their project, by disrupting momentum and 
drying up fund raising. They were therefore trying to assure 
their contributors and potential contributors that they, too, 
had power to control the situation, and that the 
implementation of the project was still a reality.
9Letter from George Klein and Robert Morgenthau to "Dear 
Friends", undated but fax paper dated November 2, 1988, New 
York.
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As Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky said in their 
analysis of the failure of the implementation phase of the 
Federal Economic Development Administration's employment 
project in Oakland, "what seemed to be a simple program 
turned out to be a very complex one, involving numerous 
participants, a host of differing perspectives, and a long 
and tortuous path of decision points that had to be cleared. 
Given these characteristics, the chances of completing the 
program with the haste its designers had hoped for— and even 
the chances of completing it at all— were sharply 
reduced."10 The Mutagon polygon, unlike the iron triangle 
or issue network, is so complex that it has the capability of 
one of its leaders doing damage, while remaining part of the 
polygon.
The delay in the ground breaking was orchestrated by the 
Cuomo administration. Besides proving the governor and not 
the mayor was the lead player for BPCA affairs, his advisors 
needed to carefully determine whether his close affiliation 
with the Holocaust museum project was, in fact, good for his 
political future. The delay was very serious for the 
Commission, because its credibility was at stake. It was not 
a delay the other members of the coalition had anticipated or 
wanted, but was deliberately planned by the Cuomo 
administration (which was part of the pro-museum coalition).
10Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, 
Implementation. Second Edition, University of California 
Press, 1979, p. 94.
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As Pressman and Wildavsky said: "Not all the delays were
unplanned, accidental occurrences; some were caused 
intentionally by participants who wanted to stop an undesired 
action or to step back and reassess the development of the 
program."11 At this point, after Frucher's departure, Cuomo 
(with his advisors such as Palomino) was reassessing his 
affiliation with the Commission and deciding whether he 
should be so closely connected with it.
At the end of September 1988 a new player entered the 
scene, which undoubtedly was a factor in the governor's 
stonewalling on the NOGA deal and delaying the Holocaust 
museum. After Frucher resigned, Cuomo appointed as president 
of BPCA David Emil, a 37 year old deputy commissioner in the 
State Social Services Department and the son of a prominent 
real estate developer. Although he is Jewish, he is not an 
actively committed Jew like Frucher. Emil acted as though 
this was just another real estate deal. Moreover, Frucher 
and Cuomo were close friends and political allies, with 
Frucher doing major behind the scenes work for Cuomo's 
campaigns. Emil lacked these personal ties with Cuomo. As 
The New York Times said of Emil's appointment: "To political
mavens, the main question is not what sort of leadership Mr. 
Emil will give Battery Park City, a complex of offices and
11Ibid., 122.
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apartments in lower Manhattan, but rather what sort of 
relationship he will have with the Governor."12
A November 21 story in a weekly that serves lower 
Manhattan said Emil had told the newspaper that a new plan 
for use of Sites 13, 14, and 1 would be announced in early 
December. (Sites 14 and 1 are the southernmost sites, with 
Site 1 east of Site 14; Site 13 is adjacent to and north of 
Site 14.) "We are still working with the principals at this 
point. There is no final resolution of the treatment of 
sites 1, 13 and 14 yet," Emil said. He said board chairman 
(and Cuomo's special counsel and long-time friend) Palomino 
and other board members did vote to accept the NOGA proposal 
in August. However, they later shelved it because they had 
believed they were originally approving only a letter of 
intent, and not the transaction itself. Emil said: "We're
discussing conceptual ideas and some specifics. It's like 
any other real estate deal." He added that he expected to 
seek a zoning change for commercial use of one of the sites 
to allow for construction of a hotel, but he declined to say 
which site. He also pointed out that the museum had 
controlled Site 14 since 1985, and had been unable to develop 
it.13
12Elizabeth Kolbert, "Albany Notes: Naming of Battery
Park City Head Expected", The New York Times. September 18,
1988.
13Joanna Molloy, "Holocaust Museum Deal Expected", 
Battery News. November 21, 1988, New York, p. 14.
The transaction with NOGA and the Commission seems to 
have been a victim of the changing of the guard, with Emil 
replacing Frucher, who had made the NOGA deal and was close 
to Cuomo, Klein and the Commission. Frucher had been a 
member of the executive committee and an active participant 
at its meetings, as well as representing BPCA and the 
governor. He thus was part of three angles of the polygon. 
In fact, housing the Holocaust museum in Battery Park City 
had been his idea. While he had a "paternal" interest in the 
project, Emil was an outsider and representing only BPCA. 
Although it cannot be proven, Emil was also probably acting 
as a "fall guy" for Cuomo, whose interest in the project 
seems to have waned over time. Palomino took over from 
Frucher as the governor's personal representative to 
negotiate with the Commission. What Frucher had been willing 
to push through and implement as quickly and cooperatively as 
possible, Emil and Palomino wanted to stonewall. They did 
not want to be responsible for possible precedents engineered 
by Frucher that would make them, the governor and BPCA 
vulnerable to criticism.
In comparison with Frucher's deep personal involvement 
with the Holocaust project, Emil's apparent interest was only 
routine and his lack of knowledge was remarkable. When asked 
in an interview about the complicated and changing structure 
of the political coalition behind the project, he said: "Why
are you asking me? I'm not involved in the Holocaust
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Memorial Commission." He said he did not know the governor 
was a Founding Co-chairman, nor anything about the details of 
the Commission. He also did not know that appointments to 
the Commission had been made by the mayor and the governor.
Emil said: "My experience of [the Commission] is that
it is a creature of a small group of people who are not 
politicians, and it happens to have politicians involved in 
it. It's really run by George Klein." Emil said he 
considered the Commission "indistinguishable from any not- 
for-profit entity in New York State. It has no greater or 
lesser governmental role— kind of like the Museum of Modern 
Art, in the sense that there are government officials who are 
interested in its successful activities for various different 
reasons because— in the case of the Holocaust memorial 
because of the commemoration of the event and so forth, in 
the case of the Museum of Modern Art for other reasons— but 
it essentially functions as a not-for-profit organization 
that has sort of ex officio political figures at various 
levels who have different interests." Emil said he had never 
heard of Herbert Rickman, Koch's political entrepreneur who 
had initiated the project and been heavily involved until 
Koch's departure at the end of 1989 (more than a year after 
Emil's arrival on the scene).14
14Interview with David Emil, CEO of Battery Park City 
Authority, August 5, 1991, New York City.
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Besides Frucher's departure and his replacement by Emil, 
another possible reason for Cuomo's decreasing enthusiasm for 
the Holocaust museum project may have been his interest in 
running for President. Although promoting a particularistic 
Jewish museum in New York City was politically good for being 
reelected governor, it could appear somewhat parochial in a 
race for President. Palomino and another Cuomo counsel, Evan 
Davis, repeatedly told the Holocaust Commission co-chairmen 
and executive committee they were concerned about first 
amendment issues. They were concerned Cuomo would be 
accused of supporting a project that could be questioned with 
regard to separation of Church and State (see Chapter 14).
While The New York Post is not always an accurate news 
source, on December 8, 1988 it broke a story on the NOGA-
Commission-BPCA situation that was to prove true in many 
respects. Primarily, the article revealed that BPCA had said 
for the first time that the Holocaust museum would have to 
pay for its lease. Instead of the previously agreed upon $1 
per year (in the lease for Site 14), the museum would have to 
pay "market rent for cultural institutions", according to 
Emil. Emil told the Post the amount would be "in the 
millions" over the period of the lease, running (as do all 
Battery Park City leases) until 2069. The rent for private 
non-profit arts groups that signed leases in the two previous 
years in buildings not owned by the city had averaged $10 to 
$12 per square foot annually, according to the article. For
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the museum's 150,000 square feet on Site 13, this would make 
the annual rent between $1.5 million and $1.8 million per 
year.
Regarding NOGA, the Post said that, under Frucher, BPCA 
had passed a resolution on August 25 to take "all steps 
necessary and appropriate related to the development of 
parcels 13 and 14 in accordance with" letters of intent 
between the parties. But Emil, who had not been present at 
the August meeting and succeeded Frucher in October, said the 
vote "merely authorized me to investigate the NOGA deal". 
Palomino, Cuomo's special counsel and chairman of BPCA, told 
the Post; "We just authorized a letter of intent, talking 
about what we thought we intended to do....We had certain 
reservations." He added that the legislation that created 
BPCA required that it be paid rent on all parcels, which the 
museum would not have done under the NOGA agreement.15 (The 
original lease also did not require payment of rent, except 
for the symbolic $1 per year. This symbolic payment seems to 
have fulfilled the letter of the law under Frucher's 
leadership, but not Emil's. Again, this may have been a 
reflection of Cuomo's shrinking interest in the project and 
grander ambitions to run for national office.)
In 1991, Emil explained the reneging on the NOGA deal 
and the change from the $1 per year rent as follows:
15Edward A. Adams, "Museum Jinxed Again: Holocaust
memorial faces new delays at Battery Park City", The New York 
Post. New York, December 8, 1988, p. 73.
349
"There was a lease entered into in 1986 which 
allowed the Holocaust Memorial Commission and the Museum 
of Jewish Heritage to build a building on one of our 
sites— 14, which would have contained the museum in the 
base and a residential building on top. And the actual 
rent that was paid under that lease was much more than 
$1 a year— [it was] $45 per square foot valuation of the 
property [for the residential portion of the complex]. 
But the thing you have to realize in order to understand 
the transaction from the economic point of view and from 
the Authority's point of view is that the Authority did 
not recognize the square footage of the museum for the 
purposes of our zoning calculations. In a nutshell we 
were allowing a bigger building to be built than might 
have otherwise been built. And we were getting paid for 
that portion of the building that would have been 
allowed on the site anyway. So we said to the Holocaust 
Memorial Commission, you can build a bigger building 
than the site currently allows and we won't charge you 
in excess of the what's presently allowed. Now, what 
then happened is the Holocaust Memorial Commission was 
unable to find a builder that was interested in building 
a residential tower on top of the museum."
Emil said the Holocaust Commission then looked for 
another transaction, in which they tried to sell the entire 
lease to NOGA. He said one critical problem for BPCA was
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that there was no public bid process for the site. "Land 
here is for public bid, not through private deals," he said. 
"As regards the question of how rent came to be charged on 
Site 13, the position of the Authority and the position of 
the governor in this particular regard was, 'Look, we gave 
you a lease on Site 14. You chose to sell the site and 
you're going to make a $30 million profit. That's what they 
got for the sale. Now you made a $3 0 million profit and you 
want us to give you another one.'"
When it was pointed out to Emil that the Commission 
didn't sell the lease to NOGA, he offered the following 
scenario: "It didn't go through, but if they did sell
it...we weren't going to give them another one. This could 
go on forever. We could give them every piece and soon they 
would have hundreds of millions of dollars." Emil then 
admitted this "seriously would ever happen", and said: "If
that transaction had gone forward it was restructured through 
a negotiated understanding with the Holocaust Memorial 
through which essentially the Authority agreed to act as 
agent to sell the property for $32 million. And the Memorial 
Commission agreed to rent the new site."16
At a December 14, 1988 meeting of the executive and
development committees of the Holocaust Commission, the 
information in the Post was confirmed and amplified. Because 
Klein was out of the country, Morgenthau conducted the
16Emil interview.
meeting and Klein "attended" by speaker phone. Morgenthau 
reported as follows on a meeting he and Klein had held with 
Emil and Palomino a week earlier: BPCA had informed the
Commission the NOGA deal was definitely off, and would be 
given no further consideration. BPCA intended to find more 
than one developer to bid on a deal that would place a 
residential apartment building on Site 14, with the museum 
moving to Site 13 (as in the NOGA deal) . The apartment 
developer would pay the museum $32 million for lease rights. 
BPCA had figured the rent for the museum at Site 13 should be 
$10 million or more over the life of the ground lease, with 
the museum paying $5 million (or half of the rent) up front. 
Another $5 million would be paid later, including a share of 
the proceeds from museum admissions. BPCA had told Klein and 
Morgenthau it would be illegal to give anyone any site rent- 
free due to provisions in the 1972 bonding agreement. BPCA 
had also said they would know within two weeks whether they 
had developer interest or not for Site 14. If so, they would 
put out a challenge bid by mid-January 1989.
The loss of free ($1 per year) rent was a major blow to 
the Commission. Other problems were also discussed at the 
meeting: The letter of agreement for the new lease was to
expire at the end of December, 1988, with a requirement for 
the museum to submit schematics by then. Although they had 
not been developed because the NOGA deal had not been firm, 
it was expected that something could be worked up to meet the
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legal requirements. If the lease was renewed, BPCA would 
want the museum to begin paying rent of $100,000 per year. 
Frucher arrived toward the end of the meeting and said the 
governor was the Commission's friend and that "someone else" 
was causing the problems. He said the governor called him 
almost daily out of genuine concern about the museum. This 
seems highly unlikely for several reasons: 1. Frucher was no
longer with BPCA and not in a position to know the exact 
status of the project; 2. This was not ever a project which 
the governor made a personal day-to-day priority; 3. Whoever 
the "someone else" was would have to be subordinate to the 
governor; 4. The governor had more important issues to 
discuss with Frucher on the telephone, such as campaign 
issues Frucher worked on for him. Perhaps in this context 
the museum was occasionally a topic of conversation.
Although the governor had distanced himself and Frucher 
had left BPCA, Cuomo remained "Founding Co-Chairman" and the 
Mutagon remained in place. There was still agreement there 
should be a Holocaust museum, but there were now negotiations 
within the polygon regarding the logistics of making it a 
reality. The executive committee authorized Klein and 
Morgenthau to go back to BPCA to obtain an extension of the 
lease and assurances that BPCA would put on the table by 
January 15 any names of potential developers for Site 14. 
They also wanted BPCA to agree to return to the NOGA deal, if 
no other developer emerged. As he had at earlier impasses,
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Altshuler expressed fears about the project's losing momentum 
(and thus funding).17 Again, as Pressman and Wildavsky 
said, there was the emergence in the "decision path of 
numerous diversions not intended by the program sponsors.1118
On February 15, 1989 the executive committee met and
decided to approve BPCA's acceptance of an offer by a 
developer to build an apartment building on Site 14, the 
original site of the museum (with the museum free standing on 
adjacent Site 13) . Although BPCA said they would have in 
hand three offers for development of an apartment building by 
January 15, one month after that date there was only one such 
offer. The name of the developer was not revealed at the 
meeting: Klein said he did not know the name and did not
want to know.
Klein said he and Morgenthau had been meeting with Emil 
and Palomino. They had been told the idea of a hotel had 
been turned down by BPCA because it would have been subject 
to a change of zoning, an EIS, and approval of the Public 
Authorities Control Board. The new deal, which still needed 
approvals from the City and BPCA, would, like the NOGA deal, 
give $32 million to the museum. Land would be rented from 
BPCA for about $4 million. On March 1, BPCA would send a RFP 
for any deal that matched the one in hand. There would be a
17Memo from Meg Reed to Senator Ohrenstein, "Holocaust 
Commission Meeting - Executive and Development Committees - 
December 14, 1988", New York, December 15, 1988.
18Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 112.
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sixty day waiting period, with a thirty day extension. BPCA 
would accept only bids materially higher than the one in 
hand. There would then be thirty days for analysis, and then 
two weeks for sealed and final bids between any parties that 
remained. Lease terms would be attached to the RFP (i.e., 
terms by which $32 million would go to the Holocaust museum) . 
For an apartment building, no EIS or rezoning was required.
Upon receipt of the $32 million, the Holocaust museum 
would give to BPCA $5 million for its required rental 
payment. This would leave $27 million for the museum. 
Payment should be the next Fall, when the apartment house 
developer would sign the lease with BPCA. The museum had to 
pay an additional $5.2 million to BPCA, for an 80 year lease 
(with no rental increases within the 80 years). This would 
be paid at a rate of 10% of any admissions contributions to 
the museum and interest from tax free bonds. BPCA had agreed 
that this portion of the rent would not commence until the 
museum opened. The museum was in default of its lease with 
BPCA, and BPCA supposedly would not renew it unless the 
Commission accepted the deal described above. Thus BPCA had 
made the Commission "an offer one cannot refuse"; the 
Commission had boxed itself into a corner, dependent on the 
wishes of the State government. The governor was still part 
of the Mutagon, but on his terms. Approval of the deal by 
the board of BPCA was anticipated within ten days, possibly
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followed by a major press conference with the governor and 
the mayor.19
On February 23, 1989, there was no press conference, but 
there were press releases from BPCA, the Mayor, and the 
Commission. BPCA said it had authorized that day "a series 
of steps that will provide for construction of a 38-floor 
residential tower, development of a luxury hotel and 
construction of a memorial to the Holocaust and Museum of 
Jewish Heritage and will provide $50 million of BPCA funding 
for New York City's housing program over the next three 
years." The press release said BPCA would issue a RFP for a 
589,000 square foot residential tower of 360 feet in height 
for Site 14, with a minimum bid of rental payments of $121 
per square foot of developable area, which included a $3 2 
million payment to the Holocaust Commission. The RFP also 
required annual rent payments to BPCA of about $3.8 million, 
to be adjusted for inflation and increased land value over 
the 80-year term of the lease. Prospective developers had 90 
days to respond.
The press release also said BPCA was issuing an RFP for 
a luxury hotel or "mixed use hotel/residential use" on Site 
1, which was "consistent with previous plans for Battery Park 
City". BPCA would seek the necessary zoning use changes. In 
addition, BPCA was entering into an agreement with the
19Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
"Holocaust Museum Update", New York, February 16, 1989.
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Holocaust Commission, in which the museum would relinquish 
its rights to Site 14 upon receipt of $32 million from the 
Site 14 developer and enter into a new lease with BPCA for 
Site 13. The Commission had agreed to pay rent of $10.2 
million, of which $5 million was to be paid immediately.
Cuomo is quoted that "Under these agreements everyone is 
a winner." The press release did not refer to the fact that 
one of Cuomo's "winners", the Holocaust Commission, was now 
losing $10.2 million, which it did not have to pay in the 
original agreement in 1986. Palomino is quoted about the 
"outstanding sites" and the "significant economic benefits 
from a first class hotel and tourist attraction in Lower 
Manhattan". He seemed to consider the memorial museum a mere 
"tourist attraction".20
Koch, who had taken a back seat to Cuomo with regard to 
the project after the site changed to Battery Park City, 
issued a statement with a lead that said he had for many 
years "supported proposals for the creation in New York City 
of a museum and memorial to the victims of the Holocaust." 
The statement then praised the economic benefits from a new 
residential development, a first-class hotel and a new 
tourist attraction in lower Manhattan, plus the generation of 
$50 million for affordable housing in New York City.21 A
20Battery Park City Authority, News Release, New York, 
February 23, 1989.
21Office of the Mayor, Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch, 
New York, February 23, 1989.
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very brief statement by Klein and Morgenthau said the museum 
would benefit greatly from being freestanding, and also from 
an infusion of $27 million in cash. They thanked Cuomo, 
Koch, Emil and Palomino— their partners in the Mutagon.22
The New York Times reported, as Klein had announced at
the February 15 executive committee meeting, that one 
proposal meeting the condition of contributing $32 million to 
the Holocaust museum had already been received. The Times 
article named Property Resources Corporation (PRC), a 
developer that had already built a condominium project in 
Battery Park City, as the prospective developer. The article 
also stated that BPCA had said the letter of intent with NOGA 
had been terminated, and NOGA's good-faith deposit check was 
being returned. NOGA was quoted about considering the 
possibility of suing BPCA.23
On April 4, 1989, Emil for BPCA and Klein and Morgenthau 
for the Commission and museum signed a Letter of
Understanding that set forth the terms ( as described above) 
by which a free-standing museum could be built, with the 
project receiving $27 million ($32 million from the developer 
of Site 14, with $5 million given back to BPCA).
Implementation could begin anew, after PRC or another
22New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, "Statement by 
George Klein and Robert Morgenthau", New York, February 24,
1989.
23Thomas J. Lueck, "Agency Revises A Museum Plan At 
Battery Park: To Require Donation by Condominium Builder",
The New York Times. New York, February 24, 1989, p. B3.
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developer was accepted by BPCA and signed a different Letter 
of Understanding with the Commission and the museum 
(obtaining Site 14 in return for a payment to the Commission 
of $32 million).
Meanwhile, on May 9, 1989, Stephen Robert, Co-chairman 
of the Development Committee announced that $17.2 million had 
been raised. Of this amount, only some $7 million was in 
cash. A financial statement on May 31, 1989 revealed there 
was a contribution income of $7,260,000, with $10,335,000 in 
pledges receivable. With $27 million anticipated from BPCA, 
funds to be raised were projected at $66,600,650. This would 
pay for the projected costs of the museum, $103,019,650; 
repayment of a $2 million bank loan; and $300,000 in 
architectural fees owed.24
The Commission decided at a June 8, 1989 meeting to go 
ahead with a massive fund raising campaign to reach their 
goal of $103 million. (This did not include $30 million for 
an endowment fund.) Altshuler said that after 40 years of 
prehistory, before the mayor convened his Task Force, plus 
seven years on this project, "we are now poised to succeed." 
He said the Commission had to finish their work now, because 
distortions and trivializations were multiplying and 
survivors were disappearing. David Edell, the fund raising
24Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements, June 15, 
1983 to May 31, 1989, A Living Memorial to the Holocaust- 
Museum of Jewish Heritage, New York.
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consultant said it was possible to raise $100 million from 
the Jews of New York City.
Frucher (who was no longer working for the governor or 
BPCA) said the governor was committed to make the project 
work: "Make it a fait accompli, and then you'll get the $27
million." He said the governor and the BPCA chairman and 
president had made a commitment that the Commission would 
receive the $27 million, and it would be too embarrassing for 
them not to follow through. He said the $5 million was to be
paid back to BPCA (from the $32 million to be received from
the developer) "to satisfy a quasi-legal psychological 
situation," and that in return the Commission had a
commitment. Klein said he hoped to have $38 million in hand
by November, including the $27 million from BPCA. He then 
would hope to break ground in January 1990, and complete the 
museum by Yom HaShoah (April) 1992. Those present voted to 
approve moving forward with the project as planned, without 
any reduction in content.25
The June 8 meeting was like a pep rally for a losing 
team. Everyone patted the other one on the back and said he 
had confidence the project would move forward. In reality, 
there were serious problems with finances, with fund raising, 
and with a deal being closed with PRC or another developer. 
The Commission was proceeding on the good faith of the
25Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
"Holocaust Commission", June 8, 1989.
360
governor and BPCA that the deal with PRC would go forward, 
with no guarantees. A Commission leader later said off the 
record that Palomino had decided the NOGA deal was no good, 
but he did not want the governor to look bad by completely 
reneging on the Holocaust museum project. Palomino had 
therefore stopped the NOGA deal and found PRC as a developer 
for the site. (This has not been proved. Palomino did not 
appear for a confirmed interview at his office, and then made 
an appointment for a telephone interview that he did not 
keep. He also did not answer questions that were given to 
him in writing.)
Meanwhile, fund raising methods had become diversified 
and intensified, and some were of questionable taste, e.g.: 
1. Proposals were prepared for foundations, that included the 
Grace Foundation. In June 1981 Yeshiva University had 
cancelled a major fund raising dinner honoring J.Peter Grace, 
after the Jewish Telegraphic Agency revealed Grace had aided 
a convicted Nazi war criminal.26 2 . There was a direct 
mail campaign, using a personal appeal by popular television 
sexologist Dr. Ruth Westheimer. Although Westheimer is a 
refugee (also described as a survivor in the mailing, which 
she is not), using her for fund raising creates a disturbing 
mix of sex and the Holocaust. 3. An "Associates Division",
26Rochelle Saidel, "Yeshiva U. Says it Cancelled Dinner 
Honoring U.S. Businessman Who aided Convicted War Criminal", 
Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin. June 2, 1981, 
p. 3.
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created to attract younger donors, held events that also were 
questionably inappropriate for fund raising for a Holocaust 
memorial. For example, on October 23, 1988, an invitation 
was issued that said: "The Associates Division of The New
York Holocaust Memorial Commission invites you to Rock and 
Roll The Night Away" at The Hot Rod, for a donation of $125 
to the Commission.
After June 1989 progress on the project barely crept 
forward for more than a year. In November PRC was chosen as 
the developer of the apartment building at Site 14, as a 
result of a RFP. The owners of PRC, Jerome Shatzky and Frank 
Lindy, then began searching for funding for their project. 
(BPCA, i.e., Palomino and Emil, had found PRC to develop the 
site before the RFP was issued.) PRC was supposed to put up 
the money for their project by April 5, 1990, and this was 
the second extension BPCA had given them. Because of the 
soft real estate market for luxury apartments, especially in 
the Wall Street area, Citibank had pulled out of financing. 
The museum therefore could not sign a lease with BPCA, 
because BPCA did not have the $27 million from the developer. 
Meanwhile, in March 1990 the Holocaust Commission was trying 
to obtain money from such sources as Leonard Stern and was 
basically being told, "Don't call us, we'll call you". 
Altshuler said in March that if there was "no hole in the
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ground by the end of June, we can all go home". He also said 
a $27 million letter of credit from BPCA would help.27
On April 19, 1990 an emergency meeting of the executive 
committee was held in the office of George Klein. Money (or 
lack of it) was the main agenda item. The committee decided 
to appoint a five member study group to explore how to scale 
back the day-to-day operations of the museum project. At 
that time there was a staff of 30, with a $3 million annual 
budget. Almost $11 million had already been spent. Another 
subcommittee was to be appointed to scale back the museum to 
$50 million (from $100 million). The committees were to 
report back in a month or less. Other suggestions were also 
made: that a State agency such as Urban Development
Corporation or the Education Department float tax free bonds 
to cover the cost so a lease could be signed; and that Cuomo 
be asked to tell BPCA the Commission wants its $1 a year 
lease back. The possibility of Howard Rubenstein, 
Morgenthau, Klein, and maybe Frucher and co-chairman Senator 
Manfred Ohrenstein meeting with Cuomo was discussed. (Koch, 
who had lost his reelection bid to David Dinkins in November 
1989 was no longer actively in the picture, although he 
remained Founding Co-chairman. Nor was the new Mayor Dinkins 
showing signs of interest at this point.)
27Telephone interview with Charles Dworkis, staff of 
Senator Ohrenstein, New York, March 23, 1990.
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The status of PRC's apartment project was also discussed 
at the meeting. After PRC had been selected, its source of 
financing, Citibank, had pulled out. Now Citibank was back 
in, but with unrealistic restrictions. Citibank had written 
a letter saying it would guarantee $150 million, if the 
developer came up with $52 million (which would include a $12 
million letter of credit and $40 million in cash). Citibank 
also wanted to be able to lay off $75 million to a third 
party co-lender. Since virtually no one was doing this kind 
of residential financing at that time, it was an impossible 
condition for PRC to meet.
George Klein admitted that accepting the governor's
original Battery Park City deal was a mistake. He said it 
was a decision made by very intelligent savvy people, but was 
based on emotion— on the desire to be the best and have the 
best museum in the best location. In retrospect, he said 
they should have stuck to the Custom House. It was 
anticipated that PRC would default and lose its $250,000 
deposit. Site 13 would still be for the museum, with the 
Commission selling the lease (with air rights) to Site 14. 
However, nothing would be built, as of then. The site, with
air rights, was worth about $3 0 million, but it seemed
nothing was about to happen.28
By August 1990, nothing had moved forward. Harry
Albright replaced Palomino as president of BPCA that month.
28Dworkis interview, April 19, 1990, New York.
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Albright, CEO of Dime Savings Bank, is said to be close to 
the governor's son, Andrew Cuomo. (Andrew is also reportedly 
the governor's contact with Morgenthau.) Museum director 
Altshuler said that Palomino had "screwed up", and that 
Albright, starting with a clean slate, was more likely to 
"undo the mess". Altshuler said Albright had told Morgenthau 
that his first assignment from the governor is to fix our 
problem. (This means getting money for the development of 
Site 14, for which the museum owns the lease and air rights.) 
Altshuler said there were a number of possibilities for doing 
this: 1. Get a new developer. 2. Give concessions from
the State's part of the deal. 3. Find a way for the 
Commission to get money in some other way than development of 
Site 14. 4. Give concessions to the Commission, such as
less rent, or forgetting the $5 million. "We are trying to 
be careful to stay out of how this is accomplished," 
Altshuler said. "But they [the governor and BPCA] got us 
into this and should get us out. They signed up NOGA and 
then threw him out. They got us out of the Custom House and 
into Battery Park City."29
By the end of 1990, nothing had moved. Albright, the 
new BPCA chairman, had promised progress by Labor Day, but 
then he became seriously ill. He then pledged to resolve the 
situation by the end of the year, but got sick again. PRC
29Interview of David Altshuler, New York City, August 9,
1990.
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had been released from its pending deal. The Commission 
hoped to get some money from a deal including the sale of its 
lease and air rights, when the market improved at a later 
date.30 In February 1991, the Commission was anticipating 
a new memo, just between the museum and BPCA. Altshuler said 
the Commission could then begin construction. He expected 
the memo in weeks, and the lease in months. He said there 
would be a ground breaking before the end of 1991, but there 
was no rush, as the museum needed to be redesigned. The
museum was to go back to Site 14, and use only half of the
site— that closest to the water. BPCA would get Site 13 back 
and could build one or more apartment buildings both on it 
and on the other half of Site 14 (when the market got 
better) .31
The expected memo from BPCA finally materialized on July 
26, 1991. As Altshuler had anticipated, it called for a new
museum lease on half of Site 14 and terminated the 1986
leases for a museum and a residential building on Site 14. 
According to this new deal, the Commission will build a $50 
million museum on half of Site 14. BPCA will give the 
Commission $10 million as a construction draw, probably by 
floating commercial paper. Later, when the other half of the 
site is leased to a developer for residential construction,
30Interview of David Altshuler, New York City, December 
20, 1990.
31Interview of David Altshuler, February 22, 1991.
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BPCA will give the museum a minimum of $10 million (depending 
on the deal), and will recoup this money from the developer. 
The museum has the half of the site that faces the Hudson 
River and Statue of Liberty.
Altshuler said of the newest memorandum of understanding 
that new external and internal designs for the museum would 
be necessary, but the concept would remain the same (see 
Chapter 14). He said that of the $23 million the Commission 
had raised, about $10 million was left. With this $10 
million and the $10 million from BPCA, the Commission would 
need to raise $30 million more to build the museum. The 
second $10 million from BPCA (from the sale of the second 
half of the site) would be used to begin the endowment fund. 
The new target date to begin construction would be 1992, with 
the museum expected to open in 1994.32
Thus the Mutagon entered a new phase. Cuomo, who (by 
coincidence or not) then seemed inclined not to run for 
President, and BPCA, which he controlled, made a new deal 
with the Commission which even involved a $10 million 
investment. (An article the day before the memorandum was 
signed said: "Of 13 current and former Cuomo aides surveyed
in the last week, none said they believed that Mr. Cuomo 
would run for President."33) Meanwhile, ten years had gone
32Interview of David Altshuler, August 5, 1991, New York
City.
33Kevin Sack, "Cuomo Seeking the Presidency? Yes, He 
Isn't, Maybe He Is", New York Times. July 25, 1991, p. B5.
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by since Koch's initiation of the project, and time, itself, 
was an enemy. The first meeting of Koch's Task Force, the 
initial stage of the Mutagon, was on July 22, 1981— almost 
ten years earlier to the day. Costs had escalated, 
unforeseen problems had developed (such as the drop in real 
estate values), protagonists such as Koch had left the scene, 
and new players (e.g., Cuomo, Palomino and Emil) had caused 
further complications and delays in implementation. Cuomo 
and BPCA had then come up with a plan to "save the day". As 
Pressman and Wildavsky said: "The advantages of being new
are exactly that: being new. They dissipate quickly over
time."34 In the case of creating a Holocaust memorial 
museum in New York City, there had been ten years of such 
dissipation.
SUMMARY
Between the Fall of 1988 and the Spring of 1991 there 
was virtually no progress on actually building the Holocaust 
museum. The Mutagon was at an impasse. First Frucher 
arranged a deal with NOGA, through which the museum would be 
free-standing on the next site and sell its lease rights for 
a luxury hotel on its original site. Soon afterward Frucher 
resigned as BPCA president and other high level political 
brokers in Cuomo's office decided the NOGA deal should not go 
forward. BPCA also reneged on the agreement whereby the
34Pressman and Wildavsky, p. 13 0.
Holocaust museum was to pay only symbolic rent of $1 per 
year, and the rental fee became some $10 million. Cuomo 
remained part of the Mutagon building the museum, and
retained his title as Founding Co-chairman. At the same
time, his office and BPCA stonewalled and seemed likely to 
kill the project with which he was associated. The probable 
reason for this was that his political advisors thought the 
original deal had Church-State problems that could hurt him 
in a Presidential race. Since severing himself completely 
could also hurt the governor, especially in New York State, 
his staff found another developer, PRC, for a deal with the 
Holocaust Commission. This deal fell apart when PRC could 
not obtain financing. The latest plan then was for the 
Commission to scale down and build a museum on half of the 
original site. The Commission expected a memo of
understanding from BPCA for the new deal by March 1991, but
it was not delivered until July 26. This latest plan 
included a $10 million contribution from BPCA and the total 
cost of the museum was expected to be $50 million. With 
exterior and interior designs recommencing again, museum 
director Altshuler anticipated a 1992 ground breaking and a 
1994 opening. With Koch still officially the Founding Co- 
Chairman but in reality out of the picture, the Mutagon now 
was an alliance with one head, as in the beginning. However, 
now that head was the governor and not the mayor.
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CHAPTER 13: INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLES AND CONFLICTS WITHIN
THE Mutagon
"Dogs in a kennel snarl at each other; but when a wolf 
comes along they become allies." Talmud: Sanhedrin, 105a.
This chapter examines the internal conflicts between 
various players in the New York Holocaust Memorial 
Commission's Mutagon of political forces. In the two 
theories most often used to analyze how interest groups 
create political alliances— iron triangle and issue network 
theories— there is a sense of harmony among the players for 
the greater good of a common goal. In the case of the New 
York Holocaust Commission's alliance with Mayor Koch, 
Governor Cuomo, and others over the years, the relationship 
within the alliance was more complex and subject to 
conflicts. There were also conflicts among members within 
the Commission. Furthermore, the fact that the governor, 
mayor, and Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) head were all 
part of the Commission itself— as well as the government 
officials with whom the Commission was dealing— causes the 
relationship between the various angles of the changing 
polygon of political allies, the Mutagon, to have built-in 
conflicts of interest.
For nearly one third of the Mutagon's ten year life the 
heads of the City and State governments shared the spotlight 
as "Founding Co-Chairmen". They had a say both as Commission 
officers and as elected officials with whom the Commission
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was dealing. In addition, two of the four Co-chairmen were 
elected officials, and the third was a major real estate 
developer that had megabuck deals going with the City and the 
State. Because of the complicated structure and overlapping 
of roles, internal conflict is integral to this Mutagon.
While iron triangle theory generally makes a clear 
distinction between the angles of the triangle— -interest 
group, executive branch, and congressional branch— Harold 
Seidman provided a good example of the conflicts of interest 
that can occur when elected officials are also part of the 
interest group. He said: "Intermingling of public and
private duties places public officials in an ambiguous 
position. There are many unanswered questions. Do the 
secretaries of housing and urban development and agriculture 
serve as directors of the National Home Ownership Foundation 
in their official capacity, or as private citizens? To whom 
are federal officials accountable for their actions as 
directors if the foundation is not an agency and 
instrumentality of the United States, what then are its 
responsibilities to the president, the Congress, and 
ultimately, through them, to the people?"1 Likewise, as 
Founding Co-Chairmen and members of the Commission members, 
as well as elected officials, to whom are the governor and
1Harold Seidman, Politics. Position, and Power. Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1970, 1980, p. 299.
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mayor responsible, regarding their actions concerning the 
Holocaust museum project?
While all of the players remained loyal to the basic 
idea of a Holocaust memorial museum, there have been varying 
intensities of loyalty and criteria for implementation, and 
changes in individuals' involvement over time. These 
differences have sometimes caused one player in the Mutagon 
to be at odds with one or more other political forces in the 
coalition. (Governor Cuomo's midstream cooling down, 
analyzed in the last chapter, is the most obvious example.) 
In addition, the complex structure of a Mutagon, with its 
large cast of city-state-private interest group players (and 
some people in more than one category at the same time), is 
subject to a number of conflicts between some of the players. 
While some of these conflicts evolved from circumstances that 
have nothing to do with the project at hand, they 
nevertheless affect the Mutagon coalition's unity.
The major players in the Mutagon have been: Mayor Koch,
Koch political entrepreneur Herbert Rickman, developer George 
Klein, Manhattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, 
Governor Cuomo, Cuomo political entrepreneurs and BPCA 
officials Sandy Frucher and Fabian Palomino, New York State 
Senate Minority Leader Manfred Ohrenstein, and, briefly, 
Peter A. Cohen (who lost his job at Shearson Lehman). By the 
time of the Mutagon' s latest phase in 1991, new BPCA 
officials David Emil and Harry Albright had also become part
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of the Mutagon. After David Dinkins became mayor in 1990, at 
a stage of impasse and stagnation, he hardly became involved. 
If the newest deal, signed between BPCA and the Commission in 
July 1991, goes forward smoothly, he will no doubt jump on 
the band wagon. (This may cause new friction with Cuomo, who 
now has no competition from a mayor, as he did from Koch.)
Koch and Klein were closely connected, and there were no 
known conflicts between them regarding the Holocaust project. 
However, they had other business, including the multimillion 
dollar Times Square redevelopment project (see Chapter 8) , 
which caused friction from time to time. Koch recalled in 
his autobiography, Mayor, how Klein came to see him in 1982 
to complain about the administration's limitation of tax 
abatements for some of his other real estate developments, 
the building of skyscrapers on the East Side. Koch quotes 
Klein that this zoning change "is going to cost me millions 
of dollars. We acquired property. I have forty-eight 
million dollars in this property. And now you are going to 
make it impossible to build on it. We are going to sue!" 
Koch continued: "I said, 'Of course you should sue, George.
I am not suggesting that you not protect yourself. I do what 
I have to do and you do what you have to do. We can still be 
friends. Don't be angry.' [Klein] said, 'I am angry.' I
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said, 'Well, I understand. But we are not going to change on 
this.' So he left."2
Klein was also involved in one of the Koch 
administration's scandals. Alex Liberman, who had been put 
in control of the City's leasing bureaus soon after Koch took 
office in 1978, was getting kickbacks from landlords to whom 
he issued leases for use of their property by the City. In 
order to receive this money, Liberman, a Holocaust survivor, 
used as a front (among others) his synagogue. During the 
investigation of Liberman, it was discovered that Klein 
donated $5,000 to the synagogue, after Liberman had leased 
three floors from him in an old Brooklyn building that had 
not had a tenant for ten years. Klein insisted the money was 
unconnected to the lease and was never named as a bribe payer 
in Liberman's indictment.3 Thus Klein's and Koch's other 
interconnections, which all involved both of their obtaining 
money, would be likely to affect their relationship in the 
Mutagon.
While Koch and Klein were political friends with "one 
hand washing the other", Koch and Cuomo had been political 
enemies more than once. They ran against each other in 
bitter Democratic primaries, for mayor of New York City in
2Edward I. Koch, Mayor. Warner Books, New York, 1985, p.
297 .
3Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed
Koch and the Betrayal of New York. Harper & Row, New York, 
1988, pp. 211-228.
1981 (which Koch won) and governor of New York State in 1982 
(which Cuomo won). As early as 1973, they were on opposing 
sides. Cuomo defended the development of a scaled down 
public housing project in Forest Hills (which would bring 
blacks into the neighborhood) , and Koch sided with the 
opponents (white, and mostly Jewish).4 There was "no love 
lost" between them, and Koch must have let Cuomo become his 
equal "Founding Co-chairman" of the Holocaust project only 
because he had no other choice. From Cuomo's perspective, he 
may have wanted to be Koch's equal on the project as a way of 
stealing some of Koch's thunder with the organized Jewish 
community of New York City and State. Since there is no 
written record of the steps leading to the addition of Cuomo, 
and since Cuomo's broker, Frucher, and Koch's broker, 
Rickman, would say only what has been detailed here (see 
Chapter 10), there is no way of further documenting how and 
why the merger took place. It is common knowledge, however, 
that these two Founding Co-chairmen of the Mutagon were not 
political of personal friends. Although they are both 
Democrats, Koch is considered conservative, even "quasi- 
Republican", and Cuomo, a liberal.
Koch supporter Klein is very much a Republican, and was 
a high level backer of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George 
Bush. Klein's partisan feelings temporarily prevented the
4Michael Harrington, "When Ed Koch Was Still a Liberal", 
Dissent Magazine ("A Special Issue: In Search of New York"),
Fall 1987, pp. 595-602.
375
Congressman in whose district the Holocaust museum is to be 
built from becoming a member of the Commission. Although 
East Side Manhattan Congressman S. William Green (Republican) 
was a member, Congressman Ted Weiss (Democrat), whose 
district includes both the Custom House and Battery Park 
City, was not originally invited to serve. (Weiss is also a 
refugee from Nazi Hungary.) Klein kept him off of the 
Commission because Weiss had introduced a resolution in 
Congress to impeach Reagan. Ironically, then Commission 
director David Blumenfeld asked Weiss for his support in the 
quest for the Custom House in February, 1984, and did not 
understand why Weiss was "neutral". Weiss was not appointed 
an Associate Chairperson until June 1986, much later than 
other elected officials.5
Another Associate Chairperson and minor player in the 
Mutagon, then Manhattan Borough President David Dinkins, also 
had a disagreement with one of the Founding Co-chairmen, 
Koch, regarding the activities of the Commission. In 1986 
Dinkins went against a request of the Holocaust Commission as 
a way of opposing Koch, whom he considered his political 
rival for a future mayoral race. Dinkins favored a local 
community group, The West Side Jewish Community Council (now 
defunct), which was engaged in an activity to which Koch's 
special assistant, Rickman was vehemently opposed. The
5Memos from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
February 13, 1984 and June 17,1986.
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episode was trivial, but it was publicized in newspapers and 
is an example of how two members of the Mutagon were at odds 
about memorializing the Holocaust. The West Side group, then 
an umbrella for more than 65 Jewish organizations, decided to 
have a public ceremony on May 14, 1986 at the original
Holocaust memorial site in Riverside Park at 83rd Street. 
School children would enhance the site by planting flowers. 
Rickman, representing Koch, said this simple ceremony would 
hurt the Holocaust Commission's fundraising efforts and he 
begged the group not to follow through with a public 
ceremony. When Borough President Dinkins was approached by 
the group and learned about Rickman's opposition, he was 
eager to support the children's planting project (and thus 
make Koch look foolish) .6 One reason that Dinkins did not 
enthusiastically take a lead in the Mutagon after he was 
elected mayor was probably the project's close association 
with his old rival, Koch. He may yet get heavily involved if 
the newest effort begins to succeed and his advisors on the 
Jewish community deem it politically expedient. This will 
create a new conflict between him and Cuomo.
At some time in 1987 Peter A. Cohen, then chairman and 
chief executive officer of Shearson Lehman Hutton, was 
appointed a co-chairman, to serve with Klein, Morgenthau, and
6Ricki Fulman, "Park to recall Holocaust", New York 
Daily News. May 15, 1986, p. 2 reports on the event. The 
politics behind it were discussed in author's presence, in 
meetings with both Dinkins and Rickman in May 1986.
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Ohrenstein. The idea behind this move, which was probably 
Klein's, was to have Cohen head fund raising efforts, 
especially in the financial sector. He was also named 
Campaign Co-Chairperson. From the beginning he was 
ineffective and his association with the Commission gradually 
faded into oblivion (although he is still officially a Co- 
chairman) . Meanwhile, he was fired from his high level job, 
and in June, 1990 had hired a lawyer to negotiate his 
severance pay.7 One titular head of the Mutagon thus 
accomplished little for the cause and then lost the job that 
was the reason for his appointment.
The exception to the internal conflict between players 
within the Mutagon is the relationship between Klein and 
Morgenthau, who seem like "strange bedfellows". Morgenthau, 
a Democrat, is an "Our Crowd" rather assimilated Jew. His 
family lived in the United States for many generations, with 
roots in Germany. His father was in Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
cabinet and his grandfather served as United States 
Ambassador to Turkey during World War I. Following in their 
footsteps on a much lower level, he is a public servant as 
the elected District Attorney of Manhattan. Klein, a 
Republican, fled Nazi Europe as a child. He is an Orthodox 
Jew who inherited a fortune and has enhanced this wealth as 
a developer. Despite their different backgrounds, their
7"Chronicle: Negotiating severance for Shearson
Lehman's ousted chairman", The New York Times. June 11, 1990, 
p. B12.
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relationship as Commission Co-chairmen since 1982 seems to 
have been smooth and cordial. For the most part, Morgenthau 
has let Klein take the lead and then signed what needed to be 
signed. Klein seems to like being in charge, and Morgenthau 
seems to like taking a back seat to him. The result has 
been a harmonious partnership with no overt conflicts. Both 
Klein and Morgenthau were appointed by Koch.
The third co-chairman, Ohrenstein, was appointed by 
Cuomo. Circumstances made his relationship the most 
conflictive and problematic in the Mutagon. He, too, came 
to the United States from Nazi Europe as a young refugee. He 
was elected to the Senate as a reform Democrat from the West 
Side of Manhattan in 1960 and became Minority Leader in 1975. 
Koch did not want Ohrenstein to be a co-chairman, and so 
stated for the record.8 Frucher said Cuomo appointed him 
because Ohrenstein "insisted".9 These sentiments by the two 
Founding Co-chairmen of the Mutagon (and the government 
officials with whom the Commission was dealing) would in 
themselves indicate there were conflicts, but political 
expediency could overcome personal differences between 
Ohrenstein and the mayor or the governor. However, another 
conflict arose that was unresolvable and surprisingly did not
interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.
interview with Meyer S. Frucher, New York, February 4,
1991.
379
do significant damage to the Commission's image or
implementation of its project.
On September 16, 1987, Ohrenstein was accused of payroll 
abuses and indicted by his Holocaust Commission co-chairman, 
District Attorney Morgenthau. By coincidence, he learned 
about the probability of the indictment on March 23, 1987. 
This was the very day of a high level fund raising dinner for 
the Commission held at Gracie Mansion, with Henry Kissinger 
as guest speaker. Both Ohrenstein and Morgenthau were also 
on the program, and the Senator was supposed to fly to
Manhattan from Albany by helicopter, especially for this 
event. At the last moment he cancelled his appearance and 
remained in Albany.
The 564 count indictment included grand larceny,
conspiracy and filing false documents. The New York Post 
headline on the day of the indictment was "Morgy Bags
Ohrenstein". The next day the Post featured a photograph of
Morgenthau, saying he thanked that paper for helping to 
expose Ohrenstein. It juxtaposed a photograph of the 
headline of the day before, which said "Ohrenstein
Indicted".10 The next week the Daily News specifically
focused on the fact that the two were Commission co-chairmen.
With the catchy headline, "The Morgy and Manny Show", the 
article said the indictment "could cause some awkward moments
10"Morgy Thanks the Post for Baring Scam", The New York 
Post. September 17, 1987.
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at the New York Holocaust Commission."11 This was the only 
article that zeroed in on Ohrenstein's and Morgenthau's 
relationship as Commission Co-chairmen. This aspect of the 
case, which could have made "good ink" for the press, was 
never again picked up.
Although it was not reported in the press, the 
situation, indeed, caused some "awkward moments". Since 
Morgenthau was "the man in the white hat" and Ohrenstein, in 
"the black hat", the Senator chose to stay away from 
Commission meetings and avoid embarrassment. He made a 
conscious effort to keep the Commission's project out of his 
legal battle with Morgenthau, to protect both the project 
and himself. Klein, who remained publicly neutral, suggested 
to Ohrenstein that he call and check to see if Morgenthau was 
attending each meeting, before deciding whether to come. 
Ohrenstein was not pleased with this suggestion, and decided 
it was better not to come at all. He remained a Co-chairman, 
but the Commission started having communications signed only 
by Klein and Morgenthau.
In November 1990, 445 of the 564 counts in the original 
indictment were dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and in 
February 1991 Ohrenstein's trial was postponed indefinitely, 
but still pending. A Morgenthau spokesman said the delay was 
to await the outcome of efforts to first try another State
11 "The Morgy & Manny Show: DA and senator may meet as
panel members", The New York Daily News. September 24, 1987,
p. 11.
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Senator, Howard Babbush.12 In September 1991, Morgenthau 
dropped all remaining charges against Ohrenstein, and the 
Senator was exonerated.
Meanwhile, by 1990 Ohrenstein had gradually begun 
participating in some Commission activities. However, by 
then his two Co-chairmen and others on the Commission were 
not happy with him for two other reasons: 1) He was the
governor's appointee as chairman, and the governor at that 
stage of the Mutagon had become a persona non grata for 
reneging on the Battery Park City NOGA deal and $1 per year 
rent. 2) Ohrenstein had from the beginning obtained a 
legislative grant of $25,000-$50,000 per year for the 
Commission from his supplemental budget "member item" 
allowance in the State budget. The Commission asked him in 
1990 to allocate $100,000 from the 1991 State budget, but he 
allocated nothing. Ohrenstein blamed it on Majority Leader 
Ralph Marino, who cut the budget of the Minority, but 
Commission leaders blamed Ohrenstein.13 (Both Morgenthau 
and Ohrenstein refused to be interviewed about the indictment 
and its effect on the Commission and their co-chairmanships.)
The governor's reputation within the Mutagon had gone 
from bad to worse after Frucher left BPCA and the NOGA deal
12Ronald Sullivan, "Senator's Trial Is Postponed 
Indefinitely: Delay May Hurt Case Against Ohrenstein", The
New York Times. February 23, 1991, p. 27.
13Interview of David Altshuler, New York, February 22,
1991.
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fell apart (see Chapter 12). By October 1987 the name of the 
museum had been officially changed to please the governor's 
office. It had been "The Museum of Jewish Heritage - A 
Living Memorial to the Holocaust". This had been deemed "too 
Jewish" by Cuomo's separation of Church and State experts 
such as counsels Evan Davis and Palomino. The name therefore 
became "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust - The Museum of 
Jewish Heritage". Then, in the summer of 1989 there was 
another attempt by the governor to try to make the museum 
appear more secular and less Jewish.
On June 28, 1989 there was a meeting of the Commission 
with Palomino, who represented BPCA and Governor Cuomo. The 
purpose of this meeting at Klein's office was that Palomino 
(i.e., the governor) was pressuring the Commission to have 
the museum open on Saturdays and Jewish holidays. Klein said 
before the meeting that he had absolutely refused to agree to 
this, but Palomino would put pressure on the Commission. 
Palomino presented his case very poorly. As two precedents 
for the museum being open on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, 
he named the Holocaust museums at Auschwitz and in 
Washington. The Washington museum was not yet open at all, 
because it had not been built. As for Auschwitz, it seems 
unnecessary to comment on his comparing a Jewish Holocaust 
museum in New York City and the Judenrein state museum at 
Auschwitz in traditionally anti-Semitic (and Judenrein) 
Poland!
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The Commission had the legal right, incorporated in its 
by-laws, to observe the Jewish sabbath and holidays. On 
February 15, 1985 George Klein, Robert M. Morgenthau, Dr.
Irving Greenberg, Judah Gribetz, Benjamin Meed, Ernest W. 
Michel, as officers of the Corporation, had signed the 
following statement of Organizational Action of Trustees in 
Lieu of Organization Meeting, adopted as part of the By-Laws 
of the Corporation:
"RESOLVED, that the following 'Statement of Policy' 
be, and the same hereby is, adopted to apply to all 
aspects of the Corporation:
'The mandate of the New York City Holocaust 
Memorial Museum is to establish in New York City of a 
perpetual living memorial to the 6,000,000 Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust [sic]. In upholding this 
solemn responsibility, the Corporation recognizes a 
sacred obligation on its part to respect the religious 
sensibilities of the Jewish community. Accordingly, all 
activities relating to the Corporation will conform with 
the religious laws, customs and traditions of the Jewish 
people.'"
The Commission listened politely to Palomino, but held 
firm. Whether BPCA could later force them to comply and open 
on Saturdays and Jewish holidays would remain to be seen. 
With the subsequently defunct PRC deal then up in the air, 
and the Commission dependent on BPCA bringing it to fruition,
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the governor and Palomino were in a good position to make 
demands. There were evidently two reasons Palomino had urged 
that the museum remain open: 1. As already stated, Cuomo's
legal experts (of which Palomino was one) were concerned with 
the issue of separation of Church and State. The Commission 
was closely linked with the governor and BPCA, and therefore 
Palomino and others were worried about an appearance of a 
State-linked entity being a religious institution. This was 
especially true after Cuomo began having aspirations to run 
for President. 2. The Catholic Diocese requested of BPCA 
land to build a church, with strong pressure from John 
Cardinal O'Connor.14 The Temple of Understanding, which was 
housed at Cathedral of St. John the Divine and had as its 
president Reverend James Park Morton, also requested free 
space from BPCA.15 The governor's pressure to have the 
museum open on Saturdays and holidays may have been to prove 
the museum was not a religious institution. Therefore, Cuomo 
would not have to give "equal time" (in this case, equal 
space) to the Jews, the Protestants and the Catholics.16
Palomino, the governor's old friend, confidant and 
counselor, did not like David Emil, Frucher's replacement in
14Letter from Chancery Office, Archdiocese of New York 
to David Emil, February 24, 1989.
15Letter from Linda M. Kirk to David Emil, New York City, 
April 21, 1989.
16Memo from Rochelle Saidel to Senator Ohrenstein, 
"Subject Holocaust Commission", New York, June 2, 1989.
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1988 as BPCA president. Palomino, who at the time was 
chairman of BPCA's board of directors, in 1990 publicly 
called for an investigation of Emil's role in awarding a 
construction contract to a company that was not the lowest 
bidder. Soon afterward, Palomino resigned and his office was 
assumed by Albright. Emil was subsequently cleared of the 
charges by the State Inspector General's office.
In addition to the above conflicts between the leading 
members of the Mutagon, some of the less important players 
also had various problems, possible conflicts of interest, 
and unrelated but potentially harmful other affiliations that 
caused controversy in the Commission. For example, survivor 
and executive committee member Ben Meed wore too many hats.
As the president of the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance
Organization (WAGRO) which runs the largest Yom HaShoah
memorial commemoration in the City, he always wanted the new 
memorial museum to have a space for his ceremony.
Furthermore, he was active on the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Council and head of its content committee. Since the two 
museums were often both seeking the same artifacts, this put 
him in a position of having a possible conflict of interest. 
By the Spring of 1991, when the New York project was
floundering and the Washington museum was rising on the Mall, 
his title for the national museum in Washington was Chairman 
of the National Survivors Campaign. Since the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Council had in March 1991 opened a fund raising
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office in New York City, competing for funds urgently needed 
by the New York Commission, Meed's role in fund raising for 
the Washington project was also a possible conflict of 
interest with his membership on the New York executive 
committee.
Commission member, Holocaust scholar and survivor Yaffa 
Eliach also wore more than one hat. Not only was she a 
member of the Commission's Academic Advisory Committee, but 
she also headed the Brooklyn Center for Holocaust Studies. 
For years the Commission tried to incorporate the Brooklyn 
institution (which has excellent archival material), but 
Eliach resisted. Finally, in August 1990 A Living Memorial 
to the Holocaust-Museum of Jewish Heritage absorbed the 
Brooklyn Center for Holocaust Studies. The reason for the 
merger was the Brooklyn institution's own serious financial 
problems.
Attorney and Commission member Menachem Rosensaft was 
president of the Second Generation organization of children 
of survivors. His family was very well connected to 
organized survivor activities. For example, his mother was 
active on the Washington project, and his father-in-law, Sam 
Bloch, on the New York project and the National Gathering of 
Holocaust Survivors. Rosensaft, himself, became president of 
the national Labor Zionist organization. However, in 
December 1988, Rosensaft engaged in an activity that made him 
a pariah among many of the Commission members, especially the
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survivors: he met with Palestine Liberation Organization
head Yasir Arafat to discuss a possible peace settlement with 
Israel. There was a general fear among most active 
Commission members that this would somehow rub off on the 
Commission's efforts and harm them.
Rosensaft said "some of the survivors who see things in 
stark terms weren't happy about it". However, he believes 
some people in the leadership of the survivor community 
"mellowed" after reading articles he wrote. "I've always 
refused to consider remembering the Holocaust or Children of 
Holocaust Survivor activities to be an all-consuming focus," 
he said. "Other things are equally important. I've been in 
the peace movement since the late '70s and have done what I 
believed had to be done."17 Since most other Commission 
members did not believe the things Rosensaft did (i.e., 
meeting with Arafat) "had to be done", there was a temporary 
but sharp conflict between him and some Commission members.
Howard Rubenstein, who refused to be interviewed, was 
himself a complex package of conflicting and overlapping 
interests. His highly political public relations firm had as 
clients both Koch and Klein's Park Tower Realty. He, 
himself, was a Commission member and his firm did some pro 
bono public relations work for the Commission. Thus one
17Telephone interview of Menachem Rosensaft, August 8, 
1991, New York City.
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Mutagon Founding Co-chairman, one Co-chairman, and the 
Commission as an entity were his clients.
Another internal conflict emerged because of Academic 
Advisory Committee member and Israeli Holocaust historian 
Yehuda Bauer. Asked by museum director David Altshuler to 
evaluate a Preliminary Concept Study of the museum on June 
24, 1987, he sent back a letter that was nothing less than 
threatening. It said:
"I must say I am absolutely appalled at the program 
and its basic concepts. Let me explain why, but please 
be advised that unless this is immediately and radically 
changed I wish to have my name taken off any list 
associated with your Museum forthwith, and I must also 
warn you that I shall take every opportunity— starting 
with my forthcoming visits to New York and Los Angeles 
this fall— to attack this outrageous design from every 
public platform I have, not least of which will be a 
major public international conference on the Holocaust 
in Britain in 1988 at which most of the Holocaust 
scholars, some 250 of them, will participate."18 
Basically, Bauer objected to the use of the term "Holocaust" 
for the murder of non-Jewish, as well as Jewish, victims. He 
indicated in his letter that he had sent copies to eight
18Letter from Yehuda Bauer to David Altshuler, July 29,
1987.
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other Holocaust scholars, survivors, and academics, both 
members and non-members of the Commission.
Altshuler responded with a placating letter, but added 
the following P.S.: "I am sorry that as a member of the
Museum's Academic Advisory Committee, you did not see fit to 
communicate with us directly before making a cause celebre by 
circulating your letter to others."19 Thus this particular 
Mutagon was not without its politics of academia, as well as 
governmental politics. Just as prominent elected officials, 
such as Cuomo, tried to control the activities of the Mutagon 
at certain stages (see Chapter 12), there were also internal 
disputes among Holocaust scholars for power and control of 
the museum's message.
Finally, there was the "business as usual" maneuvering 
by heads of major Jewish organization on the Commission to 
protect their turf and influence the Commission to follow 
their particular philosophy. For example, Bernice
Tannenbaum, a past national president of Hadassah (the 
Women's Zionist Organization) wanted the message of the 
museum to be more Zionist.
SUMMARY
The Mutagon endeavoring to create a Holocaust memorial 
museum in New York City is a long-term and changing political
19Letter from David Altshuler to Yehuda Bauer, August 5,
1987.
alliance. Because of the long time the project has 
languished, and because of changes in the cast of players and 
their roles over time, the members of the Mutagon do not 
always work in harmony. While, for the most part, they have 
supported the greater common goal of creating the museum, 
they have had differences among themselves. Both external 
and internal circumstances have contributed to these 
conflicts. Among the most significant causes for conflict 
were: Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo sharing power as
Founding Co-chairmen of the Commission, and also serving as 
the elected officials with whom the Commission must 
negotiate; the indictment of Co-chairman Ohrenstein by Co- 
chairman Morgenthau; the departure of Frucher from BPCA and 
his replacement by a much less involved Emil. All of these 
interpersonal and operational conflicts have affected the 
efficiency of the Mutagon in achieving its goals. 
Interpersonal relations, political differences and agendas, 
conflicts between Commission members that were unrelated to 
the activities of the Commission, Commission members "wearing 
two hats", protection of individuals' turf. and the 
complexity and changeability of the polygon of political 
forces working to create a Holocaust museum in New York City 
have all been causes for friction.
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CHAPTER 14: WHY IS THIS HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL DIFFERENT FROM
ALL OTHER HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS?
"The mere choice of facts presented in an exhibition 
offers a definite point of view. When selecting historical 
data, one must consider what to exclude, what to emphasize 
and why... .A statement made by a museum carries great weight. 
It implies final authority and eternal remembrance."
Martin Weyl, Director, Israel Museum1
The framework for commemorating any historical event is 
affected by political considerations, and the Mutagon of 
political allies behind the effort to create a Holocaust 
memorial museum in New York City has significantly influenced 
the plans for implementing this project. The basic concept 
has remained the same since its inception, but the changing 
structure of the Mutagon over time has caused some changes in 
plans for the museum.
The conceptual plan for A Living Memorial to the 
Holocaust-Museum of Jewish Heritage, as the proposed museum 
is called, has four central themes: 1. "The World Before",
the European and North African Jewish civilization which 
thrived for two thousand years before it was destroyed by the 
Nazis; 2. "The Holocaust", particularly as it was experienced 
by the Jews, both those who perished and those who survived; 
3. "The Aftermath" of survival, including the plight of 
refugees, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the 
pursuit of Nazi war criminals; and 4. "Renewal in America",
1Martin Weyl, "How Do Museums Speak the Unspeakable?", 
The New York Times. June 11, 1989, p. 38.
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Jewish immigration to the United States from 1654 to the 
present.2
The first two of these themes began with the report of 
the "Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: Ideas for a NYC
Holocaust Memorial Center", dated December 1981. Apparently 
a report of the original content committee headed by Rabbi 
Irving Greenberg, this document recommended that a Holocaust 
memorial center should address: the culture of European
Jewry that was destroyed, a detailed factual account of the 
destruction or European Jewry (including resistance) , and how 
this could have happened in "the supposedly civilized 
twentieth century". The report called for an exhibition 
center, a scholarly archive, and a survivors' space, with 
personal taped memoirs and memorabilia.3
The New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission's June 
1983 Certificate of Incorporation also included the first two 
of the four current themes: "(a) To perpetuate the memory of
the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust; to 
commemorate the victims of the Holocaust not only as they 
died, but as they lived; to communicate the uniqueness of the 
Jewish experience in the Holocaust; to teach the history and
2"A Living Memorial to the Holocaust— Museum of Jewish 
Heritage", brochure of the New York Holocaust Memorial 
Commission, 1990, New York City.
3"Mayor's Task Force on the Holocaust: Ideas for a NYC
Holocaust Memorial Center", no author cited, December 1981, 
(Record Group Mayor Koch, Acc'n 82-87, Subgroup Special 
Assistant Herb Rickman), Municipal Archives, New York City.
lessons of the Holocaust to all people for generations to 
come." When the Holocaust Commission sent the General 
Services Administration (GSA) Regional Office a memorandum 
asking to lease space in the Custom House on December 6, 
1983, the stated purposes were somewhat different than those 
listed in the Certificate of Incorporation, including: a. To
perpetuate the memory of the 6,000,000 Jews who were murdered 
by Nazi Germany in the Holocaust. b. To commemorate the 
lives of the victims of the Holocaust by creating a record of 
Jewish life, society and culture in Europe. c. To portray 
the arrival of Jewish immigrants to New York City and to 
restore to memory the vigorous traditions and lifestyles 
which formed a trans-Atlantic bond between European Jewry and 
the Jewry of New York City. The idea of Jewish immigration 
to New York City was not mentioned in the earlier documents, 
and may have been an attempt to "Americanize" the image of 
the museum for the GSA and the Federal government. This 
theme evolved into "Renewal in America", Jewish immigration 
to America, in the present concept plan. The fourth current 
theme, "The Aftermath" emerged over time and, like the other 
three themes, gives the museum a Jewish slant.
The literature on memorial ization,s found mostly in the
(
fields of sociology and anthropology, analyzes how the 
particular locale of a memorial or a museum affects how that 
entity portrays history. For example, Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann's theory of "social construction of reality"
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analyzes how the historical reality created in a museum is a 
reflection of where the museum is located. Their central 
hypothesis is that "knowledge" is different in different 
societies, and that a sociological study must deal with what 
is considered knowledge in a particular society.4 In other 
words, "reality" is not the same everywhere. The authors 
state that "reality is socially constructed and that the 
sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which 
this occurs." ("Reality" is defined as "a quality 
appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being 
independent of our own volition", and "knowledge" is defined 
as "the certainty that phenomena are real and that they 
possess specific characteristics".5) When the segment of 
reality under discussion is highly charged with emotion and 
affected by an interest group's conscious effort to deliver 
a political message, the differences become even more 
striking. Not only is knowledge different in different 
societies, but it is purposely made different to prove a 
point of view.
A dramatic example of how memorializing the Holocaust 
serves different purposes in different places is a comparison 
between Yad Vashem, the official Israel Government Holocaust
4Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social
Construction of Reality. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co. , 
Garden City, N.Y., 1966, p.l.
5Ibid., p. 1.
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memorial and museum, and the Buchenwald Concentration Camp 
Museum, when it was part of the then German Democratic 
Republic. At Yad Vashem in Israel, Holocaust memorialization 
is a Zionist message: the culmination of the depiction of
the Holocaust is the creation of the Zionist State of Israel. 
The exiles are ingathered from Holocaust to redemption. The 
message at the Buchenwald Concentration Camp Museum was 
remarkably similar, except that it was a Communist message: 
the culmination of the exhibits on the atrocities at 
Buchenwald was the creation of the Communist State of the 
German Democratic Republic. Ben Gurion is the hero of Yad 
Vashem, and Ernst Thalmann was the hero of Buchenwald. Nazi 
Germany was Nazi Germany, but the realities to be remembered- 
-and use of this memorialization for political purposes— were 
very different at these two memorial sites.
Berger and Luckmann did not delve into the political 
or public policy reasons for "reality" being different in 
different societies. They came close, when they said: "When
a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a 
concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology... .The 
distinctiveness of ideology is rather that the same overall 
universe is interpreted in different ways, depending upon 
concrete vested interests within the society in question."6
6Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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In The Nerves of Government. Karl Deutsch's "feedback 
model of consciousness" theory7 has the same basic concept, 
but he addresses the political forces behind a project, 
rather than the locale. Deutsch's central idea is that 
political systems are dependent on communications processes, 
and these systems are similar to some aspects of 
communications equipment. He speaks of the selective 
interests of the person who knows. Deutsch concludes 
knowledge is a point at which subjective and objective 
elements meet. He presents a theory to help identify 
patterns of political actions and values, and speaks of a 
system of symbols by which selected data are recorded and 
used for later application. Deutsch defines a symbol as, "an 
order to recall from memory a particular set of things or 
events. Any physical work or event that functions repeatedly 
as such a command can thus function as a symbol."8
Deutsch does not use the term "social construction of 
reality", but his "feedback model of consciousness" theory is 
similar to Berger and Luckmann's: "In government and
politics, will is a pattern of relatively consolidated 
preferences and inhibitions. derived from the past 
experiences of a social group, consciously labeled for a
7Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. The Free
Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1963.
8Ibid, p. 10.
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relevant portion of its members, and applied to guide the 
actions, to restrict the subsequent experiences of that group 
and its members." (emphases in original)9 Thus groups (such 
as creators of memorials) select certain aspects of 
experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort the 
message being conveyed, to suit the preference of these 
groups.
To analyze the specific conception and evolution of the 
Mutagon's Holocaust museum project in New York City, Berger 
and Luckmann's (locale) and Deutsch's (selective interests) 
theories must be combined. In New York City the museum's 
viewpoint, or way of remembering, is influenced by the large, 
organized population of nearly two million Jews. (With 
1,844,000 Jews, New York State has the highest number of Jews 
in America, and the highest percentage of Jews in any state's 
total population, 10.3 percent. The largest concentration is 
in New York City and its environs.10)
In addition to the size of the community, many members 
have high profiles in such fields as government, real estate 
development, finance, the arts, public relations, and higher 
education. The Holocaust project Mutagon's initiator, Mayor 
Koch, was himself an outspokenly Jewish mayor. His strong 
affiliation with the organized Jewish community, Israel, and
9Ibid., p. 107.
10Allison Kaplan, "Jewish Population in U.S. Steady, but 
Traditional Areas See Decline", Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
Daily News Bulletin, August 30, 1990, New York, p. 4.
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Jewish ethnicity were part of New York City's uniquely Jewish 
ambience in the United States.
Both the locale and the initial political alliance have 
given the New York City project a Jewish slant and a Jewish- 
American slant. In comparison, the museum under construction 
in Washington, D.C. is American, and more universal than 
Jewish. As Michael Berenbaum, project director for the
Washington museum, wrote: "The [Washington] Museum will take
what could have been the painful and parochial memories of a 
bereaved ethnic community [i.e., the Jews] and apply them to 
the most basic of American values. Located adjacent to the 
National Mall— surrounded by the Smithsonian Institution and 
the monuments to Lincoln, Jefferson, and Washington— the 
building and its contents are being designed with the 
neighbors in mind so that the Holocaust Museum will emerge as 
an American institution and will speak to the national 
saga. "11
Mayor Koch himself described the New York project as 
follows: "This is the Jewish Holocaust. The Museum in
Washington is not." He said there were no pressures from 
other groups to be included, and that the project was all 
privately funded.12 While there were some pressures, such 
as requests from gay, Polish, and Ukrainian groups, the New
11Michael Berenbaum, After Tragedy and Triumph. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 163.
12Interview with Edward I. Koch, New York, May 18, 1990.
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York Mutagon responded with minimal recognition, keeping the 
slant essentially Jewish. The Washington project, however, 
has as part of its political alliance representatives of such 
groups as Armenians and Ukrainians. From its inception, the 
interest group that President Carter named to create a museum 
was deliberately not composed entirely of Jews. Its more 
universal and more American way of remembering reflects the 
locale in the nation's capital (as opposed to New York City, 
acknowledged as the nation's Jewish capital), and the Federal 
government's involvement. (See Chapter 7 for details on the 
background of the Washington project.)
In addition to including other victims of the Nazis and 
other genocides, the Washington museum is portrayed from an 
American, not a Jewish, perspective. The U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum includes the following description in a 1991 
fund raising letter: "Your visit begins in the elevator
where you will be transported back to April 11, 1945— the
date American troops entered the Buchenwald concentration 
camp. (emphasis in original) An American liberator will 
appear on a video monitor and tell how what he saw that April 
afternoon changed the rest of his life." The letter begins: 
"Eisenhower knew that what he and his men saw in 1945 would 
be the only testimony many Americans would believe." The 
letter says the museum will be "A museum of American values", 
"a museum of American experiences", "a museum of American 
history", and "a museum of American people".
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It also says of the museum:
"It is a story of how 6,000,000 Jews and millions 
of other people were systematically and ruthlessly 
exterminated...a story of the evil that 400,000 American 
soldiers died fighting against 45 years ago.
"Though primarily a story about the extermination 
of the Jewish people, it is also about the persecution 
of all people regarded as different or vulnerable 
(emphasis in original)— of priests and patriots, Polish 
intellectuals and Soviet prisoners of war, homosexuals 
and the handicapped, and even innocent children."13 
The most simple but dramatic way to explain the 
differences in the "social construction of reality" and the 
"feedback model of consciousness" of the two museums is: for
the New York project, the first part of the sentence above 
would be emphasized, rather than the second phrase. To 
paraphrase, the New York museum is planned as primarily a 
story about the extermination of the Jewish people and the 
richness of their life before and afterward, but it is also, 
to a much lesser degree, about the persecution of all people 
regarded as different or vulnerable.
Beginning with the name itself, "A Living Memorial to 
the Holocaust-Museum of Jewish Heritage", the New York 
project's way of remembering is more Jewish. Rather than
13Letter of invitation to become charter supporter, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., 
Spring 1991 (undated).
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emphasizing American liberators of concentrations camps, its 
September 1991 news brochure, for example, focuses on: 
mementos of six Jewish-American families who migrated to 
America and "maintained their [Jewish] heritage and a sense 
of [Jewish] continuity in the midst of transition and 
change"; a traveling exhibit of Holocaust memorials; a 
gathering of hidden Jewish children during World War II; and 
rare film footage of pre-war Jewish life in Poland.
Berenbaum, who rationalizes the pluralism and 
universalism of the Washington museum, said: "A national
council funded at taxpayers7 expense to design a national 
memorial does not have the liberty to create an exclusively 
Jewish one in the restricted sense of the term, and most 
specifically with regard to audience. A purely Jewish museum 
is the task of the American Jewish community operating with 
private funding and without government subvention, as is the 
case with the New York Holocaust Memorial (appropriately 
titled 'The Museum of Jewish Heritage')."14
However, the New York museum (for which he omitted the 
first half of its name, "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust") 
is not being created by the "American Jewish community", as 
Berenbaum states. It is being created by a Mutagon, a 
political alliance that includes a government-created 
interest group, or Commission, of New York City and New York 
State Jews. This alliance also includes the City and State
uBerenbaum, p. 22.
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governments, and always had as its site government-owned land 
(like the Washington project). Despite government
involvement, the New York museum has a Jewish slant. This is 
because both the location and the original political alliance 
are more Jewish than the Washington project. As will be 
demonstrated, the Jewish mayor, initiator, and Founding 
Chairman of the Commission first shared power with, and then 
lost power to, a non-Jewish governor with national political 
aspirations. When the governor first became a retroactive 
Founding Co-chairman, the purpose of his involvement, as seen 
by his political liaisons to the Jewish community such as 
Sandy Frucher, was- to ingratiate him with the community. 
Therefore, Cuomo's appointments to the Commission, like 
Koch's, were from the Jewish community. Later in this 
process, however, the governor's office made an effort to 
minimize the Jewishness of the project.
While the "social construction of reality" and "feedback 
model of consciousness" theories are important tools for 
partially understanding the planned content of the New York 
Holocaust museum, they do not take into account the 
possibility of the imposition of a new "reality" or 
"consciousness" as a result of a changing political coalition 
over time. When Mayor Koch initiated the Holocaust memorial 
museum project in 1981, the Jewish leaders he chose to 
implement it expected to be able to make the content uniquely 
Jewish. Operating in ethnically Jewish New York City, with
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Koch's encouragement, they thought other elected officials 
would approve of a particularistic Jewish memorialization of 
the Holocaust.
When the proposed museum became City-State and the 
Mutagon changed, politics interfered and changed the 
"reality" or "consciousness". Berger and Luckmann's and 
Deutsch's theories do not account for such a situation, with 
a long-term project's political allies changing over time. 
After Governor Cuomo's political entrepreneur, Sandy Frucher, 
offered Battery Park City as a site, the governor became 
retroactive Founding Co-chairman of the Commission, equal to 
Koch. Frucher wore three hats: the governor's liaison to
the Commission, president of Battery Park City Authority 
(BPCA), and member of the Commission's executive committee. 
Because of his deep personal commitment to such a project, 
his idea that it was politically good for the governor, and 
his close personal friendship with the governor, Frucher was 
able to smooth over any differences the Commission and the 
governor's office had about the museum's particularistic 
Jewish way of remembering.
The museum lease, signed by BPCA, the governor, and 
Commission Co-chairmen on September 24, 1986, in itself
proves the museum was to be decidedly Jewish. It said: 
"'Business Days' shall mean any day which is not a Saturday, 
Sunday or a day observed as a holiday by either the State of 
New York or the federal government and, as long as New York
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Holocaust Memorial Commission, Inc. is the Tenant, the 
following Jewish holidays: Rosh Hashanah (both days), Yom
Kippur, Succoth (first two (2) days), Shmini Atzereth, 
Simchas Torah, Passover (first two (2) days and last two (2) 
days) and Shavuoth (both days).")15
Although such a definition of business days in the lease 
should have warned them, the governor and other members of 
his staff seemed to become aware only later that the scope of 
the planned museum was parochially Jewish. As was detailed 
in Chapter 13, the "Jewish" definition of "business days" in 
the 1986 lease later caused friction between the governor and 
the Commission. He sent another trusted old friend and 
confidant, his counselor Fabian Palomino, to try to "undo the 
damage" almost three years later. On June 28, 1989,
Palomino, who was chairman of the board of BPCA and also 
represented Governor Cuomo, met with the Commission. His 
purpose (i.e., his and the governor's) was to pressure the 
Commission to have the museum open on Saturdays and Jewish 
holidays. Co-chairman George Klein and others were polite 
but noncommittal to Palomino; after he left they made it 
clear among themselves that their by-laws gave them the right 
to close on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, and they were 




In October, 1986, the name of the museum (according to 
its provisional charter) officially became "The Museum of 
Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial to the Holocaust". At the 
end of November, however, the governor's office conveyed his 
displeasure (or that of his attorneys) with the name of the 
museum. The reasons for the complaint were not given in 
detail, but they were related to the emphasis on "Jewish 
Heritage" in the name. The governor's office was worried 
about the appearance of a possible Church and State conflict. 
Eventually, pressure from the governor's office forced the 
Commission to change the name of the museum to "A Living 
Memorial to the Holocaust— Museum of Jewish Heritage". (The 
name was changed by the Commission in November 1987, and made 
official in the provisional charter by the Regents of the 
University of the State of New York on April 22, 1988.)
Cuomo feared not only criticism from separation of 
Church and State advocates, but also requests for parcels of 
land from other religious groups (such as he received from 
the Catholic Diocese and St. John the Divine). He therefore 
tried to change the image of the museum and make it appear 
less Jewish, by changing the emphasis in the name. Being 
linked with a narrowly Jewish institution would be helpful 
with his Jewish voters in New York City and State (where Jews 
account for twenty percent of the Democratic primary), but 
Cuomo was then seriously considering running for President. 
He decided to please both his local and potential national
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electorates, by keeping the name but reversing it to minimize 
the Jewish component. The Commission, which knew it was now 
subject to the governor's wishes (because it had opted to 
build the museum in Battery Park City), accepted the change.
The new Memorandum of Understanding signed on July 26, 
1991 between BPCA, the museum and the Commission, brought 
other changes, with language that was quite different than 
that of the original 1986 lease. This, too, reflected the 
wishes of the governor's office and new BPCA president David 
Emil that the museum should not appear to be a religious,
i.e., a Jewish, institution. At this point, the original 
Founding Co-chairman, Koch, was completely out of the picture 
(although he retained his title). The Mutagon's shape had 
changed, and the new mayor, David Dinkins, had little or 
nothing to do with the project. The new "social construction 
of reality" and "feedback of consciousness" had changed with 
the change in the political polygon; the governor and BPCA 
were now in command of the situation.
According to the 1991 Memorandum, the museum to be 
established will be "an important cultural institution in the 
south residential neighborhood of Battery Park City, 
comprising a civic and cultural facility in furtherance of 
the public purposes the Authority was created to 
accomplish.1,16 In case the term "civic and cultural
16Memorandum of Understanding, Battery Park City 
Authority, New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, Inc., and 
A Living Memorial to the Holocaust: Museum of Jewish
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facility” is not sufficient to clarify that the museum is not 
a religious, i.e., a Jewish, institution, the Memorandum then 
spells it out in no uncertain terms: "The Building shall be
operated at all times during the term of the New Museum Lease 
in accordance with the then current requirements of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."17 The 
museum no longer has "no business days" defined as Jewish 
holidays and Saturdays, as in the 1986 lease. Instead, "The 
Museum shall be open to the general public for at least 240 
days per year."18 If the Commission chooses to close the 
museum on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, they may still do 
so. However, this religious aspect of the museum is not now 
documented in the new Memorandum, as it was in the old lease.
The following three new restrictions are even more 
telling, regarding the governor's concern about separation of 
Church and State:
"The Building shall not be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or in 
connection with any part of the program of a school or 
department of divinity for any religious denomination.
"The Museum shall not organize, sponsor, coordinate 
or supervise public or private, group or individual
Heritage, July 26, 1991, 
New York City, p. 2.
17Ibid., p. 7 .
18Ibid., p. 8
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prayer in the Building, and no portion of the Building 
shall be designated as a place for any such prayer.
"The Museum shall not require any person to observe 
or conform to the laws or customs of any religion or 
denomination as a condition to the use and enjoyment of 
the Building or any facilities located at the 
Building. "19
These three paragraphs are almost paranoid in their 
display of the fear that the museum will be a Jewish 
religious institution. From the inception of the current 
project in 1981, it had always been planned as a memorial 
project. A special space for remembering Hitler's victims 
was always included in the plan. If the museum provides such 
a special place for remembering those murdered in the 
Holocaust, is this considered a place for prayer?
In Jewish tradition remembering the dead is associated with 
prayer, and defining or separating the two is almost 
impossible. Only when the new architectural design for the 
scaled-down museum on half of Site 14 is ready and approved 
by BPCA will there be an answer to the question of whether a 
space for remembering is considered (according to BPCA) a 
space for praying.
Related to this is another question. The tradition of 
holding an annual Holocaust memorial ceremony in New York 
City began in 1944, even before World War II ended. On April
19Ibid. , p. 8.
19, 1944, the first anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto
Uprising, more than 30,000 Jews gathered on the steps of City 
Hall to hear Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and prominent Jewish 
leaders honor the memory of those who had died in the 
uprising.20 After the war, this evolved into an annual 
ceremony on Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day (the 27th 
day of the Hebrew month of Nissan ), sponsored by the Warsaw 
Ghetto Resistance Organization (WAGRO). Benjamin Meed, head 
of WAGRO and a member of the Commission's executive
committee, stressed for years that New York City needed an
appropriate site for such a ceremony (which has been held in 
various locations such as Temple Emanu-El, The Felt Forum of 
Madison Square Garden and the Javits Convention Center). 
From the inception of the New York City (later New York) 
Holocaust Memorial Commission, members of its executive 
committee assumed and informally discussed the idea that the 
annual ceremony would be held in or at the anticipated
Holocaust Memorial Museum. Yom HaShoah commemorations always 
include prayers, such' as Kaddish for the dead and the El 
Moleh Rahamim, the Jewish memorial prayer said at funerals. 
According to "the letter of the law" of the new Memorandum, 
it appears that Yom HaShoah commemorations will be 
prohibited.
20James E. Young, "Holocaust Memorials in America: The
Politics of Identity" in Survey of Jewish Affairs. Vol. 10, 
ed. by William Frankel, Basil Blackwell, London, 1991, p. 3 
of page proofs.
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The last paragraph quoted above is almost absurd. For 
example, there was always the provision for a restaurant or 
snack bar in all earlier museum floor plans, and it was 
always understood by the Commission's executive committee 
that only kosher food would be served. If the food is kosher 
in the new museum, does this mean the museum is requiring 
people to "observe or conform to the laws or customs of any 
religion or denomination as a condition to the use and 
enjoyment of the Building or any facilities located at the 
Building."? According to a strict interpretation, the answer 
would be affirmative, and perhaps the museum will thus be 
prevented from serving kosher food. Since eating kosher food 
for one snack or light meal should not be a problem for 
anyone, and eating non-kosher food is not possible for 
observant Jews (including some Holocaust survivors, 
Commission officers and members) who will visit the museum, 
this paragraph (at least in this interpretation) seems 
restrictive to a fault.
At this point it is impossible to further analyze the 
way of remembering in the forthcoming museum and how this 
will be affected by the Mutagon. New interior and exterior 
designs are yet to be developed. However, museum director 
David Altshuler said the original concept will stay the same, 
with these four main themes: "The World Before", "The
Holocaust", "The Aftermath", and "Renewal in America".
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SUMMARY
The particular way that a museum presents history is a 
reflection both of who is doing the remembering and where the 
remembrance is taking place. While the basic concept of the 
projected Holocaust memorial museum in New York City has 
remained the same for more than ten years, the Mutagon, the 
changing alliance of political forces behind creation of the 
museum, has had an effect on the museum's message and image. 
Since the inception of a Mayor's Task Force in 1981, this 
message and image have always had a particularistic Jewish 
slant. With the exception of elected officials designated 
because of their offices, all of the members of the original 
New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission were Jewish.
Berger and Luckmann's theory of "social construction of 
reality" analyzes how the historical reality created in a 
museum is a reflection of the museum's locale, and Deutsch's 
"feedback model of consciousness" theory addresses the effect 
of the political forces behind such a project. A combination 
of these two theories, which considers both where a museum is 
being created and who is doing that creating, is necessary 
for analyzing how the Mutagon has affected plans for the 
Holocaust museum in New York City. After Governor Cuomo 
joined the overtly Jewish Mayor Koch as a Founding Co-
Chairman of the Commission in 1986, the Mutagon changed. The
governor's legal experts then began questioning the
possibility of a separation of Church and State conflict for
this project (to be located on land granted by the State). 
This led to a name change for the museum, and ultimately to 
a new Memorandum of Understanding in July 1991, in which the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was 
invoked by BPCA. There may be more significant changes in 
concept in the forthcoming new interior design, to be 
completed some time in 1992.
413
PART THREE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AMD CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 15: THE MUTAGON AS A CONCEPT FOR ANALYZING POLITICAL
ALLIANCES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
"Once the Holocaust expanded beyond the private realm of 
Jewish memory and entered the public domain, it became 
subject to all of those forces that shape and reshape images 
in the public's consciousness and, by so doing, shape public 
memory itself." Alvin H. Rosenfeld1
This study has developed and utilized the so-called 
Mutagon concept to analyze the complicated and changing 
political coalition that has endeavored from 1981 through 
1991 to create a major Holocaust memorial museum in New York 
City. The Mutagon concept augments existing interest group 
theory, which does not adequately account for: 1. changes in
political coalitions over time during long-term projects; 2. 
the possibility of an interest group having to deal with both 
a governor and a mayor; 3. the conflicts of interest when 
elected officials are part of the interest group that deals 
with government.
The new concept for analyzing political coalitions on a 
state and local level, the Mutagon, was defined as follows: 
Government policy for a long-term city-state public-private 
project emerges from a changing polygon consisting of the 
interest group, the mayor, the governor, and other elected
1Alvin H. Rosenfeld, "The Holocaust in Jewish Memory and 
Public Memory", Dimensions: A Journal of Holocaust Studies.
Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1986, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith, New York.
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and appointed officials. Although the Mutagon is working for 
closure, it may instead create an impasse because of: 1. the
changes within this polygon that occur over time {especially 
when a new major player enters or an old major player 
leaves); 2. the top-heavy structure of a political alliance 
that at some stages has two heads; and 3. the complex 
relationship among the polygon's web of players.
Using this Mutagon, this study analyzed the political 
processes during the 45 year impasse in efforts to complete 
a major Holocaust memorial in New York City. The study first 
analyzed the pre-history of the current effort, i.e., earlier 
failed projects beginning in 1946. More specifically it 
analyzed the genesis and changing circumstances of the 
current project, which began in 1981 and continued into 1992. 
During its first ten years, the stages of the New York City 
project were: 1. the Mayor's Holocaust Memorial Task Force—
1981-1982; 2. the New York City Holocaust Memorial
Commission— 1982 through 1985; 3. the New York Holocaust
Memorial Commission— from early 1986 on; 4. an ultimate 
Memorandum of Understanding in July 1991, which gives the 
Commission one year to begin implementing the project or lose 
the opportunity to build in Battery Park City. The new 
Mutagon concept takes into account: l) . the shifts in
political alliances that occur over time; and 2). the top- 
heavy structure of a public-private project that involves 
both city and state governments.
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The study demonstrated that the ways in which the New 
York City and State governments intervened— from the 
conception of the idea for the latest memorial museum project 
in 1981 and throughout the attempted implementation stage—  
are extremely complex, with an intricate interplay of City 
and State government. The guestion of whether the Commission 
is private, State- and City-connected, or both, is also 
complex. This study analyzed how government intervention has 
changed over ten years, and how the changing structure of the 
combined interest group and government influences affected 
implementation of the project.
The Mutagon concept is necessary because literature on 
the structure of interest group-government alliances is 
limited, and dominated by iron triangle and issue network 
theories. As was detailed, both of these theories are 
generally applied to interest groups dealing on a Federal, 
rather than a state-city level. These iron triangle and 
issue network theories, therefore, are not adequate for 
analyzing the structure of the political forces behind the 
New York Holocaust memorial museum or any long-term public- 
private project involving both city and state governments. 
Not only do they deal with political coalitions on a Federal 
level, but they analyze a less complex and more stable 
polygon.
Hugh Heclo and Anthony King critiqued iron triangle 
theory, and instead developed an issue network theory. Heclo
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said that "the iron triangle concept is not so much wrong as 
it is disastrously incomplete.1,2 Likewise, issue network 
theory is not wrong but "disastrously incomplete" for 
analyzing a project such as the New York City Holocaust 
museum. Heclo defined an issue network as "a shared- 
knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as defined 
by the network, some problem) of public policy." According 
to Heclo, participants in issue networks are shifting, fluid 
and anonymous, unlike the iron triangle concept of a defined 
small circle which forms to promote specific narrow issues. 
An iron triangle is generally defined as a solid trilateral 
bond formed by the interest group, its advocates in Congress, 
and in the executive branch agency, with government policies 
emerging from this closed triangle. (Members of Congress 
pass favorable legislation, executive agency personnel 
implement these mandates, and interest groups support the 
helpful elected officials.)
As was shown, both the issue network and iron triangle 
theories are "disastrously incomplete" for analyzing the 
political alliance of the New York City project: it is much
more complex, has changed over ten years of impasse, and 
consists of two levels of government— city and state. The 
Mutagon polygon for the New York City Holocaust museum 
project consists or consisted of the former and present
2Hugh Heclo in The New American Political System edited 
by Anthony King, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 87-124.
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mayor, the governor, past and present Battery Park City 
Authority (BPCA) officials, and an interest group (which the 
government created). In addition to the interest group (the 
officially appointed New York City and then the New York 
Holocaust Memorial Commission) , other interested parties have 
included survivor organizations, heads of Jewish 
organizations, developers, administrative staff of the 
Commission and museum, architects and exhibit designers, and 
consultants. At some phases, the City Council, the Board of 
Estimate, the State Legislature, and the City Planning 
Commission were also involved to an extent. Furthermore, 
many of the players wore two hats, especially those who were 
both Commission members and government officials with whom 
the Commission was dealing. The Mutagon accounts for changes 
in a complex coalition over time, while the issue network and 
iron triangle theories do not.
As was demonstrated, during the ten years since the 
initiation of the Holocaust project Mutagon, the power of 
various members and components of the polygon has increased 
or diminished. In addition, new partners joined the 
coalition and others drifted away. The by-laws of the New 
York Holocaust Memorial Commission are flawed, because there 
is no provision for removing anyone. While no one was ever 
officially removed from office or membership, a few people 
have resigned (e.g., Ivan Boesky) and others have merely lost 
interest. So much time has gone by since the inception of
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the project that many government officials who were staunch 
advocates, the prime examples being Mayor Koch and Sandy 
Frucher of BPCA, are no longer in office.
At one phase beginning in 1986, the Mutagon polygon had 
two heads with power of appointment to the Commission— the 
mayor and the governor. The "Founding Co-chairmen", however, 
are not just the mayor and governor— they are a specific 
mayor— Koch, and a specific governor— Cuomo. After Mayor 
Koch, the original founder, lost the 1989 elections, he 
continued to retain his title, but the power shifted to the 
governor. Not knowing what title to give Koch's replacement, 
Mayor David Dinkins (who has shown little interest), the 
Commission decided to list his name on literature and 
stationery as "Mayor of the City of New York" and thus 
consider him an officer. Museum Director David Altshuler 
said that the governor who will replace Cuomo will be listed 
as "Governor of the State of New York", with Cuomo retaining 
his "Founding Co-chairman" title after he leaves office.
Using the Mutagon concept, it was possible to analyze 
the complex interrelationships within the political alliance 
creating the New York museum project. As was shown, this 
polygon includes: two executive branches (the mayor and the 
governor) BPCA, the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission 
(officially appointed by Koch and Cuomo), and others. The 
Commission has four Co-chairmen, one of whom, Peter Cohen, is 
only serving on paper. There were conflicts among the three
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active Co-chairmen, especially after one Co-Chairman, 
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, indicted 
another Co-chairman, New York State Senate Democratic Leader 
Manfred Ohrenstein. (Morgenthau dropped all remaining 
charges in September 1991.) The Co-chairman who has taken 
the lead and been most prominent is powerful real estate 
developer George Klein. Koch appointed Klein and Morgenthau 
in 1983; when Cuomo became Koch's "Founding Co-chairman in 
1986, he appointed Ohrenstein (and later appointed Cohen, who 
then lost his job at Shearson Lehman, and "disappeared" from 
the Commission).
The Mutagon was employed to analyze why there is still 
no major Holocaust memorial in New York City— which has been 
home for the largest Jewish and the largest Holocaust 
survivor populations in the United States. More than ten 
years after initiation of the current project, at the 
beginning of 1992, there was still not even a hole in the 
ground. In order to understand why the current project has 
been at such an impasse, the following issues were analyzed: 
the politics behind earlier and current attempts, how the 
issue of Holocaust memorialization was placed on United 
States and New York City governmental agendas, and the 
project's changing structure of players, allies, and 
processes.
Related events that preceded Koch's creation of a 
Holocaust Commission were reviewed to place the current
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project in historical perspective: the emergence of the
Jewish community as an interest group in the United States; 
the increased importance of memorialization of the Holocaust 
for the Jewish community; the many earlier attempts, 
beginning in 1946, to create a Holocaust memorial in New York 
City; and President Jimmy Carter's national initiative.
As was shown, earlier failed attempts to create a 
Holocaust memorial in New York City were begun by powerless 
individuals and small, disorganized interest groups, and 
failed partially because none of the mayors before Koch made 
the idea his own and aggressively led the effort. They all 
remained private endeavors, with different parcels of City 
land made available for various failed projects over the 
years. The pre-history of the current project can be 
summarized as follows: 1. The first attempt to create a
major Holocaust memorial in New York City began in 194 6, but 
a memorial was never a priority for the organized Jewish 
community until President Carter made the idea official 
government policy (after interest in the Holocaust emerged).
2. Israel has been the community's first priority, with 
rescue of Jews ranking second and related to the first, and 
this has made fund raising for a memorial difficult. 3. Fear 
of anti-Semitism and McCarthyism inhibited the community's 
support of early efforts. 4. Although the 1967 and 1973 wars 
in Israel raised Holocaust consciousness in the organized 
American Jewish community, this was directed toward giving
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money to help Israel, not to building a memorial. 5. 
Holocaust survivors were not influential in the Jewish 
community until about 1980. 6. A psychological healing time
was necessary before the issue of the Holocaust could be 
dealt with, and this may have affected earlier efforts to 
create a memorial. 7. No single individual (or group) with 
both money and influence took the lead for earlier projects. 
8. Because the issue of Holocaust memorialization was not 
major for the organized Jewish community until the mid-1970s, 
elected officials had no reason to give it priority before 
then. 9. Before 1978, neither the Federal nor the New York 
City government intervened and coopted the idea of creating 
a Holocaust memorial.
As was detailed, the situation changed, and around the 
mid-197 0s memorialization of the Holocaust gained increasing 
acceptance in the organized Jewish community. After this 
culminated with Carter's 1978 announcement of a national 
memorial, there was greater political advantage from a 
mayor's initiating a Holocaust memorial in New York City. 
Koch, encouraged by his political entrepreneur Herbert 
Rickman, then coopted the issue of Holocaust memorialization 
to gain more political favor in the Jewish community in New 
York City. In 1981 the mayor created his own narrow interest 
group, a Task Force and then a Memorial Commission, both to 
build a memorial and to strengthen his ties with the 
organized Jewish community in New York City. He chose to
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head this interest group his friend George Klein, a powerful 
real estate developer who was vice president of the Jewish 
Community Relations Council of New York.
The study examined the reasons why the project has been 
at an impasse, stemming from the unwieldy and changing 
structure of the Mutagon responsible for implementation, and 
the length of time the project has dragged on. Included 
were: changes in political alliances over time (e.g., new
elected and appointed officials); having at the helm (for 
much of the time) both the mayor and the governor; other 
priorities (especially fundraising crises) in the organized 
Jewish community; conflicts among the Commission members; the 
politics of site selection; and the personalization of the 
project by one major player (Klein). Although the idea of 
Holocaust memorialization increased in importance in the mid- 
1970s in the American Jewish community and remains central in 
the early 1990s, the Mutagon still was not able to 
successfully complete a project by the beginning of 1992. 
(An unrelated external reason for the delay in implementation 
was "Black Monday" on Wall Street, October 19, 1987, and the 
subsequent worsening economic conditions in New York City. 
The economic climate both dropped property values in Battery 
Park City and wiped out potential and actual donors, 
resulting in new decisions on the best way to fund the 
museum.)
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As was shown, the shape of the Mutagon changed most 
drastically when Koch's Commission became City-State in 1986, 
and Governor Cuomo joined him as a "Founding Co-chairman". 
The dissertation analyzed the negative effects of this 
Mutagon in its new form: the State government's trying to
influence the final outcome of the project, the governor's 
policies producing bureaucratic problems and delayed 
implementation, friction between the City and the State over 
the project, and the election and appointment of new State 
and City government officials disrupting the continuity of 
the project's implementation.
Besides these negative aspects, the study evaluated the 
positive effects of the mayor's, and later the governor's, 
intervention on the project in New York City. These included 
the gift of government resources such as land and money, and 
the indirect positive impact of the mayor's (and later the 
governor's) connection at some stages helping to overcome 
bureaucratic problems within the government.
In addition to going beyond iron triangle and issue 
network theories to add to the literature on the structure of 
interest group-government alliances, this Mutagon concept has 
also built on the established body of work on agenda setting 
and public policy, which are related to the structure of 
interest group politics. The study demonstrated how changes 
in the complex Mutagon coalition have affected both the
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agenda setting for and implementation of the museum project, 
and led to more than ten years of stagnation.
As was shown, on the surface the project seems as though 
it was destined for smooth sailing. Unlike earlier attempts 
in New York, the current project was placed on the agenda by 
the mayor, who then created the interest group, including 
developers and other supporters of Koch. Furthermore, 
President Carter's creation of the President's Commission on 
the Holocaust three years earlier had set a precedent and 
memorialization of the Holocaust had become a hot item for 
the major Jewish American organizations before 1981. By 1977 
various unconnected factors had come together to make 
commemorating the Holocaust a suitable issue for the agendas 
of American politicians: e.g., the 1967 Six Day War and the
197 3 Yom Kippur War had brought forth visions of another 
Holocaust; Menachem Begin, who was skillful at using the 
Holocaust for his own political ends, became Prime Minister 
of Israel in June, 1977; leaders of survivor organizations, 
feeling their mortality, began urging other survivors to 
share their memories; the television program Holocaust was 
the first major (fictionalized) network airing about the 
Holocaust in 1978; children of survivors became adults and 
began wondering about their parents' secretiveness about the 
past; secular American Jews who were politically disappointed 
with Israel were seeking a substitute secular tie to Judaism; 
in 1977 the United States Justice Department established a
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Special Litigation Unit to investigate and bring to trial 
Nazi war criminals living in the United States.
For these reasons, in John Kingdon's words, when Carter 
needed to court the Jewish community in 1978, the issue of 
the Holocaust "arose in the primeval soup". Kingdon's model 
for determining what gets on a government's agenda was used 
to analyze how a Holocaust project emerged on Carter's 
agenda, leading to Koch's creation of the New York City 
Commission. According to Kingdon, it is important to know 
what made the soil fertile, rather than the origin of the 
seed. His model has three streams— problem recognition, 
policy formulation and refinement, and politics— which must 
come together at a critical time, in order for an issue to 
suddenly "get hot".
As was detailed, Koch initiated the New York project 
when Rickman approached developer George Klein in the Spring 
of 1981 (an election year). Klein became chairman of a 
Mayor's Task Force, and that July twenty-eight other leaders 
of the Jewish community were named as members. In 1982 this 
Task Force recommended a permanent commission, and in 1983 
the mayor appointed the New York City Holocaust Memorial 
Commission. In 1986 Governor Cuomo became Founding Co- 
chairman, along with Koch, and the Mutagon changed its form. 
Cuomo appointed additional Commission members and Co- 
chairmen, and the name was changed to the New York Holocaust 
Memorial Commission. Cuomo had offered to house the museum
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in Battery Park City, which he controlled through BPCA, and 
he therefore became a powerful member of the Mutagon. When 
Koch left office at the end of December 1989, the structure 
of the Mutagon changed again, giving the governor more power. 
Koch retained his title, but became inactive. His absence 
after so prominently linking himself with the project, and 
Cuomo's shifting interest as he looked toward a possible 
national election for President, were analyzed as factors 
that impeded implementation.
The study analyzed how the original New York City 
Holocaust Memorial Commission gave Rickman, Koch, Klein and 
others the opportunity to use the issue of Holocaust 
memorialization to increase their potential influence in the 
organized Jewish community. They were able to both promote 
the idea and increase their power by being linked with the 
project and recommending or appointing members. After Koch 
gave the chairmanship to Klein, his rich long-time friend, 
Klein could then encourage other wealthy developers to be 
generous both to the Holocaust project and to Koch's mayoral 
campaign.
Robert Dahl's and Edward C. Banfield's theories of 
citizen participation were discussed as partial analyses of 
the "player" aspect of the Mutagon concept of government- 
interest group structure. While they— unlike iron triangle 
and issue network theories— analyze political alliances on a 
local level, they still do not account for changes in
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political alliances when projects are long-term; nor do they 
account for a mayor and governor sharing power. Unlike 
Dahl's and Banfield's analyses, the Mutagon is a changing 
construct. For the Holocaust project the polygon was two- 
headed during crucial years, with Governor Cuomo and Mayor 
Koch jointly in control.
In addition to interest group theory, this study also 
analyzed how Koch's and then Cuomo's intervention in efforts 
to create a Holocaust memorial museum, and the location of 
the project in New York City, give the museum's 
conceptualization a particular slant. It was demonstrated 
that, like interest group and citizen participation theories, 
theories of social construction of reality and political 
symbolism are useful but limited for analyzing the New York 
City Holocaust memorial project. Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann's theory of "social construction of reality" was 
discussed as a relevant analysis of how the historical 
reality created in a museum is a reflection of where the 
museum is located. Karl Deutsch's related "feedback model of 
consciousness" theory was also cited as relevant for an 
understanding of why history is remembered the way it is, or 
why a museum has a particular slant. Berger and Luckmann's 
and Deutsch's concepts are virtually the same: groups (such
as creators of memorials) select certain aspects of 
experience and attach symbols to them, which may distort the
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message being conveyed, to suit the preference of these 
groups.
Berger and Luckmann's and Deutsch's theories were 
combined to demonstrate that both the locale in New York City 
and the changing shape of the Mutagon polygon of political 
forces affected the conceptualization and evolution of the 
Holocaust museum project. The museum creators' viewpoint, or 
way of remembering, is influenced by the large organized 
Jewish population of nearly two million Jews, many of whom 
are prominent in "worlds" that make New York "move and 
shake".
However, it was shown that, unlike the Mutagon concept, 
"social construction of reality" and "feedback model of 
consciousness" theories do not take into account the 
possibility of the imposition of a new "reality" or 
"consciousness" as a result of a changing political 
coalition. In the case of the New York City project, first 
Mayor Koch opened the door by providing an opportunity to 
create a Holocaust memorial. Both he and the leaders he 
chose to carry out the task wanted the museum to have a 
decidedly Jewish slant. Later, once the proposed museum 
became City-State and the Mutagon changed its structure, 
politics interfered and changed the "reality" or 
"consciousness". Berger and Luckmann's and Deutsch's 
theories do not analyze such a situation.
As was shown, after Governor Cuomo offered Battery Park 
City as a site and became a Founding Co-chairman, he learned 
too late that the planned museum and exhibits were recounting 
history with a Jewish viewpoint. Because of possible 
criticism from separation of Church and State advocates (and 
requests for land from other religious groups), he tried to 
change the message of the "reality" of the museum. First he 
insisted that the name of the museum be changed, and "The 
Museum of Jewish Heritage-A Living Memorial to the Holocaust" 
thus became "A Living Memorial to the Holocaust-Museum of 
Jewish Heritage". His association with the project could 
help him please Jewish voters in New York City and State, but 
could be detrimental if he decided to run for President. 
Therefore he compromised, by keeping the name but reversing 
it to minimize the Jewish component. The governor's concerns 
about the Jewish message of the projected museum ultimately 
resulted in BPCA's invoking the First Amendment (i.e., 
separation of Church and State) in the 1991 Memorandum of 
Agreement between BPCA and the Holocaust Commission.
This study concluded that the Mutagon political 
alliance— which changes, is long-term, has a complex 
interconnection of players, and includes both state and city 
governments— was largely responsible for the ten year impasse 
in creating a Holocaust museum in New York City. To arrive 
at this conclusion, the following methodology was used: 
Interviews were conducted with members, staff and officers of
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the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, BPCA officials, 
leaders of earlier efforts to create major Holocaust 
memorials in New York City, initiators of the national 
project in Washington, museum directors at Yad VaShem in 
Jerusalem, and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, 
and experts on Holocaust history and the American Jewish 
community. (Unfortunately, none of the three active Co- 
chairmen ever responded to countless requests for 
interviews.) These broad-ranging interviews were aimed at 
understanding the pre-history of the current project and why 
it has not yet been implemented.
In addition to some 30 interviews, research was carried 
out in archives that included the Jewish Labor Bund, YIVO, 
the American Jewish Committee archives and library, the 
President Jimmy Carter Library, the Warsaw Ghetto Resistance 
Organization (WAGRO), the Jewish Community Relations Council 
(JCRC) , and the New York City Municipal Archives. An 
unpublished and richly detailed review of the first effort to 
erect a major Holocaust memorial in New York City (initiated 
in 1946-1947) was discovered in the YIVO archives and 
incorporated into this study. Likewise, original documents 
pinpointing the genesis of the Federal project in 1977, also 
unpublished, were found in the Jimmy Carter Library in 
Atlanta and used in the study. The Bund archive provided 
unpublished source material on one of the memorials planned 
for Riverside Park, and the WAGRO archives provided many
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important bits and pieces of original source material on the 
46 year history of failed efforts. Unfortunately, the old 
files of the JCRC were warehoused and inaccessible, and there 
were no data there on early history of the current project. 
This, however, was found in the Municipal Archives. Besides 
developing the Mutagon concept and building on interest group 
and related literature in political science, this study thus 
for the first time pulled together from various people and 
archives the entire history of attempts to create a major 
Holocaust memorial in New York City. It was necessary to put 
this history on the record in order to understand exactly how 
the current project emerged and began taking shape. As for 
information on the current project as it progressed, files, 
documents and other information were made available by the 
New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, BPCA, and the office 
of Senator Ohrenstein.
This study is an effort to move toward a broader 
understanding of government-interest group alliances. The 
Mutagon contributes to the body of literature on interest 
groups, citizen participation and political symbolism. As 
was demonstrated, this new concept is necessary to account 
for changing political coalitions during the course of long­
term projects that involve city and state governments and 
interest groups. It builds on earlier works on interest 
groups and citizen participation, but provides a broader and 
changing analytical framework. One of the most important
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conclusions to be stressed about political alliances is that 
for long-term projects, the shape of such alliances changes 
over time. The area of studies of long-term public-private 
city-state projects is very limited, and other case studies 
and empirical research should be carried out.
Regarding political symbolism, this study deals with how 
an interest group's project is affected by the political 
environment. The changes in the government's participation in 
the Mutagon at various stages, and the location of the 
project in New York City were analyzed as factors that affect 
the way the museum project was conceptualized and evolved. 
The plans for the museum's way of remembering history were 
shown to be influenced by both the changing political 
alliance and the locale of the project. Most studies of 
interest groups have focused on how the group influences the 
political climate in which it is operating, rather than the 
opposite. More studies are needed on how interest groups are 
affected by the political, social and cultural environment in 
which they are functioning, and this dissertation makes a 
contribution in this area.
This study developed and used a Mutagon to analyze the 
long-term and changing coalition of state, city and private 
political forces responsible for the latest effort to build 
a major Holocaust memorial museum in New York City. Even 
though the Holocaust has become a multimillion dollar 
industry in the United States, with a national memorial
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museum rising on the Mall in Washington, D.C., a national 
association of Holocaust centers, a national network of 
children of survivors, national gatherings of survivors, 
national academic conferences, courses in many universities, 
public school curriculums in some states and cities, hundreds 
of fiction and non-fiction books, movies, and television
programs, there is still no major Holocaust memorial in New
York City, the center of the organized Jewish community in 
the United States.
The first attempt to create a Holocaust memorial in New 
York City was remarkably early, in 1946-1947. Today an 
engraved stone remains in Riverside Park at 83rd Street. 
Placed there in October 1947 and intended as a cornerstone, 
it says: "This is the site for the American memorial to the
heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto battle April-May 194 3 and to the
6 million Jews of Europe martyred in the cause of human 
liberty." More than 45 years later this early effort and 
many later ones still have not produced a major Holocaust 
memorial in New York City.
After ten years of impasse, the Mutagon has in 1992 
another opportunity to finally break this impasse and create 
a museum in Battery Park City. BPCA and the governor, at 
this stage the most powerful players in the Mutagon, have 
imposed a July 1992 deadline for implementation to begin. 
The Commission's ability to raise the necessary private 
funding by this deadline will be the key factor. Otherwise,
they will have to request an extension of the deadline from 
their partners in the Mutagon, BPCA and the Governor. At 
this stage, the prospects for sufficient private funding by 
the deadline are doubtful, and the State's reaction cannot be 
predicted. Although the Mutagon's complicated and long-term 
characteristics led to an impasse, it might still be possible 
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